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ABSTRACT
The thesis discusses the determinants of economic 
cooperation and integration between Argentina and Brazil 
since 1939. The work is organised in three parts. Part I 
presents the theoretical framework. Drawing on international 
relations and development theory, it is suggested that 
perceptions on constraints and opportunities in the 
international system, along with the progress of 
industrialisation, shaped the incentives for cooperation. In 
addition, the role of ideas in shaping policies and 
institutions is emphasised. Special consideration is given 
to the ideas of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA), which were especially influential in the fifties.
Part II offers an account of economic cooperation and 
integration between 1939 and 1960. It is suggested that 
after 1955 there was a strong convergence of views in 
Argentina and Brazil about the advantages of bilateral 
cooperation. This was associated with the end of the 
'special relationship' Brazil-USA, growing friction in the 
Inter-American system and dissatisfaction with the working 
of the Bretton Woods institutions. In addition, structural 
change in the industry increased the costs of protection and 
the gains from trade. As a result, the proposal of a 
regional free trade area became more attractive.
Part III concerns itself with the evolution of 
cooperation after the creation of the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960. It is argued that LAFTA 
provided an outlet for industrial exports in a context 
largely dominated by highly inward-looking trade and 
industrialisation policies (import-substituting 
industrialisation). The gradual maturation of the industrial 
sector and growing industrial exports sustained the 
interest in the regional market. Finally, the creation of 
the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) is analyzed. The 
challenge of the consolidation of the MERCOSUR is discussed 
in the light of the new international context and the past 
experience on economic integration in Latin America.
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1INTRODUCTION
The project for Latin American economic integration was 
revived in the mid-eighties and impressive progress has been 
obtained since then. There is a sense of optimism which 
contrasts with negative views of previous attempts at 
integration. Past efforts for integration are now seen as an 
archaic legacy out of which Latin America is now emerging, 
in her quest for modernisation and a dynamic insertion in 
the international economy.
However, if it is politically convenient and sometimes 
necessary to stress the future rather than the past in order 
to encourage change l, an understanding of recent progress in 
regional integration would benefit from the adoption of an 
historical perspective. This thesis analyses the variables 
that shaped cooperation and integration in the 1939-1992 
period. These variables will be examined within a 
'evolutionary' framework that draws on recent theoretical 
contributions from development economics and international 
relations. There is a growing awareness among economists, 
political scientists and historians that institutions and 
ideas can provide a key missing link between the analytic 
precision of formal models and actual decision making in 
conditions of bounded rationality. These theories are 
reviewed in Part I which sets out the research hypotheses.
Part II studies the evolution of cooperation and
1 Cf. M.V. Benevides, '0 Governo Kubitschek: A Esperanga 
Como Fator de Desenvolvimento', in A. de Castro Gomes (org.), 0 
Brasil de JK (Rio de Janeiro, 1991), p. 21.
integration between Argentina and Brazil in the 1939-60
period. This period is significant as it witnessed the 
creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA), the first integration initiative that achieved some 
progress, after the failure of the initiatives of 1939-40
(Pinedo-Aranha) and 1953-54 (Per6n-Vargas). It should be
observed that the systematic study of the Argentine-
Brazilian economic relations in the 1939-60 period, and 
especially from 1939 to 1955, has been largely neglected in 
the existing literature. While there are important works on 
the political relations between Argentina and Brazil, and on 
the economic and political relations of both countries with 
the central economies, much less attention has so far been 
given to the role of economic and political factors in 
regional trade and to the frustrated attempts at integration 
launched before 1960. This thesis aims to make a 
contribution in this area. It will be argued that when 
closer attention is given to trade relations in the 1939-55 
period, a more qualified view of the role played by regional 
rivalry emerges, as both countries sought to cooperate in 
order to secure the gains from trade and this cushioned the 
impact of power competition and mutual suspicions. After 
1955, structural change in the domestic economy increased 
the gains from trade while the evolution of the 
international economy fostered convergent views of 
development in Argentina and Brazil. These factors would 
lead to closer cooperation and the creation of LAFTA in 
1960.
Part III considers the rise and fall of LAFTA, and its 
substitution by a new generation of bilateral agreements, 
which culminated with the formation of the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) in 1990. While changes in international 
conditions favoured divergent perceptions and unilateral 
development policies in Argentina and Brazil in the 1960-80 
period, it will be demonstrated that the 'maturation' of the 
industrial structure and the system of preferences provided 
by LAFTA reinforced an interest in cooperation among policy­
makers and entrepreneurs in both countries. New evidence is 
provided to show that LAFTA played a significant role in 
sustaining regional trade in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
feeling of failure that haunted LAFTA, stemming from its 
inability to progress towards a free trade area, should not 
obscure its contribution to the expansion of trade, the 
intensification of regional contacts and the accumulation of 
experience in trade negotiations. Additional evidence in 
favour of this argument is presented in the shape of an 
index of trade intensity. Finally, the factors underpinning 
the creation of the MERCOSUR are addressed and the prospects 
for progress considered in the light of the long term 
variables presented in previous chapters.
4PART I. ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION: THEORETICAL 
ASPECTS
5CHAPTER I. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC 
POLICY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to offer a general theoretical 
framework for the study of economic cooperation and 
integration. Section I concerns itself with the determinants 
of external economic policy. The recent debate on the role 
of structures, ideas and institutions in international 
relations theory is briefly reviewed in sub-section 1.1. It 
is suggested that the 'institutionalist' or 'modified 
structural' school of thought offers significant 
contributions to 'system-centred' analysis. In sub-section
1.2 the modified structural approach is expanded into an 
'evolutionary' model in which structures, institutions and 
performance/outcomes interact. The nature of these 
interactions is analyzed in section sub-section 1.3. The 
concepts of 'learning' and 'adaptation' are used to describe 
the links between structures and policy decisions.
Section II concerns itself with the structural 
variables that determine the costs and benefits of economic 
cooperation and integration in peripheral economies and 
particularly in Latin America. Sub-section II.1. discusses 
the conditions of the international system that can be 
expected to lead to higher levels of cooperation and
6integration. Sub-section II.2. addresses the influence of 
the domestic economic structure on integration. Sub-section
II.3 summarizes the conclusions of the chapter.
I. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK; AN ' EVOLUTIONARY' PERSPECTIVE
1.1. Structures. Actors and Institutions
A fruitful debate has been taking place in recent years 
in the theory of international relations. The debate 
addresses the role of structural and institutional variables 
in shaping foreign economic policy From one side, the 
system-centred or neo-realist approach suggests that state 
decisions and international outcomes can be derived from the 
structure of the international system, defined in terms of 
the distribution of economic and military capabilities 2. 
States are regarded as indivisible units capable of 
delivering an unique, rational response to systemic 
inducements. This offers a parsimonious, elegant framework 
in which the distribution of power determines specific
1 A review of different schools of thought in 
international relations can be found in R. Gilpin, The 
Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey,
1987), chapter 2 and J.G. Ikenberry et al, 'Introduction: 
Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy', 
in J.G. Ikenberry, D.A. Lake and M. Mastanduno (eds.), The 
State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca, 1988), 
pp. 3-7.
2 The system-centred approach is rigorously presented by 
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 1979) . 
See also I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System (London, 
1974) .
patterns of behaviour and change l. But other authors argue 
that system-centred approaches leave many relevant variables 
outside the scope of analysis. It has been observed that 
frequently states behave differently from ways predicted in 
system-centred analysis 2. The same systemic conditions can 
elicit different responses from national states 3. Systemic 
constraints and opportunities are therefore considered to be 
only a subset - although, clearly, a critical one - of the 
relevant explanatory variables in foreign economic policy. 
This has led to the search of a more encompassing 
theoretical framework for the study of international 
political economy. The so-called 'modified structural' 
school has sought to fill in the gaps left by the system-
1 From a neo-realist perspective, the structure of the 
international system can be defined on the basis of three 
elements: (i) the existence of "anarchy”, in the sense that 
in the international system there is no central authority 
with the power to coordinate state decisions and establish 
a hierarchy of states; (ii) the 'functional equivalence' of 
states, in the sense that all sates play similar functions; 
(iii) the specific distribution of power among the units 
that form the international system. As the first two 
elements are constant, it is the distribution of power that 
can explain differences in behaviour and outcomes. Cf. K. 
Waltz, 'Reductionist and Systemic Theories', in R. Keohane 
(ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York, 1986 a), pp. 
55-68.
2 Cf. R. Keohane, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of 
World Politics', in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its 
Critics. pp. 1-26.
3 This point is convincingly made by Katzenstein and 
supported by comparative studies on the foreign economic 
policy of industrial countries. Cf. P.J. Katzenstein, 
'Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and
Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy', in P.J. Katzenstein 
(ed.), Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies 
of Advanced Industrial States (Wisconsin, 1978), p. 4.
centred approach 1. This school accepts the premise that 
there are systemic constraints on actors' behaviour and that 
the position of the country in the international system 
largely shapes its policy options. However, the modified 
structural approach also reserves a significant place for 
(a) the role of institutions, (b) the role of ideas and (c) 
the role of 'non-state' actors in the international economy
2. In addition, this school also emphasizes the need of a 
more disaggregated level of analysis in the study of the 
relevant structural variables. These three dimensions of the 
modified structural approach are now considered.
1 The label "modified structuralism" was coined by S.D. 
Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes 
as Intervening Variables', in S.D. Krasner (ed.), 
International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983), p. 6. The modified 
structural approach has also been labelled 'neo-liberal 
institutionalism' by R. Keohane, International Institutions 
and State Power (Boulder, 1989), p. 10. Keohane uses this 
designation in order to emphasise the importance of 
political processes and human-created institutions in 
affecting behaviour. However, the term 'neo-liberal' has a 
specific meaning in economics which is different from that 
in international relations. Therefore, the term 'modified 
structuralism' will be used for the sake of precision. A 
pioneer discussion of the relations between institutions and 
systemic theory is offered by E.B. Haas, Bevond the Nation 
State: Functionalism and International Organisation 
(Stanford, 1964), especially pp. 62-86.
2 If the concern with ideas and institutions is not a 
new one among social scientists, only recently research in 
this field has attracted more attention from mainstream 
theorists. For an assessment of the revival of 
institutionalism and a comparison of the 'old' and 'new' 
institutionalist schools see J. Harris, J. Hunter and C.M. 
Lewis, 'Introduction: Development and Significance of New 
Institutional Economics', unpubl. paper, Conference on 
Public Choice and Development, University of London, London 
16-18 September 1993.
(a) The Role of Institutions
Uncertainty is inherent to systems in which there exist 
interdependence among actors' decisions and in which these 
decisions are not coordinated by any central mechanism. In 
this context, institutions emerge as an instrument to 
diminish uncertainty and provide a more controlled, stable 
and predictable pattern of behaviour. They shape 
interactions and facilitate decision-making *. Institutions 
are defined as 'persistent and connected sets of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, 
constrain activity and shape expectations' 2. In doing so, 
institutions help to reduce transactions costs and increase 
the production of public goods 3. In same cases, they are 
devised just to inhibit certain type of behaviour. For 
instance, rules may be designed so as to avoid the 
initiation of a trade war. In other cases, they consist of 
an elaborated framework that facilitates the celebration of 
agreements in several areas and establish positive norms of
1 In the words of D.C. North, 'The New Institutional 
Economics and Development', unpubl. paper, Conference on 
Public Choice and Development, University of London, London 
16-18 September 1993, p. 2, institutions 'impose constraints 
on human interaction in order to structure exchange'.
2 Cf. R. Keohane, International Institutions, p. 3.
3 Cf. R. Keohane, 'The Demand for International 
Regimes', in S.D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, pp. 
153-54.
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behaviour *. In general, institutions are deeply embedded in 
human transactions. Even systems that seem to work 
"spontaneously", like a perfect competitive market, are 
rooted in a set of elaborated institutional arrangements 2.
Clearly, institutions cannot be merely seen as a 
"technical" solution for managing interdependence and even 
less one that necessarily conforms to a certain criterium of 
optimum. Institutions reflect the distribution of power 
among actors and are value-laden, as has been convincingly 
argued by Susan Strange 3. They are the result of past 
negotiations in which power was exercised. They imply an 
asymmetrical distribution of the costs and benefits of 
interdependence. Institutions are deeply embedded in 
politics and it is in this light that they should be studied 
4. However, the relative autonomy of institutions does not 
allow to directly derive behaviour and outcomes from power. 
The mediation of institutions has to be considered for an
1 Cf. R. Keohane, 'The Demand for International 
Regimes', p. 155, and A.A. Stein, 'Coordination and 
Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in S.D. 
Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, p. 125.
2 Cf. G.M. Hodgson, Economics and Institutions: A 
manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics (Oxford, 
1988) , p. 174.
3 Cf. S. Strange, 'Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of 
Regime Analysis', in S.D. Krasner (ed.), International 
Regimes, p. 344, and S. Strange, States and Markets: An 
introduction to International Political Economy (London,
1988), p.22.
4 The argument has been developed by R.H. Bates, 'Social 
Dilemmas and Institutions: An Assessment of the New 
Institutionalism', unpubl. paper, Conference on Public 
Choice and Development, University of London, London 16-18 
September 1993, pp. 27-28.
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adequate understanding of decision-making in foreign 
economic policy.
This thesis concerns itself with a specific set of 
institutions, namely international regimes. Regimes are 
formally defined as 'principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures around which actor expectations converge 
in a given issue-area' in international relations l. 
International regimes set a framework for negotiations and 
for the formulation of policies in certain areas of the 
international economy, where they articulate the conflict of 
interests. As institutions, regimes have a close association 
with structural variables but also some degree of relative 
autonomy. Regimes appear as both a 'dependent' and an 
'intervening' variable between structures and outcomes in 
the international system 2. They reflect structures and at 
the same time exert a specific, relatively autonomous 
influence on actors' behaviour.
(b) The Role of Ideas
Actors' perceptions are a significant variable in 
shaping institutions and behaviour. Actors' bounded 
rationality is grounded on a specific set of theories and 
beliefs about how the real world functions. Interests are 
only intelligible in the light of actors' past experiences 
and theoretical ideas - even if those are not explicitly
1 Cf. S.D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes', p. 1.
2 Ibid., p. 359.
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articulated l. Therefore, understanding the evolution of 
relevant ideas and their diffusion among policy-makers is a 
necessary condition for understanding the formulation of 
external economic policy. This clearly challenges the 
assumption of 'instrumental rationality', implicit in the 
neo-realist approach 2.
(c) Relevant Actors in the International System
The modified structural approach emphasises that 
interactions are not confined solely to the level of 
national governments as in the system-centred approach. R. 
Keohane and J. Nye have distinguished between two different 
ways by which non-governmental actors can play a role in the 
international system 3. One is by means of their 
participation in domestic political coalitions that control 
or influence governmental policies. In this case, non­
1 E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley, 1989), p. 
12, points that 'power is normally used to translate 
knowledge-informed interests into policy and programs'. J. 
Nye, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', World Politics, vol. 
XL, no. 2 (1988), p. 239, observes that 'to say that states 
act in their self-interest is merely tautological (...) 
unless we have a reasonable account of how such interests 
are perceived and redefined'.
2 For a critique of the 'instrumental rationality' 
assumption see D.C. North, 'The New Institutional 
Economics', p. 2. This assumption implies that the rational 
behaviour of actors can be deduced from their contextual 
conditions as observed by the analyst. For an earlier 
critique see R. Nelson and S. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory 
of Economic Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), p. 63-71.
3 Cf. R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence 
(New York, 1989), p. xiii.
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governmental actors interact through the mediation of inter­
state or inter-governmental agencies. These are called 
'international interactions'. It should be observed that 
domestic politics may influence foreign policy in directions 
which cannot be directly deduced from the position of the 
country in the international system. Conversely, non­
governmental actors may bypass national governments and 
establish direct exchange with other governments or private 
actors. When interactions involve at least one non­
governmental actor it is spoken of 'transnational 
interactions'. The growing importance of transnational 
corporations, non-governmental organisations and the 
international flow of information have in effect qualified 
to a significant extent the capacity of states to determine 
the shape and nature of international relations. Even though 
the state remains a crucial protagonist of the international 
system, analysts have become increasingly attentive to 
reciprocal influences and 'bargaining networks' that develop 
outside the realm of traditional inter-state relations *.
(d) An Issue-Area Definition of Structures
Neorealism emphasizes the distribution of power as the 
critical structure in international relations. Structures 
are in turn defined in terms of the distribution of economic 
and military capabilities. These capabilities are assumed to 
be perfectly fungible so as to make up an unique, highly
1 Cf. S. Strange, States and Markets, p. 21.
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aggregated structure of power in international relations. 
However, a definition too aggregate of power tends to miss 
the fact that the relevant structures shaping actors' 
behaviour are specific to the issue-area under 
consideration. Modified structuralism emphasizes this 
specific nature of the relevant structural variables *. This 
school of thought argues that power resources cannot be 
easily transferred from one issue-area to another 2. Thus, it 
is necessary to adopt a more disaggregated level of analysis 
and to identify the relevant structures shaping policy 
decisions in a specific issue-area.
(e) Conclusions
The modified structural approach seeks to complement 
the system-centred one by making room for the role of 
institutions, a knowledge-based definition of interests and 
policies (ideas), a broader set of actors (including 
domestic political coalitions and transnational 
interactions) and an issue-specific definition of the 
relevant structures (disaggregated analysis). It should be 
emphasised, however, that this does not dismiss system- 
centred analysis. It is admitted that some general, useful 
insights on the behaviour of international actors can be
1 Cf. R. Keohane, International Institutions, pp. 53-59.
2 Ibid., pp. 56-57. For instance, despite of the key 
role that the USA plays in the security structure of the 
Western World, she has been unable to oblige Japan to adopt 
expansionary macroeconomic policies in order to reduce 
Japan's trade surplus.
15
obtained from the analysis of systemic constraints and 
opportunities. But these insights need to be subsequently 
enriched with other variables which mediate between 
structures and performances. In the following section, this 
approach to the study of the international political economy 
is more formally developed in terms of an evolutionary model 
of structural and institutional change.
1.2. An Evolutionary Model of Structural and Institutional 
Change
Models in international relations have been frequently 
inspired by the theory of oligopolistic competition and 
industrial organisation. These have offered an attractive 
metaphor and useful tools for the study of problems which 
involve uncertainty, incomplete information, transactions 
costs and multiple equilibria, within a setting of complex 
interdependence. In its simplest form, the modified 
structural approach can be compared to the conventional 
'structure - behaviour - performance' model in industrial 
organisation, as shown in figure 1:
Figure I. The Simple Modified Structural Model
Structural Variables =*• Regimes (Institutions) =* Outcomes
Source; S.D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in S.D.
Krasner, International Regimes (Itahaca, 1983), p.5.
This model can be made more specific if the links 
between structures and outcomes are more explicitly 
presented, as in figure 2. The inclusion of feed-back among 
the different variables permits to address policy change in 
the analysis.
Figure 2. The Expanded Evolutionary Model
Country's Position in the International System
4
Systemic Constraints and Opportunities
4
Ideas =>=*=>=> 4 <=<=<= <= Political Coalitions
4
Adaptation and Learning 
4
International Regime 
4
Outcomes
In the expanded model of figure 2, systemic variables 
define actors' constraints and opportunities and hence the 
boundaries of policy-making. Institutions contribute to 
define the actual policy followed within the sub-set of 
policies allowed by the structural context. Institutions 
reflect past negotiations, the knowledge-based preferences 
of actors and the domestic political alliances that 
influence foreign policy making. In turn, actors modify
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ideas and institutions as they analyze new pieces of 
information and the structural context is transformed *. An 
evolutionary path in the way described by Nelson and Winter 
and Axelrod then emerges from the feed-back between 
structures and institutions 2. This feed-back is the subject 
of the following section.
1.3. Learning. Adaptation and Regime Dynamics
(a) Adaptation and Learning
When the various feed-backs that shape the evolution of 
structures, ideas, regimes and outcomes are considered it is 
then necessary to study how they create tensions that 
stimulate change. More specifically, the question is how 
actors change their behaviour as a result of the signals
1 A similar proposal had been previously set forth by 
Ernst Haas in his quest of an 'useful' systemic theory. In 
Haas' words: '(A)ny system that specifies a number of 
components, in the context of transition, calling attention 
to the conduct of certain actors, systemic feed-backs on the 
actors, and actor feed-backs on the system, and manage to do 
so without being platidinous or tautological will have gone 
a long way towards satisfying our criterion of usefulness'. 
Cf. E. Haas, Bevond the Nation State, p. 62.
2 Cf. R. Nelson and S. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory, 
pp. 209-18 and R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New 
York, 1984), pp. 10-24. The term 'evolution' will not be 
used in this work in the sense of progress towards more 
efficient or perfect institutions. It just imply a process 
of change in successive time periods. For a critique of the 
'panglossian' use of the term evolution in biology and 
economics, see G.M. Hodgson, 'Evolution and Institutional
Change: On the Nature of Selection in Biology and
Economics', in U. Maki, B. Gustafsson and C. Knusden,
Rationality. Institutions and Economic Methodology (London,
1993), pp. 225-28.
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sent by evolving structures (which constrain behaviour) and 
outcomes (which provide information about actual 
consequences of previous decisions). Haas suggests that 
actors can react to changing external conditions through 
adaptation and learning 1 2. Learning implies a broad
reformulation of the consensual basis upon which a system 
works. This leads to a new shared perception of the nature 
of the problem and of the structure of the cause-effect 
relationships among the variables that the regime intends to 
affect or control. Adaptation, on the other hand, reflects 
a gradual increase in experience and understanding which 
does not involve a fully-fledged reformulation of problems 
and instruments 3. Adaptation can take place in two different 
settings. The first, labelled 'incremental growth', is based 
on the extension of the tasks handled by the international 
regime in a relatively stable environment, characterised by 
the convergence of actors' demands. The second, labelled 
'turbulent non-growth', is characterised by a weakening of 
coherence between means and ends, contradictory objectives 
and the weakening of the internal consensus that sustain the 
regime in a context of environmental instability.
1 Cf. E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, chapter 2. These 
concepts play the same role as the concepts of selection and 
learning used by Nelson and Winter, namely linking 
structural change and actors' decisions.
2 I am grateful to Jose R. Chiappim, who suggested me 
the idea of applying the concepts of adaptation and 
learning, originally developed by Haas for international 
organisations, to the study of the dynamics of international 
regimes.
3 Cf. E. Haas, When knowledge is Power, pp. 3-5.
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More formally, learning amounts to a change of regime 
through the reformulation of the principles and norms 
organising behaviour. Adaptation leads to changes within a 
certain regime through the reformulation of rules and 
decision making procedures. These concepts are defined as 
follows: 1
(i) principles are 'beliefs of facts, causation and 
rectitude';
(ii) norms refer to 'standards of behaviour defined in 
terms of general rights and obligations';
(iii) rules are 'more specific prescriptions and 
proscriptions regarding behaviour';
(iv) Decision-making procedures are 'the prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choices'.
This set of definitions goes from the general to the 
particular. A change of regime is associated with 
alterations in the general basis that informs actors' views 
and behaviour, namely learning. Changes within a regime are 
related to the more specific, detailed application of this 
basis, namely adaptation.
(b) Sources of Change
A change of regime can be provoked by external or 
internal pressure. Structures and outcomes can be reshaped 
by factors from outside the issue-area regulated by the
1 Cf. J.A. Finlayson and M.W. Zacher, 'The GATT and the 
Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and
Functions', in S.D. Krasner, International Regimes, p. 275.
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regime, prompting a re-negotiation of the current regime. 
Current regimes may no longer be compatible with 
developments in other areas and will have to adjust. In 
other cases, it is the very working of the regime that 
undermines its foundations. Regimes may lead to outcomes 
that challenge prevailing principles and norms. 
Contradiction among the various components of a regime may 
become apparent as the external environment changes *. In 
addition, the generation of new theoretical ideas may also 
represent a source of change if they become consensual 
knowledge among relevant actors. Changes in shared 
perspectives are very important in the formation and change 
of regimes 2. An increase in the actors' capacity to 
formulate problems and policies makes easier to establish a 
common basis for defining interests, to assess the impact of 
decisions and to conduct negotiations. In this process, 
'epistemic communities' offering new ideas can play a 
critical role.
The lack of a consensual basis for regime change may 
imply a discontinuity in the process of adjusting behaviour 
to changing structures. When the mismatch between expected 
and actual outcomes and/or between regime and power become 
too conspicuous, there will be a stimulus for a broad 
redefinition of policies. But if actors do not share a 
common perspective this stimulus for change may just lead
1 See on this point O.R. Young, 'Regime Dynamics: The 
Rise and Fall of International Regimes', in S.D. Krasner, 
International Regimes, pp. 107-110.
2 Cf. E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, pp. 20-28.
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turbulent non-growth or declination. Moreover, if the 
structure of incentives is such that dominant actors have a 
significant interest in preserving the regime in its 
original form, advances in knowledge may reinforce the 
intensity of conflict rather than contribute to a change of 
the regime l. In this case, links among institutions, 
structures and outcomes will be reasserted in the long term 
through the collapse or the regime or its progressive loss 
of ability to restrain behaviour in the international 
economy.
(c) Conclusions
In this section, the relationship between structural 
change and institutional change was defined in terms of 
learning and adaptation. These concepts describe the way in 
which actors change their behaviour as a result of 
structural change and of the influence of new ideas. 
Learning leads to a change in principles and norms, 
underpinning an international regime and hence to a change 
of regime. Adaptation leads to a change in rules and 
decision-making procedures and hence modifies behaviour 
within the same regime.
1 Cf. Ibid., p. 118. See also North, 'The New 
Institutional Economics', p. 8.
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1.4. Conclusions: A Restatement of the Problem
The objective of the theses is to study the 
determinants of economic cooperation between Argentina and 
Brazil in the period 1939-93. This can be restated as a set 
of questions framed in the theoretical approach presented 
above:
- which structural variables are associated with a 
change of regime, or more specifically, with a move towards 
regimes of higher cooperation and economic integration 
between the two countries;
- how has change in structural variables reshaped 
actors' patterns of behaviour - through learning and 
adaptation - and which has been the role of ideas in the 
move towards cooperation;
- which has been the influence of regimes, if any, on 
the actual patterns of bilateral trade?
The modified structural approach in its dynamic form 
provides an useful framework for the study of the evolution 
of cooperation. This framework will be applied to the 
economic relations between Argentina and Brazil in the past 
fifty years. But nothing has yet been said about which 
structural variables are relevant for the historical 
research. A set of more specific hypotheses linking 
structural and institutional variables is thus necessary. 
This is the subject of the following section.
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II. The Political economy of Economic Cooperation
II.1. Introduction
A group of countries can achieve different levels of 
cooperation in their effort to manage economic 
interdependence *. The exchange of information on economic 
policy is the simplest form of cooperation. Countries retain 
full sovereignty but uncertainty is reduced by facilitating 
the flow of information. In turn, higher levels of 
cooperation demand some degree of 'shared sovereignty', in 
the sense that countries assume a commitment not to adopt 
unilateral decisions in certain areas. This may adopt the 
form of preferential arrangements in which reciprocal 
imports are exempted from trade barriers 2. When preferences 
embrace most of bilateral trade a free trade area (FTA) 
results. When, in addition to trade liberalisation, 
countries accept to adopt a common external barrier vis-a- 
vis the rest of the world, a customs union (CU) is formed. 
A common market (CM) represents a still higher level of 
cooperation. Liberalisation is extended to factors of 
production which will cross borders freely in search of
1 Cf. Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Ensavos Sobre Coordinaci6n de Politicas 
Macroeconomicas (Santiago, 1992e), pp. 159-67.
2 Cf. J. De Melo et al, 'The New Regionalism: A Country 
Perspective', in J. De Melo and A. Panagariya, New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 
160-61.
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higher rewards. When countries forming a CM adopt a common 
currency then the agreement is an economic union. Finally, 
the adoption of common political authorities in an economic 
union brings about political union. Separate national 
sovereignty disappears as the countries now form a new 
single political entity l. In practice, these forms of 
cooperation do not appear in pure form. A combination of 
them is most frequently found in the real world. However, it 
is useful to retain the pure models in order to assess the 
political and economic costs and benefits associated with 
different forms of cooperation.
From the point of view of policy-makers, the political 
costs of cooperation are related to the loss of sovereignty 
that cooperation entails. Moving towards higher levels of 
cooperation means giving up the use of certain instruments 
and transferring decisions to supra-national bodies. 
Clearly, national states prefer to retain full control over 
economic policy, which provides them with flexibility to 
pursue internal and external goals. This will be 
particularly important in a context of mutual suspicion, 
namely when countries fear political or economic dominance 
or when they are rivals in the quest for an hegemonic 
position. In addition, some domestic groups will be hurt by 
trade liberalisation and will demand protection. If these
1 Cf. B. Balassa, 'Hacia Una Teoria de la Integracidn 
Economica', in M.S. Wyonczek, Inteoracion de la America 
Latina: Exoeriencias v Perspectivas (Mexico, 1964), pp. 7-8 
and El-Agraa, 'International Economic Integration', in D. 
Greenaway, Current Issues in International Trade: Theory and 
Policy (London, 1985), pp. 183-84.
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groups influence policy, cooperation can be limited. On the 
other hand, governments may accept sharing sovereignty if 
this helps them to achieve certain political and economic 
objectives, for example, higher rates of growth, higher 
levels of industrialisation *, macroeconomic stability 2 and 
a stronger position in international and domestic 
negotiations 3. The conditions that can tilt the balance 
either in favour or against cooperation will be briefly 
considered now 4.
II.2. Structural Variables: Constraints and Opportunities in 
the International Economy
(a) Integration and External Constraints on Growth
It is a well established point in standard economic 
theory that an open, multilateral trading system is the most 
favourable international environment for growth and trade 5.
1 Cf. C.A. Cooper and B.F. Massel, 'Towards a General 
Theory of Customs Union for Developing Countries', Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. LXIII, no. 5 (1965), pp. 461-76.
2 ECLAC, Ensavos. p.161.
3 Cf. J. de Melo et al (1992), 'The New Regionalism', p.
177.
4 The presentation that follows is only referred to 
cooperation and integration among periphery economies, that 
occupy a subordinated position within the international 
system. No references will thus be made to the determinants 
of cooperation among advanced industrial states.
5 Cf. J. Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: An 
Overview', in J. De Melo and J. Panagariya, New Dimensions 
in Regional Integration, p. 29.
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In such a context, free trade areas and customs unions in 
both developing and developed regions cannot find a proper 
justification However, in practice, the international 
context usually differs from this ideal. If A and B face 
barriers to the expansion of their exports to C, a regional 
trade agreement between A and B can lead to better outcomes 
than unilateral liberalisation 2. The gains from integration 
will be higher the greater the barriers in C against exports 
from A and B. If the total amount of imports from C does not 
fall after integration, economic integration will be 
unambiguously welfare-enhancing. External constraints on 
growth may also be associated with competitive asymmetries 
that prevent A or B from exporting to C. Technology-based 
trade models illustrate this type of constraint. A higher 
rate of technological innovation in C than the rate of
1 The place of economic integration in standard theory 
is in the realm of 'second-best' polices, only justifiable 
when the 'first best' cannot be applied for political or 
institutional reasons. See on this point W.M. Corden, 'The 
Normative Theory of International Trade', in R.W. Jones and 
P.B. Kenen, Handbook of International Economics , vol. I 
(North Holland, 1984), pp. 113-14. However, in two cases 
economic integration can be considered a fist best policy 
from an economic point of view. Firstly, when forming a 
customs union leads to an improvement in the terms of trade. 
In this case the 'small country' assumption of standard 
theory no longer applies. Secondly, when there exist 
external economies that are not limited to national 
boundaries and therefore unilateral polices cannot represent 
an appropriate response. Economic integration is then an 
adequate policy to produce these externalities. In both 
cases, as what is being maximised is joint-welfare, the 
willingness of the partners to reach distributive and 
compensatory agreements becomes crucial to the success of 
the union. Cf. El Agraa, 'International Economic 
Integration', pp. 205-6.
2 This point is formally demonstrated by de Melo et al, 
'The New Regionalism', pp. 168-69.
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technology diffusion in A and B, in association with 
increasing returns, may lead to recurrent external 
disequilibrium *. This will provide an incentive for A and B 
to grant each other preferences and restore equilibrium.
In sum, in an open, multilateral international economy 
incentives for regional integration will be reduced. 
Conversely, the further the actual system departs from this 
ideal type the higher the stimulus for integration will be. 
One of the hypotheses to be explored in the theses is that 
economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil increased 
with the perception that the international system imposed 
constraints on the rates of growth they could achieve. 
Conversely, when the international economy was seen as 
conducive for trade and growth, the incentive for 
cooperation decreased.
The perception of the existence of external constraints 
on growth can be reinforced by the presence of formal or 
informal trading blocs. Trading blocs imply a loss of 
bargaining power for countries that are not part of any of 
them. A fragmented international trade system then provides 
an incentive to establish new regional trade agreements 2. 
But it may happen that A or B can choose between forming a
1 Cf. for instance G. Amendola et al, 'The Dynamics of 
International Competitiveness', Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. 
vol. 129, no. 1 (1993), pp. 453-57. A similar argument 
(based on the social costs of idle resources) is proposed by 
R. Ffrench-Davis, "Distorciones del Mercado y Teoria de las 
Uniones Aduaneras", Integracion Econdmica. vol. 14, no. 142 
(1980), pp. 41-8.
2 Cf. Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism', p.
30.
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bloc or participating in an extra-regional bloc (C). If the 
externalities that A can obtain from integration with C are 
higher than with B, A will seek an alliance with C. A 
critical factor is therefore whether A and B share a common 
perspective on opportunities and constraints in the 
international system. It will be argued that divergent views 
hindered cooperation between Argentina and Brazil in certain 
periods. The nature of these countries' relationship with 
the USA played a large (but not exclusive) role in shaping 
views of opportunities and constraints in the international 
system. Another variable to be considered is the possibility 
of retaliation from countries that do not belong to the FTA 
or CU. Peripheral economies are particularly sensitive to 
pressure from centre countries, with which they usually have 
their most significant economic relations. The degree of 
tolerance of the international system to preferential 
arrangements and the international commitments regarding the 
principle of the most favoured nation clause affected 
Argentina and Brazil's disposition to closer cooperation.
II.3. Structural Variables; The Transformation of the 
Domestic Economy
In addition to international variables, domestic 
economic structures shape the political economy of economic 
cooperation and integration. Two set of variables are 
especially relevant: (a) the degree in which the economies 
are competitive or complementary; (b) the importance of
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increasing returns to scale and of intra-industry trade.
(a) Complementary and Competitive Domestic Structures
Economic complementarity between two countries favours 
cooperation because it enhances trade. But this is not 
enough for sustaining a process of economic integration. 
From a standard economics' point of view, the static effects 
of economic integration depend on the relative importance of 
trade creation and trade diversion *. Trade creation is the 
substitution of cheaper imports from members countries for 
more expensive local production and is therefore welfare- 
enhancing. Trade diversion is the substitution of cheaper 
imports from third countries by more expensive imports from 
member countries and therefore reduces welfare 2. If in 
balance trade creation outstrips trade diversion then 
economic integration increases welfare and can be considered 
a rational policy 3. The balance depends on certain features 
of the economic and trade structures. Trade creation is more 
likely to occur when (i) the economies of the member 
countries are more competitive; (ii) the initial barriers to 
trade are high; (iii) the final common barriers are low;
1 Cf. J. Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York, 
1950), pp. 45-48.
2 Cf. P. Robson, The Economics of International 
Integration (London, 3rd edition, 1987), chapter 2.
3 It has already been mentioned that the common external 
tariff of a CU can be set at a level in which trade 
diversion is avoided. If this condition is fulfilled, 
economic integration is always welfare-enhancing.
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(iv) the initial volume of trade relative to production in 
each country is small; and (v) the initial participation of 
custom union members in total trade is low l. Condition (i) 
suggests that economies highly specialised in primary 
production will benefit less from integration than economies 
that have achieved industrial diversification. Supply 
constraints limit the scope of competition and hence the 
gains from integration. Conditions (ii) and (iii) suggests 
that economies that industrialise under high trade barriers 
can obtain large benefits from integration if the FTA or CU 
adopts low external tariffs.
It will be argued that the progress of 
industrialisation in the forties and fifties created 
conditions similar to those defined in points (i) to (iii) 
above. Argentina and Brazil achieved industrial 
diversification behind high barriers and therefore (from a 
welfare point of view) a strong incentive existed to 
integrate the economies, as duly observed by contemporary 
analysts. But if gains from trade could be high, so was the 
resistance posed by those favoured by protection. The 
tension between gains from trade and vested interests was 
qualified by the subsequent diversification of exports and 
the increase of intra-industry trade in regional trade. This 
is analyzed in the following section.
1 Cf. T.A. Jaber, 'The Relevance of Traditional 
Integration Theory for Less Developed Countries', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 9, no. 3 (1970), pp. 261-64; S. 
Linder, Trade and Policy for Development (New York, 1967), 
p. 128; P. Robson, The Economics of International 
Integration, pp. 144-45.
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(b) Increasing Returns and Intra-Industry Trade
Gains from trade are higher in the presence of 
increasing returns 1 and this makes the case for cooperation 
and integration stronger 2. Moreover, when increasing returns 
are associated with product differentiation, intra-industry 
trade emerges and this carries key implications for the 
political economy of integration 3. Intra-industry trade 
qualifies the link between gains from trade and the
1 Increasing returns mean that productivity rises with 
the expansion of production. Increasing returns are related 
to static and dynamic economies of scale. Static economies 
of scale arise from the dilution of fixed costs in 
production and distribution and also from savings in the 
purchase of inputs. Dynamic increasing returns result from 
growing experience in production, research and investment. 
Cf. H. Helpman, 'Increasing Returns, Imperfect Markets and 
Trade Theory', in R.W. Jones and P.K. Kenen, Handbook of 
International Economics, vol. I, pp. 227-29.
2 J. De Melo et al, 'New Regionalism', pp. 170-71.
3 Intra-industry trade is the international exchange of 
goods that belong to the same industry, this defined at a 
certain level of statistical aggregation. Intra-industry 
trade is usually measured through the Grubel and LLoyd 
Index, defined as Bi = [(Xi + Mi) - |Xi + Mi|].100 / (Xi + 
Mi), where Xi are Mi are exports and imports of the sector 
i, respectively. The association between intra-industry 
trade, increasing return and product differentiation is 
discussed by D. Greenaway, 'Intra-Industry Trade, Intra-Firm 
Trade and European Integration: Evidence, Gains and Policy 
Aspects', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 26, no. 2 
(1987), p. 155. The presence of increasing returns boosts 
the gains from trade, while political incentives to 
liberalise depend on wether inter- or intra-industry trade 
prevails. When increasing returns are associated with 
product differentiation, intra-industry trade becomes more 
significant and higher gains from trade are compatible with 
less political friction.
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political cost of trade liberalisation *. The reallocation of 
factors will be less traumatic if trade leads to 
specialisation on different branches of the same industry 
rather than on different industries. It is easier to 
transfer labour and capital to activities that demand 
similar skills and technical capabilities 2. The greater the 
levels of intra-industry trade among a group of countries, 
the lesser the political resistance that economic 
integration will elicit from domestic interests.
Another implication of the type of adjustment to 
economic integration has to do with the concern of the 
military with regional hegemony. It is less likely that 
intra-industry trade changes relative power. Trade within 
the same industry implies that both countries will preserve
1 See, for example, P. Krugman, 'Trade in Differentiated 
products and the Political Economy of Trade Liberalisation', 
in J. Bhagwati, Import Competition and Response (Chicago, 
1982) , for valuable insights on the theory of trade 
liberalisation under imperfect competition. D. Greenaway and 
R. Hine, 'Intra-Industry Specialisation, Trade Expansion and 
Adjustment in the European Economic Space', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 29, no. 6 (1991), pp. 604-7,
offer a review of empirical research on intra-industry trade 
and costs of adjustment in Europe. D. Tussie, The Less 
Developed Countries and the World Trading System: A
Challenge to the GATT (London, 1987), provides a 
comprehensive account of the impact of intra-industry and 
inter-industry trade on the economic relations of peripheral 
and central economies.
2 The costs of adjustment in terms of frictional 
unemployment, retraining of labour and investment in new 
physical capital will be lower in the case of intra-industry 
trade. Theory indeed suggests that intra-industry trade does 
not depend on different intensities in the use of factors of 
production and therefore the impact of trade on factors' 
income should be reduced. Cf. W.M. Corden, 'Intra-Industry 
Trade and Factor Proportions Theory', in H. Giersch, On the 
Economics of Intra-Industrv Trade; Symposium 1978 (Tubingen,
1978) .
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production in this industry, although they will specialise 
on specific branches. For instance, producing either cars or 
trucks will not make difference for a country which is 
interested in preserving metal-mechanical production. 
Conversely, inter-industry trade may lead to the suppression 
of an industry envisaged as 'strategic' by power concerned 
actors in the government. If inter-industry trade 
predominates, opposition to liberalise trade will rise. In 
competing for hegemony, what matters are relative 
capabilities and power concerned actors will react to an 
imbalance in industrial capabilities *.
This argument can be presented through the concepts of 
sensitivity and vulnerability, suggested by Keohane and Nye
2. Sensitivity is defined as a situation in which unilateral 
decisions on trade taken by A can harm B. However, by 
adopting new policies and reallocating resources, B can 
overcome the consequences of a disruption of trade. 
Vulnerability, on the other hand, implies that B will not be 
able to replace the goods provided by A, except in the long 
term and at a heavy cost. Ceteris paribus, intra-industry 
trade leads to high sensitivity but low vulnerability. This 
occurs because if intra-industry trade is discontinued by A, 
it would be easier for B to transfer resources and produce 
the goods previously obtained from A. On the other hand,
1 The pioneer, classical work on the role of trade in
the pursuit of political power is A. Hirschman, National 
Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, 1945), 
especially pp. 17-33.
2 Cf. R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence
(New York, 1989), pp. 11-19.
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when trade is based on different industries, the adjustment 
to a fall in trade will be more difficult *. Inter-industry 
trade thus implies higher vulnerability. From the point of 
view of power competition, this is bound to create more 
concern than a situation of sensitivity .
The theses will argue that the implantation of the 
modern chemical and metal-mechanical industries in Argentina 
and Brazil by the late fifties entailed a qualitative change 
in the evolution of regional cooperation. Increasing returns 
then became a significant feature in industrial growth 2. 
From the late fifties the upgrading of industrial 
capabilities led to growing industrial exports and intra­
industry trade. A process of gradual 'maturation' of the 
industrial structure occurred, in which the scope for trade 
and inter-dependence was enlarged. Although slow and 
idiosyncratic, industrial learning reshaped regional trade 
in Latin America 3. Moreover, the pattern of industrial
1 It is assumed that it is difficult to transfer 
resources between industries and that no convenient 
alternative source of imports exists in the short term.
2 The importance acquired by increasing returns and 
intra-industry trade are associated with the higher capital 
and technological intensity displayed by the industries 
established by the spurt of new foreign investment from 
1955.
3 The idea of a gradual upgrading of industrial 
capabilities - following a somewhat idiosyncratic path 
associated with the specific conditions of the Latin 
American markets - emerged from a series of case studies on 
the export performance of Latin American firms from the mid­
seventies. See, in particular, J. Katz, 'From Infant 
Industry to Technology Exports: The Argentine Experience in 
the International Sale of Industrial Plants and Engineering 
Works', Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)-ECLAC, Working 
Paper no. 14 (1976) ; J.Katz and E. Ablin, Tecnoloaia v 
Exportaciones Industriales: Un An^lisis Microecondmico de la
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transformation converged in Argentina and Brazil and this 
enhanced common interests and perspectives. In this context, 
the gains from trade increased and political resistance was 
reduced (though clearly not eliminated). Industrial 
convergence and the diversification of exports played a 
relevant role in sustaining the interest in regional trade 
in the sixties and seventies, despite the less favourable 
conditions for integration that the international economy 
and regional rivalry posed in this period.
II.4. Conclusions
1. This section reviewed the literature on the 
structural variables shaping the political economy of
Exoeriencia Argentina Reciente (Buenos Aires, 1976); J. 
Tavares de Araujo, 'Mudanga Tecnoldgica e a Competitividade 
das Exportagoes Brasileiras de Manufaturados', Universidade 
Federal de Rio de Janeiro-Instituto de Economia Industrial, 
Texto para Discussao. no. 8 (1982); S. Teitel and F.C.
Sercovich, 'Exportacion de Tecnologia Latinoamericana', El 
Trimestre Econdmico. vol. LI, no. 204, pp. 811-41. The new 
competitive advantages of the Latin American firms also 
allowed them to invest in foreign countries, especially in 
other peripheral countries, a phenomena which attracted the 
attention of researchers in the early eighties. Cf. S. Lall 
et al, Les Multinationals Multinationals Oriainaires du 
Tiers Monde (Geneve: IRM/PUF, 1983) and L.T. Wells, Third 
World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Direct Investment 
From Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press). 
Empirical research was followed by an effort to rethink the 
theory of industrial exports from the region. For a review 
of this literature see F. Fransman, 'Conceptualising 
Technical Change in the Third World in the 1980s: An
Interpretative Survey', Journal of Development Studies, vol. 
21, no. 4 (1984), pp. 572-651; B. Herbert-Copley, 'Technical 
Change in Latin America Manufacturing Firms: Review and
Syntheses', World Development, vol. 18, no. 11 (1990), pp. 
1457-69; and L. Haguenauer, 'Competitividade: Uma Resenha da 
Bibliografia Recente Com Enfase no Caso Brasileiro', 
Pensamiento Iberoamericano. no. 17 (1990), pp. 327-336.
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cooperation and integration. At the international level, 
stimuli for integration arise when governments consider that, 
the international economy is moving away from the 
theoretical ideal of a multilateral, open trade system. 
Shared perceptions on the existence of external constraints 
on growth will trigger defensive responses and encourage 
cooperation. Conversely, the perception that the 
international system allows for sustained growth makes 
governments less keen to share sovereignty and they will 
therefore prefer flexibility. The move towards cooperation 
can be either reinforced by the formation of other trading 
blocs or curbed if retaliation by third countries is likely.
2. The diversification of the economy, industrial 
convergence and growing intra-industry trade boost the 
interest in regional cooperation. They imply more trade and 
(relatively) less resistance to integration from both, 
entrepreneurs and military concerned with the vulnerability 
that inter-industry trade provokes. Structural change in 
Argentina and Brazil since the late fifties created more 
favourable conditions for cooperation. The upgrading of 
industrial capabilities and the diversification of 
production and exports enhanced the role of increasing 
returns and intra-industry trade.
3. These hypotheses linking institutional and 
structural change give some guidance for the study of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. They will be 
tested and re-elaborated in the historical research 
presented in Part II. Still, the links between cooperation
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and structural change are mediated by ideas. It is thus 
necessary to previously review the ideas that have been 
influential in policy-making and economic integration in 
Latin America. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER II, EC LA AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION.
In chapter I it was suggested that actors' perceptions 
were a significant variable in shaping international 
regimes. The generation of new theoretical insights on 
certain problems can have a large influence on the design of 
policies and institutions. This chapter offers an account of 
the ideas associated with the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA), and in particular with its first Executive 
Secretary, the Argentine economist Radi Prebisch. ECLA 
proposals were very influential in Latin American economic 
integration in the late fifties. ECLA played the role that 
Haas attributes to 'epistemic communities' in international 
organisations !. It acted as a catalyst in the first wave of 
integration efforts. It was a source of technical 
capabilities (at that time, a very scarce resource in Latin 
America), studies and information on industrialisation and 
regional trade.
In particular, ECLA's centre - periphery conception 
succeeded in setting up a new articulated framework to study 
the specific problems of industrial development in backward 
countries. Within this approach, proposals for regional 
integration became coherent and gained more support from
1 Cf. E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, pp. 40-46.
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policy-makers. However, some observers attribute to ECLA 
ideas a negative influence on Latin American development for 
being 'inward-looking' and biased against international 
trade. This chapter argues that this perception is invalid 
and that there is little evidence to support it in the major 
theoretical works of ECLA. Clearly, indiscriminate 
protection in Latin America had a negative influence on 
industrial efficiency and economic integration *• But it is 
incorrect to attribute to ECLA the responsibility for these 
policies. The analysis of ECLA ideas in this chapter will 
permit a clearer distinction between the role of ideas and 
the role of structural and political constraints on policy­
making.
Finally, ECLA ideas are revisited in the light of more 
recent theories of international trade, growth and public 
goods in the international system. It is suggested that 
these theories offer some support to early ECLA concerns and 
allows for a clearer identification of the problems at stake 
in international negotiations than conventional trade 
theory.
1 Industrial and trade policies in the period are 
briefly reviewed in Part II.
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I. THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY THEORY
1.1. Centre and Periphery
In the late forties RaCil Prebisch presented his 
classical work about the international insertion of Latin 
America and the specific characteristics assumed by 
industrialisation in the Periphery *. This and other works 
associated with ECLA (subsequently the Economic Commission 
for Latin American and the Caribbean, ECLAC) would come to 
have an enduring influence on Latin American economic 
thought and on development economics. The key concern of the
1 The reader can consult the vast literature produced by 
ECLA and Prebisch himself. The 1949 Prebisch's 'manifesto' 
is a significant hallmark in the development of the centre - 
periphery theory. The 'manifesto' is reprinted in R. 
Prebisch, 'The Economic Development of Latin America and its 
Principal Problems', Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
vol. VII, no. 1 (1962), pp. 1-51. Prebisch further developed 
his ideas in subsequent works. See in particular R. 
Prebisch, International Cooperation in Latin American 
Development Policy (New York, 1954) ; R. Prebisch, 
'Desarrollo Economico, Planeamiento y Cooperacidn 
Internacional', in ECLA, En Torno a las Ideas de la CEPAL: 
Problemas de la Industrializacion en America Latina 
(Santiago, 1977) . ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America 
(Santiago, 1949), especially part I, pp. 3-85, remains a 
classical early presentation of the theory. In a late work, 
R. Prebisch, 'Notes on Trade From the Standpoint of the 
Periphery', CEPAL Review, no. 28 (April 1986), pp. 203-14, 
summarised with clarity many of the basic tenets of the 
original contributions. A penetrating account of the 
beginnings of ECLA and the Centre - Periphery theory can be 
found in C. Furtado, A Fantasia Oraanizada (Rio de Janeiro, 
1985). 0. Rodriguez, La Teoria del Subdesarrollo de la CEPAL 
(Mexico, 1981) offers a highly rigorous presentation of ECLA 
development theory. This section draws largely on 
Rodriguez's work. R. Bielschkowsky, Pensamento Econdmico 
Brasileiro: O Ciclo Ideoloaico do Desenvolvimentismo (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1988) analyzes in detail the impact of ECLA ideas 
on the Brazilian debate on economic development in the 
forties and fifties.
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theory is with the characteristics assumed by the diffusion 
of technology in centre and periphery countries. Economic 
development in the periphery is regarded as 'one more stage 
in the worldwide spread of new forms of productive 
techniques' *. Yet development adopts different forms in 
centre and periphery out of the specific features that 
singularise their economic structures. That of the periphery 
is specialised in primary production and heterogeneous - in 
the sense that comprises sectors with contrasting labour 
productivity, as technical progress is confined to the 
export sector. Conversely, the economic structure of the 
centre is diversified and homogeneous, i.e.. more uniformly 
permeated by technical change. These differences had their 
origin in an earlier start of industrialisation in the 
centre. The structural features of both types of economies 
were forged during the period of 'outward-looking growth' 
('crecimiento hacia afueraM . and to a large extent 
reproduced during the period of 'inward-looking growth' 
('crecimiento hacia adentroM in the periphery. Centre and 
periphery were thus two poles of a system that dynamically 
tended to recreate, in relative terms, the original 
asymmetry. This implies that technical progress and 
productivity growth in the periphery will recurrently lag 
behind the centre. The different characteristics of the 
economic structures of centre and periphery generate three 
basic trends which are specific to periphery: (a) the
tendency towards external imbalance; (b) the tendency
1 Cf. ECLA, Economic Survey, p. 3.
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towards structural unemployment; (c) the tendency towards 
the deterioration of the terms of trade.
(a) External imbalance. The existence of a structural 
tendency towards external disequilibrium is attached to 
differing demand elasticities for primary and industrial 
products and to the effects of technical change upon the 
demand for primary products. First, as income increases, 
demand for industrial goods grows faster than that for 
primary goods. Secondly, technical change in the centre 
increasingly substitutes industrial for primary goods. As a 
result, growth in the periphery expands imports from the 
centre at higher rates than the centre expands its imports 
of peripheral products. This imbalance places a limit to 
economic growth in the periphery, which is proportional to 
the difference in the elasticity of demand for primary and 
industrial products - or between peripheral exports and 
imports.
(b) Structural unemployment, A set of distinctive 
features are suggested to be found in the periphery that are 
responsible for the tendency towards structural 
unemployment: (i) the large reserves of labour available in 
low-productivity activities; (ii) the use of capital- 
intensive technologies, that reduces demand for labour and 
leads to technological unemployment, particularly in 
backward agricultural sectors; (iii) the feeble capacity to 
save and invest (see also sub-section c).
(c) Terms of trade. The divergent effects of the 
diffusion of technical change in centre and periphery leads
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to the erosion of the peripheral terms of trade. 
Productivity increases in the centre are not entirely 
translated into lower prices. This is explained by (i) the 
competition process, based on product differentiation and 
not in lower prices and (ii) the power of labour unions 
which capture a share of the gains from technical change. 
Thus, the fruits of technical progress are retained in the 
centre as oligopoly rents and/or higher wages. Conversely, 
these mechanisms are not present in the periphery. Technical 
change in the primary sector expands production but as this 
faces an inelastic demand then prices fall. Moreover, as 
workers displaced by technical progress in the primary 
sector cannot find employment in the industry (given, as 
mentioned, the specialised economic structure of the 
periphery), wages fall as well and so do prices. Therefore, 
neither oligopoly rents nor higher wages sustain the price 
of primary goods and thereby contribute to retain the fruits 
of technical progress in the periphery *.
The deterioration of the terms of trade is suggested to 
occur during different phases of international economic 
cycles. In periods of recession the price of periphery goods 
will fall more than that of industrial goods. In periods of
1 ECLA's conclusions reverse those suggested by David 
Ricardo. This author expected an improvement in the terms of 
trade for the agricultural sector as the expansion of 
industrial demand would lead to cultivate less fertile land, 
thereby raising the price of agriculture goods. The 
hypotheses that the terms of trade for the periphery 
deteriorated in the long term gave rise to a complex 
empirical debate. Cf. J. Spraos, 'The Statistical Debate on 
the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities 
and Manufactures', Economic Journal, vol. XL, no. 1 (1980), 
pp. 107-28.
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international expansion the price of periphery goods will 
increase without achieving its former levels. This shapes a 
long-term trend in which at the end of each successive cycle 
the structure of relative prices has moved against the 
periphery.
1.2. Investment and Growth
ECLA identified a set of forces constraining capital 
accumulation and growth in the periphery. Some of them are 
related to the tendencies already mentioned. If exports are 
bound to increase at slower rates than imports, external 
bottlenecks set a limit to economic growth. In turn, the 
deterioration of the terms of trade reduces the surplus 
available for investment. These factors are compounded by 
payments of royalties, technology and interests to the 
centre, which further contracts the investible surplus *. Yet 
surplus losses are not confined only to the external sector. 
Income distribution is heavily concentrated in the periphery 
and this induces a premature imitation of the patterns of 
consumption of the centre. Funds are thus diverted from 
investment, the domestic market is contracted and effective 
demand channelled towards expensive imported goods 2.
Problems of insufficient accumulation are aggravated by 
the use of capital-intensive technologies. While the
1 See Prebisch, 'Notes on Trade', p. 205.
2 This point is already made by Prebisch in the 1949 
'manifesto'. See R. Prebisch, 'The Economic Development of 
Latin America', p. 7.
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development of these technologies accompanied the gradual 
growth of incomes and savings in the centre, the periphery 
had to adopt them in a much shorter period of time, mobilise 
resources out of smaller income levels, and use large scale 
technologies to serve reduced internal markets. Hence, 
financial constraints are particularly stringent for 
industrial investment in the periphery. This factor 
reinforces the negative consequences of the misallocation of 
resources in the process of capital accumulation.
1.3. Policy Implications; Industrialisation and 
Planning
Industrialisation emerges as the core strategy to 
spread technology and retain the fruits of technical 
progress in the Periphery. Only industry can internalise the 
stimulus for growth and provide employment for the labour 
force released from the agricultural sector and thereby 
prevent the deterioration of the terms of trade !. In turn, 
the existence of marked differences in productivity levels 
with respect to the centre makes protection a necessary
1 ECLA, The Latin American Common Market (New York, 
1959) , p. 9, observes that 'first and foremost it should be 
recalled that, from the standpoint of the labour force, 
industry, like other urban activities, has the dynamic 
function of absorbing the manpower which technical progress 
releases from agriculture and other primary activities, from 
artisan industries and from pre-capitalist occupations with 
very low productivity'.
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condition for industrial growth in the periphery l. 
Alternative policies, like the reduction of wages and 
devaluations, are not supported by ECLA. Besides its social 
and political implications, ECLA points out that falling 
wages will bring about a fall in the terms of trade by 
reducing the price of exports 2. Protection is thus seen as 
more adequate to promote industrial growth in the periphery.
Moreover, planning is deemed necessary to assure steady 
growth in the industry. There is an ideal pattern of 
reference to which industrialisation should conform in order 
to avoid domestic and external disequilibrium 3. In this 
pattern, the rates of investment and growth in different 
sectors (export and imports, agriculture and industry) and 
in different industrial branches (capital, intermediate and 
consumer goods) should keep a certain technical 
proportionality. Otherwise, industrial growth would be 
hindered. The role of planning is to channel investment so 
as to conform to this pattern of balanced growth 4.
1 In Prebisch's words: 'the principal justification for 
protection lays on the differences in productivity between 
the centre and periphery. These differences are basically 
explained by the great disparity of capital per worker and 
technical capabilities'. Cf. Prebisch, International 
Cooperation, p. 16.
2 Ibid., p. 16.
3 Cf. 0. Rodriguez, La Teoria del Subdesarrollo. p. 
271. A significant contribution to this argument was made by 
R. Nurkse, Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1961), especially pp. 241-258, who 
proposed a strategy of 'balanced growth'.
4 Cf. ECLA, 'Desarrollo Economico, Planeamiento', p. 35.
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While highlighting the role of the state in periphery 
industrialisation, ECLA gave little attention to the study 
of the state itself and to whether the institutional 
capabilities and the political will required by the 
ambitious ECLA programme were in place. In the early sixties 
ECLA became increasingly involved in the promotion of social 
and economic reform in Latin America, a move away from the 
industrialist emphases of the fifties. This revealed a 
concern by ECLA in more directly assessing the so called 
'structural obstacles' to development *. However, the change 
in the political climate with the rise of military 
governments in Argentina and Brazil and the heyday of 
counter-insurgency 2 would lead to the steady loss of 
influence of ECLA ideas and the reverse of the timid efforts 
at economic and political reform. Concurrently, ECLA was 
challenged in the theoretical field as well, and lost its 
intellectual appeal. Criticisms took shape in both 
dependency and neoclassical theories. While dependency 
gained momentum in the sixties by placing politics in the 
centre of the development debate 3, neoclassical critics
1 Cf. 0. Rodriguez, La Teoria del Subdesarrollo. p. 280.
2 At the beginning of the sixties, the idea of planning 
and the emphases on the solution of social problems 
benefited from the support received by the Alliance for 
Progress and by the fact that democratic governments were 
still in power. But these objectives were set aside in the 
second half of the sixties as the Cold War strategy 
predominated and the military governments sought legitimacy 
in rapid growth. Cf. J.S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United 
States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston, 1990), p. 123.
3 To a certain extent, dependency was an outgrowth of 
ECLA. The work of F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Deoendencia 
v Desarrollo en America Latina (Mexico, 1967), was written
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offered a more articulated challenge in economics by 
pointing out the distortions generated by interventionist 
policies l. By the mid-sixties ECLA no longer offered a bases 
for 'shared knowledge' to Latin American tecnicos nor did it 
play an active role in shaping policy-making.
1.4. Export pessimism. Import Substitution and The 
Political Economy of International Trade
ECLA's basic objective was industrialisation and this 
could be attained through import substitution or the 
diversification of exports. Both alternatives are compatible 
with ECLA theory 2. This view can be easily found in ECLA
in the early sixties with a view to providing political 
content to ECLA periodisation of Latin American development. 
Cf. F.H. Cardoso, 'The Originality of the Copy: CEPAL and 
the Idea of Development', Ceoal Review, no. 4 (1977), pp. 7- 
41. But dependency literature quickly moved to challenge the 
idea that the periphery could develop within the 
international capitalist system. Thereby, dependency 
challenged the reformist hopes of ECLA. For an analysis of 
the dependency debate, see G. Palma, 'Dependency: A Formal 
Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis 
of Concrete Situations of Dependency', World Development, 
vol. 6, no. 7-8 (1978), pp. 881-924.
1 Cf. I.M.D. Little, Economic Development: Theory. 
Policies and International Relations (New York, 1982), and 
J. Bhagwati, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1978). Although many of ECLA ideas are 
somehow now incorporated to the new mainstream theories of 
trade and growth (see section III), these 'new wave' of 
economic thinking arrived when the influence of ECLA in 
Latin America had been buried a long time ago.
2 Norberto Gonz&lez observed that in ECLA formative 
years the term 'import-substitution' was in fact used as an 
euphemism for industrialisation, since the deliberate 
promotion of industry faced strong opposition at that time. 
Industrialisation, and not import substitution, was the core 
of ECLA ideas. Cf. Norberto Gonzalez, former Executive 
Secretary of ECLA, interview, Buenos Aires, 27 October 1993.
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works *. ECLA acknowledged that import-substitution implied 
a cost in terms of efficiency and that this policy was only 
justifiable to the extent that exports could not be expanded
2. Efforts to expand industrial exports were preferable to 
import-substitution 3. However, ECLA and other authors 4 
adopted a rather pessimistic view regarding opportunities 
for Latin American exports in the post-war period. ECLA 
assumed that trade could no longer represent the 'engine of
It is interesting to recall how Prebisch (1961), 
'Desarrollo Econdmico, Planeamiento', p. 5, criticised 
indiscriminate protection: '(T)he need for import
substitution and, consequently, for the protection of 
substitutive activities, has been unavoidable. But there has 
been a failure to boost exports to the same extent. There 
has been a discrimination in favour of industrial 
substitution and against exports, particularly the 
industrial ones. The ideal policy would have been to promote 
exports in order to place them on an equal footing with 
substitution activities' (author's translation).
2 Cf. R. Prebisch, International Cooperation, pp. 20-22.
3 Prebisch called attention to the fact that industrial 
exports could sustain growth at a much lower cost in terms 
of public support than import substitution. Cf. R. Prebisch, 
'Desarrollo Econdmico, Planeamiento', p. 28. In a similar 
vein, ECLA, The Latin American Common Market, p. 9, 
observes that 'given a specific rate of economic growth in 
Latin America, the development of industrial exports would 
reduce the scale on which import-substitution had to be 
promoted'.
4 Cf., for example, R. Nurkse, Equilibrium and Growth in 
the World Economy, pp. 304-24. In promoting development in 
Latin America, Prebisch, 'The Economic Development of Latin 
America', p. 50, observed that 'the most obvious possibility 
would have been to increase export earnings. The difficulty 
was that, in each period, the total sales of primary 
products depended on the needs of the industrial countries 
(and) discrimination by France and the UK in favour of 
suppliers in the franc and sterling areas, together with the 
heavy subsidies and protection given by the industrial 
countries to their own primary producers limited what could 
be done in this respect.'
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growth' that it had represented in the past. This was 
related to the change of principal cyclical centre of the 
international economy in the inter-war period, with the rise 
of the United States of America (USA) and the decline of the 
United Kingdom (UK). As the USA displayed a more reduced 
import coefficient than the UK, it was suggested that she 
would not be able to impart enough dynamism to the rest of 
the world. Stimulus to growth coming from higher exports by 
the centre would be retransmitted to the Periphery with a 
too large temporal lag, straining the international trade 
and payments system l. This, in combination with the lack of 
external financing for Latin America 2, implied that little 
stimulus for growth would come from the international 
economy. These negative trends had imposed, as a matter of 
facts rather than options, import-substituting policies in 
order to sustain high rates of growth in the periphery.
Clearly, the assessment of the prospects of 
international trade in the late forties and fifties proved 
not to be valid for the sixties. However, this does not 
represent an anti-trade bias implicit in ECLA theory. A 
virtuous link with centre technology, investments and 
markets was regarded as a fundamental factor in peripheral 
development. But for ECLA this convergence of interests was 
not spontaneous. ECLA understood that international trade 
involved complex issues of political economy as the
1 This argument has been recently revisited by C. 
Furtado, 'The Nature of the Principal Centre', CEPAL Review, 
no. 42 (1990), pp. 11-15.
2 This will be analyzed in the next chapter.
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industrialisation of the periphery entailed a complementary 
change in the economic structure of the centre. Mutual 
adjustments in both poles of the system were required. The 
successful management of this transformation would have to 
be negotiated and agreed, demanding new institutions to 
promote structural change and adjustment. This can be seen 
as the international counterpart of ECLA favourable view on 
domestic planning and industrialisation. Deliberate inter­
governmental action was deemed necessary at the 
international level in order to correct the disequilibria 
arising from a purely market-led process. In both the 
domestic and international economy an ideal pattern of 
transformation was conceived, based on a balanced or 
complementary growth with which the actual patterns were 
compared *.
In sum, ECLA considered that a convergence of interests 
of centre and periphery existed in the long term. But this 
convergence would not automatically emerge from free trade. 
It had to be constructed through international cooperation 
with a view to promote mutual adjustments in the economic 
structure of the poles of the system. ECLA established a 
link between structural change and the politics of 
international cooperation, a link at that time absent in 
mainstream theory.
1 There was an implicit idea of 'articulated 
industrialisation' in centre and periphery 
('industrializacion mancomunada'). in the sense that 
structural change had to be complementary in the poles of 
the system. Cf. Octavio Rodriguez, former ECLA economist, 
interview, Montevideo, June 1993.
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II. ECLA AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
In ECLA's perspective, economic integration appears as 
a significant instrument for fostering industrialisation *. 
Economic integration was expected to increase the scope and 
efficiency of import-substitution, based on economies of 
scale. Increased efficiency would subsequently permit the 
expansion of exports of industrial goods to the centre 2. 
This would reshape the form in which policy-makers view the 
costs and benefits of integration.
First, static gains in efficiency were considered a 
significant but not exclusive objective of regional 
integration. The emphasis was on expected effects on rates 
of growth, investment and technological diffusion. Secondly, 
trade diversion was not considered always negative. In some 
cases this could be an objective to be pursued. Trade 
diversion would result in foreign exchange savings that
1 The principal work summarising ECLA ideas on economic 
integration is ECLA, The Latin American Common Market, 
especially pp.5-9. Important contributions within a similar 
approach can be found in S. Dell, Problemas de un Mercado 
Comlan en America Latina (Mexico, 1959) and V. Urquidi, 'The 
Common Market as a Tool of Latin American Economic 
Development: A Comment', in A. Hirschman, Latin American 
Issues: Essavs and Comments (New York, sixth edition 1967).
2 In Prebisch's words: 'The development of industrial
exports among LA countries will lead to a reduction in the 
costs of production and provide certain industries with the 
possibility of exporting to the rest of the world. A policy 
of encouragement and cooperation in the centres would permit 
to accelerate this movement'. Cf. R. Prebisch, 'Economic 
Development and Monetary Stability: The False Dilemma',
Economic Bulletin For Latin America, vol. 6, no. 1 (1961), 
p. 34.
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could be used to sustain capital goods imports and hence 
growth. The meaning of 'trade diversion' was blurred in this 
context, since total trade with the rest of the world would 
increase, now made up of different goods. Thirdly, lower 
protective barriers at regional level did not need to 
constitute an objective for all sectors, although a fall in 
average barriers was expected. In certain cases, integration 
would permit to establish import-substituting industries 
that were not feasible before and tariffs would persist in 
these emerging industries. But gains in efficiency would 
allow to reduce protection in established industries *. 
Fourthly, improving the efficiency of ISI and expanding 
exports to the rest of the world were complementary and 
mutually reinforcing strategies 2. In turn, more regional
1 As will be discussed in Part II, indiscriminate 
protectionism was rampant in the early fifties. ECLA indeed 
compared the welfare consequences of integration with the 
actual situation at that time and not with the ideal
situation of multilateral free trade.
2 This point is forcefully argued in ECLA (1959), The 
Latin American Common Market, pp. 8-9: 'It must be
acknowledged that hitherto domestic markets facilities 
created by import substitution policy have not given rise to 
any impressive undertakings in the field of industrial
exports to the rest of the world. Moreover, since in many 
cases protectionist policy, in the shape of very severe 
import restrictions, if not bans, has been carried too far, 
the atmosphere of competition in the internal market has
become appreciable less intense. The return to the customs
tariff as an instrument of protection, the lowering of 
intra-regional duties in some cases and their abolition in 
others would do much to restore the spirit of competition, 
greatly to the benefit of industrialisation policy. In this 
new environment, the gradual development of a flow of 
industrial exports to the rest of the world might be one of 
the objectives of Latin American trade policy'.
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competition would permit to increase exports to centre 
markets and reduce the stimulus for import-substitution 1
III. TRADE. GROWTH AND PUBLIC GOODS; A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF 
ECLA
From the late seventies, new developments in trade 
theory have identified technology and imperfect competition 
as a key variable shaping trade flows and gains from trade. 
Increasing returns, product differentiation and 'strategic' 
policies have increasingly attracted the attention of 
economic theorists 2. Something similar has happened in 
growth theory, where 'endogenous growth' and externalities 
associated with technology form a growing field of 
theoretical and applied research 3. The significant role 
attributed to technological learning in the new trade and 
growth theories have large implications for thinking
1 Ibid., p. 10.
2 Cf. P. Krugman, Rethinking International Trade 
(Cambridge Mass., 1991), especially chapter 1. For an 
'evolutionary' approach to technology and trade see G. Dosi, 
K. Pavitt and L. Soete, The Economics of Technical Change 
and International Trade (Hemel Hampstead, 1990), pp. 3-20.
3 Cf. P. Romer, 'Increasing Returns and Long-run 
Growth', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 5 
(1986), pp.1002-37. Recently, this author has observed that 
'the economics profession is undergoing a substantial change 
in how we think about international trade, development, 
economic growth and economic geography. In each of these 
areas we have gone from a progression that starts with 
models based on perfect competition, moves to price taking 
with external increasing returns and finishes with explicit 
models of imperfect competition'. Cf. P. Romer, 'The Origins 
of Endogenous Growth', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
vol. 8, no. 1 (1994), p. 20.
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international cooperation. The potential scope for state 
intervention is expanded in these theories. 'Strategic' 
sectors can be targeted by governments in order to increase 
market shares in industries that generate larger 
externalities and oligopoly profits *. Subsidies to R&D may 
constitute in certain cases an adequate policy to promote 
competitiveness and growth. In a world of increasing returns 
and imperfect competition, in which market shares are 
affected by strategic decisions of governments and oligopoly 
firms, trade friction can be very large. Thus, as one moves 
away from perfect competition towards strategic 
interactions, political economy cannot be ignored.
In a pure Hecksher-Ohlin world countries are 
receptacles of different factor endowments. Any intervention 
on trade - given the small country assumption - harms the 
country that applies it. Political economy is confined to 
the control of vested domestic interests that resist free 
trade within each country. No friction can arise in the 
international system, since all will gain from 
specialisation in accordance with the principle of 
comparative advantages. However, when specialisation is 
somewhat arbitrary (i.e., it can be affected by state 
policies and history 2) and adjustments are not automatic
1 Cf. J.A. Brander, 'Rationale for Strategic Trade and 
Industrial Policy', in P. Krugman (ed.), Strategic Trade 
Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1986), pp. 23-46.
2 If there are economies of scale in an industry, 
initial state subsidies or just an earlier start in 
production may lead to oligopoly positions which are not 
based in comparative advantages. Trade is in this sense
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(i.e., resources can remain unemployed for a long period, 
particularly if patterns of trade are rapidly changing) 
international political economy asserts its relevance *• The 
new trade theory shows that gains from trade are still 
higher in the presence of increasing return, but relative 
gains can be critically affected by policy. The world now 
resembles that described by early ECLA ideas and by the 
modified structuralist school of international relations. 
Room needs to be made for institutions and negotiations in 
order to constrain behaviour and make policy decisions 
compatible. 'Governance' and the production of public goods 
in the international trade system become major themes in 
foreign economic policy 2.
In this respect, ECLA early insights seem to have been 
confirmed by later theoretical developments. Imperfect 
competition and interactions among non atomistic actors 
describe the context in which international efforts for 
coordination take place. Policy coordination can be seen as 
a public good that contributes to sustain trade by avoiding 
a war of subsidies and protection. ECLA proposals for 
international cooperation can be interpreted in the light of 
Kindleberger's concern with the production of public goods 
in the international system. International coordination, for
path-dependent and 'history matters'. Cf. P. Krugman, 
Geography and Trade (Leuven, 1993).
1 On this point see Kindleberger, Government and 
International Trade (New Jersey, 1978).
2 Cf. C.P. Kindleberger, 'International Public Goods 
Without International Government', American Economic Review, 
vol. 76, no, 1 (1986), pp. 1-12.
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ECLA, is required to promote mutual adjustment in centre and 
periphery as industrialisation advances in the periphery. 
Clearly, the fact that there is room for government 
coordination in order to provide a public good does not 
imply that governments will act accordingly *. But a clearer 
identification of the problems at stake - as that provided 
in the fifties/early sixties by ECLA and more recently by 
the new theories - can contribute to guide political 
analysis.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
1. By offering a new theoretical framework which put 
together industrialisation, international trade and economic 
integration, ECLA contributed to shape economic policies in 
Latin America and played the role of a catalyst in the move 
towards economic integration of the late fifties.
1 This remits the discussion to the analysis of the 
state and state policies which have received growing 
attention by theorists. If frequently public choice theories 
are highly sceptical about the role of the state, a more 
balanced view seems to be emerging, as argued by Evans, 
based on the concept of relative autonomy of the state and 
on the analysis of the type of relation that state and civil 
society maintain. Cf. P. Evans, 'The State as a Problem and 
Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural
Change', in S. Haggard and R. Kaufman (ed.), The Politics of 
Economic Adjustment: International Constraints. Distributive 
Conflicts and the State (Princeton, 1992), pp. 139-181. See 
also C. Anglade and C. Fortin, 'The State and Capital 
Accumulation in Latin America: A Conceptual and Historical 
Introduction', in C. Anglade and C. Fortin, The State and 
Capital Accumulation in latin America, vol. I (London, 
1989) . For a recent review and critique of public choice 
theories, see H. Streeton and L. Orchard, Public Goods. 
Public Enterprises and Public Choice: Theoretical
Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government (New 
York, 1994).
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2. Industrialisation in the periphery was seen by ECLA 
as driven by external constraints on growth. But 
'spontaneous' import-substitution in the past was plagued 
with inefficiency and disequilibrium. These problems could 
be reduced through planning, economic integration and 
international cooperation.
3. Planning would permit to adjust the actual pattern 
of structural change to an ideal pattern of balanced growth 
and thereby avoid disequilibrium. Regional economic 
integration, in turn, would raise the efficiency of import 
substitution, curb the move towards indiscriminate 
protection and encourage industrial exports to regional and 
world markets. Last but not least, international cooperation 
would assure that the transformation of the structure of 
exports and imports in the periphery was matched by a 
corresponding transformation in the centre.
4. ECLA theory made room for the role of the state and 
policy cooperation although ECLA itself did not analyze 
which factors actually shaped state policies. In the early 
sixties ECLA became more concerned with political and 
economic reform. But this move was cut by the polarisation 
of the political and intellectual climate in the mid­
sixties. Still, some of ECLA insights were confirmed and 
developed in more recent theories. They contribute to 
explain why actors' interests can diverge and when 
international cooperation is required. In doing so, more 
rigorous questions can be addressed in the study of the 
international political economy.
59
PART II. FROM BILATERAL AGREEMENTS TO LAFTA. 1939-60
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CHAPTER III. STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. 1939-55
INTRODUCTION
This part of the thesis discusses the determinants of 
cooperation and integration between Argentina and Brazil in 
the period 1939-60. In previous chapters a general framework 
for studying economic cooperation was proposed and a set of 
hypotheses linking structural variables and economic 
integration suggested. The relevance of these hypotheses 
will now be examined through an historical study of the 
origins of the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA). This chapter will discuss the impact on regional 
cooperation of structural change in the international system 
and in the domestic economy in the period 1939-55. Chapter 
IV will address these variables in the period 1955-60. 
Finally, Chapter V studies the change in the bilateral trade 
regime, namely the shift from 'restrained bilateralism' 
towards the attempt at creation of a free trade area 
(LAFTA).
Economic relations between Argentina and Brazil in the 
period 1939-55 combined cooperation and rivalry. On the one 
hand, these countries competed for a more influential 
position in Latin America. Brazil's foreign policy in most
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of the period was based on a 'special relationship' with the 
United States of America (USA), stemming in part from a 
common interest in counterbalancing the Argentine influence 
in Latin America. On the other hand, there also existed 
significant forces fostering cooperation between Argentina 
and Brazil, despite the limits posed by geopolitical 
suspicions. The major stimulus for closer cooperation 
stemmed from both the benefits that the two countries could 
derive from trade and the possibility of strengthening their 
position in international affairs. In the case of Argentina, 
the situation of relative international isolation in which 
the country was placed in the period prompted her to seek 
closer relations with her Latin American neighbours, and 
Brazil in particular. From the Brazilian point of view, 
Argentina was more than a valuable commercial partner. A 
larger role for Brazil in regional and hemispheric affairs 
was deemed to require some support from her Southern 
neighbour. This encouraged the quest for cooperation and 
qualified the influence of rivalry in regional foreign 
policy.
The variables that shaped these contending forces of 
cooperation and rivalry will be addressed in this chapter. 
Section I discusses the impact of change in the 
international system upon Argentine policy towards Brazil. 
Section II analyzes this impact in the case of Brazil's 
policy towards Argentina. Section III addresses the 
influence of trade and industrialisation on regional
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cooperation. Section IV presents the conclusions of the 
chapter.
I. ARGENTINA; IN SEARCH OF A PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY. 1939-55
The consequences of the inter-war World Depression in 
Latin America should be briefly recalled in order to assess 
the context in which the bilateral economic relations of 
Argentina and Brazil developed in 1939-55. The crisis had a 
large impact on the objectives and instruments of foreign 
economic policy. Far-reaching disequilibrium in the external 
front encouraged the promotion of industry and a larger 
economic role for the state. Protection in the central 
economies was matched with the expansion of controls over 
the external sector in the periphery State activism in 
Argentina and Brazil was not confined to defensive measures 
aimed at stopping the drain of foreign exchange. Governments 
also set out to negotiate bilateral agreements with a view 
to preserve export markets and diversify their international 
trade partners. In this respect, Argentina and Brazil were
1 These trends had indeed significant antecedents before 
193 0, but they were reinforced in the thirties and gained 
momentum in the forties. Cf. C. Diaz-Alejandro 'Latin 
America in the Thirties', in R. Thorp, Latin America in the 
Thirties: The Role of the Periphery in World Crisis (Oxford, 
1984), pp. 17-49; C.M. Lewis, 'Industry in Latin America 
Before 1930', in L. Bethel (ed.), Cambridge History of Latin 
America. vol. IV (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 269-319; W. Suzigan, 
Industrializacao Brasileira: Oriaem e Desenvolvimento (Sao 
Paulo, 1986).
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placed in different positions by the end of the thirties. 
This would play a significant role in shaping Argentina and 
Brazil's views of bilateral cooperation.
1.1. Looking for New Partners; From the 'Roca-Runciman 
Agreement' to the 'Pinedo Plan'
The international front looked particularly gloomy in 
the case of Argentina. The advantages of Argentina's 
traditional close economic and political ties with the UK 
shrank in the thirties as the UK sought to reduce the impact 
of the crisis on the British economy l. In May 1933 Argentina 
signed the 'Roca-Runciman Agreement' with the UK by which 
she sought to protect her position in the British market, 
then threatened by the preferences that the UK had granted 
to the British Dominions by the Ottawa Treaty of 1932. 
Argentina agreed to offer preferential treatment to UK 
exports and investments in exchange for an import quota for
1 Cf. M.P. Abreu, 'Argentina and Brazil During the 
Thirties: The Impact of British and American International 
Economic Policies', R. Thorp (ed.), Latin America in the 
Thirties, pp. 144-62; M.P. Abreu, 'Anglo-Brazilian Economic 
Relations and the Consolidation of American Pre-eminence in 
Brazil, 1930-45', in C. Abel and C.M. Lewis (eds.), Latin 
America. Economic Imperialism and the Sate: The Political 
Economy of the External Connection from the Independence to 
the Present (london, 1985), pp. 379-93; R. Gravil, 'A Time 
of Acute Dependence: Argentina in the Thirties', The Journal 
of European Economic History, vol. 7, no. 2 and 3 (1978), 
pp. 337-378.
64
Argentine meat and other tariff concessions *. However, the 
terms of the agreement meant only a partial relief for 
Argentine difficulties 2. Argentina's position in the 
international system had become remarkably weak. Argentina 
had no promising substitute as regards the UK place in her 
foreign trade. This can be seen in table III.l.A.
1 The UK promised to consult Argentina in case she 
needed to apply further restrictions on imports from this 
country. UK restrictions on imports of chilled beef from 
Argentina should not exceed 10% of the imports of the period 
June 1931 - July 1932. For frozen meat and mutton,
progressive restrictions would be imposed, from 10% to 35%. 
In turn, Argentina was expected to apply the sterling gains 
in buying British goods and paying dividends and interests 
to British capital in the country - after the deduction of 
debt charges owed to other governments. Further concessions 
to the UK were granted at the moment of renewal of the 
Treaty in 1936.
2 The Roca-Runciman Agreement aroused strong criticisms 
in Argentina. It was considered that too many concessions 
had been given to the UK in order to defend a group of 
exporters (basically, the exporters of chilled beef) which 
in practice accounted for a relatively small part of 
Argentine total exports. Some authors have pointed out that 
the Agreement was the price that the government had to pay 
for preserving the so-called 'concordancia', the political 
coalition that backed the conservative governments of the 
thirties. Cf. J. Fodor and A. O'Connell, 'La Argentina y la 
Economia Atl&ntica en la Primera Mitad del Siglo XX', 
Desarrollo Economico. vol. 13, no. 49 (1973), pp. 3-65. See 
also Gravil, 'A Time of Acute Dependence'. Conversely, 
Alhadeff has argued that the Agreement was instrumental for 
economic recovery after 1933, as the Roca Funding Loan made 
it possible to finance a price support programme for the 
agricultural sector. The expansion of public debt also had 
an stimulating effect while the fund boosted consumers and 
business confidence by reducing interest rates. Cf. P 
Alhadeff, 'Dependency, Historiography and Objections to the 
Roca Runciman Pact', in C. Abel and C.M. lewis (eds.), Latin 
America. Economic Imperialism and the State, pp. 367-93.
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TABLE III.l.A
ARGENTINA; MAIN TRADE PARTNERS. 1934-55 
(In percentage)
Period S.A. Brazil USA Europe UK Germ Fran
1934-39
Average X 8.6 5.4 10.5 76.5 34.3 7.5 5.0
M 10 5.7 15.2 62.0 22.9 9.5 4.8
1940-45
Average X 17.8 7.1 25.3 48.3 34.5
M 28.7 20.2 24.1 31.3 16.6 0.3 0.5
1946-50
Average X 13.1 6.4 13.1 66.4 24.1 2.4 6.8
M 15.9 9.7 28.4 43.1 12.3 0.5 6.2
1951-55
Average X 18.5 11.2 17.0 56.6 18.1 6.5 5.4
M 21.7 10.4 16.5 43.0 6.8 8.4 5.9
X = Exports to country or region of destination/total 
exports.
M = Imports form country or region of origin/total imports. 
SA = South America.
Source: Republica Argentina. Direccidn General de
Estadisticas y Censos, Anuario de Comercio Exterior (Buenos 
Aires, various years).
Table III.l.A shows that exports to the UK represented 
more than one third of total Argentina exports in 1934-39. 
The USA, on the other hand, absorbed less than 10 %.
Moreover, Argentina's trade balance with the USA was 
chronically unbalanced. This became a central problem when 
the European currencies in general and sterling in 
particular became inconvertible and hence triangular trade 
was no longer possible. Between 1918 and 1940 Argentina 
obtained a surplus with the USA in only three years: 1935,
66
1936 and 1937. This changed during Second World War, but the 
dollar shortage was severely felt in the post-war years. 
Table III.2.A shows the substantial strain that trade with 
the USA placed on the Argentine total trade balance.
TABLE III.2.A
ARGENTINA: TRADE BALANCE. SELECTED YEARS 
(In Thousands of Argentine pesos)
Year SA USA Europe Total
1937 52.2 44.3 743.8 753.3
1938 6.5 -136.1 213.5 -60.4
1942 10.5 113.1 399.7 514.6
1943 127.2 353.3 590.9 1250.2
1947 81.3 -1883.7 2168.3 156.4
1948 -110.3 -1749.4 1613.4 -647.9
Sources: Cf. Table III.l.A
Table III. 2. A reflects the fact that the USA had 
reached a key position in the thirties as a source of 
manufactured goods and capital for Latin America but 
remained a closed market for Argentine exports, which were 
competitive with US domestic agricultural production l. Trade 
friction with the USA compelled the Argentines to cultivate
1 In September 1927 the US prohibited imports of meat 
from countries affected by the foot-and-mouth disease, among 
which Argentina was included. The 1930 Howley-Smoot Act 
consolidated the protectionist stance of the US agricultural 
policy. Competing agricultural imports were all but 
completely banned by 1935. Cf. D. Rock, 'Argentina 1930-46', 
in L. Bethell, Cambridge History of latin America, vol. VIII 
(Cambridge, 1991), p. 45.
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the UK connection. This policy displayed a singular 
continuity throughout the twenties and thirties, reflecting 
the narrow space in which the Argentine options were 
confined. This space was defined by her close but asymmetric 
association with the UK and by the 'closeness' of the US 
market to Argentina's main exports.
The outbreak of Second World War and the subsequent 
disruption of trade with Europe made it still more urgent 
for Argentina to develop and diversify her external 
relations. One obvious course of action was to reach a more 
favourable modus vivendi in trade matters with the USA. 
Another was to intensify trade links with neighbouring Latin 
American countries and in particular with Brazil. Both 
avenues were in fact considered in the 'Pinedo Plan', an 
innovative set of proposals presented to the Argentine 
Congress on the 14th of November of 1940 *. The Pinedo Plan 
distinguished three main areas of exchange: (a) the sterling
1 Cf. 'El Plan de Desarrollo Econdmico Ante el Honorable 
Senado', reprinted in Desarrollo Econdmico. vol. 19, no. 75 
(1979), pp. 403-26. An assessment of the challenges faced by 
the Argentine economy at that time was provided by Federico 
Pinedo in a lecture delivered in June 1942. He observed that 
'it is unfounded the belief that a hungry and destroyed 
Europe means great prospects to countries which can produce 
the basic goods she would urgently need, since one cannot 
see how Europe can obtain in the short term the means of 
payments necessary to buy them' (author's translation). Cf. 
F. Pinedo, 'Relaciones Econdmicas Inter-Americanas', Revista 
de Economla Argentina, vol. 41, no. 290 (1942), p. 236. He 
also observed that after the war the international market 
would not be entirely open and this would harm Argentina if 
she had no connections 'with the big conglomerates of 
countries (...) whose economic prevalence in tomorrow's 
world is certain'. Cf. ibidem., p. 237.
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area, where Argentina obtained trade surpluses in non- 
convertible currency; (b) the US or dollar area, in which 
Argentina held a significant deficit in convertible 
currency; (c) the area comprised by neighbouring Latin 
America countries, regulated by various systems of exchange 
controls. The central concern of the Pinedo Plan was the 
expansion of trade with the USA and Latin America areas in 
order to compensate for the fall of Argentine exports to 
Europe. Regarding the USA, the Plan contemplated both 
selective import-substitution and the exploitation of 
potential export opportunities to be found in the US market 
l. Interestingly enough, the creation of a special body in 
charge of promoting industrial rather than agricultural 
exports to the USA was proposed - as it was assumed that 
imports of agricultural goods would continue to be
restricted. Such industrial exports should come from the 
'natural industries', i.e.. those related to the processing 
of agricultural goods.
As regards Latin America, emphasis was placed on
increasing the then relatively modest levels of trade. The 
creation of a free trade area (FTA) would be the best way of 
attaining this objective. The Plan emphasized the role to be 
played by a FTA in achieving the economies of scale required 
by the process of industrialisation. The FTA should progress
1 Cf. L. LLach, 'El Plan Pinedo, Su Significado
Historico y los Origenes de la Economia Politica del 
Peronismo', Desarrollo Economico. vol. 23, no. 92 (1984),
pp. 515-57 and D. Rock, 'Argentina 1930-46', p. 43.
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in a context of openness with the aim of encouraging intra- 
regional trade rather than hindering extra-regional imports 
*. When the Pinedo Plan was presented, negotiations were 
already taking place with Brazil in order to liberalise 
bilateral trade. These negotiations continued after Pinedo's 
resignation (see below) and culminated with the signing of 
the November 1941 Agreement for Progressive Free Trade. This 
agreement represented a high point in bilateral cooperation 
and committed Argentina and Brazil not to apply trade 
barriers to activities yet not established in either 
country. As the process of industrialisation was at an early 
stage in both countries, the agreement was intended to 
forestall protectionist demands in the future. By assuring
1 This clearly distinguishes this first attempt to 
economic integration from that of the late fifties, when 
import-substituting industrialisation became the dominant 
strategy. F. Pinedo, 'Relaciones Econdmicas', p. 238, 
emphasised that the efforts to form a custom union with 
Brazil should be seen as a step towards the integration of 
Argentina within the new international economy. He concluded 
that 'an economic union among few or many Latin American 
countries (...), to be fruitful, has to be aimed to the 
elimination of barriers in the region, and not to the 
exclusion of what is extra-continental' (author's 
translation). British observers in Buenos Aires, however, 
did not feel reassured by the promise of keeping the 
regional market open: 'the advantages which Brazil and
Argentina agree to afford to each other are also left open 
(...) for inclusion in similar treaties with other 
neighbours. An extending area of Latin American free trade, 
coupled with preferences, if not tariffs, behind which are 
to built up local manufacturing industry, is the clearly 
envisaged aim of both parties to the present treaty. Such, 
at least, has been the interpretation placed upon the treaty 
by the Argentine press, which has welcomed it also from the 
standpoint of Argentina's need of industrial development and 
increased self-sufficiency in the post-war period'. Cf. FO 
461 1, 'Correspondence respecting America, Part I, January 
to March 1942', A 381/298/2, 10 January 1942.
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a regional market for new industries, it was expected to 
have a large impact on trade. It sought to liberalise 
bilateral trade at the very moment in which international 
trade collapsed because of the war.
The proposal for a Latin American free trade area in 
the Pinedo Plan has received little attention in the 
literature. The Plan, however, suggests that policy-makers 
already understood the role of the regional market in 
industrialisation and the 1941 treaty represented a 
significant antecedent to the initiatives of the late 
fifties. Two arguments in favour of a free trade area were 
then set forth which would reappear later, namely the 
importance of economies of scale and the problem of the Most 
Favoured Nation Clause (MFN) l.
(i) Economies of scale and parallel industrialisation 
in Argentina and Brazil. During early negotiations with 
Brazil, Economic Minister Federico Pinedo observed that
'I have always understood that it would be ideal to progress 
towards a customs union - open, of course, to other 
neighbouring countries (...). Let's suppose that a policy in 
this direction would have been initiated many years ago. 
Instead of having in Brazil and Argentina parallel 
industries producing at high costs in different and all but
1 The leading role of Raul Prebisch in the formulation 
of both the Pinedo Plan and ECLA ideas may contribute to 
explain this continuity.
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closed markets, we could have arrived at a profitable 
division of industrial work between the two nations (..•) I 
am prepared to make most efforts in order to reach an 
understanding with Brazil as ample as possible"'*.
A similar point of view was held on the Brazilian side, 
where it was observed that a customs union 'will allow 
industrial development in one country to be supported by 
that in the other, instead of competing in identical and 
artificial manufactures' 2. Thus, policy makers in both 
countries realised the importance of the process of 
industrialisation taking place and sought to encourage 
specialisation in an early stage 3.
(ii) The problem of the Most Favoured Nation Clause. 
The initiative for progressive free trade between Argentina 
and Brazil could not ignore previous agreements in which the
1 Pinedo to Berger, Archives of the Centro de Pescruisa 
e Documentacao of Rio de Janeiro (therefrom CPDOC), Archive 
Souza Costa (therefrom SC) 4.09.12, Buenos Aires, 12 
September 1940 (author's translation). Similar emphasis on 
the diversification of the structure of trade can be found 
in Pinedo's letter to the Brazilian Foreign Minister Osvaldo 
Aranha, CPDOC, Osvaldo Aranha Archive (therefrom OA),
40.01.23, Buenos Aires, 5 March 1940, in which he 
acknowledged the full-hearted support that the initiative 
received from Aranha.
2 Letter from the Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires, 
Rodrigues Alves, to Foreign Minister Osvaldo Aranha, CPDOC, 
Archive Osvaldo Aranha (therefrom OA) , 40.01.23, Buenos 
Aires, 27 September 1940 (author's translation).
3 Clearly, the soundness of this proposal for taming 
sooner than later indiscriminate protection would be 
confirmed by the difficulties faced by trade liberalisation 
in the sixties.
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MFN clause had been conceded to third parties. It was 
necessary to adopt an institutional framework allowing for 
an exemption to this clause. A way out was found in the 
creation of a free trade area or customs union *. This was a 
response to the pressure exerted by the USA and the UK, 
which tried to avoid discrimination in the markets of 
Argentina and Brazil 2. Moreoevr, between 1939 and 1941 the 
international system became more permissive as regards trade 
arrangements 3. The war made it more difficult for the UK to 
place effective pressure on her partners. The USA, in turn, 
adopted a more positive outlook on import substitution and 
regional trade during the war, as she expected that this 
would contribute to ease supply constraints associated with
1 A customs union was deemed to represent 'the way of 
avoiding that other countries, making use of the clauses of 
the Most Favoured Nation, take advantage of the benefits 
granted to neighbouring and friendly countries' (author's 
translation). Cf. Rodrigues Alves to Aranha, CPDOC OA
40.01.23, Buenos Aires, 27 September 1940.
2 The Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires reported 
that, in relation with UK pressures against the treaty with 
Brazil, the Argentine Foreign Minister Torriani was prepared 
to 'denounce the treaties with England if they compromise 
Argentine objectives in a moment in which the country goes 
through so great difficulties' (author's translation). Cf. 
letter from Rodrigues Alves to Aranha, CPDOC OA 40.01.23, 
Buenos Aires, 29 January 1941. Clearly, it is unlikely that 
Argentina would have taken such a bold step at that time. 
But Torriani's reaction is indicative of the interest in 
achieving a free trade agreement with Brazil.
3 In 1941 the Inter-American Economic Consultive 
Committee of Washington recognised the legitimacy of 
establishing preferential agreements among neighbouring 
countries. This possibility was explicitly mentioned in the 
trade agreements signed then by Argentina with the USA. Cf. 
Rodrigues Alves to Aranha, CPDOC OA 40.01.23, Buenos Aires, 
25 October 1941, p. 3.
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the war effort.
The move towards closer cooperation in 1939-41 was 
probably negatively affected by the decision of the 
Argentine congress, at the beginning of 1941, of not to 
ratify the Pinedo Plan. However, this seems not to have had 
a decisive effect in bilateral cooperation as far as 
negotiations with Brazil continued and the Treaty for 
Progressive Free Trade signed after Pinedo's resignation l. 
In effect, the conduction of the economic and foreign policy 
was not the main issue at stake in the Argentine political 
debate. During the discussions of the Pinedo Plan in 
congress the policy alternatives offered by the opposition 
were much similar to Pinedo's proposals. The reason why the 
Pinedo Plan was turned down by the Argentine Congress seems 
to have been essentially one of domestic politics 2. 
Argentina faced in 1940 the challenge of political and 
economic reform 3. Political reform, aimed at liberalising
1 The Pinedo Plan was ratified by the Senate Chamber but 
turned down by the Deputy Chamber, in which the opposition 
held majority. Still, some of the measures included in the 
Plan were implemented through executive decrees. Cf. D. 
Rock, 'Argentina, 1930-46', p. 43.
2 This convergence of proposals was emphasised by 
Pinedo during the debates in the Senate Chamber on the 17 
December 1940: 'either our plan is in the right direction to 
work out the problems or our adversaries have no imagination 
at all, because they have not raised alternative proposals. 
They have just limited themselves to offer the same 
proposals' (author's translation). The debate is reprinted 
in F. Pinedo, En Tiemoos de la Repflblica (Buenos Aires, 
1947), especially p. 270.
3 Cf. L. LLach, 'El Plan Pinedo', pp. 516-17.
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the political regime, was necessary to obtain support for 
economic reform. Pinedo himself had previously set out to 
negotiate with the Radical Party a new political 
understanding which should create conditions for applying 
his policies *. This was frustrated by rigged elections in 
the provinces.of Santa Fe and Mendoza which further strained 
the political climate in Argentina. As a result, the Plan 
was not ratified, prompting Pinedo's resignation.
Thus, the evidence suggests that the failure of 
congress to ratify the Pinedo Plan was not due to a hostile 
attitude in Argentina as regards cooperation with Brazil. 
Geopolitical rivalry had not yet become a dominant issue in 
regional relations nor a significant one in domestic 
politics 2. On the other hand, the failure to reach a 
political agreement in Argentina, which could have permitted 
a more coherent and sustained approach towards regional and
1 Pinedo started conversations with the opposition 
leader Marcelo de Alvear with the objective of reaching an 
agreement on economic and political reform, as expressed by 
Pinedo in an interview to the newspaper La Naci6n. 12 
January 1941. In the interview, Pinedo argued that 'the 
objective is not only to reach an understanding so as to 
take care of these problems (the economic and financial 
problems of the country). Many of the measures waiting for 
Parliamentary decision are obviously of urgent necessity 
(...) But it is not a truce (...) what should be looked 
after, but a definitive peace' (author's translation).
2 This situation was at variance with what would happen 
in 1953-54, when Peron launched his economic union 
proposals, to be discussed later. In the early fifties 
bilateral relations between Argentina and Brazil became a 
hotly debated and conflictive issue in Brazil's domestic 
politics which decisively contributed to curb economic 
cooperation.
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hemispheric cooperation, was not inconsequential. This 
probably increased uncertainty over the implementation of 
the agreement in 1941 and certainly contributed to the
reversal of cooperation in 1942. In particular, the 
deterioration of Argentina-USA relations and its impact on 
regional and hemispheric affairs contributed decisively to 
redefine interests in a centrifugal direction. This point is 
addressed in the following section.
In sum, the structural conditions of the period 1939-41
were particularly favourable for cooperation between 
Argentina and Brazil. The war had led to a convergence of 
perspectives on the need to increase regional trade. 
Hegemonic powers were less willing or less able to resist 
preferential arrangements. Geopolitical rivalry was not a 
stumbling block in the way to closer cooperation. In this 
context an agreement for 'progressive free trade' was 
possible. It represented a bold move to foster efficiency 
and growth which acknowledged the importance that industrial 
production had acquired.
1.2. Conflict With the USA
Reshaping commercial relations with the USA, as
proposed in the Pinedo Plan, proved to be a sluggish, 
complicated process. Political and trade friction were a 
recurrent feature in Argentine-US relations. In effect, 
Argentina played a leading role at several Pan-American
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Conferences in resisting the attempts of the USA to 
consolidate her political leadership in Latin America. 
Argentina's privileged association with Europe, and 
especially the UK, made for a position of strength and 
independence in hemispheric affairs, jealously defended by 
Argentine diplomacy l. In addition, the competitive nature of 
agricultural production was a stumbling block in trade 
negotiations. If the proximity of war led the USA to seek a 
trade agreement with Argentina, the negotiations carried 
between June 1939 and January 1940 failed and this outcome 
was very much resented by the Argentines 2. This raised 
serious concerns in Argentina about the evolution of her 
foreign trade and contributed to set apart this country from 
the USA 3. At the beginning of Second World War a
1 Cf. A.C. Paz and G. Ferrari, Politica Exterior 
Argentina. 1930-62 (Buenos Aires, 1964), pp. 57-63.
2 President Cantilo severely condemned US protectionism 
as the USA only offered to reduce tariffs on meat and 
linseed up to a restricted quota. The British, whose 
bilateral practices were usually criticized by the USA, 
observed that 'negotiations (...) broke down because America 
was prepared to give away very little and wanted too much. 
Despite these lofty ideals about unhampered development of 
world trade they insisted upon a system of quotas with a 
corresponding obligation of Argentina to buy American 
goods'. Cf. FO 371 2416, 22 January 1940.
3 Reporting on a conversation with Pinedo, Ambassador 
Armour suggested that the basic point in Argentina-USA 
relationship was to open the US market to Argentine 
products. He pointed out that 'what Argentina needs is a 
minimum of economic security and an opportunity to sell more 
in the Western hemisphere.(...) The greater problem that 
will have to be faced eventually is the question of markets 
for wheat, meat and other products that the USA cannot 
absorb'. Cf. Armour to the Secretary of State, 611.531/1538 
in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1940. vol. V
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rapprochement eventually occurred between Argentina and the 
USA and a trade agreement signed in October 1941, the first 
since 1853. But this more cooperative disposition would not 
last. Bilateral relations steadily eroded after the 
hemispheric conference of Rio de Janeiro, where Argentina 
opposed the US initiative of severing diplomatic relations 
with the Axis powers l. From February 1942 the USA adopted a 
straightforward hostile approach towards Argentina, in the 
shape of an extensive economic boycott on the supply of 
intermediate and capital goods 2. The USA also endeavoured to 
sever trade links between Argentina and her partners in 
Europe and Latin America. In effect, the economic boycott 
included the prohibition of using Marshall Plan dollars in 
Europe for buying Argentine goods until mid-1949 3. In 1944 
the USA made insistent demands on the UK asking for the 
cancellation of the latter's commercial agreement with 
Argentina, which provided for the importation of large 
quotas of Argentine meat. Between 1942-44 the USA tried to 
obstruct Argentine imports of rubber from Bolivia and
(Washington, 1961), pp. 462-3.
1 Cf. J.S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States; A 
Conflicted Relationship (Boston, 1990), p. 82.
2 Cf. C. Escude, Gran Bretana. Los Estados Unidos v la 
Declinacion Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1986), pp. 322-29; A. 
Lanus, De Chaoultnec al Beagle; Politica Exterior Argentina 
(Buenos Aires, 1984), pp. 24-32.
3 Cf. C. Escude, Gran Bretana. especially pp. 322-29.
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Brazil, copper from Chile and tin from Bolivia l. Therefore, 
Argentine difficulties in the external front, already made 
acute by the war, were heavily reinforced by her conflict 
with the USA. Only in the early fifties did bilateral 
Argentine-US relations begin to normalize. The Eisenhower 
government privileged a Cold War strategy in which the re­
incorporation of Argentina in the system of hemispheric 
security was crucial 2. In addition, the economic policy 
adopted by Per6n after 1952, and especially his favourable 
attitude towards US investments in the oil sector in 
Argentina, encouraged the rapprochement between this country 
and the USA 3. At the end of 1954 the Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank) provided to Argentina a loan of US$ 60 millions
1 Cf. In January 1944 a Brazilian Commercial mission 
arrived at Buenos Aires in order to negotiate the supply of 
rubber tires to Argentina. The USA were reported 'to place 
every obstacle in the way of Argentina acquiring rubber 
supplies from Brazil'. Cf. FO 371 37723: AS 144, 7 January 
1944. Commenting on the US-Chilean copper limitation 
agreement, Corden Hull stated that 'perhaps the greatest 
advantage of the agreement from our point of view has been 
a voice in the control of copper exports to Argentina'. Cf. 
Secretary of State to Ambassador Bowens, Chile 
835.24/2445, Telegram, in Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1944 . V. VII (Washington, 1964), p. 706.
2 On the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration 
see S.G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign 
Policy of Anti-Communism (London, 1988). The change in 
foreign policy already began in the late forties, when the 
objective of promoting democracy was gradually abandoned in 
favour of a policy based on security concerns. Cf. L. 
Bethel1, 'From the Second World War to the Cold War', in A. 
Lowenthal (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and 
Latin America (London, 1991), pp. 41-70.
3 Cf. 'Argentina Crisis: US Officials Favor Peron - But 
Largely for Business Reasons', The Wall Street Journal. 27 
June 1955.
79
to build a new steel mill and the USA began to consider this 
country in her programmes of military assistance *. Still, 
for most of the period it was the conflict with the USA 
which dictated, to a significant degree, the evolution of 
Argentina's foreign policy.
1.3. Post-War Bilateralism and Regional Agreements
Post-war Argentine international and regional policies 
were dominated by her conflict with the USA and difficulties 
in sustaining essential imports. The experience of the 
forties reinforced this Argentine drive for autonomy and the 
diversification of trade. Moreover, the international 
context continued to look unpromising. Bilateral agreements 
were the basic instrument used by most countries to regulate 
trade and the 'dollar shortage' remained a central problem 
for Argentina and many Latin American countries, since most 
imports could only be supplied by the USA during the period 
of European reconstruction. The failure to return to full 
convertibility in Europe (and particularly in the UK) 
continued to pose the question of how to finance critical 
imports of capital and intermediate goods from the dollar 
area. The Argentine response to the constraints posed by the 
world's 'dollar shortage' was to deploy an intense
1 Cf. S.G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 38. 
See also J.C. Torre and L. de Riz, 'Argentina Since 1946', 
in L. Bethell (ed.), Cambridge History of Latin America, 
vol. VIII (Cambridge, 1991), p. 89.
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diplomatic activity aimed at reaching bilateral trade and 
payments agreements with European and Latin America 
countries l. In this strategy, as in the Pinedo Plan, Latin 
America and particularly Brazil received considerable 
attention. Argentina thus played a leading role in 
encouraging regional trade in this period. Regional 
agreements were seen as a form of increasing trade without 
having to use hard currency. In addition, it was expected 
that they would provide for Argentina an instrument to 
extend her political influence in the region, and hence 
reduce her vulnerability in the international system. 
Argentine comparative higher development nourished 
aspirations of regional leadership 2. The first half of the 
fifties witnessed several initiatives launched by President
1 For a review of the 'dollar shortage' debate of the 
period see L.B. Yeager, International Monetary Relations: 
Theory. History and Policy (New York, 1966), especially the 
appendix to chapter 25) . By the end of 1953 60 % of
Argentine trade was covered by bilateral agreements. Cf. 
Bank of London and South America, Fortnightly Review, vol. 
18, no. 448 (1953), p.789.
2 On the Argentine aspiration to increase her influence 
in the region see FO 371 108793 AA 1021/1, 4 January 1954. 
US observers pointed out that 'Argentina's international 
aspiration includes a dominant position in Southern South 
America, a position of leadership in Latin America and a 
place in the word corresponding to somewhat inflated views 
of national capabilities. To reach these goals, Per6n 
requires internal economic expansion, a free hand to assert 
Argentine influence over neighbouring countries and foreign 
support for Argentine pretensions in word affairs'. Cf. NIE- 
91-54, 9 March 1954, Secret, in Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1952-55. vol IV (Washington, 1983), p. 462. 
See also section II for an analysis of the reactions 
generated by the Argentine initiatives for 'economic union' 
with smaller neighbours.
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Per6n with a view to promote economic integration with 
neighbouring countries, for which he sought to obtain the 
support of Brazil. Peron also expected to cooperate with 
Brazil in the defence of the price of common primary 
exports, like wool and leather *. Thus, a series of 'economic 
union' treaties with smaller neighbours were signed by 
Argentina in 1953-4. In February 1953 the 'Santiago Act' 
between Chile and Argentina was signed, aimed at 
establishing a customs union 2. Subsequently, 'economic
union' treaties were signed with Paraguay (August 1953),
\
Ecuador (August 1953) and Bolivia (September 1954). These 
agreements represented an attempt by Argentina at 
diversifying economic and political relations in a context
1 Cf. letter from Luzardo to Vargas, CPDOC, Archive 
Getulio Vargas (therefrom GV) 52.01.14, 'Cartas' (8), Buenos 
Aires, 27 March 1952, pp. 4-5.
2 The 1953 treaty was expected to (i) stimulate trade
and industrialisation in both economies; (ii) gradually
reduce tariffs and other trade barriers; (iii) simplify
bilateral exchange controls; (iv) provide for the free 
transit of goods towards third countries; (v) develop the 
transport infrastructure. Cf. US State Department Central 
Files, 'Economic and Financial Review, Second Quarter of 
1953', 855.00/7-1453, Desp. no. 38, 14 July 1953, in
Argentina: Internal Affairs. Microfilm, Decimal Numbers 735, 
835 and 935 (Maryland, 1987). Although the composition of 
trade between Chile and Argentina was basically made of 
primary products, some modest steps were given in order to 
promote industrial trade. A subsequent agreement signed on 
19 July 1954 between metallurgic producers of Argentina and 
Brazil were elevated to the Commissions of the Economic 
Union Treaty with a view to including metallurgic products 
in the exchanges list. The results were largely 
disappointing, however, because obstacles remained in the 
concession of import permits. Cf. ECLA, Estudio del Comercio 
Inter-Latinoamericano en 1954 v 1955: Situaci6n v
Perspectivas en 1956 (New York, 1956b), pp. 16-17.
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marked by geopolitical rivalry and the fragmentation of 
international trade.
II. BRAZIL IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. 1939-55
II.1. The 'Special Relationship'
The situation of Brazil in the international system was 
in relative terms much more comfortable than that of 
Argentina. First, Brazil held her most intensive commercial 
links with the USA, which was the main market for coffee l, 
Brazil's principal export commodity. Tables III.l.B and
III.2.B show this more favourable position of Brazil.
1 A 193 5 commercial agreement allowed Brazilian coffee 
exports to enter free of taxes in the US market. Cf. ECLA, 
Estudio del Comercio Inter-Latinoamericano (New York, 
1956a), p. 76.
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TABLE III.l.B
BRAZIL: MAIN TRADE PARTNERS. 1934-55 
(In percentage)
Period S.A. Arg US Europe UK Germ Fran
1934-39
Average M 7.2 4.7 37.4 49.3 10.1 15.2 6.9
X 14.6 12.7 25 52.9 12.1 21 3.1
1940-45
Average M 18.1 10.8 49.7 23.4 14.3 — —
X 21.7 16.7 56.1 12.5 5.9 —— —
1946-50
Average M 11.6 7.9 45.8 34.4 8.6 0.8 3
X 11.4 8.4 49.7 28.6 10 0.5 •CM
1951-55
Average M 8.9 6.3 45.4 38.3 5.4 7.9 5.1
X 14.1 6.9 34.9 37.6 4.6 8.1 5.6
X = Exports to country or region of destination/total 
exports.
M = Imports from country or region of origin/total imports. 
SA = South America.
Average = Arithmetic average for the period .
Source: Minist§rio da Fazenda. Diretoria de Estatistica
Economica e Financeira, Com§rcio Exterior do Brasil. Janeiro 
a Dezembro. 1934-38 (Rio de Janeiro, 1939); Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, Anucirio Estatistico 
do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, various years).
Clearly, in comparison with Argentina, the distribution 
of Brazil's exports and imports was favourable. Considering 
that between 1939 and 1955 the USA was the basic source of 
capital goods supplies, the fact that Brazil undertook most 
of her trade with the USA implied a higher potential for 
acquiring the equipment she needed to sustain investment and 
growth. The USA absorbed and supplied more than 40 % of 
total Brazil's exports and imports, respectively, since
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1940. This percentage was less than 20 % in the case of 
Argentina. On the other hand, Table III.2.B shows that 
Brazil suffered too as a result of the post-war 'dollar 
shortage'. If this deficit was set at a relatively higher 
levels of imports from the USA than Argentina, they would 
still be regarded as a source of external disequilibrium and 
constraint on growth in post-war years.
TABLE III.2.B
BRAZIL: TRADE BALANCE. SELECTED YEARS 
(In Thousands of Cruzeiros)
Year SA USA Europe Total
1937 -395.8 536.3 -152.0 -98.6
1938 -439.8 622.3 -328.3 -222.5
1942 688.4 429.3 1134.1 2851.1
1943 15.3 1025.5 1010.6 2335.4
1947 1142.8 -5761.1 2631.2 -1609.8
1948 776.9 -1489.0 1823.4 712.0
Source: Cf. Table III.l.B.
The more favourable position of Brazil was not 
restricted to trade matters. Brazil also developed friendly 
political ties with the rising hegemon along the lines of 
Baron of Rio Branco's 'unwritten alliance' !. This had been 
instrumental by the turn of the century in the peaceful 
solution of disputes over the large Brazilian border with 
several Latin America countries. Brazil saw in the USA a
1 The expression was coined by E.B. Burns, The Unwritten 
Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New 
York, 1966).
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natural ally in her attempts to balance British influence 
and contain Argentine aspirations of regional leadership in 
Latin America. Close links with the rising hegemon would 
yield substantial pay-offs for the Brazilian economy. In 
effect, the USA adopted in the thirties a more favourable 
stance towards with Brazil than that of the British with 
respect to Argentina. In particular, as observed by Abreu, 
the USA embraced a multilateral outlook on trade policy 
which relieved the Brazilians from having to offer 
preferential concessions As a British official at the Bank 
of England put it:
'In Brazil, (US officials argued that) their position was as 
dominating as ours in Argentina and they were pleased to 
point out that they had deliberately refrained from 
canalising trade and payments there as, they claim, we have 
done in Argentina' 2.
US 'multilateralist' approach towards Brazil persisted 
despite the fact that Brazil was carrying out her trade with
1 Cf. M.P. Abreu, 'Argentina and Brazil During the 
Thirties', especially pp. 150-51.
2 Cf. FO 371 2416, 22 January 1940. However, as
discussed, the enlightened hegemon view on US policy cannot 
be extrapolated to the case of Argentina. The USA adamantly 
resisted to liberalise imports of agricultural products 
which could harm agricultural producers in the USA, as was 
seen in the 1939-40 negotiations with Argentina. This 
qualification should also be kept in mind in order to 
understand conflict in the post-war trade system, especially 
in temperate agricultural goods and textiles.
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Germany on a bilateral basis !. The June 1936 bilateral 
treaty for compensated trade with Germany permitted Brazil 
to obtain a market for her cotton exports - which the US 
market could not absorb - and diversify her sources of 
industrial goods and military equipment 2.
In the forties, the basic thrust of Brazilian external
1 It is a matter of debate whether US goodwill towards 
Brazil was secured by Vargas' ability to capitalise on 
certain strategic assets (such as the vulnerability of the 
Brazilian North East coast, during the war, the German 
efforts to enlarge her influence on Latin America and the 
Argentine enduring dispute with the USA) or was just the 
'residual' consequence of US efforts to consolidate a long­
term project of hegemony, cloaked in a multilateral approach 
to commercial relations. For S. Hilton, 'Brazilian Diplomacy 
and the Rio-Washington Axis During the World War Second 
Era', The Hispanic America Historical Review, vol. 59, no.
2 (1979), pp. 201-31, Vargas acted in a 'machiavellian' 
fashion giving false assurances to both, the USA and 
Germany, in order to keep a highly profitable double 
approach - bilateral and multilateral - to trade policy. G. 
Moura, Autonomia na Deoendencia; A Polltica Externa 
Brasileira de 1935 a 1942 (Rio de janeiro, 1980), especially 
p. 63, highlights the ability of Vargas in maintaining a 
'pragmatic equidistance' which allowed him to secure 
concessions from both rivals. M.P. Abreu, 'Anglo-Brazilian 
Economic Relations', suggests, on the contrary, that Vargas 
obtained in fact very little additional bargaining power 
from his German connection and emphasises instead the role 
played by the US long-term objective of consolidating 
multilateralism and containing Argentina.
2 The tolerance of the USA with Brazil's German 
connection was resented by the opposition to Vargas. A 
former member of the Brazilian Treasury Delegation in the 
USA complained in a personal letter to Corden Hull: 'From
1937 to 1940 the USA saw Germany leap to first place in the 
Brazilian market. (...) It saw Brazil buying arms and 
munitions in Berlin with the gold collected for coffee sold 
in New York. Impassably, the USA almost begged pardon to the 
Brazilian dictator for his provocations'. Cf. FO 371 37889 
AS 4545/36/54/6, 26 August 1944.Cf. See also G. Moura,
Autonomia na Deoendencia. pp. 91-91. Commercial links with 
Germany were subsequently terminated when the British 
imposed a naval blockade.
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policy was to obtain US support for her process of economic 
development in exchange for cooperation with US strategic 
objectives, namely the war effort and the consolidation of 
the pan-American system *. The firm support given by Brazil 
to the USA during the war placed her in the position of 
privileged recipient of US economic and military aid. 
Priority in the supply of oil and capital goods, credits 
from the Eximbank for the construction of the Volta Redonda 
integrated steel mill, the favourable Inter-American Coffee 
Agreement of 1940, military support and financing for 
investments in infrastructure, were among the advantages 
that Brazil obtained from her wartime cooperation with the 
USA. In the mid-forties, Brazil obtained the same priority 
as the UK in the distribution of oil supplies. Volta Redonda 
received from the US government the same treatment regarding 
the provision of capital goods as that of new steel projects 
in the USA herself 2.
The 'special relationship' with the USA and distant 
relations with the problematic Argentina was naturally the 
most convenient policy for Brazil in this context. This
1 This cooperation included the construction of military 
basis with U.S. personnel in the North East (April 1942), 
the declaration of war to the axis (August 1942) and the 
dispatch of Brazilian troops to the Italian war theatre by 
the end of 1944.
2 Cf. C. Escude, La Argentina Versus las Grandes 
Potencias: El Precio del Desafio (Buenos Aires, 1986), pp. 
158-82; A. Hurrell, 'The Quest for Autonomy: The Evolution 
of Brazil's Role in the International Economy', unpubl. PhD 
diss., University of Oxford, 1986, p. 31. (1986), p. 31.
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policy persisted even after the transformation of the 
international conditions with the end of the war. After 1945 
there was a decrease in the consideration that the USA had 
placed on Brazil and a reversal of the high expectations 
that Brazil held about her role in the new post-war 
international order l. The USA would adopt an increasingly 
less sympathetic appraisal to Brazil's requests for 
financial and political support. As a global power, facing 
military and economic demands in many other parts of the 
world, the USA placed Latin America in a low priority 
position in her agenda. Latin America appeared as a region 
in which US hegemony was uncontested. Yet this change in 
Brazil's position was not immediately perceived 2. The Dutra 
administration (1946-1950) did not introduce relevant 
changes in the orientation of the earlier Vargas' policies 
(1930-1945) on the external front, assuming that Brazil 
continued to be a 'special case' in Latin America. It was 
believed that US support for Brazil would continue to come, 
stemming from a solid political association 3. These
1 Cf. A. Hurrell, 'The Quest for Autonomy', p. 60.
2 It has been argued by G. Moura, 'Brazilian Foreign 
Relations 1039-50: The Changing nature of Brazil-United
States Relations During and After the Second World War', 
unpubl. PhD diss., University of London, 1984, that policy­
makers suffered from a misperception of where Brazil's true 
international interests laied after the war.
3 Cf. P. Malan, 'Relagoes Economicas Internacionais do 
Brasil, 1945-64', in B. Fausto (ed.), Historia Geral da 
Civilizacao Brasileira: 0 Brasil Reoublicano. Economia e 
Cultura. vol. Ill (Sao Paulo, 1984), p. 63.
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expectations on the continuity of US support for Brazil's 
development were still entertained by Vargas at the 
beginning of his second presidency. They seemed to be 
confirmed by the installation of the Joint Brazil-USA
Commission in July 1951 l, which should elaborate development 
projects to be financed with US support. However, no
significant new funding became available. In 1953 the new 
Republican administration made it clear that it was not
prepared to commit large sums of US public capital in
development projects in Latin America. The Eisenhower 
government insisted instead on the role to be played by 
private foreign investments in Latin America. The USA 
believed that sound economic policies in Latin America would 
be discouraged by large inter-governmental loans. Thus, 
during his second presidency Vargas was confronted by a 
completely different situation to that of his first 
presidency. The 'special relationship' had been severely 
eroded 2. The outbreak of the Korean War did not lead to an
1 The Joint Brazil-US Commission had been created in 
December 1950.
2 This process was observed by US analysts with growing 
concern: 'In recent years, US-Brazilian relations have been 
impaired by growing Brazilian nationalism, which has 
produced friction in both economic and political-military 
affairs.(...) In particular, Brazil feels that the US 
economic and financial assistance to Brazil has not been 
commensurate with Brazil's past services and present 
strategic importance to the USA, and with Brazil's value to 
the USA as a moderating influence in Latin America and 
United Nations affairs'. Cf. 'National Intelligence 
Estimate', Secret, 86, 4 December 1954, in Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1952-55. p. 643.
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enlargement of Vargas' leverage with respect to the US - nor 
did it provide the enduring boost for primary exports that 
Peron had been anxiously awaiting. Brazil would expect much 
less from cooperation with the USA and the normalisation of 
Argentine-US relations made cooperation with Argentina less 
conflictive. This facilitated a convergence of interests by 
Argentina and Brazil after 1955, which would play a 
significant role in the integration efforts of the late 
fifties.
II.2. Brazil and Argentina
From a Brazilian standpoint, the relationship with 
Argentina was the resultant of two conflicting forces: (a) 
regional rivalry, alignment with the USA and domestic 
political opposition to collaboration with the Peronist 
regime worked in different moments to set the two countries 
apart; (b) Brazil's quest for strengthening her position in 
the hemispheric system and sustaining trade led her to seek 
cooperation with Argentina.
(a) Regional rivalry, alignment with the USA and 
domestic opposition to collaboration with Per6n
Regional Rivalry. Argentina represented Brazil's 
principal rival in the quest for political and economic 
influence in Latin America. Although some diplomatic
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initiatives had been taken earlier in the century to 
establish new bases of understanding between the two 
countries l, mutual suspicion and rivalry prevailed in the 
conflictive context of the forties 2. First, Argentina 
regarded with suspicion the close cooperation between Brazil 
and the USA since she feared that this would shift the 
balance of power in Latin America in favour of Brazil. Such 
a concern was in fact a central issue in the letter that the 
Argentine Foreign Minister sent to Corden Hull with a view 
to normalising Argentine-US relations 3.
Secondly, Argentine approaches to small neighbouring
1 Saenz Pena payed a visit to Brazil in 1910 with the 
aim of establishing a /Pacto de Cordial Inteliaencia'. In 
1915 the so-called 'ABC Treaty' was signed by Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile. This intended to set up a cooperative 
framework for dealing with international problems in the 
region. The Argentina Chamber of Deputies would subsequently 
fail to ratify the treaty. Cf. L. Moniz Bandeira, O Eixo 
Arqentina-Brasil: 0 Processo de Intearacao na America Latina 
(Brasilia, 1987), p. 20.
2 Rivalry between the two countries began in the 
colonial times, in the shape of the struggle between the 
Spanish and Portuguese Empires in Latin America. A 
comprehensive study of Argentina and Brazil political 
relations is provided by L. Moniz Bandeira, Estado Nacional 
e Politica Internacional na America Latina (Brasilia, 1993). 
An account of the different moments of cooperation and 
rivalry in bilateral political relations can be found in H. 
Jaguaribe, 'Brasil-Argentina: Breve An&lisis de las 
Relaciones de Conflicto y Cooperacidn', Estudios 
Internacionales. no. 57 (1982), pp. 152-3.
3 Storni asked in his letter for the 'urgent provision 
of airplanes, spare parts and machinery to restore Argentina 
to the position of equilibrium with respect to other Latin 
American countries '. Cf. R.A. Humphreys, Latin America and 
the Second World War, vol. II (London, 1982), pp. 152-3. On 
the arms embargo to Argentina, see R.A. Potash, The Armv and 
Politics in Argentina. 1945-62: Peron to Frondizi (London, 
1980), pp. 76-77.
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countries were seen elsewhere as attempts to establish an 
hegemonic position in the region. From 1943 Brazil 
endeavoured to secure a more significant economic and 
political presence in the region, largely as a reaction to 
Argentine inroads in Latin America *. This was heightened by 
the Bolivian c o u p  of December 1943, which seems to have 
counted on Argentine support 2. In particular, hegemonic 
ambitions were attributed to the economic union treaties 
that Argentina had signed with Chile, Paraguay and Ecuador 
in 1953-54 3. During the visit of the Chilean Foreign
1 In May 1943 Brazil conceded important benefits to 
Paraguay which then had much closer ties with Argentina. 
Cooperation included a loan for public works in Paraguay. 
Paraguay and Bolivia were regarded as 'the diplomatic battle 
field between Argentina and Brazil'. Cf. Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, Biblioteca Artiqas 
(therefrom MFA-BA), Ambassador Gutierrez to Foreign 
Minister, Box 61 - Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 24 May 1943 
(author's translation). See also Moniz Bandeira, Estado 
Nacional, p. 68.
2 Cf. R.A. Humphreys, Latin America, p. 122.
3 Reactions in Brazil to the economic union treaties 
were 'of repudiation to the expansionist tendencies 
associated with the so-called doctrina iusticialista'. 
Itamaraty was also expected to endeavour to 'limit the 
Argentine action in neighbouring countries and to persist in 
its pan-American policy' (author's translation) . Cf. MFA-BA, 
Ambassador Pittaluga to Foreign Minister, Box 101 - Brasil, 
Section la, no. 5/53, C.9/953, Confidential, Rio de Janeiro,
4 March 1953. Uruguay - who faced a serious diplomatic 
conflict with Argentina at that time (see on this point 
chapter V) - was highlighted in a polemic speech delivered 
at by UDN senator Assiss de Chateaubriand, who suggested 
that Brazil should approach this country in order guarantee 
the 'sovereignty of the Uruguayan democracy, so much 
threatened by Argentina' (author's translation). Cf. MFA-BA, 
Box 101 - Brasil, Section la, N.4/53, 518/953, Ambassador 
Pittaluga to Foreign Minister, Rio de janeiro, 17 August 
1953.
93
Minister to Brazil in March 1953, Chilean diplomats hastened 
to emphasise that the economic union agreement with 
Argentina had only economic objectives and therefore it had 
not implied the formation of any kind of political bloc *.
Finally, power competition with Argentina strongly 
affected Brazil's views of bilateral trade relations. In 
particular, the opposition to Vargas maintained a vigilant 
attitude as regards trade with Argentina. In 1949, a secret 
report by UDN (National Democratic Union) senator from 
Alagoas, Arnon Collor de Mello, alleged that Brazil's trade 
with Argentina had contributed to strengthen Perdn's 
position. In his view, by doing so Brazil had been 
unconsciously helping her likely enemy in a future war 2. In 
sum, power competition shaped the hostile response that 
Argentina's initiatives at regional integration elicited 
from Brazil and the USA. Concurrently, Argentina regarded 
with suspicion Brazil's alliance with the USA and the anti- 
Argentine campaign sponsored by the UDN press. The
1 In the words of the Chilean Ambassador in Rio de 
Janeiro: 'My country needs a commercial association with all 
these countries which could complement her economy with a 
view to enhancing progress and welfare. The recent visit of 
President Peron to Chile (...) had the objective of studying 
agreements of an exclusive economic nature. All that has 
been said denying this objective is completely baseless' 
(author's translation). Cf. Correio da Manha. Rio de 
Janeiro, 12 March 1953.
2 Cf. L. Moniz Bandeira, Estado nacional. p. 66. This 
behaviour corresponds to that predicted by A. Hirschman in 
a context of power competition, namely the effort to 
increase the influence over smaller neighbours and to reduce 
exposure to trade disruption by the hegemonic rival.
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implications of this friction for bilateral cooperation will 
be addressed in more detail later, within the context of the 
conflict between Vargas and the UDN.
Brazil's alignment with the USA and US Policy Towards 
Argentina. Besides regional rivalry, Brazil's resistance to 
closer cooperation with Argentina was aimed at avoiding a 
clash with the USA. This was related to US opposition to 
regional economic integration in Latin America. The USA 
regarded with hostility Argentine initiatives at forming 
economic unions with other Latin American countries. For the 
USA, the brand of regionalism promoted by the Peronist 
regime could lead to a weakening of the pro-Western stance 
of Latin America - a fear that grew with Perdn's 'third 
position' in the context of the Cold War *. In the case of 
Europe the USA encouraged the process of economic 
integration with a view to strengthening the economies of 
crucial allies, threatened by the Soviet Union. In Latin 
America, she had no compelling reasons for adopting a 
similar policy 2. First, the Soviet challenge was perceived 
as less serious in Latin America. Secondly, economic 
integration in Latin America was being sponsored by a 
'trouble-maker' (Argentina) whose intention, allegedly, was 
to create a 'Southern Bloc' opposed to the inter-American
1 Cf. 611.35/6-2352, Secret, 1 March 1952, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1952-54. vol. IV, p. 405.
2 See on this point the interesting analyses of C. 
Escude, El Precio del Desafio. pp. 133-412.
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system *. Hence, political friction between the USA and 
Argentina created a negative climate for intra-Latin 
American cooperation.
The form in which financial aid was provided by the USA 
also affected the Latin American assessment of costs and 
benefits from regional cooperation. In Europe, US 
reconstruction aid was channelled through an inter-European 
body (the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 
OEEC) which contributed to enhance regional economic 
coordination. The financial support provided by the USA to 
the constitution of the European Payments Union also 
encouraged regional trade. Conversely, aid to Latin America 
was provided on bilateral basis, thereby reinforcing 
competition among the Latin American countries for obtaining 
support for their own national development projects, with no 
regard to a regional dimension 2. Already in June 1954, the 
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration of the USA 
observed that the
'Latin America countries want to move in a regional 
direction and have more regional relationships of an 
economic nature', and that 'our government has had a firm 
position against such a move. (...) Our discouraging such a
1 Cf. FO 371 108793 AA 1021/1, 4 January 1954; and FO 
371 108796 AA 1041/1, 20 January 1954.
2 Cf. J. Grunwald et al, Latin American Integration and 
US Policy (Washington, 1972), p. 92.
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development would create an unfavorable attitude because 
they know of the successful regional development in Europe 
on an economic basis' l.
US mainstream policy would continue to be that of providing 
bilateral finance to individual country's development plans, 
analyzed case by case. Only by the beginning of the sixties 
would US policy experience a change in favour of a more 
supportive approach.
It is then hardly surprising that Brazil assessed the 
costs of closer cooperation with Argentina as very high. To 
the extent that this could be seen as a departure from her 
alignment with the USA, this could alienate US support for 
Brazil. In addition, Argentine-US rivalry was favourable for 
her strategic interests. An alliance with the hegemonic 
power in order to contain a regional rival - which at that 
time displayed higher levels of economic development - 
looked naturally appealing for Brazil. The smooth working of 
this alliance required to confine, within narrow limits, the 
Latin American policy of Brazil, which should be 
subordinated to the inter-American approach 2. This 
contributes to an understanding of why Brazil did not
1 Cf. 'Minutes of the Meetings Held in the Executive 
Office Building', MSA-FUA, Director's files, FRC 56 A 632, 
Confidential MISC/RH-47, 21 June 1954, in Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1952-54. p. 323.
2 See on this point M. Hirst, 0 Praomatismo Imoossivel: 
A Politica Exterior do Seaundo Governo Vargas (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1990), p.22-23.
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sponsor any policy for regional integration of her own in 
the period before 1955.
Domestic Political Variables. Although a consensus in 
favour of economic cooperation with Argentina had never 
existed in Brazil, it became a central issue of debate 
between 1951 and 1954 l. The UDN, the main opposition party 
to President Vargas, regarded in Peron's Argentina the same 
type of authoritarian leadership and statist economic 
policies it was fighting at home. Vargas' Labour Minister 
Joao Goulart was considered the link between Labourist 
politicians in Argentina and Brazil. He was charged with the 
intention of coopting labour unions in order to follow in 
the steps of Per6n. UDN leaders therefore firmly opposed 
cooperation between the two governments, which they 
considered would reinforce the anti-liberal features of the 
Vargas regime 2. In addition, the various political 
compromises assumed by Vargas with a view to broaden his 
basis of support led to the coexistence of conflicting views 
within the government itself. This made it more difficult to
1 Cf. M. Hirst, 0 Pracrmatismo Imoosslvel. p. 38, has 
observed that 'in no other moment in contemporary Brazilian 
history had the relations with Argentina generated such a 
great internal political mobilisation' as in the first 
months of 1954. 'Peronism was characterized as a major 
threaten which could distress both the internal order and 
the international commitments of Brazil' (author's 
translation).
2 The UDN even accused Vargas of having received a 
funding from Peron for his electoral campaign. Meanwhile, 
the Peronist press in Argentina openly voiced its preference 
for Vargas candidacy. Cf. L. Moniz Bandeira, Estado 
Nacional. pp. 71-2.
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implement any coherent foreign policy strategy *. Domestic 
feuds in Brazilian politics, within and outside the 
government, had left Vargas practically immobilized 
respecting a more open and firmer cooperation with Per6n.
This point is clearly illustrated by the confused 
episode involving Vargas and Per6n in relation with the 
Argentine-Chilean Treaty of Economic Union of October 1953 
(the "Santiago Act”). The Treaty was criticised in Brazil on 
the grounds that it went against the idea of pan-American 
unity - in other words, it was seen as hostile with respect 
to the USA. In turn, in a confidential conference given at 
the Argentine National War School in November 1953, Per6n 
reacted to these criticisms making a strong attack on 
Itamaraty and Vargas. Per6n affirmed in his speech that 
Vargas had indeed privately given his support to a Southern 
economic union and had promised to join Argentina and Chile 
as soon as political conditions in Brazil were more 
propitious to the initiative 2. The subsequent leaking and
1 Thus, Vargas nominated Baptista Luzardo, a close 
friend of both Peron and Vargas, as Ambassador in Argentina. 
At the same time, he nominated Joao Neves da Fontoura, a 
political enemy of Luzardo and firmly opposed to cooperation 
with Argentina, as Foreign Minister. Luzardo's diplomatic 
activities in Buenos Aires were under continuous attack by 
those associated with Neves da Fontoura. Cf. for instance 
letter from Neves da Fontoura to Vargas, CPDOC GV, 
'Correspondencias' (15) 52.01.13/3, Rio de Janeiro, 17 March 
1952 and letter from Luzardo to Vargas, CPDOC GV 52.08.22/2, 
Buenos Aires, 7 August 1952.
2 It seems that Argentina did invite Brazil to 
participate in the economic union treaty with Chile, and 
this received a sympathetic consideration by Vargas. 
Contacts were carried in confidentiality through Ambassador
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publication of this conference by Argentines exiles in 
Montevideo provoked a political storm against Vargas, for 
what was seen as his secret dealings with the Argentine foe 
*. Particularly revealing was the so-called 'Joao Neves 
Accusation', an interview given by the former Minister Joao 
Neves to the 0 Globo newspaper of Rio de Janeiro 2. In the 
interview, Neves accused President Vargas of ambiguity in 
his foreign policy and stated that only his presence at the 
head of the Ministry had prevented Vargas from entering into 
a full understanding with Per6n. It is also interesting to 
note that even Vargas' supporters limited their defence to 
just denying the existence of conversations between the two 
Presidents, without addressing the point of whether 
cooperation with Argentina could in fact be instrumental in 
furthering Brazil's interests in the international economy
3
Luzardo in Buenos aires, a personal friend of both Vargas 
and Peron. Cf. A. Lanus, De Chapulteoec al Beagle, pp. 286- 
88.
1 Anti-peronist feelings in Brazil were so strong that 
this alleged connection between Vargas and Peron was used 
again in September 1955 in an attempt to discredit Vargas' 
political heirs, Kubitschek and Goulart. Cf. FO 371 114027 
A 1041/1, Confidential, 30 September 1955.
2 O Globo. 4 April of 1954. Joao Neves left the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations in June 1953, when he was substituted 
by Vicente Rao. Vargas then also nominated Joao Goulart for 
the Ministry of Labour and Osvaldo Aranha for the Economic 
Ministry.
3 This point was made by H. Jaguaribe, 'A Dendncia de 
Joao Neves', Cadernos de Nosso Tempo, vol. 1, no. 2 (1954), 
pp. 83-100. In his remarkable analysis of the Joao Neves' 
'accusation', Jaguaribe offered a broad discussion of the
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These cleavages in Brazilian politics contributed to 
the cool reception that Perdn's initiatives had in Brazil. 
Looking only at the structural variables it could have been 
expected that cooperation with Argentina had reached higher 
levels after 1953. By then it was already clear that 
Brazil's special relationship with the USA had come to an 
end. In addition, the rapprochement between Argentina and 
the USA after 1952 weakened the basis of Brazil's former 
foreign policy. Cooperation in the early fifties would have 
been much less costly than in the forties. Systemic 
constraints had been eased while mounting economic 
difficulties made cooperation more attractive. However, the 
internal dynamics of Brazilian politics made cooperation 
with Argentina problematic. Bilateral relations had become 
a significant internal political issue because domestic 
opposition to Vargas associated cooperation with Argentina 
with a reinforcement of Vargas' populist policies.
(b) Brazil's quest for strengthening her position in 
the hemispheric system
The advantages of the special relationship with the USA 
was qualified by Brazil's fears of too great a dependence on 
the USA. Moreover, Brazil considered that her strategic
convenience of closer political and economic cooperation 
between Brazil and Argentina, and set forth many ideas that 
would reappear later in the 'New Foreign Policy'.
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importance for the USA depended in part on her capacity to 
play the role of mediator between the USA and Latin America 
countries. This strategy was stated by Brazilian diplomats 
in the following terms:
'In the American continent, the economic asymmetry between 
the USA and Latin American countries and the singular 
position of Brazil as an intermediate between the two 
extremes, are the basis for the definition of Brazilian 
policy l.
Such a role demanded mollifying Argentine resistances to 
Brazil's regional initiatives and securing a respectful 
consideration from other Latin America countries. Some 
ambiguity in the Brazilian position was therefore inevitable 
in order to make compatible the condition of 'principal 
ally' of the USA and that of 'honest broker' in Latin 
America affairs. Both dimensions of Brazil's foreign policy 
were related and demanded a delicate balancing act by 
Brazilian diplomats.
Several pieces of evidence confirm this view about 
Brazil's regional and hemispheric policy. It was 
particularly apparent in the episode of Brazil's decision to
1 Cf. Archive of the Ministery of Foreign Affairs of 
Brazil, Itamaraty Palace, Brasilia, Centro de Documentcao 
(therefrom CDO), 'Expedidos Diversos no Exterior: Instrugdes 
para a Delelgagao Brasileira a Conferencia Econdmica da 
OEA', Confidential, 13 August 1957 (author's translation).
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grant diplomatic recognition - despite US efforts to prevent 
such a move - to the Argentine government which emerged from 
the c o u p  of June 1943. Brazil sought to prove her autonomy 
regarding the USA and gain the sympathy of Argentina and 
other Latin America countries, thereby reinforcing what she 
saw as her role of 'chief link' between the USA and Latin 
America l. At the beginning of 1946, US Ambassador Berle 
would complain about what he considered 'Vargas' inescapable 
habit of playing both ends against the middle, whereby, 
while working closely with us, he likewise maintained close 
connections with Argentina' 2. Talking to Uruguayan 
diplomats, Brazilian Foreign Minister Velloso observed that 
Brazil
'would follow US policies towards Argentina, but within
1 The British ambassador in Rio observed that 'in the 
first days after the revolution (the military coup in 
Argentina) the Brazilian ambassador was enthusiastic in his 
praise of the new regime and it seemed that the Brazilian 
government thought the opportunity a good one to assert 
dramatically its independence of the USA'. Cf. FO 371/ 
33598, 10 June 1943. In a private conversation with British 
diplomats, the Brazilian Foreign Minister Osvaldo Aranha 
emphasised the gains accruing to Brazil from an early 
recognition of the Argentine government: (i) proved that 
Brazil was really South American; (ii) obtained the sympathy 
of the Argentines; (iii) would stimulate Argentine 
cooperation in continental affairs; (iv) showed to the USA 
that Brazil remained 'the chief link' between them and South 
America; (v) it 'assisted in consolidating Brazilian 
leadership in the region'. Cf. FO 371 33589 A 6952, 27 July 
1943. It should also be recalled that Aranha, along with 
Pinedo, played a key role in the 1939-41 rapprochement 
between Argentina and Brazil.
2 Cf. Telegram, 835.0012-2546, Secret, 25 February 1946, 
in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946. p. 223.
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certain limits, which would not include (•••) the
application of economic sanctions nor adopting measures
which could made difficult cordial relations in the future' 
1
A similar attitude can be observed in the case of President 
Dutra's favourable opinion about the Argentine presence at 
the Rio de Janeiro Conference on hemispheric security 2. 
Moreover, this view seems to have been widespread among
1 Cf. MFA-BA, 'Entrevista con el Ministro de Relaciones 
Exteriores Sr. Velloso Sobre la Reciente Nota Argentina', 
Box 31-3 - Brasil, 596/944, 12 November 1944 (author's
translation). Moreover, Brazil resented the so centralised 
control that the USA exercised over certain Brazilian 
exports during the war. Osvaldo Aranha is reported to have 
expressed 'in confidential terms that he was opposed to the 
control mechanisms through which the USA managed the 
distribution of quotas for rubber and rubber tires. These 
mechanisms are heavily centralised in Washington' (author's 
translation). Cf. letter from Ambassador Gutierrez to the 
Foreign Minister, MFA-BA, Box 31-4 - Brasil, 249/943, Rio de 
Janeiro, 22 June 1943.
2 Cf. FO 371 61157 AS371/371/2, 7 January 1947. In May 
1947 Presidents Peron and Dutra met at the border city of 
Uruguayana, where they inaugurated an international bridge 
and signed agreements on border trade and transportation. 
Dutra himself was criticized by Lacerda after his meeting 
with Peron. Lacerda (who seems to have been haunted by fears 
of 'secret pacts' between Brazil and Argentina) feared that 
Dutra had assumed the commitment to give political support 
for Argentina in exchange of Argentina wheat. Cf. MFA-BA, 
Box 76 - Brazil, 367/947-la, Strictly Confidential, 6 June 
1947. P.R. Almeida, A Diolomacia do Liberalismo Econdmico: 
As Relacoes Internacionais do Brasil Durante o Governo' Dutra 
(Sao Paulo, 1991) offers substantial evidence that the 
change in foreign policy prompted by Dutra was less dramatic 
than usually suggested in the bibliography.
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Brazilian diplomats *. Efforts to mediate were not limited to 
the conflict Argentina-USA. Brazil also made a frustrated 
attempt to mediate in the conflict between Argentina-Uruguay 
of the early fifties in order to stop the stream of economic 
sanctions then imposed by the Argentines 2.
The two directions mentioned in Brazil's foreign 
economic policy were not contradictory. They reflected the 
idea that strengthening Brazil's position in the region 
would contribute to the 'special relationship' with the USA. 
On the other hand, this implied keeping bilateral relations 
with Argentina within limits acceptable to the USA. A move 
towards a broad understanding with Argentina would have 
aroused suspicions in the USA and hence compromised Brazil's 
priority objective of maintaining the 'special 
relationship'.
1 Even Joao Neves da Fontoura, who strongly criticized 
the 1953 Argentine initiative to form an economic union, 
expressed to US ambassador Byrnes the view that 'Argentina 
could not be left outside of the pan-American system and 
that the USA should give more attention to the attitudes and 
opinions of the neighbours of Argentina' (author's 
translation). Cf. MFA-BA, 'Politica Internacional y 
Americana', Box 71 - Brazil, Section la, 17, 834/946, 10 
December 194 6.
2 Cf. letter from Neves da Fontoura to Vargas, CPDOC GV 
52.01.14, Rio de Janeiro, 14 January 1952. On the Argentine- 
Uruguayan conflict see chapter V.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF BILATERAL TRADE
A critical factor among the determinants of cooperation 
are the gains from trade. For two neighbouring countries 
which present a large complementarity in agricultural 
production, trade is a powerful incentive for cooperation. 
Trade brings about welfare gains that governments balance 
with the political influence of affected domestic interests. 
Three variables will be used in order to assess the role of 
bilateral trade in shaping cooperation policy: (1) the rates 
of growth of bilateral trade as compared with that of total 
trade; (2) changes in the structure of bilateral trade; (3) 
the constraints on the expansion of trade imposed by the yet 
low degree of industrialisation achieved by Argentina and 
Brazil at the time.
III.l. Rates of Growth of Bilateral trade
Two principal periods in the evolution of bilateral 
trade are easily identified in table III.3. During Second 
World War (1939-45) bilateral trade expanded steadily as a 
result of the collapse of traditional markets and suppliers 
in centre economies. In the early post-war period (1946-55) 
this dynamism receded, although trade in constant dollars in 
the triennium 1953-55 was three times higher than in 1934- 
36.
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TABLE III. 3
BRAZIL: BILATERAL TRADE WITH ARGENTINA. 1934-60 
(In Millions of Constant US$ Dollars of 1946-47)
Year Balance
(l)-(2)
Exports
(1)*
Imports
(2)**
1934 -25.6 28.1 53.7
1935 -30.9 25.3 56.3
1936 -47.6 24.9 72.5
1937 -52.9 29.0 82.0
1938 -41.8 26.0 67.9
1939 -10.1 33.7 43.9
1940 -15.8 36.9 52.8
1941 3.8 58.6 54.7
1942 21.6 82.8 61.2
1943 -23.1 64.0 87.1
1944 -11.9 116.4 128.4
1945 -25.4 113.3 138.8
1946 27.1 93.9 66.7
1947 32.7 113.5 80.8
1948 31.1 107.3 76.2
1949 -31.6 85.0 116.7
1950 -25.8 73.6 99.4
1951 -5.5 101.7 107.3
1952 52.6 86.3 33.7
1953 -98.0 69.9 168.0
1954 -4.5 90.6 95.1
1955 -46.9 90.3 137.3
1956 -10.4 56.8 67.3
1957 11.0 87.5 76.5
1958 15.9 89.7 73.8
1959 -51.8 35.9 87.8
1960 -32.6 46.8 79.4
* Exports of Brazil to Argentina, FOB prices.
** Imports of Brazil from Argentina, CIF prices.
Source: Cf. Table III.l.B. Prices in US$ constant dollars 
calculated by using US wholesale index, United States, 
Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United 
States (Washington, various years).
Table III.4 shows the expansion of Argentine and 
Brazilian exports to each other and to the rest of the 
world. In the case of Argentina, trade grew at higher rates 
with Brazil than with the rest of the world in any of the
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sub-periods considered, namely 1934-39, 1940-45, 1946-50 and 
1951-55. In the case of Brazil, the role of the regional 
market was less stable and a significant change took place 
after the war.
TABLE III.4
EXPORTS BY DESTINATION: YEARLY RATES OF GROWTH 
(In percentage)*
Average 1934-9 1940-5 1946-50 1951-55 1934
Total Arg 
Arg to Bra
0.03
1.3
5.5
10.9
-3.3
7.0
0.6
4.7
1.9
2.7
Total Bra 
Bra to Arg
0.9
3.3
16.1
21.1
6.7
-7.5
-10.1
-1.9
9.4
7.2
* Calculated from Exports and Imports in US$ Constant 
Dollars of 1946-47.
Total Arg = Total Exports of Argentina.
Total Bra = Total Exports of Brazil.
Arg to Bra = Exports of Argentina to Brazil.
Bra to Arg = Exports of Brazil to Argentina.
Source: Cf. Tables III.l.A, III.l.B and United States,
Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United 
States.
Brazil's exports to Argentina grew at an especially 
impressive rate during the war and her participation in the 
Argentine market rose from an average of 5.2 % in 1936-8 to 
an average of 24.5 % in the period 1942-44. She became the 
principal source of Argentine imports in 1943. The trend was 
reversed after the war and Argentina lost ground in Brazil's 
total trade. This probably did not reduce Brazilian 
commercial interests in Argentina, however, as the 'dollar 
shortage' reinforced the interest in diverting imports away
from the dollar area and - as will be shown later - this
provided an incentive for cooperation in trade and payments.
III.2. The Structure of Bilateral Trade
The important place that Argentina occupied as a source 
of Brazilian imports is largely explained by her critical 
role as a supplier of wheat. Argentina was almost the 
exclusive source of wheat imports for Brazil until 1950. 
After 1950 the USA became a significant competitor for 
Argentina in the Brazilian market due to the highly 
favourable (subsidised) terms provided by Public Law 480. 
Moreover, the crop failure of 1952 in Argentina severely 
reduced her exports of wheat to Brazil. This was reflected 
in the fall of the Argentine participation in the Brazilian 
market by the end of the period.
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TABLE III.5
BRAZIL: IMPORTS OF WHEAT. 1937-55
Average From Argentina Total 
(Millions of US$ Dollars)
Argentina/total 
(Percentage)
1937-39 36.2 36.7 99
1940-45 39.9 40.1 99
1946-50 62.8 70.1 89.6
1951-55 66.6 122.1 54.6
1956-60 63.0 107.0 61.7
Source : Cf. Table III.l.B.
Despite this fall, wheat continued to be the backbone 
of the Argentine exports. This dominant role of wheat 
reflected in a low degree of diversification of the 
Argentine export structure (cf. table III.6). Brazil, on the 
other hand, exported to Argentina a wider range of products, 
especially during the war (cf. Table III.7).
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TABLE III.6
BRAZIL: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA
(Percentage of Total Value of Imports from Argentina)
Year I II III IV
1938 4 94 2
1939 6 92 2
1940 3 95 3
1941 5 89 6
1942 11 83 6
1943 14 80 6
1944 12 83 5
1945 1 6 89 4
1946 2 9 82 7
1947 3 93 4
1948 2 96 2
1949 1 2 96 1
1950 3 96 1
1951 4 94 1
1952 2 7 89 2
1953 1 97 2
1954 2 94 3
1955 1 98 1
1956 3 94 3
1957 1 95 3
1958 • • 97 2
1959 1 98 1
1960 1 96 3
I = Live Animals
II = Raw Materials
III = Food
IV = Manufactures
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica,
Anuario Estatistico do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, various 
years) and R. Fonseca, 'O Intercambio Brasil-Argentina e o 
Comercio Intra-Industrial', Master Dissertation, Pontificia 
Universidade Catolica, Rio de Janeiro."
Ill
TABLE III.7.
BRAZIL: COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA
(Percentage of Total Value of Exports to Argentina)
Year I II III IV
1938 26 72 2
1939 30 61 10
1940 30 49 21
1941 42 28 30
1942 33 20 47
1943 40 25 35
1944 36 22 42
1945 37 20 43
1946 49 28 23
1947 37 28 35
1948 52 29 19
1949 50 25 26
1950 30 56 14
1951 47 44 9
1952 47 47 3
1953 25 74 1
1954 17 81 2
1955 39 56 4
1956 26 71 2
1957 44 55 • •
1958 39 60 1
1959 49 48 2
1960 47 49 3
I = Live Animals
II = Raw Materials
III = Food
IV = Manufactures
Source: Cf. Table III.6.
On average, during 1940-45 and 1947-50, 36.3 % and 23.3 
% of Brazilian exports to Argentina were manufactures,
respectively. As a result, the interest of Brazilian
(■
industrial exporters in the regional market grew
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consistently in this period !. Brazilian exports of iron 
bars to Argentina rose from 2,170 tons on average between 
1935-38 to 17,494 tons on average between 1940-42, 
representing 8 % and 82 %, respectively, of the total
Argentine market. Cotton textiles occupied an especially 
significant place in Brazil's exports of manufactures, as 
can be seen in table III.8. The 1940 trade agreement with 
Argentina received enthusiastic support from Brazilian 
industrialists. This opened a market that would alleviate 
the situation of the Brazilian textile industry, which, 
industrialists claimed, suffered from surplus capacity 2.
1 Already in mid-June a Brazilian economic mission was 
formed with a view to visiting Latin American countries and 
promoting industrial exports. Cf. Federagao das Indtistrias 
do Estado de Sao Paulo (FIESP), circular no. 68-40. 28 June 
1940. The fear of loosing the markets conquered by Brazilian 
exporters during the war attracted the attention of the 
industrial associations. In the 1944 Industrial Congress 
governmental support was demanded in order to keep the 
momentum of industrial exports after the war. Cf. FIESP 
Conqresso Brasileiro da Indtistria (Sao Paulo, 1944), p. 10. 
This concern was also evidenced in a memorandum handled to 
President Vargas in late 1952. Cf. Boletim Informativo FIESP 
(therefrom BI) , vol. XIV, no. 167 (15 December 1952), p. 
273. See also BI, vol. XVI, no. 184, 13 April 1953, pp.42- 
43, in which the specific role that the Argentine market 
could play was emphasized.
2 Cf. FIESP, Relatorio dos Trabalhos Realizados em 1940 
(Sao Paulo, 1941a), especially pp. 33-4. Cf. also letter 
from Pupo Nogueira, Director of the Textile Syndicate to 
Osvaldo Aranha, CPDOC OA, 40.6.23, Sao Paulo, 20 June 1941. 
Exports of textiles, however, fell sharply in the early 
fifties, out of increasing competition from other countries 
and Balance of Payments difficulties in Argentina.
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TABLE III.8
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS OF COTTON TEXTILES BY DESTINATION
(In tons and percentage)
Year Argentina Total Argentina/Total
In Tons In Percentage
1940 3270 3959 82.7
1941 5544 9238 62.2
1942 13133 25539 59.3
1943 5319 26434 24.0
1944 9718 20070 58.1
1945 6637 24246 35.7
1946 2453 14103 18.9
1947 5541 16678 34.6
1948 2123 5638 37.7
1949 2880 4010 71.8
1950 988 1361 72.6
1951 771 1596 48.3
1952 62 153 40.5
Source: Cf. Table III.l.B
The expansion and diversification of trade led to 
changes in the relative position of the two countries. 
Firstly, Brazil's trade balances with Argentina, which had 
been negative during the thirties, turned into a surplus in 
the forties (cf. table III.3). Secondly, Brazil's importance 
as a source of imports for Argentina was enhanced. In 
effect, before the Second War World War Brazil had been 
principally regarded in Argentina as an important market for 
wheat. In addition, by the late thirties, contemporary 
Argentine observers pointed out the compensatory role that 
Brazil could play in alleviating Argentina's trade deficits
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with the USA !. During the war, however, Brazil would also 
become a source of industrial and semi-industrial products, 
such as that of rubber and iron goods, for Argentina. The 
conditions generated by the war and the USA economic boycott 
of Argentina heightened the latter's reliance on trade with 
Brazil. Correspondingly, the Argentine market became a 
significant outlet for Brazilian industrial production.
III.3. Industrialisation and Constraints on Trade
The inability of Argentina and Brazil to supply to each 
other the industrial goods which were most demanded - 
capital and intermediate goods - constrained the expansion 
of trade in the period. This had to do with the fact that 
industrial capabilities were still relatively limited in 
both countries. The process of industrialisation demanded 
increasing imports of capital goods. However, Argentina and 
Brazil had not yet developed their capital goods industries. 
This can be seen in tables III.9.A, III.9.B, III. 10.A and
III.10.B. While industrial production was concentrated on 
light consumer industries, industrial imports were
1 As Brazil displayed a negative trade balance with 
Argentina and a positive one with the USA, it was suggested 
that these countries could find a 'triangular modus 
vivendi(...) which could resolve at the same time, by simple 
compensation, the current economic differences between 
Brazil and the USA and the problems between Brazil and 
Argentina' (author's translation) . Cf. A. Perez Constanzo, 
'Relagoes Comerciais Argentino-Brasileiras; O Brasil Como 
Mercado Consumidor de Trigo e Seus Problemas', Boletim do 
Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores. no. 11 (1939), p. 19.
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increasingly composed of capital goods.
TABLE III.9.A.
ARGENTINA; STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
(In Percentage of the Total Value of Production)
Period 1937-39 1948-50 1959-61 1963-65
Sector
Food and 
Beverage 37.3 25.4 19.2 18.7
Textiles 7.4 11.7 8.4 7.8
Wood products 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7
Paper and 
Printing 6.3 4 3.6 3.4
Chemicals 4.4 5.8 7.1 8
Petrochemical 4.9 5.3 7.2 8.4
Rubber Products 0.8 1 1.4 1.4
Leather Products 4.2 4.7 4.1 2.6
Metal products 6.4 6.5 8.8 10.1
Transport Equipm 
&Non Electrical 
Machinery
•
5.6 9.6 14.1 16.5
Electrical
Machinery 1.1 2.0 6.6 5.8
Source: C. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of 
the Argentine Republic (New Haven, 1970), p. 224.
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TABLE III.9.B.
BRAZIL: STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
(In Percentage of Total value of Production)
Sector/Year 1939 1949 1959
Food 31.4 31.9 24.1
Beverage 2.6 3.2 2.4
Textiles 23.0 18.6 12.5
Shoes and Garment 4.6 4.3 3.4
Chemicals 5.8 5.2 8.9
Metal products 6.3 7.6 10.5
Machinery 1.1 1.6 2.8
Transport Equipment 2.9 2.3 6.8
Electrical Machinery 0.9 1.4 3.5
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica,
Servigo Nacional de Estatistica. Censo Industrial (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1950 and 1960) .
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TABLE III.10.A
ARGENTINA: IMPORT STRUCTURE. 1935-54
(In Percentage of the Total Value of Imports)
Period 1935-39 1945-49 1950-54
Sector
Food and Beverages 9.9 6.8 7.8
Textiles and Garment 25.6 15.6 9.5
Chemicals 6.2 6.8 7.3
Iron Manufactures 12.1 12.5 13.8
Rubber Products 1.0 1.7 1.8
Vehicles and NEM a/ 11.9 18.8 20.3
a/ NME = Non Electrical Machinery
Source: C. Diaz Alejandro, Essavs on the Economic History, 
p. 257.
TABLE III.10.B
BRAZIL: IMPORT STRUCTURE. 1938-50
(In Percentage of Total value of Imports)
Sector/Period 1938-39 1948-50
Food Products, Beverage
and Tobacco 14.9 17.9
Fuels, Lubricants,
Derivatives coal and Petroleum 13.1 12.8
Raw Materials 30 23.8
Capital Goods 29.9 35.2
Manufactured Consumer Goods 10.9 9.7
Others 1.2 0.6
Source: W. Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development 
in Brazil (New Haven, 1965), p. 36.
In Argentina, imports of transport equipment and non 
electrical machinery increased their participation in total 
imports from 11.9 % to 20 % between 1935-9 and 1950-4. In
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Brazil, capital goods imports increased their participation 
in the import structure from 29.9 % to 35.2 % between the 
late thirties and the late forties. Conversely, the 
representation of these sectors in the total value of 
production of the industry was 6.7 % and 11.6 % in the case 
of Argentina (1937-39 and 1948-50, respectively) and 4.9 % 
and 5.3 % in the case of Brazil (1939 and 1949,
respectively). This meant a supply constraint on the 
expansion of trade *. A similar conclusion can be reached 
looking at Argentine and Brazilian exports of capital goods 
in the period (cf. Tables III.11.A and III.11.B). The 
participation of Argentina and Brazil as suppliers of
capital goods to each other was extremely low (1.2 % is the
highest figure, for 1941-42) illustrating the limits placed
by industrial capabilities on higher regional trade and 
inter-dependence.
1 In developed countries, in accordance to the pattern 
early observed by S. Linder, Essays on Trade and 
Transformation (London, 1961), industrial production and 
import structure tend to overlap, giving rise to more 
intensive trade.
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TABLE III.11.A
ARGENTINA: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS! OF CAPITAL GOODS*
(Thousands of US$ current dollars)
Average 1941-42 1951-2
Total Imports capital goods 11480.6 96.8
Imports from Brazil 63.7 0.24
Brazil/Total (% source) 0.6 0.3
Total exports capital goods 1106.3 406.1
Exports to Brazil 198.6 23.4
Brazil/total (% destination) 18 5.8
SA/total (% destination) 92.6 91.5
* Capital Goods defined as "Non Electrical Machinery” in the 
Argentine Foreign Trade Classification.
Source: Reptiblica Argentina, Direcci6n General de
Estadisticas y Censos, Anuario de Comercio Exterior (Buenos 
Aires, various years). Figures in current US$ dollars 
obtained by applying official sellers' exchange rate, as 
provided by the Banco central de la Repfiblica Argentina, 
Suplemento Estadistico de la Revista Econdmica (Buenos 
Aires, various years).
TABLE III.11.B
BRAZIL: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CAPITAL GOODS*
(Thousands of US$ current dollars)
Average 1941-2 1951-2
Total imports capital goods 6815.9 124540.3
Imports from Argentina 78.9 19.4
Argentina/total (% source) 1.2 0.02
Total exports capital goods 238.3 194.3
Exports to Argentina 84.2 4.7
Argentina/total(% destination) 35.3 2.4
SA/total (% destination) 99.6 17.1
SA and Africa/total(% destin.) 99.6 93
* Capital Goods defined as "Machinery and Tools for the 
Industry" in the Brazilian Foreign Trade Classification
Source: Elaborated from Ministerio da Fazenda, Comercio
Exterior do Brasil: Por Mecadorias Segundo os Paises (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1947 and 1953). Figures in current US$ Dollars 
obtained by applying official sellers' exchange rates, as 
provided by W. Baer, Industrialization and Economic 
Development, pp. 271-72.
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In addition, industrialisation followed a competing 
pattern in both countries. This had to do with the so called 
'easy stage' of import-substituting industrialisation or 
ISI-1. At this stage, industrial growth occurred in 
industries which were less demanding in terms of technology 
and scale - the consumer goods industries. The pattern of 
import substitution was intensive in capital and 
intermediate goods exports, while the internal market was 
reserved for domestic producers of consumer goods *. 
Therefore, there was an implicit bias against regional trade 
in industrial goods. The participation of imports of 
industrial consumer goods in total imports tended to fall in 
the period, reflecting this pattern of industrialisation 
(cf. Tables III.10.A and III.10.B).
Moreover, the fact that these industries did not 
present such significant increasing returns as the capital 
goods implied that the costs of protection were still 
relatively reduced in this stage of industrialisation - 
despite of the fact that there were gains in efficiency and 
growth to be obtained through higher levels of 
specialisation 2. Conversely, the scope for competition with 
domestic production were high. As far as both economies were
1 This pattern has been thoroughly reviewed in the 
literature. Cf., for example, J. Katz and B. Kosacoff 
(1989), El Proceso de Industrializacion en la Argentina; 
Evolucion. Retroceso v Perspectiva (Buenos Aires, 1989).
2 This argument will be develop more rigorously in the 
next chapter.
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specialised in similar products, it can be expected that 
industrialists would resist liberalising industrial trade. 
In other words, gains from trade were relatively lower, 
while the costs of competition could be high - thus 
increasing the resistance of domestic producers to freer 
trade *.
Finally, not only were the capital- and technology­
intensive industries poorly represented in the industrial 
structure of Argentina and Brazil. They also were run by 
state firms (in Brazil) or directly controlled by the 
military (in Argentina). The Direction of Military Factories 
(DGFM) in Argentina controlled a group of metal-mechanical, 
naval and chemical industries, including some nationalised 
German firms 2. In Brazil, public enterprises were prominent
1 As mentioned, Brazilian industrialists were very much 
in favour of a more aggressive policy for industrial exports 
to other Latin American countries. But they were far from 
enthusiastic with the idea of a free trade area. In a speech 
given at the Military Club in April 1948, the Brazilian 
industrial leader Roberto Simonsen offered a sceptical view 
regarding economic integration in Latin America on the basis 
of the lack of industrial complementarity in the region: 
'Given the nature of tropical production, large part of the 
(Latin American) countries offer similar products. (...) 
Thus, a Latin American customs union would not have, at the 
moment, the same justification, foundations and results as 
a customs union among European countries' (author's 
translation). Cf. R. Simonsen, '0 Plano Marshall e um Novo 
Criterio nas Relagoes Internacionais', in FIESP, Simonsen e 
a Ooeracao Pan-Americana (Sao Paulo, 1958), p. 134. In order 
words, in the conditions of the late forties, a free trade 
area would imply more competition rather than the exchange 
of complementary products.
2 On the role of the military in encouraging 'strategic' 
industrial production see R.A. Potash, The Armv and 
Politics, pp. 80-81. In particular, General Savio, as 
Director of the DGFM, push forwards an initiative for
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in steel (CSN), vehicles (National Motors) and some 
chemicals (National Alkalis). Although direct control of the 
industry by the military was less marked in Brazil than in 
Argentina, the Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War 
School) showed an especial and early concern with industrial 
production in its programmes l. The importance of the links 
between industry and defence, in turn, were repeatedly 
emphasized by Brazilian industrialists, who carefully 
cultivated a connection with military interests 2. It can be 
expected that this perceived inter-relation between industry 
and defence was a factor preventing the liberalisation of 
trade in industrial goods in the region. Uncertainties about 
the redistribution of industrial capabilities in a free 
trade area placed efficiency and welfare concerns in a
building an integrated steal mill and a weapons factory. On 
the DGFM see also R. Mallon and J. Sourrouille, Politica 
Economica en una Sociedad Conflictivar El Caso Arqentino 
(Buenos Aires, 1973), p.8.
1 The School was created in August 1949 and from the 
beginning identified 'development' and 'industrialisation' 
as areas which should receive careful attention by the 
military. Cf. A. Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing 
Patterns in Brazil (Princeton,1971), pp. 172-187.
2 The FIESP systematically received military authorities 
and students of the Superior War School. In an editorial of 
its official publication, FIESP praised 'the inter-relation 
of interests, the growing rapprochement between the military 
and the producers (as classes orodutoras). (...) Weapons,
ammunition and transport equipment cannot be improvised, but 
they result from an advanced and well organized industrial 
machine, that is, from an industry technically developed' 
(author's translation) . Cf. BI, vol. VIII, no. 92 (9 July
1951), p. 1. See also BI, vol. XIX, no. 159 (20 October
1952), p.30; BI, vol. XVIII, no. 220 (21 December 1953), 
p.447; BI, vol. XX, no. 239 (3 May 1954), p.139.
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second place as regards independent production of 
"strategic” industrial goods in a context of power rivalry 
in the region.
On the other hand, trade in capital goods in that 
period is illustrative, in a very reduced scale, of a trend 
that would acquire full expression in the late sixties and 
seventies, namely the importance of the regional market for 
capital goods exports from Argentina and Brazil. Although 
Argentine-Brazilian trade in capital goods fell in the 
period 1950-55, Latin America continued to represent the 
largest destination of these exports for Argentina. In the 
case of Brazil, Latin America was the almost exclusive 
destination of her exports of capital goods in 1941-2, of 
which Argentina accounted for more than a third. Latin 
America participation in Brazil's total capital goods 
exports fell in the period 1951-2, matched with the increase 
in the participation of a group of African countries 
(Abyssinia, Mozambique and Angola). Clearly, absolute 
figures are rather unimpressive. As mentioned, they can at 
best be considered as indicative of the potential of the 
regional market for expanding trade in these sectors, rather 
than a actual significant force in stimulating cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
1. This chapter has analyzed the structural variables 
shaping economic cooperation and integration between
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Argentina and Brazil in the period 1939-55. These variables 
were related to changes in the international system and to 
the evolution of trade and industrialisation. But behaviour 
did not result directly from structures. Domestic and 
international political variables played a significant role 
as well, especially in certain critical situations, in which 
a new response to changing conditions was required.
2. The outbreak of Second War World was a major event 
that prompted a convergence of perspectives in Argentina and 
Brazil. Ministers Federico Pinedo and Osvaldo Aranha led a 
very significant effort to expand regional trade at a moment 
in which international trade collapsed. These efforts gave 
rise to an agreement for progressive free trade in November 
1941, which would have permitted the creation of a regional 
market for new industries. However, the agreement was not 
implemented. The reason lies on growing regional and 
hemispheric rivalry after 1942. It is likely that rivalry 
could have been lessened had the Argentine conservative 
government agreed to open the political regime in the early 
forties and had US policy-makers followed a more judicious 
approach towards Argentina. In any case, the potential for 
conflict can be traced to the position of Argentina and 
Brazil in the international system, which shaped divergent 
perspectives on constraints and opportunities. Argentine-US 
rivalry had been nourished by trade friction and the 
Argentina's close association with the UK. After 1942, 
Argentine stubborn neutrality made the Argentine-US conflict
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especially hard to resolve. Conversely, Brazil held a close 
economic and political association with the rising hegemon, 
on which she based her special relationship with the USA. 
For Brazil, bilateral relations with Argentina were then 
confined by the limits established by the special 
relationship and regional power rivalry.
However, Brazil's position was more complex than just 
following US policy. Brazil tended to see herself as the 
'chief link' and interlocutor between the USA and Latin 
America, a position which could enhance her bargaining power 
with respect to the USA. This demanded some ambiguity in 
order to gain Argentina's confidence. Brazil's interests in 
Argentina were reinforced by the fact that substantial gains 
from trade could be obtained, stemming from complementarity 
in agricultural production.
3. In the early fifties a convergence of perspectives 
again emerged. In both countries, the dollar shortage 
represented a stimulus for the diversification of trade and 
the celebration of payments arrangements. Disenchantment 
with the results of the special relationship with the USA 
was high in the Brazilian government at that moment. 
Gradually, a new perception of the position of Brazil in the 
international system began to emerge. It seems that in 1953 
Vargas regarded with sympathy an attempt at rapprochement 
initiated by Peron. However, cooperation with Argentina 
became an issue of Brazil's domestic political conflict. As 
a result, behaviour diverged from what could be expected
126
from the change in structural conditions. The rapprochement 
between the two countries would have to wait for a change in 
Brazilian politics, which would occur after the election of 
Kubitscheck in 1955.
4. Gains from trade were also a major variable 
favouring cooperation. Complementary in primary production 
and, especially during the war, high rates of growth of 
bilateral trade and trade diversification, contributed to 
develop a mutual interest in cooperation. Although the 
growth of trade receded in the post-war period, the 'dollar 
shortage' continued to be a powerful 'focusing device' in 
favour of cooperation in trade and payments matters. Still, 
supply capabilities and the progress of import-substitution 
in consumer goods restrained the possibility of achieving 
higher levels of regional trade.
5. The contradictory forces influencing the economic 
relations between Brazil and Argentina produced an ambiguous 
but distinct pattern of cooperation in the 1939-55 period 
which can be labelled restrained bilateralism (this point is 
developed in chapter V). If Brazil made serious efforts to 
expand trade and preserve a climate of political cordiality 
with Argentina, she was not prepared to assume any major 
political commitment that could compromise her strategic 
alliance with the USA or boost Argentine prestige in Latin 
America. Divergent perspectives as regards systemic 
constraints and the existence of geopolitical rivalry 
imposed a political threshold on cooperation which both
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countries would not be able to cross. Economic integration 
in its different forms necessarily requires certain degree 
of "sovereignty surrender" or at least "shared sovereignty" 
in several policy areas. This implies a process of complex, 
continuous political negotiation not only in the realm of 
inter-state relations but also regarding the various 
domestic groups whose interests could be affected. 
Therefore, economic integration needs both a domestic and an 
international political climate conducive to the process of 
negotiation and subsequent adjustments in the economy. None 
of these conditions was present in the case of the attempts 
at economic integration between Argentina and Brazil in the 
period 1939-55 - except during the short-lived effort for 
cooperation of the years 1939-41. As a result, cooperation 
stopped at a relatively early stage of economic inter­
dependence and hence the attempts to form a would-be free 
trade area in 1941 and 1953 were unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER IV. 1 DEVELOPMENTAL!SM' AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. 1956-60
INTRODUCTION
After 1956 most of the barriers that had hindered 
closer economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil in 
the past fifteen years began to fade. The objective of this 
chapter is to analyze why these barriers fell and left space 
for a remarkable convergence of objectives and policies in 
the external and domestic realms, clearing the way for the 
creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA) in February 1960. It will be argued that the 
increase in regional cooperation between 1956-60 resulted 
from the perception that international support was faltering 
precisely when the region embarked in an ambitious programme 
of industrialisation. Section I discusses international 
constraints on the 'developmentalist' project embraced by 
Argentina and Brazil in this period. These constraints were 
related to US policy towards Latin America (1.1) and the 
consolidation and configuration of the post-war 
international economic regime (1.2). A systematic divergence 
of perspectives between Latin America and the USA with 
respect to the pace of industrialisation and financing for 
development stimulated a convergence of perspectives in
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Argentina and Brazil. In addition, the failure of the 
Bretton Woods multilateral economic regime to include trade 
in agricultural goods and ease external disequilibrium also 
contributed to generate similar defensive attitudes in the 
two countries.
Sections II and III analyze Argentine-Brazilian 
bilateral economic cooperation in this period. A large 
reformulation of Brazil's foreign economic policy took 
place, in which Latin America and Argentina received higher 
priority (section II). Concurrently, Argentine diplomacy in 
the region, although much less dynamic than in the previous 
period, evolved in a convergent direction to that of Brazil 
(section III). Problems remained in bilateral relations, but 
the dominant trend was in favour of cooperation. This 
created a climate conducive for the creation of a regional 
market.
Section IV focus on the impact of trade and 
industrialisation on cooperation. Although regional trade 
lost dynamism in the late fifties (IV.1), industrialisation 
began a new stage at that moment (IV.2), the second phase of 
import-substituting industrialisation (ISI-2), based on 
capital-intensive industries. A rapid process of structural 
transformation occurred in which technological change and 
increasing returns to scale played a more significant role. 
As a result, the benefits of a regional market increased in 
the ISI-2 phase.
Finally, section V presents the main conclusions of the 
chapter.
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I. 'DEVELOPMENTAL!SM' AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
I.l.The Challenge of Developmentalism
A critical factor reshaping the context of economic 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil after 1955 was the 
adoption in the two countries of the so-called 
'developmentalist' policies. The governments of Juscelino 
Kubitschek in Brazil (January 1956 - January 1961) and
Arturo Frondizi in Argentina (May 1958 - March 1962) set out 
to promote a process of rapid structural transformation of 
the economy aimed at building the industrial basis for 
sustained long-term growth. These policies reflected a 
higher articulation in economic thought on industrialisation 
and a response to the experience of the past twenty years. 
Convinced that the pre-193 0 international insertion of Latin 
America had gone for good, developmentalist policy-makers 
sought to solve the problem of achieving sustained growth 
without external disequilibrium by means of 'completing' or 
'integrating' the industrial structure of the country. This 
meant a "deepening" of the process of import-substitution. 
As shown by Sikkink, such an objective implied !s (i) 
granting first priority to investments in capital-intensive 
industries, in the intermediate goods sector (energy,
1 Cf. K. Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions; Developmentalism 
in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, 1991), pp. 33-36. See also C. 
^zusterman, Frondizi ans the Politics of Developmentalism in 
^raentina. 1955-62 (London, 1993), pp. 75-97.
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steel), the capital goods sector (mechanical and electrical 
machinery) and durable consumer goods (motor vehicles and 
domestic appliances), along with major investments in 
infrastructure; (ii) relying on massive external financing 
and technological support, from public and private sources, 
on the understanding that domestic resources and 
capabilities were insufficient to accomplish the desired 
transformation of the industrial structure; (iii) allowing 
for substantial state intervention, aimed at directing 
investments towards high priority areas; (iv) sustaining 
very high rates of investment with a view both to accelerate 
the process of development and to catch-up with the 
industrialised world.
Achieving developmentalist goals would require 
substantial inflows of foreign resources. Imports of capital 
and technology from the centre would be crucial to sustain 
industrialisation. Therefore, developmentalist policies 
would tend to exacerbate balance of payments disequilibrium 
in the short run. Although external disequilibrium was 
recurrent in the economic performance of Argentina and 
Brazil !, the concentrated effort to industrialise strained 
the external sector in 1956-60. The key feature of 1956-60 
was thus the conflict between the region's drive for 
industrialisation, which heightened demands for 
international cooperation, and the view that the 
international system had placed Latin America in a
1 It was already discussed in chapter III that the external 
sector remained a central concern for Argentina and Brazil in the 
period 1939-55.
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unfavourable position.
This conflict was strengthened by the negative 
evolution of the Argentine and Brazilian external sectors in 
the period. In effect, table IV. 1 shows that the terms of 
trade and the participation of Argentina and Brazil in world 
exports fell between 1955 and 1960, while the external 
public debt increased in order to finance current account 
deficits.
TABLE IV.1
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: PERFORMANCE OF 
THE EXTERNAL SECTOR
(In millions of current US$ dollars and in percentages) 
Period Balance Terms of Increase Exp as %
of Trade Trade
(a)
Debt (%) 
(b)
World Trade 
(c)*
Argentina
1946-50 1349.3 -55.6 2.374
1951-55 206.7 -788.1 50 1.2906
1956-60 -46.4 -1773.6 146.3 0.9976
Brazil
1946-50 1384.5 -5.4 2.237
1951-55 674 -138 237.1 2.019
1956-60 655 -1240.5 32.1 1.3372
Sources: Elaborated from ECLA, External Financing in Latin 
America (New York, 1965) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), International Financial Statistics (Washington, 
various years).
(a) Effect of the deterioration of the terms of trade: five 
years losses or gains as compared with export and import 
prices of 1950
(b) Percentage of increase in the long-term public debt
(c) Percentage of the country's exports in total world 
exports
* Data correspond to the period 1948-50
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This can also be seen in table IV. 2. The purchasing 
power of exports declined slightly 1 while the demand for 
imports increased strongly, boosting current account 
deficit. As public international loans were not enough to 
cover the deficit, then short-term, more expensive financing 
from suppliers had to be sought, as will be shown later, 
generating higher external instability.
TABLE IV.2
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(In millions of current US$ dollars)
ARGENTINA BRAZIL
Year X Purchas. Current X Purchas Current
Power (a) Account Power (a) Account
1950 1579 129 1891 142
1951 1385 -238 2174 -560
1952 799 -385 1623 -780
1953 1302 354 1858 17
1954 1225 78 1811 -259
1955 1113 -266 1615 -40
1956 1127 -143 1794 -2
1957 1120 -333 1817 -358
1958 1179 -301 1676 -329
1959 1317 -23 1789 -433
1960 1476 -266 1756 -643
1961 1371 -728 1767 -318
(a) Purchasing power of exports of goods and services =
total exports plus the real effect of the terms of trade.
Source: ECLA. Balance of Pavments Statistics (New York,
1986).
1 On average, the purchasing power of Argentine exports fell 
from US$ 1.3 millions in 1950-54 to US$ 1.2 millions in 1955-59. 
In the case of Brazil, these figures were US$ 1.9 millions (1950- 
54) and US$ 1.7 millions (1955-59).
IPP-
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In sum, external disequilibrium was the consequence of 
the big gap that existed between developmentalist objectives 
and the conditions of the international economy, which were 
not favourable for the strong industrialisation drive that 
policy-makers wanted to adopt. This gap constituted the 
basis of friction with the USA and convergence of 
perspectives between Argentina and Brazil in the late 
fifties.
1.2. 'Developmentalism' and the Evolution of US Policy 
Towards Latin America
The Second World War made the hegemony of the USA 
virtually uncontested in the Western World in general and in 
Latin America in particular. The objectives of the USA were 
to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in Latin 
America and secure a favourable environment for her business 
interests. And this at the least possible cost in terms of 
public resources, given the US already heavy involvement in 
other areas of the globe. The result was the combination of 
anti-communism and free enterprise which constituted the 
bases of US foreign policy towards the region since the late 
forties and throughout the fifties !. This policy, however, 
confronted the expectations that had been generated in Latin 
America by US promises of post-war support for development, 
and subsequently, by the success of the Marshall Plan in
1 Cf. S.G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, especially 
84-99.
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Europe l. Views sharply diverged and inter-American relations 
then moved towards conflict.
In the late thirties and during the war the USA signed 
bilateral trade agreements with several Latin American 
countries with a view to securing a stable wartime supply of 
foodstuffs and strategic materials. Concurrently, efforts 
for 'limited' import-substitution in Latin America were 
regarded sympathetically, to the extent that they would 
compensate for the loss of imports formerly obtained in 
Europe and Asia. Thus, US and Latin American objectives and 
strategies, namely the stabilisation of export prices and 
the diversification of the economy through ISI, tended to 
converge. However, a basic disagreement over long-term 
objectives persisted and this was bound to come to surface 
with the end of the war.
First, while the USA regarded Latin America industrial 
diversification as an emergency, temporary goal, Latin 
America considered this a long-term objective 2. Secondly,
1 The USA had promised that after the war economic 
cooperation would be provided for Latin America, but the 
discussion of this was postponed several times and eventually set 
aside by the USA at the Bogota Conference of 1948. Cf. R. Thorp, 
'A Reappraisal of the Origins of Import Substituting 
Industrialisation', p. 190. By the end of this year President 
Truman administration had already made his mind about policy 
objectives, which would be based on anti-communism and free trade 
and investment. These two objectives would be forcefully pursued 
by the Eisenhower administration after 1953. Cf. S.G. Rabe, 
Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 16-41.
2 The promise that the Marshall Plan would reinvigorate the 
European demand of primary goods from and the supply of 
industrial goods to Latin America was therefore unwelcome by the 
Latin Americans at Bogota, as this entailed that the region would 
occupy its former position of primary producer. Cf. S. Rabe, 
Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 17.
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the USA regarded extensive state intervention in the economy 
and the organisation of commodity markets as an instrument 
of the war period. In the US view, a liberal international 
economy (at least for most industrial goods), working upon 
a multilateral bases, was the desirable framework for post­
war economic relations. Conversely, many Latin American 
countries were ready to adopt a wide array of protection and 
promotion policies for the industrial sector *. From the 
Latin America's point of view, the USA should give support 
to this, by providing financial and technological assistance 
and by stabilising commodity markets 2. The USA, however,
1 The concern with the preservation of industry after the 
war received considerable attention by industrialists. Cf. R. 
Simonsen 'O Plano Marshall e urn Novo Criterio nas Relagdes 
Internacionais', in FIESP, Simonsen e a Qperacao Pan-Americana 
(Sao Paulo, 1958) p. 15-17. In addition, the failure of attempts 
at liberalisation in the post-war years, notably in Brazil during 
the Dutra years (1946-51) and in Argentina under the Provisional 
Government (1955-58), convinced these countries that employment 
and growth required the promotion of industry. Cf. P.R. Almeida, 
'A Diplomacia do Liberalismo', pp. 7-15; P. Gerchunoff, 'A Note 
on the Economic Policies of the Liberating Revolution', in G. Di 
Telia and R. Dornbusch (eds.), The Political Economy of 
Argentina. 1946-83 (London, 1989), pp. 103-7.
2 Such a perception was also held by the industrial private 
sector. Speaking in 1947 to the Economic Council of the National 
Confederation of Industries of Brazil (CNI), Roberto Simonsen 
observed that 'no plan for the defense of the continent can be 
dissociated of a plan for economic development. Political 
objectives require first to work out economic problems, which are 
perhaps more serious here than in Europe' (author's translation) . 
Cf. R. Simonsen, 'Sugestoes para uma Politica Pan-Americana: 
Problemas do Desenvolvimento Economico Latinoamericano', in 
FIESP, Simonsen e a Qperacao Pan-Americana, p. 72. Industrialists 
considered that the war had compromised the renovation of their 
industrial equipment and that they would have to compete in 
disadvantage. Simonsen thus demanded a 'technical conference 
(...) in order to elaborate an emergency plan and precisely 
establish the amount of external contributions that each country 
needs' to renovate industry (author's translation). Cf. ibid., 
p. 74. See also FIESP BI, vol. I, no. 18 (12 December 1949), p.2 
and BI, vol. I, no. VIII (24 April 1950), pp. 1-2.
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held different views. She considered that Latin America 
could achieve high growth by the proper mobilisation of 
existing resources in the private sector and therefore no 
special financial assistance would be required. Promoting 
heavy industry on the bases of extensive state intervention 
and US public capital was regarded as unsound 1. It was 
believed that financial contributions would have the effect 
of delaying the adoption of policies in favour of private 
foreign investment, this the genuine solution for Latin 
America economic difficulties. The US negative approach to 
Latin American demands created recurrent friction in 
hemispheric relations in the fifties. Strong feelings were 
held in Latin America about being 'forgotten' or 'taken for 
granted' by the USA 2.Interests and perceptions in the USA 
and Latin America then largely diverged and this would lead 
to growing discontent in the region.
Moreover, the articulation of the Latin American 
discontent in common proposals was probably made easier by 
the fact that inter-American fora had been created, 
originally with the aim of fostering US security objectives 
in the region 3. This gradually became an arena in which 
Latin America collectively presented her economic demands.
1 On the views in the State Department, see R.A. Pastor, 
Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Princeton. 1992), p. 174.
2 Cf. P. Malan, 'Relagoes Economicas', p. 65.
3 Cf. G. Moura, Sucessos e Husoes: Relacoes Internacionais 
do Brasil Durante e A p o s  a Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1991a), pp. 73-76; G. Connel-Smith, The Inter-American 
System (London, 1966), pp. 220-28.
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Bodies like the Council for Economic and Social Affairs and 
the inter-American Economic Conferences were used to exert 
pressure on the USA in the economic field.
Latin American demands focused on three basic points 
that the USA in turn was reluctant to accept: (i) increasing 
public financing for development in Latin America, including 
the creation of a regional development bank with this 
objective; (ii) establishing commodity agreements for the 
main Latin America exports in order to stabilise prices and 
markets; (ii) consultations between the USA and affected 
Latin America countries as regards the disposal of
agricultural surplus under Public Law 480 (which provided 
for the subsidised exports of agricultural products) and the 
imposition of quotas and tariffs on Latin America exports
Disputes along these lines dominated the Economic 
Conference of American States that took place in Buenos
Aires between 15 August and 4 September of 1957. The
endurance and repetitive fashion of the conflict was
emphasised by Assistant Secretary Rubottom. Commenting on 
the Buenos Aires conference, he observed that while Latin 
America advanced its 'customary proposals', the USA had to 
insist on her 'traditional and thoroughly justifiable view' 
that 'foreign and domestic private capital(...) should carry
the main burden of financing and promoting economic
1 Cf. 'National Intelligence Estimate: Conditions and Trends 
in Latin America', NIE 80/90-55, Washington 6 December 1955, in
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-57. vol. VI
(Washington, 1987), pp. 20-22. See also 'Summary of Main Subjects 
for Discussion at Buenos Aires Economic Conference and of Related 
United States Policies', Enclosure, Washington, 2 August 1957, 
in Foreign Relations of the United States. 19555-57. pp. 140-43.
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development, and that the Governments should seek to create 
investment climates conducive to a higher rate of private 
investment' *.
In sum, the USA remained fairly impermeable to Latin 
American demands for higher financial contributions to 
development. This represented a recurrent and growing source 
of friction in hemispheric relations. The conflict between 
the USA and Latin America was already present in the early 
post-war period. But it would mature in a common regional 
positions after 1955. The politics of regional rivalry 
between Argentina and Brazil then left room for cooperation 
in their negotiations with the USA.
1.3. Latin America Convergence in the Multilateral
Arena
The Bretton Woods agreements and post-war mechanisms of 
international cooperation were seen by most Latin America 
countries as highly inadequate for attending their specific 
problems. Firstly, the multilateral institutions in charge 
of providing funds for Balance of Payments (BOP) 
disequilibrium and for development - the International
1 Cf. 'Letter From the Assistant of State for Inter-American 
Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Assisstant Secretary for 
International labor Affairs, Department of Labor (Werts)', 
Washington 23 October 1957, Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1955-57. p. 580. Cf. also 'Instruction From the Secretary 
of State to All Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics”, 
CA-3710, Confidential, Washington, 21 October 1957, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1955-57. pp. 573-78. The demands 
placed by latin America in the Buenos Aires Conference would 
subsequently re-emerge in Kubitscheck's 'Pan-American Operation' 
(more on this can be found below).
140
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), respectively - fell 
short of possessing the resources and flexibility that 
Keynes had envisaged as necessary to underpin a 
fundamentally open trade and payments international system 
This was reflected in the 'ad hoc' solution found for the 
European reconstruction, which was financed by the Marshall 
Plan, an emergency programme set up outside the multilateral 
mechanisms of Bretton Woods. Secondly, the organisation 
envisioned to complement the payments system in the field of 
international trade, the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO, set up in the Havana Charter of 1948) would never be 
sent to the US Congress for ratification and this was a 
setback for Latin America's interests. The USA considered 
that the ITO entailed a set of rules that would jeopardise 
the principles of non-discrimination and the free operation 
of the market forces. The loose institutional arrangement 
that by default took its place, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), neither incorporated the proposals 
put forward by the developing countries in Havana 2 nor
1 Keynes proposed the creation of a 'Clearing Union' that 
would be endowed with an amount of resources for BOP adjustment 
much higher than than that proposed in the 'Stabilisation Fund' 
of US negotiator White. Keynes also considered that pressure for 
BOP adjustment should be placed in both debtor and creditor 
countries in order to avoid a tendency towards deflation in the 
international economy. Cf. R.N. Gardner, Sterlincr-Dollar 
Diplomacy in Current Perspective; The Origins and the Prospects 
of our International Economic Order (New York: 1956), chapter V.
2 In fact, Article XVIII of the GATT incorporated some 
special provisions for developing countries previously agreed in 
Havana. However, this article was subject to so many restrictions 
that in fact it was much easier to resort to the normal provision 
stated in Article XII of the GATT, allowing for import controls
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included the sectors (agriculture and textiles) which were 
of highest interest for them *.
As a result, Latin American perspectives converged 
towards a rather pessimistic outlook on the region's place 
in the post-war international economy and prompted the 
adoption of a defensive stance during the Havana and GATT 
negotiations 2. Brazil played an active role in setting 
forward the demands of developing countries and sought to 
reinforce common positions 3. The attitude of the Brazilian 
negotiators was spurred by the strong opposition to 
liberalisation by Brazilian industrialists, which accused 
the GATT of being a rich-country club interested in
in case of BOP difficulties. If this was easier, it was 
considered unsatisfactory. ECLA pointed out that restrictions 
based on BOP were necessarily contingent, a short-term device 
that could not properly be used as an instrument for a long term 
policy of development. Cf. ECLA, Estudio del Comercio Inter- 
Latinoamericano. pp. 51-52.
1 The 1948 ITO Charter was drafted by a Preparatory 
Committee during the conferences of London (September 1946), 
Geneva (April 1947) and Havana (November 1947). Debates were 
dominated by two different cleavages. The first one was the US-UK. 
dispute about dismantling the system of imperial preferences. The 
second one had to do with developing countries' demands to be 
allowed to protect industry. Cf. G. Curzon, Multilateral 
Commercial Policy (London, 1965), chapter VII; R.N. Gardner, 
Ster 1 ing-Dollar. pp. 364-8. See also C. Wilcox, A Charter for 
World Trade. (New York, 1949), especially pp. 35-36 and pp. 142- 
43. The GATT originally emerged as a provisional arrangement 
(proposed by the USA at the end of the 1946 London Conference) 
in order to provide a legal framework for the round of tariff 
negotiations launched in 1947.
2 The convergence of perspectives included most developing 
countries. Argentina, however, did not participate of 
multilateral institutions until 1960 and hence did not play a 
role in this move (see II) . Conversely, the GATT was regarded 
with much concern and attention in Brazil.
3 Cf. P.R. Almeida, 'A Diplomacia do Liberalismo', pp. 10-
11.
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haltering industrial development in Brazil. The 
representative of FIESP at the Torquay GATT negotiations 
argued that 'Brazil can only loss for remaining in a body 
like the GATT whose activities, in fact, are only beneficial 
for the developed countries' and whose aims were 'to 
stratify countries in their current position'. He also 
pointed out that Brazil should abandon the GATT in order to 
have 'freedom of movements for encouraging economic 
development' *. Therefore, at the beginning, the main 
objective of the Latin American countries in general and 
Brazil in particular was to be able to protect industry from 
international competition 2.
By the end of the fifties, however, Latin America 
defensive attitude was somewhat modified. In 1958, the 
influential 'Haberler Report' on market access for 
developing countries (a study carry out under the auspices 
of the GATT by a commission of experts chaired by Gottfried 
Haberler) concluded that developed countries' policies had 
in fact hindered the export potential of developing ones 3. 
The Report prompted more offensive action by Latin America
1 Cf. BI, vol. VI, no. 71 (20 May 1951), pp. 26-27, 20 May 
1951 (author's translation). In particular, Brazilian 
industrialists feared the consolidation of tariffs during the 
GATT negotiations at Torquay. As no system of ad-valorem tariffs 
existed in Brazil, tariff protection was very low (see also next 
chapter). The consolidation of tariffs would place industry in 
a difficult situation when non-tariff protection was removed. Cf. 
BI, vol. V, no. 51 (25 September 1950), p. 1; BI, vol. V, no. 53 
(9 October 1950), pp. 1-2.
2 Cf. D. Tussie, The Less developed Countries, pp. 19-22.
3 Cf. GATT, Trends in International Trade. Report bv a Panel 
of Experts (Geneva, 1958).
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as regards export promotion. This reflected the perception 
that external difficulties required coordinated action on 
the export side of the equation as well *. Moreover, the 
fears of loosing ground in international markets were 
reinforced by two major events. First, the formation of the 
European Economic Community in 1957. The trends in the EEC 
were to give protection to European production of temperate 
agricultural products and discriminate in tropical products 
in favour of the former European colonies in Africa and 
Asia. Secondly, the waiver from GATT rules obtained by the 
USA in 1955. This allowed her to continue the programme of 
subsidies and protection for the agricultural sector. In 
both cases, common concerns about a Latin American 
marginalisation of the world economy were heightened.
In sum, Latin American countries felt excluded from 
post-war international economic arrangements. The features 
assumed by US policy towards Latin America and the 
shortcomings of the Bretton Woods institutions were already 
clear by 1956-8, when the developmentalist programme was 
launched. Fears already present in the region in the early 
post-war years were heightened in the second half of the 
fifties by the creation of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) , by US subsidies to agriculture and by the findings of 
the 1958 Haberler Report on constraints on exports from
1 This would be the substance of the developing countries' 
'Note on the Expansion of Trade' of 1959, the 'Program of Action' 
of 1961 and the new chapter on "Trade and Development” 
incorporated to GATT (Part IV) in February 1965. The latter was 
direct result of the momentous pressure arising from the 
culmination of the First UNCTAD in 1964. Cf. D. Tussie, The Less 
Developed Countries, pp. 32-36.
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developing countries. The perception of being marginalized 
from the international system was the framework within which 
efforts for closer economic cooperation would develop in the 
late fifties.
II. SHIFTING FOCUS IN BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY; FROM THE 
'PAN AMERICAN OPERATION' TO THE 'NEW FOREIGN POLICY'
II.1. Setting a New Agenda for Hemispheric Relations
It was Brazil, the former closest ally of the USA in 
Latin America, that would take the lead in presenting Latin 
American demands for more comprehensive economic 
cooperation. As mentioned, Brazil had been gradually 
modifying her position as regards the 'special relationship' 
with the USA since 1945. Brazilians came to understand that 
after the war the country had been placed on the same 
footing as other Latin American countries and no special 
consideration would be given to Brazil's development needs. 
As part of an hemispheric security alliance within which all 
members expected to obtain a similar treatment from the USA, 
Brazil seemed to have lost her former international 
protagonism. Although President Vargas had acknowledged 
these changes in the international context, it was only 
after Vargas' suicide (August 1954) that political 
conditions in Brazil allowed a broad reformulation of 
foreign policy.
The need for change was reinforced by President
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Kubitschek's (1955-1960) developmentalist objectives. He 
would adopt a new policy towards Latin America in which 
regional cooperation was expected to place Brazil as a key 
actor in the reformulation of hemispheric economic relations
l. With this objective in mind, Kubitschek launched in May 
1958 the so-called 'Pan-American Operation' (Qperacao Pan- 
Americana. Portuguese acronym OPA). As during the Vargas 
era, the main objective of OPA was to secure international 
cooperation for industrialisation, invoking US strategic 
interests. However, in this case, the special relationship 
would be between Latin America and the USA - and not just 
between Brazil and USA, as in the forties 2. The bilateral 
approach gave way to a regional approach. The main ideas in 
the OPA proposal were the following:
(i) immediately after the war it was necessary for the 
USA to concentrate her efforts on the reconstruction of 
Europe in order to contain the Soviet military threat. This 
objective, however, had been by large successfully
1 These ideas were detailed by Kubitschek in his conference 
at the Superior War School of Rio de Janeiro, 26 November 1958, 
reprinted in J. Kubitschek, Kubitschek e a Qperacao Pan-Americana 
(Sao Paulo, 1963).
2 Looking at the OPA in retrospective, a Brazilian diplomat 
emphasised, in the early sixties, that 'the history of the inter- 
American system since the creation of the Pan-American Union in 
1890 to the launching of OPA in 1958 can be described as a series 
of meetings of a political-juridical (or even political-rhetoric) 
nature. (...) During this long period nothing or very little has 
been done to modify or improve the socio-economic conditions of 
the continent. The important thing that makes the OPA a hallmark 
in the pan-American history is the fact that for the first time 
an attempt was made to unify Latin America as a whole in the 
defence of common interests' (author's translation). Cf. CDO, 
'Oficios Recebidos, Diversos no Exterior, 1960-61, Delegagao do 
Brasil Junto a OEA', 562/196, Anexo 2, Confidencial, 28 December 
1961.
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accomplished by the mid-fifties. Since then, Latin America 
had become the 'weakest link' of the Western defensive 
system because of her economic backwardness and the poverty 
of the majority of the population. These conditions were 
conducive to social unrest and political instability. 
'Underdeveloped regions are regions open to the penetration 
of anti-democratic ideas. The battle of the Western World is 
(...) the battle of development' l.
(ii) Competition between the two blocs of the Cold War 
was no longer confined to the military arena. In fact, it 
was taking place principally in the economic field. 
Developing countries would accept help from whoever was 
prepared to provide it on the most generous terms. 
Kubitscheck also pointed out that the economic support 
offered by the Soviet Union to developing countries compared 
favourably with that offered by the USA 2.
(iii) Development could only be achieved by means of a
1 Cf. letter from Kubitschek to Eisenhower, CPDOC/BDE 
58.08.22, 22 August 1958.
2 A series of commercial and technical cooperation 
agreements had been signed between some Latin America countries 
(including Argentina and Brazil) and the Soviet Union in the 
fifties. These agreements worried the USA. In 1956 the USA called 
attention to the 'astute and aggressive' Soviet policy in Brazil: 
'the principal weapon is Russia's willingness to supply petroleum 
equipment to national monopolies contrasting with US 
unwillingness to do so'. Cf. 'Memorandum from the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland)', 7 June 
1956, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-57. p. 703. 
The same concern existed respecting the Argentine-USSR trade 
agreement of May 1953, in which the USSR offered to Argentina 
credits for imports of petroleum, transport equipment and 
machinery. Cf. Department of State, Central Files, 'Economic and 
Financial Review, Third Quarter 1953', Microfilm, Section c-2, 
16 May 1954. On the Kubitscheck's use of this agreements to press 
for more US support see G. Moura, Sucessos e Ilus5es. pp. 38-39.
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dramatic increase in the rate of investment in 
infrastructure and basic industries. The scale of the 
investment effort was necessarily beyond the possibilities 
of foreign and domestic private capital. Therefore, massive 
inflows of public funds would be a sine qua non for the 
success of the development drive *. This enhanced levels of 
public financing ought to be complemented with other 
measures to be taken both in developing and developed 
countries. They comprised most of the Latin America early 
demands to the USA: the stabilisation of the Latin America 
export markets through commodity agreements; the promotion 
of economic integration in Latin America; technical 
cooperation and the creation of a propitious environment for 
foreign private investment.
II.2 Latin America in Brazil's Foreign Policy
When the OPA was launched the Eisenhower Administration 
was especially sensitive to the Latin American situation as 
a result of Milton Eisenhower's reports over his 'finding 
trips' in the region. Still of more impact was the hostility 
that plagued Vice-President Nixon's visit to Latin America 
in May 1958 2. In November 1958 a Special Commission of the
1 See in particular J. Kubitschek, Kubitschek. pp. 81-88.
2 Nixon had to flee from Caracas after violent street 
demonstrations. For an account of the incident, cf. M.S. 
Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin 
America (New York, 1963), pp. 211-12. As a form of placating the 
discontent that appeared to have become so widespread in Latin 
America, the USA eventually decided to accept the creation of a 
regional development institution - the Inter-American Development
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Organisation of the American States (OAS) was created, the 
so-called 'Committee of the Twenty One', in charge of 
implementing the OPA. However, the initial diplomatic 
success of the initiative was overshadowed by the subsequent 
failure of the USA to take effective action. This was 
already crystal clear in November 1956. President 
Kubitscheck spoke of his disappointment with the 'lack of 
interest in Brazil and Latin America in general' shown by 
the USA, in a speech given at the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Rio de Janeiro l. New attempts at reviving the 
initiative were made by Kubitscheck, the last of which
through a new letter to Eisenhower in July 1959, with no
success 2.
Concurrently, Latin America grew in importance in the 
formulation of Brazil's external policy. There was a shift 
from a firm opposition to regional blocs - that had 
characterized the 'special relationship' era - towards a 
favourable stance on economic integration. At least three 
factors seem to account for this new Brazilian perspective. 
First, as mentioned, Brazil was searching for a new foreign
Bank, IDB - in August 1958. However, if the Eisenhower
administration was already sensitive about the need of a fresh
approach to Latin America, the event that effectively prompted 
the acceptance of the IDB was the creation of a regional bank for 
development in the Middle East, which rendered unsustainable the 
refusal to create a similar institution in Latin America. Cf. S. 
Dell, The Inter-American Development Bank; A Study in Development 
and Financing (New York, 1972), pp. 28-30.
1 Cf. FO 371 139075, AB1021/2, Confidential, November 20th
1956.
2 Cf. letter from Kubitschek to Eisenhower, CPDOC BDE 
60.07.19, code 1, Brasilia, 19 June 1960. At that moment the USA 
was in fact already studying a new approach to Latin America.
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policy after the exhaustion of the 'special relationship'. 
In the speech given at the Superior War School Kubitscheck 
observed that Brazil had been 'aloof from the world and even 
from Latin America'. A new international role for Brazil was 
expected to come from 'assuming' Brazil's Latin American 
identity *. Secondly, Brazil had developed an industrial 
basis and technological skills that allowed her to play a 
much more active role at the commercial and technological 
level than in the past. The idea of looking at Latin America 
for more 'mutual aid', while expecting less from the USA, 
entailed the realisation that Brazil was then placed in a 
favourable position to reap the benefits of more trade and 
cooperation in Latin America 2. In effect, Brazil approached 
small neighbouring countries like Uruguay, Paraguay and 
Bolivia in order to reach agreements on economic cooperation 
3. Last but not least, Brazil felt confident about the
1 Cf. J. Kubitschek, Kubitschek. p. 81.
2 Commenting on a conversation held with Itamaraty's 
Political Director, a British diplomat concluded that 'the 
Brazilians believed that a lot could be done by the use of soft 
currencies like the cruzeiro and the peso and by a rational 
deployment of the technical know-how which some of the Latin 
America countries now possess. Brazil herself is one best placed 
in this respect'. Cf. FO 371 139075 AB 1021/2, Confidential, 20 
November 1959.
3 Both Kubitschek and Foreign Minister Horacio Lafer spoke 
about bringing these countries within Brazil's 'commercial orbit' 
and 'Brazilian leadership' in the region. These statements were 
made at a press conference in Peru, at the end of a Latin 
American trip that included Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile. Cf. FO 
371 126224 AB 1042/1, Restricted, 6 December 1957. As mentioned, 
this more aggressive export approach towards Latin America 
received the support of the Brazilian industrialists. Already in 
1956, they had asked former Foreign Minister Macedo Soares 'for 
the adoption, with respect to South American countries, where the 
possibilities of an expansion of manufactured exports are higher, 
of a more realistic and economically oriented policy' (author's
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possibility of becoming a regional leader. At that time, her 
main competitor, Argentina, was beset by economic and 
political disarray, which prevented this country from 
playing a more active role in regional politics !.
In sum, the combination of three factors encouraged 
Brazil to seek new opportunities in regional affairs. First, 
the need to find a new international role for the country. 
Secondly, the opportunity to use more extensively Brazil's 
new industrial and technological capabilities. Thirdly, the 
relative retreat of Argentina, which facilitated Brazilian 
leadership in the region. Like Argentina in the forties, the 
relatively more advanced position achieved by Brazil at a 
regional level, and her dissatisfaction with the support 
received from centre countries, made her more inclined to 
play an active role in regional affairs.
II.3. The 'New Foreign Policy'
These new trends in Brazil's foreign policy would 
experience further developments in the period 1960-1964,
translation). Cf. BI, vol. XXXVIII, no. 394 (22 April 1957), p. 
107.
1 The British Ambassador in Rio observed that Brazil's 
new role had 'been made considerably easier by the setback 
suffered by Argentina as a result of the debacle of the Perdn's 
regime' and because Brazil had 'an excellent and much reputed 
foreign service'. Cf. FO 371 126224 AB1042/1, 6 December 1957, 
handwritten comments of Ambassador Harrison. On the 
characteristics of the Brazilian foreign service that made it a 
highly professionalised institution, relatively isolated from 
political pressure, see C. Barros, 'The Formulation and 
Implementation of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Itamaraty and the New 
Actors', in H. Munoz and J.S. Tulchin, Latin American nations in 
world politics (Boulder, 1984).
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during the Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart presidencies, when 
Brazil embraced the so-called 'Independent' or 'New Foreign 
Policy'. The Kubitschek government could be seen as a 
transitional stage in which the new policy was taking shape 
in a still hesitant fashion *. The 'New Foreign Policy' was 
meant to represent a decisive step in the direction of 
expanding Brazil's international role through a 
'developmentalist' alliance with the countries emerging from 
decolonisation in Africa and Asia. The policy was an 
expression of the breaches that had already appeared in the 
rigid bipolar ism of the fifties 2. The expansion of the 
developmentalist alliance should rely on close cooperation 
within Latin America, and especially between Brazil and 
Argentina. An ambitious agreement was then signed by 
Presidents Frondizi and Quadros in order to coordinate 
foreign policy, as will be analyzed in section III.l. It was 
believed that this could place countries like Brazil in the 
position of intermediary between the developed countries and 
the new independent states. The 'New Foreign Policy' could 
be seen as a reformulation, now in a world stage, of the 
'buffer' strategy already tried by Vargas in the forties 
with respect to the USA and Argentina. In addition, it also 
reflected the progress of industrialisation in Brazil, which
1 Cf. G. Moura, 'Avangos e Recuos: A Politica Exterior de 
JK', in A. Castro Gomes (ed.), 0 Brasil de JK (Rio de Janeiro, 
1991), p. 22. This was particularly evident as regards Brazil's 
policy towards Africa, in which Brazil hesitated between giving 
support to the independence forces or preserving her traditional 
links with Portugal.
2 For an analysis of Quadros' foreign policy see P. Malan, 
'Relagoes Economicas Internacionais', pp. 94-99.
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prompted her to look for trade opportunities in emerging 
peripheral markets.
Although the 'New Foreign Policy' seems a natural 
development of the policy initiated by Kubitschek, it is 
difficult to assess wether it was a viable strategy in the 
context of the early sixties. In particular, the adverse 
circumstances created by the Cuban revolution for an 
'autonomist' foreign policy suggest that this was perhaps a 
too idealistic move. The Cuban Revolution had led to a broad 
reformulation of US policies which seemed to represent a 
late victory of the OPA, but this change was ambiguous. On 
one hand, the 'Alliance for Progress', launched by President 
Kennedy in March 1961, did favour reformist efforts in the 
short term and gave support to the recently created LAFTA *. 
On the other hand, the 'Alliance for Progress' was embedded 
in a security strategy which became dominant. A. Lowenthal 
has observed that the combination of support for social 
reforms and the 'modernising' role expected from the 
military was contradictory and likely to fail 2. This 
provided an awkward environment for the 'New Foreign 
Policy'. However, this cannot be interpreted just as 
unrealistic move that had no support in current trends in
1 Although by the end of the fifties the USA was already 
considering a change in policy towards Latin America, the Cuban 
Revolution was the catalyst for action. The 'Alliance for 
Progress' sought to combine social and economic reform (including 
economic assistance and planning) with a more active role of the 
army in civic action and counter-insurgency. This was seen as a 
form of eliminating the roots of discontent and political unrest. 
Cf. J. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, p. 123.
2 Cf. A. Lowenthal, Patterns in Conflict: The United States 
and Latin America (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 29-30,
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Latin America and in the international system *. The fact 
that a 'conservative' brand of this policy would be adopted 
by the mid-seventies by Brazil's military government 
suggests that there were long term trends at work. 
Industrialisation, to which developmentalism gave a 
substantial impulse, had transformed the economic basis of 
the country and Brazil's perceptions about the role that she 
could play in the international system.
II.4. Conclusions
Looking at the whole period 1939-60, at least three 
different stages in the evolution of Brazil's foreign policy 
can be identified. Between 1939-55, the emphasis was placed 
on the 'special relationship' with the USA. At this stage, 
Argentine-Brazilian relations were limited by regional 
rivalry and the conflict between the USA and Argentina. In 
the period 1956-60, however, Brazil turned towards Latin 
America with the aim of leading a regional bloc which could 
negotiate more favourable terms of economic cooperation with 
the USA. This was prompted by Brazil's understanding that 
her former position in the continent had been lost and by 
the shared perception in Argentina and Brazil that they had 
been neglected by the USA. Finally, the autonomist stance 
initiated by Kubitscheck was extended in 1960-63 so as to
1 LAFTA had also been depicted as an idealistic approach 
with little basis in the real world. It will be argued in the 
this chapter that this view underestimates the role of structural 
change in this period and the 'learning' of the early post-war 
period.
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include the emerging states of Africa and Asia in the 
developmentalist alliance. Argentina and Brazil expected to 
increase their international role as buffer states and 
leaders of the developing countries.
Thus, there was a continuum in which regional rivalry 
lost ground in favour of cooperation for enhancing the 
region's bargaining power in the international system. 
Argentina increased her role in Brazil's foreign policy 
along this continuum, and the divergent interests that had 
prevented closer cooperation in the past faded. ECLA's 
proposals for regional integration would find a much more 
conducive context in the late fifties than that found by 
Pinedo-Aranha in the early forties and by Peron-Vargas in 
the early fifties.
III. 'DEVELOPMENTAL!SM' AND ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN COOPERATION
III.l. Foreign Policy Convergence and the Urucruavana 
Meeting
The ousting of Per on and the taking office of a new 
Government in September 1955 fully reinserted Argentina in 
Washington's mainstream directions in international affairs 
-although, as mentioned, a rapprochement was already well 
under way during the last three years of the Peronist era l.
1 In fact, it seems that the USA feared that if Peron was 
ousted and the Radical Party reached the Government, the 
Argentine approach towards foreign investments in the oil sector 
would become stricter than in Peron's final years in government. 
In effect, after the c o u p  (and despite the burden placed by oil
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But this did not mean the end of political conflict in 
Argentina. The 'Provisional Government' (September 1955 - 
March 1958), which emerged from the so-called "Liberating 
Revolution", could not avoid recurrent economic and 
political instability. This constrained the ability of 
Argentina to adopt new foreign policy initiatives, although 
some measures were adopted with a view to liberalizing 
controls on foreign trade *. It was during the presidency of 
Arturo Frondizi (March 1958-March 1963) that a 
developmentalist strategy was adopted, setting new 
priorities for Argentine foreign policy.
Frondizi's developmentalist policy largely converged 
with that of Kubitschek in Brazil. The close identification 
between the two countries, stemming from their common 
developmentalist goals and democratic regimes, led to one of 
the most remarkable periods of cooperation in the region 2.
imports on the balance of payments). General Aramburu would not 
open this sector to foreign capital. Argentine request of 
Eximbank credits for the construction of oil pipelines were in 
turn declined by the USA, as it was considered that 'ample 
private capital was available for petroleum exploration and 
exploitation in Argentina'. Cf. US Department of State, 
'Ambassador Dinner Conversation with President Aramburu', 
611.35/2-1756, Desp. no. 642, 17 February 1956, Argentina;
Internal Affairs. Microfilm. Cf. also FO 371 119917, 31 July
1956, Restricted.
1 The most significant initiatives were the dismantling of 
the Institute for the Promotion of Exchange (IAPI), the joining 
of the Paris Club with a view to 'multilateralize' payments with 
Europe (see also next chapter), and the application for 
membership to the International Monetary Fund. Cf. R. Mallon and 
J. Sourrouille, Politica Economica, pp. 14-17.
2 Like Kubitschek, Frondizi counted on the political asset 
of being a democratic, reformist President who claimed to 
represent a new generation of statesmen seriously concerned with 
social and economic progress in Latin America. He also presented 
Argentina as an example of the democratic path towards
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Although in some moments policies diverged - as in the case 
of the different attitude adopted by Frondizi and Kubitschek 
respecting the application of the IMF austerity programmes 
in 1959 1 - cooperation prevailed in most of the period. Both 
countries embraced the idea that foreign policy should be 
put to the service of development goals. Both countries 
sought political support and trade in Africa and Asia 2. Both
development, at variance with the socialist path adopted by Cuba. 
Cf. R. Frigerio, El Desarrollo Araentino v la Comunidad 
Americana; Conferencias en Universidades de Estados Unidos 
(Buenos Aires, 1959), especially chapter I.
1 While in June 1959 Frondizi adopted a severe 
stabilisation plan that led the economy to an extremely deep 
recession, Kubitschek decided to continue his ambitious programme 
of investments, as proposed in the 'Targets Plan' ('Plano de 
Metas') for the expansion of basic industries and infrastructure. 
The aim was to sustain the momentum of growth and keep cohered 
the political coalition that supported the government, despite 
of its consequences on inflation. Cf. Benevides, M.V., 0 Governo 
Kubitschek: Desenvolvimento Economico e Estabilidade Polltica. 
1956-61 (Rio de Janeiro, 1976), pp. 222-223. See also L. Sola, 
'The Political and Ideological Constraints to Economic Management 
in Brazil (1945-63)', D.Phil Thesis, Oxford University, 1982, 
chapter III. This would lead Brazil to break relations with the 
IMF in June 1959. The 'contagious' implications of the Brazilian 
attitude concerned the USA, which was therefore keen to show 
support to Argentina and point out her dissatisfaction with 
Brazil's monetary mismanagement. An US observer considered that 
the 'contrasting experiences of Government of Argentina and 
Government of Brazil involve one of the most important problems 
confronting us in the continent'. Cf. Department of State Central 
Files, Confidential, 835.1016-1559, no. 1977, June 15 1959,
Argentina: Internal Affairs. Microfilm. Concurrently, a British 
diplomat praised Argentina for remaining 'ostentatiously 
virtuous' before alleged Brazilian attempts to convince the 
Argentines to stand with Brazil 'in defiance of the IMF'. Cf. FO 
371 139009, 3 December 1959. These comments were made in
reference to the alleged motives of the visit to Argentina of 
Brazilian Foreign Minister Horacio Lafer from the 23rd to 27th 
of November 1959.
2 Frondizi paid a visit to India in 1960. An Argentina 
commercial mission, with a 'promotional' objective, visited 
Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, South Africa, and the United 
Arab Republic at the beginning of 1962. Cf. FO 371 162090, 26 
February 1962.
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countries insistently argued that economic cooperation had 
been unduly disregarded in the design and operation of the 
inter-American system *. Both countries underlined that 
security in the Western World ought to be related to large 
scale economic support for development in Latin America. The 
OPA received full support from Argentina - after some 
hesitation rendered by the fact that Brazil launched the 
initiative without previous consultation with other Latin 
American countries. Argentina publicly demanded a 
satisfactory response to the OPA. As early as December 1958 
Foreign Affairs Minister Carlos Florit expressed his 
scepticism about the achievements reached so far by the 
Committee of the Twenty-One. He then strongly urged a 
revitalisation of the initiative of President Kubitschek 2.
As a result of this convergence, in the early sixties 
Argentina and Brazil sought to establish a more systematic
1 Argentina shared the widespread view that Latin America 
had been marginalised. The formation of the OECD was seen as an 
attempt to set up an 'economic OTAN' with negative consequences 
for the region. Cf. Arturo Frondizi Personal Archives, Centro de 
Estudios Nacionales (thereafter AF-CEN), 'Memorandum from Mr. 
Arnaldo T. Musich to the Foreign Relations Ministry, Arturo 
Frondizi Personal: Una NATO Econdmica', Carpeta 91, no. 1, 
Politica Internacional, Folio 31, non dated.
2 Cf. Repdblica Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores y Culto, 'Conferencia de Prensa de S.E. el Sr. 
Ministro Dr. Carlos A. Florit', unpub1ish., Buenos Aires, 
December 1958. This convergence was also stressed by Brazilian 
diplomats, who observed that in the past there was a 'tendency 
to accept sporadic aid and assistance as a generous favour of the 
USA. Still, there is a growing awareness in some countries, like 
in Argentina, that development in Latin America would only come 
if it is organised and planned with enough external 
support'(author's translation). Cf. CDO, 'Instrugoes para a 
Delegagao Brasileira a III Sessao da Comissao Especial para 
Formular Novas Medidas de Cooperagao Economica', STAP/DAm/Dur/8- 
1960-3, Confidential, 31 August 1960.
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pattern of consultation and coordination with each other in 
international affairs. This was a clear aim set forth 
tentatively by Frondizi and Kubitscheck, which Frondizi and 
Quadros would consolidate and extend after 1960. A landmark 
was the meeting of Frondizi and Quadros at Uruguayana, a 
town on the border between Argentina and Brazil, between 
April 20th and April 22nd of 1961. The 'Uruguayana 
Declaration' was then issued, in which both countries 
declared their intention to strengthen economic and 
political cooperation. The 'Agreement of Consultation and 
Exchange of Information' was also signed on this occasion. 
It was meant to provide for systematic consultation in 
international matters at presidential level so as to 
establish 'a definite and formal strengthening of the links 
between the two countries' *. The countries agreed to join 
forces in negotiations with international institutions and 
to lend full support to the 'Alliance for Progress'. They 
also analyzed problems of bilateral trade and economic 
cooperation 2.
1 Cf. FO 371 155829 AA 10310612, 3 May 1961. This document 
also highlights the continuity of this agreement with previous 
initiatives made during Kubitschek presidency. Thus, it was 
noticed that 'President Frondizi put forward a draft Treaty of 
Friendship and Consultation, reportedly modelled on a document 
agreed last year between Sr. Lafer, the last Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Kubitschek government, and Sr. Taboada, then 
Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs. Under this Treaty (...) 
the two countries will (...) undertake to consult each other, at 
presidential level, before determining their respective attitudes 
to major international problems'.
2 The cooperative utilisation of the hydroelectric energy 
potential of the 'Sete Ouedas' falls on the Parana River was also 
agreed, a point that both counties failed to push forward later 
and which would embitter bilateral relations in the sixites and 
seventies. Cf. A. Lanus, Politica Exterior Argentina, p. 296.
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If differences of emphasis were still visible in 
Uruguayana l, the meeting marked a very high point in 
bilateral cooperation. From mutual suspicions in the 
forties, Argentina and Brazil agreed to coordinate foreign 
policy in the early sixties. Such a level of understanding 
would not be reached again until the mid-eighties. Moreover, 
cooperation continued after the resignation of Janio Quadros 
in October 1960. On a brief meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 
September 1961, Frondizi and Goulart reaffirmed the validity 
of the Uruguayana declaration. It was then clear that 'the 
main lines of Brazil's foreign policy will continue to be 
those laid down by Sr. Quadros', but without his 'theatrical 
gestures'. Moreover, it was suggested that 'Dr. San Thiago 
Dantas' aim is to professionalise the new and more 
independent foreign policy of Brazil' 2. When he visited 
Buenos Aires in November 1961, Foreign Minister San Thiago 
Dantas reaffirmed the importance of Argentine-Brazilian 
collaboration in the progress of economic integration in 
Latin America. In a speech at the National Academy of Law, 
Dantas observed that
'both Brazil and Argentina are in the process of industrial
1 Frondizi privileged the obtention of economic assistance 
from the USA while Quadros insisted on the quest for higher 
autonomy. Frondizi considered that it was unrealistic to 
emphasise divergences with the USA, as both countries then badly 
needed financial assistance. Cf. A. Lands, Politica Exterior 
Argentina, pp. 289-296, on this point.
2 Cf. 371 155829 AA 103106/6, 26 September 1961.
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and agricultural development. They have much to offer to 
each other and together they form a solid nucleus for the 
Latin American common market .This is an important reason why 
the two countries should cooperate more closely9 l.
In sum, the late fifties-early sixties was a period of 
remarkable convergence between Argentina and Brazil in the 
external front, leading to a steady increase in cooperation. 
This culminated with an agreement for the coordination of 
external policy in April 1961. This approach, initiated by 
Kubitschek and developed by Quadros, was continued by 
Goulart after Quadro's resignation.
III.2. The Persistence of Rivalry
Some difficulties remained, however, and elements of 
rivalry were still present. If these elements were 
relatively controlled in 1955-61 and did not hinder 
cooperation, they contribute to understand why rivalry re- 
emerged in the second half of the sixties.
In effect, the ambitions of regional leadership had not 
been completely abandoned. The reinvigorated Brazilian 
interest in Latin America concerned the Argentines, who 
feared to be placed in a secondary position in regional 
politics 2. This was particularly challenging, given
1 Cf. FO 371 155829 AA 103106/4, 14 November 1961.
2 The agreements reached by Argentina with Uruguay, 
respecting the hydroelectric exploration of the Uruguay river 
(Salto Grande), and with Paraguay, on the Parana River (Salto de
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Argentina's outstanding role in regional politics in the 
past. The remembrances of past friction could not be 
immediately dissipated. This was furthered by the newly 
industrial capabilities that Brazil had developed. Fears 
that Brazil would dominate industrial production and 
Argentina retreat to agrarian specialisation were 
significant !. Frondizi made it clear on several occasions 
that national development programmes should have priority 
over regional programmes 2. The goal of forming a Latin 
America common market, he argued, 'should be necessarily 
preceded by a process of national integration within each 
country' 3. At least some circles in the Argentine government
Apioe), were suggested to 'reveal the Argentine quest for a 
leadership role in Latin America'. Cf. FO 371 139008 AA 1021, 2 
January 1959. Similar comments were made respecting Frondizi's 
visit to Bolivia in June 1961. Cf. FO 371 155827 AA 1021/3, 22 
June 1961. Another element that evidences the persistence of 
competition in the region was the attitude of Argentina and 
Brazil towards political conflict in Paraguay. They interfered 
in the Paraguayan conflict by providing arms and logistic 
assistance to the contending parties, namely the Paraguayan 
dictator Alfredo Stroessner, who received Brazilian support, and 
the febrerista rebels, supported by the Argentines. The 
involvement was in a very limited scale, but revealed the 
permanence of rivalry in the bilateral relation. See L.A. Moniz 
Bandeira, Estado Nacional. chapter 8, on this point.
1 Rogelio Frigerio, former adviser to President Frondizi, 
interview. Buenos Aires, 27 October 1993. On the Argentine 
concerns with Brazil's industrial competition see R. Frigerio, 
La Intearacidn Regional; Instrumento del Monopolio (Buenos Aires, 
1968) .
2 Cf. 'Discurso Ante el Congreso de Uruguay', Montevideo, 7 
April 1958; 'Discurso en el Congreso del Paraguay', Asuncion, 30 
October 1958; 'Discurso en la Cancilleria del Brasil', Rio de 
Janeiro, 9 April 1958. These speeches are collected in A. 
Frondizi, La Politica Exterior Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1963).
3 Cf. A. Frondizi, Politica Exterior, p. 39 (author's 
translation).
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still regarded Brazil as vitally interested in containing 
the process of development in Argentina and considered that 
Brazil's conflict with the USA would strengthen the 
Argentina's role in the region *.
In turn, Brazil felt unease at the Argentine 
rapprochement with the USA. As stated by Luis Bastian Pinto, 
a Brazilian diplomat in Buenos Aires:
'with her attention directed to the dollar area, in a phase 
of intense collaboration with and growing dependence on the 
USA, Argentina - which in the past was the champion of 
multilateral solutions and adopted an attitude of 
independence - now seems to incline towards bilateralism 
through a rapprochement with Washington. (•••) To some
extent there was an inversion of the basic positions of 
Brazil and Argentina. Argentina seeks to play the role that 
Brazil traditionally played in the past, namely that of
1 Rogelio Frigerio, interview. This perspective also 
appears in documents of the period. Thus, for instance, a secret 
Memorandum for the Secretary of Liaison and Coordination of the 
Argentine government containing the 'keys for understanding the 
current international situation of Argentina' and intended to 
serve as an outline for discussions with the military, offers the 
following assessment: 'Brazil, given her current economic crisis, 
fears the rapprochement of the Argentine with the USA because 
that could reduce the financial help in dollars that she needs 
(...). But, fundamentally, because the Argentine development 
means the recovery for our country of her mentor role in Latin 
America and the victory of the River Plate Basin over that of the 
Amazon and the coastal Rio-Santos axis' (author's translation). 
Cf. AF-CEN, 'Secretaria de Enlace y Coordinacion: Apuntes Muy 
Breves Sobre una Clave Internacional del Actual Momento 
Argentino', Memorandum, Secret, Carpeta 91, no.l, Folio 5, Buenos 
Aires, 17 November 1959.
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conciliator between Washington and Latin America' *.
Thus, competition for influence and expectations about 
special support from the USA (now from the Argentine side) 
were still present and this probably facilitated the 
subsequent reversal of cooperation.
III.3. The Lack of Political Consensus in Argentina
Despite the interest of President Frondizi in 
coordinating policies with Brazil, Janio Quadros 
'neutralist' positions raised resistances in Argentina and 
Frondizi had to consider the reaction of the military 2. The 
Uruguayana meeting was heavily criticized in Argentina as a 
dangerous move in foreign policy 3. In this there was too an 
inversion of positions between Argentina and Brazil. In 
1951-53, the opposition to Vargas tried to block cooperation 
between Vargas and Peron. In 1960-62, it was the opposition
1 CDO, 'Embaixada de Buenos Aires, Oficios 1957-59, XI 
Conferencia Inter-Americana: Asuntos Econdmicos, Posigao
Argentina', N.1128, Confidential, 29 december 1959 (author's 
translation).
2 Cf. R.A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, p.
336.
3 Paradoxically enough, while the Argentine press and the 
military criticized Frondizi's alignment with the 'irresponsible' 
attitudes of President Quadros, in Brazil and in diplomatic 
circles it was believed that Quadros had obtained great benefit 
from Frondizi's 'experience' and 'moderation' in international 
affairs. This clearly emerges from the conversation between the 
British Ambassador in Rio, Wallinger, and the Argentine 
Ambassador, Muniz (cf. F0371 155829 A103106/3, Confidential, 2 
May 1961).
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to Frondizi that objected closer cooperation with Brazil. 
Like Vargas, Frondizi faced a complex domestic situation and 
his room for manoeuvre was reduced. Frondizi had to endure 
an hostile surveillance of his foreign policy, where his 
rivals saw a failure to uphold international 
responsibilities as they understood them.
The anti-communist ideology of the military, for whom 
the boundaries between an 'autonomist' and a 'pro-communist' 
policy were not clear, made foreign policy still more 
complicated. The military had become an increasingly 
powerful actor based on the ideology of the Cold War. If 
foreign policy had never attracted domestic consensus in 
Latin America, the Cold War made this a still a more 
divisive and destabilising issue *. It was an issue which 
could be used to mobilise the opinion of the USA and the 
military in support of domestic political groups and the 
governments of Frondizi and Quadros-Goulart were weakened by 
this. Therefore, at variance with the European case, in 
Latin America the Cold war contributed to weaken rather than
1 Although the main factors behind the ousting of Frondizi 
by the military in 1962 seem to have been principally related to 
the advance of Peronism in the provincial elections and the 
unveiling of the pact between Frondizi and Peron, the disastrous 
manner in which Frondizi managed his foreign policy with respect 
to Cuba also made a significant contribution to weaken his 
government. In particular, his secret meeting with Cuban Minister 
Ernesto Guevara led to a major crisis between the President and 
the military - still more serious than that provoked in Brazil 
by the alleged pact between Peron and Vargas in 1954. Cf. R.A. 
Potash, The Armv and Politics in Argentina, p. 345-351. See also 
A. Conil Paz and G. Ferrari, Politica Exterior Argentina, p. 211. 
This was added to the insatisfaction provoked by Frondizi's 
refusal to support the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS in December 
1961 (a position also adopted by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and 
Ecuador).
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to foster regional cooperation.
IV. THE NEW STAGE OF IMPORT-SUBSTITUTING INDUSTRIALISATION 
AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
From the point of view of regional trade, the period 
1955-60 was dominated by two trends. On the one hand, 
bilateral trade fell, adding to the external difficulties of 
Argentina and Brazil. On the other, both countries went 
through rapid structural change on the basis of the 
implantation of new industrial sectors. This resulted in a 
strong incentive to reshape bilateral agreements.
IV.1. The Loss of Dynamism of Regional Trade
In the previous chapter it was shown that bilateral 
trade lost dynamism after the end of the War. This became 
more pronounced in the second half of the fifties, when 
total trade in constant dollars fell from an average of US$
211.8 millions in the biennium 1953-54 to an average of US$
149.9 millions in the biennium 1959-60 - a fall of about 30 
%. Tables III.3 and graph IV. 1 show these trends in 
bilateral trade.
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GRAPH IV. 1. Bilateral Trade Araentina-Brazil*7 
(In millions of constant US$ dollars of 1948-50)
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Source: Cf. Table III.3.
Brazil's exports to Argentina fell at a rate of minus 
13.2 % annually in 1955-60. This record was worse than that 
of 1951-55, when exports to Argentina fell at a rate of 
minus 1.9 % annually. The Argentine export performance was 
dismal too. The rate of growth of Argentine exports to 
Brazil was minus 5.6 % in 1955-60. Although the fall of 
exports was less marked than that of Brazil, it compares 
badly with the period 1951-55 (when exports grew at a 
positive 4.7 %) . As a result, the importance of Argentina 
and Brazil as markets for their reciprocal exports fell, as 
can be seen in table IV.3.
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TABLE IV.3
BILATERAL TRADE IN TOTAL TRADE. 1955-60 
(In Percentage)
Brazil: participation of Argentina in total exports and 
imports
Year Exports Imports
1955 7.0 11.6
1956 4.4 6.2
1957 7.4 6.0
1958 8.6 6.5
1959 3.4 7.6
1960 4.4 6.5
Average
1956-60 5.6 6.6
Average
1951-55 6.3 6.9
Argentina: participation of Brazil in total exports and 
imports
Year Exports Imports
1955 17.9 14.0
1956 8.2 10.6
1957 9.2 13.3
1958 9.2 14.3
1959 10.3 7.7
1960 9.2 „ 6.4
Average
1956-60 9.2 10.4
Average
1951-55 11.2 10.4
Sources: Cf. Tables III.l.A and III.l.B.
The fall in total trade was accompanied by a 
restructuring of trade towards primary goods, as can be seen 
in graph IV. 2 This was a trend of post-wear years that 
continued in the late fifties. It is remarkable the fall of 
manufactured exports by Brazil. If Brazil managed to export 
some new industrial goods after 1955, especially railway
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equipment 1, these items did not represent a significant part 
of actual bilateral trade and its structure continued to 
present a low degree of diversification.
GRAPH IV.2. Trade In Manufactures 
(In percentage of totaL exports)
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Several factors explain the poor performance of 
bilateral trade after 1955. Two of them will be highlighted 
in this work, namely (i) the effect of the trade and 
exchange reforms applied in 1956 and 1959 in Argentina and
1 Brazil exported railvay equipment to Argentina for a value 
of about US$ 3 millions of dollars in 1955 and US$ 1 million of 
dollars in 1956 (which represented 89 % and 41 %, respectively, 
of the total exports of the item 'Machinery, Transport Equipment 
and Accessories'). Cf. IBGE, Anuario Estatistico do Brasil (Rio 
de Janeiro, various years). However, these exports subsequently 
fell. They reached only US$ 350 thousands of dollars in 1958 and 
were almost zero in 1957, 1959 and 1960.
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in 1958 in Brazil, which increased the instability of the 
economy; (ii) the fact that the second half of the fifties 
was a transitional period in which previous bilateral trade 
agreements became less effective. These factors will be 
addressed in detail in the next chapter.
In sum, the evolution of bilateral trade in 1956-60 did 
not contribute to alleviate the external situation of 
Argentina and Brazil. It indicated that existing mechanisms 
for encouraging trade were not working effectively. The 
combination of this negative signal with the stimulus 
provided by rapid transformation in the industry would 
prompt new forms of cooperation in the late fifties.
IV.2. Structural Change in the Domestic Economy and Economic 
Integration
(a) Structural Change, Increasing Returns to Scale and 
Regional Integration
The 1956-60 period was characterized by a new phase in 
the process of import-substituting industrialisation, the 
ISI-2 phase, based on a set of new capital-intensive 
industries, in which technology was more sophisticated and 
increasing returns to scale were more significant l. This 
represented a transformation of the pattern of 'horizontal'
1 Clearly, the process of industrial transformation did not 
begin in the late fifties, and some metal-mechanical and chemical 
industries were already expanding in the forties. However, this 
process suffered a rapid acceleration since 1955.
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industrialisation of the previous period, the ISI-1, which 
was based on the production of labour-intensive, 
technologically simple light consumer goods. The leading 
sectors of ISI-2 were consumer durable goods, transport 
equipment, chemicals and capital goods, with an outstanding 
role for the automobile and associated industries. These 
sectors gained participation in the industrial structure at 
expense of traditional industries like textiles, food and 
beverage. The participation of the chemical, electrical and 
metal-mechanical sectors in total industrial production 
increased in Brazil from 10.5 % in 1949 to 22 % in 1959 and 
in Argentina from 22.7% (average 1948-50) to 35 % (average 
1959-61) (cf. tables III.9.A and III.9.B).
The ISI-2 phase reshaped the costs and benefits of 
economic integration. To understand how this occurred, it is 
convenient to first restate the hypotheses suggested in 
chapter I in the light of the transformations that occurred 
in the late fifties. Evidence in favour of these hypotheses 
will be subsequently presented in the sub-sections (a) and
(b) .
To begin with, the diversification of the industrial 
structure opened new opportunities for regional trade which, 
it can be argued, industrialists were interested in 
exploring. The implantation of new sectors implied 
overcoming supply constraints on regional trade. Domestic 
production became more similar to the import structure in 
Argentina and Brazil, and therefore more able to produce the 
goods whose demand grew steadily in both countries, namely
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intermediate and capital goods. Concurrently, the importance 
acquired by static and dynamic economies of scale in the 
ISI-2 affected the links between protection, industrial 
efficiency, the size of the market and trade. The gains from 
trade and specialisation, and therefore the benefits of the 
creation of a regional market, were higher in the presence 
of increasing returns to scale. Conversely, the costs of 
protection increased. If the role of the regional market in 
achieving economies of scale had already been perceived by 
Pinedo in 1940, the argument carried still more weight in 
the late fifties. Finally, increasing returns to scale and 
overlapping structures of demand and production in both 
countries created new opportunities for intra-industry 
trade. Although in 1956-60 it was too early for these 
opportunities to be reflected in the structure of trade, the 
potential for intra-industry trade substantially increased. 
This can be expected to make trade more attractive in the 
new sectors, as the costs of adjustment would be reduced and 
so the power implications of industrial specialisation *.
Figure 1, elaborated from the North-South trade diagram 
proposed by Bollino and Padoan 2, illustrates the gains that 
a regional market can offer in the presence of increasing
1 As intra-industry implies transferring resources between 
similar activities, adjustment to trade is easier. In addition, 
intra-industry trade mollifies concerns about security by 
reducing the vulnerability of the countries to an unilateral 
suspension of trade. See chapter I on these points.
2 Cf. C.A. Bollino and P.C. Padoan, 'Growth and 
Specialisation in an Enlarged Europe: Is a virtuous Circle
Possible?', Revista di Politica Economica, vol. LXXXII, no. 12 
(1992), pp. 267-285.
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returns to scale. Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that 
average total costs depends only on the volume of 
production, then North countries will enjoy a competitive 
advantage respecting the South. This stems from an earlier 
start at industrialisation, which allowed the North to pre­
empt the international market for industrial goods l. In the 
ISI-1 phase of industrialisation, the South gives to its 
industry a level of protection equal to T1 in order to 
compensate for the initial North-South asymmetry in the 
production of light manufactures. As in these industries 
economies of scale are less significant, and labour costs 
and natural resources (factors which are generally more 
abundant in the South) represent a large proportion of total 
costs, then protection can be expected to be small 2. 
However, when South production moves towards more complex 
industrial goods, in the ISI-2 phase of industrialisation, 
cost differences between North and South grow, as increasing 
returns to scale become more significant (and so does the 
initial North-South asymmetry of costs and market shares). 
Hence, protection has to be set now at the higher T2 level. 
In order to reduce the inefficiency that this implies, a 
group of South countries may be encouraged to create a free 
trade area. This allows them to increase industrial
1 Such a result is consistent with the ECLA and 'new trade 
theory' presented in chapter I.
2 In some cases, the South can export ISI-1 goods to centre 
economies and T1 would be zero or even negative. Hence the 
diagram only applies for industries protected and oriented to the 
internal market, which was the case of most industrial production 
after the war.
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production from P to P*, and thereby reduce protection from 
T1 to Tl* (ISI-1) and from T2 to T2* (ISI-2). Clearly, as 
the slope of the total cost curve is higher in the ISI-2 
phase than in the ISI-1 phase, the fall in the levels of 
protection allowed by an increase in production will be 
higher in the ISI-2 than in the ISI-1 phase, and so will the 
incentive to integrate 1.
FIGURE I. The Regional Market and Industrial Protection in
ISI-1 and ISI-2
m - ' ±
?
1 Formally, returns to scale in the ISI-1 and ISI-2 phases, 
respectively, can be expressed as ¥,(w,x) = [C,(w,x)/x]
[dCj (w,x) ,dx] and %  = [C2(w /X) /x] [dC2(w,x) .dx] , where w is a 
vector of input prices, x is the volume of production and C is 
the total costs curve. As mentioned, since 'F is the inverse of 
the elasticity of the costs curve with respect to production,
> 1 implies increasing returns to scale. In other words,
increasing returns implies that the marginal cost curve is below 
the average cost curve and hence the latter is falling with 
production. The argument that increasing returns to scale are 
higher in ISI-1 than in ISI-2 amounts to say that %  > %  > 1. Cf. 
E. Helpman, 'Increasing Returns, Imperfect Markets and Trade 
Theory', in R.W. Jones and P.B. Kenen, Handbook of International 
Economics. vol. I (North Holland, 1984), p. 328. In this work, 
the concepts of economies of scale and increasing returns to 
scale will be used as synonyms, by assuming that the production 
functions are homotetic.
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The rest of this section concerns itself with the study 
of the implications of ISI-2 for regional cooperation and is 
intended to provide historical and statistical evidence for 
the hypotheses presented above. First, the hypotheses that 
increasing returns to scale played a more substantial role 
in the ISI-2 than in the ISI-1 phase of industrialisation is 
studied by comparing the evolution of production, employment 
and the stock of capital in both periods in Argentina and 
Brazil. Subsequently, the impact of ISI-2 on governmental 
and entrepreneurial perceptions on integration will be 
considered.
(a) A Simple Test for Increasing Returns to Scale in 
the ISI-1 and ISI-2 Phases
The suggested association between increasing returns 
and structural change in the late fifties can be scrutinized 
through a simple statistical test based on the so-called 
'Verdoorn Law' or 'Second Kaldor Law' *. According to the 
Verdoorn-Kaldor Law, in the presence of increasing returns, 
the expansion of production leads to gains in productivity. 
If this is true, there should be an association between 
production growth and productivity growth. It has been 
suggested that increasing returns were more significant in 
the ISI-2 than in the ISI-1 phase of industrialisation. This 
hypotheses has been studied by Katz and Kosacoff for the
1 A theoretical discussion of the Verdoon Law can be found 
in J.S.L. McCombie and A.P. Thirwall, Economic Growth and Balance 
of Payments Constraint (New York, 1994), pp.177-80.
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Argentine industry in the periods 1946-54 (ISI-1) and 1954- 
61 (ISI-2) l. The results presented by Katz and Kosacoff
support the hypothesis that a new phase of industrialisation 
began in the second half of the fifties and that this was 
associated with higher increasing returns to scale. The 
authors found that production growth and productivity growth 
were significantly correlated in Argentina between 1954-61 
(R squared = 0.78, significant at a 5 % level) but not 
between 1946-54 (R squared = 0.30, n.s.). They concluded 
that increasing returns were a relevant variable in
industrial production in 1954-61 but not in 1946-54. The
work of Katz and Kosacoff offers support to the argument 
that structural change in the late fifties provided a new 
stimulus for economic integration, aimed at achieving 
economies of scale in the new industries.
However, the original specification of Verdoorn, used 
by Katz and Kosacoff, may lead to problems of spurious 
correlation 2. An alternative test was proposed by Kaldor, 
which uses employment growth instead of productivity growth 
as the dependent variable in order to eliminate this problem
3. While the original Verdoorn Law states that p = a + bq
1 Cf. J. Katz and B. Kosacoff, El Proceso de
Industrializacion en la Argentina, pp. 67-77. A similar argument 
is presented by R. Mallon and J. Sourouille, Politica Econdmica. 
pp. 121-25.
2 As the variables used in the correlation have a common 
component, production growth (which appears as a variable on its 
own and in the numerator of the productivity variable) , then 
spurious correlation may occur.
3 Cf. J.S.C. McCombie and A.P. Thirwall, Economic Growth, 
pp. 167-70. For a comparison of the Verdoorn and Kaldor 
specifications and a discussion of the empirical results obtained
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(where p stands for productivity growth and q for production 
growth) , the respecif icied equation states that e = a* + 
b*q, where e stands for employment growth, q for production 
growth, a = -a* and b* = 1 - b l. The original Verdoorn test 
requires b > 0 for the data to be consistent with increasing 
returns. The re-specification requires b* < 1. In effect, if 
b* < 1, an increase in industrial production leads to a less 
than proportional increase in industrial employment and 
hence to more than a proportional increase in labour 
productivity 2. The results of the application of the re­
specified equation for the Argentine and Brazilian 
industrial sector are presented in Appendix I. They are 
broadly consistent with the hypothesis of a higher role of 
increasing returns to scale in both countries in the second 
half of the fifties.
Still, this re-specification is still insatisfactory, 
since it misses the contribution of capital inputs to 
productivity growth. Part of the increase in labour 
productivity may have been explained by the use of higher 
amounts of capital per worker rather than by increasing 
efficiency in the use of labour for a given amount of
from testing the Kaldor specification see R.W. Rowthorn, 'What 
Remains of Kaldor Law?, Economic Journal, vol. 85, N. 36 (1975),
pp. 10-19.
1 The re-specification is straightforward, since by 
definition p = q - e. See J.S.C. McCombie and P. Thirwall, 
Economic Growth, p. 168.
2 Obviously, it is also necessary that b* significantly 
differs from zero. Otherwise, there will be no association 
between production and employment growth and no meaningful 
conclusion can be drawn from the value of b* .
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capital. In order to take into account both factors, a Cobb- 
Douglas function was adjusted for the economy, on the basis 
of the time series for capital and labour inputs provided by 
Elias 1. The results are presented in Appendix II. They 
confirm that, in the case of Argentina, increasing returns 
cannot be rejected for the 1955-65 period, while constant 
returns to scale cannot be rejected for the 1945-55 period. 
In the case of Brazil, increasing returns cannot be rejected 
in the 1950-55 and 1955-65 periods. Still, as employment 
data is only available in Brazil from 1950, the results of 
the regression for the ISI-1 period should be taken only as 
a preliminary excersise, which clearly does not allow to 
draw definitive conclusions. Moreover, a cross-section study 
of the Brazilian industry, using data for the stock of 
capital provided by the 1949 and 1959 censuses, suggests 
that constant returns prevailed in the late forties and 
increasing returns in the late fifties 2.
In sum, while the hypothesis of a significant change as 
regards the presence of increasing returns to scale between 
the ISI-1 and ISI-2 periods is fully confirmed for 
Argentina, this still remains obscure for the case of Brazil 
in the ISI-1 period.
These results presented have to be considered most 
cautiously. Besides the problems of the quality of the data
1 Cf. V.J. Elias, Sources of Growth: A Study of Seven Latin 
American Countries (San Francisco, 1992), pp. 175-80 and Appendix 
E.
2 Cf. A.C. Campino et al, "Fungao de Produgao Para o Setor 
Industrial Brasileiro", mimeo, IPEA-USP, 1971. I am grateful to 
Leonardo Campos Filho, who called my attention to this work.
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and the small number of observations, the Cobb-Douglas 
function does not include the effect of autonomous 
technological progress. As during the ISI-2 period new 
technologies were introduced by foreign firms, productivity 
increases may have been related to the effects of autonomous 
technical change and not to economies of scale. However, 
these problems probably qualify but do not challenge the 
results. Higher amounts of capital and the introduction of 
new technologies can be expected to be associated with 
increasing returns. Higher capital intensity makes more 
likely the presence of static economies of scale in the 
shape of falling fixed costs of production. Higher 
technological complexity, in turn, makes more likely the 
presence of dynamic economies of scale stemming from 
technological learning.
(c) Protection and The Political Economy of the 
Regional Market
The political economy of the ISI-2 period was 
characterized by huge transfers of resources towards 
priority sectors, in which the state and the multinational 
enterprises played a leading role. These were the central 
actors, with national capital playing a minor role, in 
accordance with the description offered by Peter Evans l. 
Multinational firms were seen as sources of capital and
1 Cf. P. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of
Multinational. State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, 
1979), pp. 64-94.
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technology in a context in which international trade and 
financing were adverse to the developmentalist objectives. 
The state invested in infrastructure and intermediate 
industries, and provided a broad array of incentives for 
attracting foreign capital.
In Argentina, a new Law on foreign investment was 
passed in July 1958, providing for a liberal policy on 
profits remittances and capital repatriation l. These 
policies succeeded in attracting large amounts of foreign 
capital to Argentina. While foreign direct investment under 
Law 14.222 amounted to US$ 12 millions in 1954-55, it 
reached US$ 325 millions in 1958-59, and a total of US$ 412 
millions for the 1957-1963 period, under Law 14.780. In 
Brazil, the basic instrument for attracting foreign direct 
investment was comprised by Instruction 113 of SUMOC. This 
instruction, that had been approved during the Cafe Filho 
interim government in January 1955, established that imports
1 Law 14.780 of 1958 replaced Law 14.222 of 1953 respecting 
the control of foreign investments. It contemplated a broad array 
of stimulus for foreign firms, like tariffs reductions for their 
imports, credit subsidies and the advantages provided by the 
regime of industrial promotion - the latter defined by Law 
14.781-58, embracing fiscal benefits and protection. Cf. Altimir 
et al, 'Los Instrumentos de la Promocion Industrial en la Post- 
Guerra', Desarrollo Economico. vol. 6. no. 22-23 (1966), pp. 470- 
487. Two main differences can be mentioned with respect to the 
previous legal framework for foreign investment: (i) it was
allowed the free remittance of profits through the free exchange 
market; (ii) it put a larger degree of discretion in the 
Executive hands as regards the concession of subsidies. When in 
December 1958 an exchange reform was sanctioned (see next 
chapter) , a tariff of 40 % was imposed on imports of capital 
goods. However, foreign firms were exempted from this surcharge. 
In addition, the Frondizi government sought to work out pending 
disputes with foreign enterprises and opened the search and 
exploration of oil fields - which were formerly under the 
monopoly of a state company, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales 
(YPF) - to foreign companies
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of capital goods by foreign firms would be considered as 
foreign direct investment. This amounted to an implicit 
subsidy in favour of foreign firms since their investments 
could be converted to cruzeiros at the free exchange rate, 
while profits remittances could be settled at the official 
rate. Foreign firms made extensive use of this mechanism in 
the Kubitschek period. More than 70 % of the US$ 565
millions of FDI placed by foreign firms in Brazil between 
1955 and 1960 used Instruction 113 !. In addition, in both 
countries a structure of effective protection was set up 
assuring the profitability of the priority sectors. Capital 
and intermediate goods could be imported free of duties for 
these sectors which at the same time were isolated from 
external competition through heavy import barriers.
These new trends in economic policy and structural 
change provided conflicting signals through time as regards 
regional integration. On the one hand, the state committed 
a large amount of resources to build the infrastructure, 
produce intermediate goods (like steel and petrochemicals) 
and offer the fiscal incentives required by the expansion of 
priority sectors. These costs were heightened, as mentioned, 
by the presence of increasing returns to scale and by the 
small dimensions of the internal markets. The disequilibrium 
generated by ISI-2 compromised the fiscal and external 
position of both countries. This boosted the rates of 
inflation in the late fifties, reflecting the efforts to
1 P. Malan (1984), 'Relagoes Economicas Internacionais', p.
83.
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transfer domestic and external resources (in the absence of 
a long term financial system) in favour of the priority 
sectors of industry *. Therefore, ISI-2 involved heavy costs 
for the state and the society, which provided a stimulus for 
the governments to seek less costly alternatives. A regional 
market, as articulated by ECLA ideas, represented a 
contribution to this objective.
However, the very array of incentives provided by the 
state generated strong vested interests in the continuity of 
protection. To be sure, industrialists were in favour of 
expanding regional trade, with a view to reducing 
microeconomic inefficiency. The private sector perceived the 
importance of the economies of scale and the role that the 
regional market could play 2. This was highlighted in a study 
of the Economic Department of FIESP in 1958, on the basis 
that 'the national markets are insufficient to keep
1 Cf. L. Orenstein and A.C. Sochaczewski, 'Democracia e 
Desenvolvimento', in M.P. Abreu, A Ordem do Procrresso: Cem Anos 
de Politica Econdmica Reoublicana (Sao Paulo, 1990), pp. 171-195, 
and A. Petrecolla, 'Unbalanced Development', in G. Di Telia and 
R. Dornbusch, The Political Economy of Argentina (London, 1989), 
pp. 109-114, for an analysis of the disequilibria of the late 
fifties.
2 It has been already mentioned how the Latin American 
markets were seen as a especially promising avenue for expanding 
industrial exports by Brazilian industrialists. Cf. for instance, 
BI, vol. XXII, no. 268 (22 November 1954), p.307 and BI, vol. 
XXIII, no. 272 (20 December 1954), p.333. Commenting on Brazil's 
efforts to increase trade with neighbouring countries, FIESP 
observed that 'the orientation of Itamaraty (...) of promoting 
economic agreements with almost all the Latin American countries 
represents a step forward towards the association of Brazil with 
the economies of these countries.' A regional market would 'crown 
all these efforts, if it can be created' (author's translation). 
Cf. BI, vol. XLIV, no. 448 (27 May 1958), pp. 569-70. Such a 
position contrasts with the earlier reluctant view adopted by 
Simonsen and indicates a shift towards a more positive attitude 
on integration.
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industries continuously operating in the case of a large 
number of manufactured goods' *. The private sector would 
favour controlled liberalisation in sectors amenable to 
oligopoly arrangements and intra-firm trade. These sectors 
were comprised principally by the new industries installed 
in the late fifties, under multinational control. A survey 
of business opinions in the early sixties showed that firms 
in the 'new', more internationalised industries were more 
favourable to a regional market than the 'old' industries of 
the ISI-1 period 2. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires 
stressed that
'the industrial enterprises which are looking in a 
businesslike way at the free trade area idea are principally 
the American or European firms which have already 
established enterprises in several Latin American countries. 
The free trade area holds out to them the long term prospect 
of being able to specialise and make e.g. cars in Brazil and 
trucks in Argentina' 3.
Thus, there was a stronger interest in expanding regional 
trade than in the ISI-1 period. But this interest cannot be
1 Cf. BI, vol. XLVII, no. 463 (20 August 1958), p. 1067. 
Economies of scale were as well one of the key arguments used by 
ECLA in favour of regional integration. See also chapter II.
2 Cf. F.H. Cardoso (1968) , Ideoloaias de la Burcruesia 
Industrial en Sociedades Dependientes (Mexico, 1968), pp. 205-06. 
These new sectors would in fact form the basis of the expansion 
of industrial exports in the sixties (see chapter VII).
3 Cf. FO 371 147679 A 1123/16, 26 February 1960.
183
equated to support for a free trade area *. These firms 
would support managed regional trade, not unimpeded regional 
competition.
In effect, scepticism was widespread among Brazilian 
industrialists when LAFTA was created. Ignacio Costa, head 
of the FIESP Foreign Trade Department, observed that 
'Brazil's industry was growing so fast that she would be 
able in the future to enter in the Latin American markets 
without the free trade area', which was thus seen as 'a 
disadvantage, rather than an advantage, to Brazil' 2. This 
attitude may explain Brazil's hesitant attitude in the 
period immediately after the signing of the Montevideo
1 Dr. Jose Melero, former Argentine representative at LAFTA 
and GATT, interview. Montevideo, 11 October 1993. See also next 
chapter.
2 Cf. FO 371 147680 AA 1123/25, 2 June 1960. FIESP insisted 
to the Brazilian representatives at LAFTA that adequate 
assurances should be given to industries already installed in 
each country. During the 1958 negotiations of a Southern free 
trade area (cf. next chapter) FIESP demanded (i) to be consulted 
about the list of products whose import would be allowed; (ii) 
guarantee of protection for industries already established; (iii) 
the presence of representatives of the industry in the Executive 
Secretary of the Trade Committee, where the debates on 
equilibrium in regional trade would take place. Cf. BI, vol. LIV, 
no. 520 (23 September 1959), pp. 44-45. Subsequently, FIESP 
editorials emphasised the need to restrict imports that 'go 
beyond of what is necessary, affecting the national industry'. 
Cf., for instance, BI, vol. XII, no. 625, p.37. Foreign Minister 
Horacio Laffer, in his speech to the II Inter-Governmental 
Meeting of LAFTA, reassured domestic producers that LAFTA would 
be flexible enough so as not to represent a threaten to domestic 
producers. Cf. Barbosa, 0 Brasil e a inteqracao regional (Sao 
Paulo, 1991), p.10. If in the first round of LAFTA negotiations, 
FIESP complained about not being heard by Itamaraty, in the early 
sixties it praised the high degree of cooperation then achieved: 
'the relationship (between Itamaraty and FIESP) is completely 
different in what has to do with the receptivity to the 
industrialists suggestions, which are now approved and 
considered' (author's translation). Cf. BI, vol. LXXXI, no.737 
(20 November 1963), p. 4.
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Treaty *. Similar misgivings existed among Argentine 
industrialists. The Argentine position was described as one 
in which 'there is marked scepticism in business circles 
about the success of the new market. (...) Industrialists are 
more concerned with competition than with opening new 
markets' 2. Moreover, resistances to free trade were 
reinforced by the fact that the industrial structure 
developed in the late fifties contained a very large number 
of firms, considering the size of the Argentine and 
Brazilian markets 3. The irrational industrial structure thus
1 British commentators emphasised that although Brazil 'has 
been far from backward' in LAFTA negotiations, 'the impression 
was given, perhaps erroneously, during the second half of the 
year, that Brazil was suffering from certain misgivings over the 
concept of LAFTA and might seek to introduce further delays in 
the already well spaced out programme. There was in fact 
considerable surprise that the recent meeting in Montevideo was 
not itself postponed'. The decisive factor seems to have been 
'firstly Argentina pressure and secondly (...) the decision of 
Mexico to climb from the outset on to what she now judged to be 
a worthwhile bandwagon'. Cf. FO 371 A 1123/16, 26 February 1960.
2 CF. FO 371 147679 A 1123/16, 26 February 1960.
3 In the case of the automobile sector in Argentina, twenty 
six firms asked for their inclusion in the Regime of Promotion 
of the Automobile Industry between 1959-60, all of which obtained 
a favourable reply from the government. Three of these firms gave 
up before beginning production, ten closed their facilities by 
1964 and another four firms left the market in 1967. Only eight 
firms (all of them multinational firms) remained, along with 
DINFIA, the producer of vehicles operated by the Armed Forces Cf. 
J. Sourrouille et al, Transnacionalizacion v Politica Economica 
en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1985), p. 27 and 29. This was 
still a relatively high number of firms, given the size of the 
Argentine market for transport equipment. In Brazil, ten firms 
were installed under the auspices of Kubitschek's Executive Group 
for the Automobile Industry (Portuguese acronym GEIA), of which 
eight were multinationals, one a public enterprise (FNM) and one 
a private Brazilian firm (Vemag). Cf. M.A. Leopoldi, 'Crescendo 
em Meio a Incerteza: A Politica Economica do Governo JK', in A. 
Castro Gomes (org.), O Brasil de JK (Rio de Janeiro, 1991), 
pp.86-7. As shown by S. Dell, A Latin American Common Market? 
(Oxford, 1966), pp.23-24, the combined market of Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela could absorb
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configured was the result of both the amount of incentives 
offered by the government and the dynamics of oligopoly 
competition, which prompted a synchronised move to new 
markets *. This inefficiency made local producers to look 
fearfully at the possibility of foreign competition.
In sum, there was a problem of temporal inconsistency 
in the evolution of the trade and industrial policy. 
Protection and subsidies provided the stimulus to industrial 
diversification and created new opportunities for trade and 
industrial specialisation at a regional level. A regional 
market could then facilitate the realisation of trade 
opportunities and contribute to rationalise the industrial 
structure, increase efficiency and reduce the transfer of 
resources. However, if more (managed) regional trade was 
favoured by the new highly oligopolised industries, they 
would oppose a free trade area, an opposition which the 
inefficiency of the industrial structure rendered more 
necessary.
300,000 automobiles per annum in the mid-sixties. This was less 
than the production per annum of FIAT (566,000), Opel (136,000) 
and that of Ford in Britain.
1 Multinational firms tend to move together towards emerging 
markets in order to prevent oligopoly competitors from 
establishing an advantage which could affect competition at a 
global level. The result of this reactive strategy is a 
concentrated expansion of industrial capacity. This tends to 
exceed the optimum of installed capacity vis-a-vis the size of 
the markets. The excess of capacity implies a much costly process 
of adjustment to trade liberalisation. On the factors shaping 
foreign direct investment see J.H. Dunning, 'The Eclectic 
Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement and Some 
Possible Extensions', Journal of International Business Studies, 
vol 19, no. 1 (1988), pp. 1-31.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
1. Many conflicts that had been latent or obscured in 
the early post-war period, affecting the relationship 
between Latin America and the international system, acquired 
full expression and maturity after 1956. These conflicts had 
to do with the perception that Latin America had been 
marginalized in the design of the post-war international 
order. The relationship with the USA, the uncontested 
hegemonic power of the period, was central in shaping these 
negative perceptions. It was considered that inter-American 
economic cooperation had been placed in a very secondary 
position as compared with the emphasis on security. In 
addition, the Bretton Woods system seemed to neglect the 
needs of developing countries regarding exports, financing 
and industrial protection. The decision of the governments 
of Kubitschek and Frondizi to pursue a program of rapid 
industrialisation heightened this friction and aggravated 
external disequilibrium in the region. As a result, 
Argentine and Brazilian views converged in the late fifties 
as regards their place in the international system and the 
need of coordinated action.
2. The result of this convergence of views was a 
remarkable increase of cooperation and the dilution of the 
rivalries of the previous period. This opened room for the 
creation of LAFTA in 1960. Brazil moved from a position of 
relative distance from Latin America towards an active 
regional policy. This was aimed to enhance both Brazil's
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autonomy and her economic and political role in the region. 
Argentina moved in a similar direction. Although old 
rivalries and domestic political conflicts, especially in 
Argentina, created some difficulties, conflictive forces 
were curbed and the geopolitical barriers that had hindered 
the efforts for economic integration in 1939-55 were ironed 
out in 1956-60.
3. The change in perspectives of the late fifties was 
not only related to changes in the international system. 
Structural change in the economies of Argentina and Brazil 
contributed to reshape the benefits and costs of economic 
integration. Developmentalist policies encouraged industrial 
upgrading and diversification between 1956-60. This gave 
rise to the implantation of new intermediate and capital 
goods industries which sustained the ISI-2 or 'intensive' 
phase of import-substituting industrialisation. Increasing 
returns to scale became more significant and so did the 
costs of protection and the gains from trade. Governments 
sought to reduce these costs and, based on ECLA ideas, set 
out to create a free trade area. Industrialists would adopt 
a narrower point of view. Important industrial sectors 
supported the idea of limited trade liberalisation in order 
to reduce microeconomic inefficiency and explore the 
opportunities for industrial exports and intra-industry 
trade. In this sense, the ISI-2 created more favourable 
conditions for regional trade.
4. On the other hand, there was a problem of temporal 
inconsistency between industrial diversification, achieved
behind high tariffs, and the subsequent creation of a free 
trade area. Protection to priority sectors consolidated 
interests against regional competition. This factor - along 
with other variables that will be discussed in the next 
chapter - led to the failure of the free trade area project. 
This, however, should not obscure the fact that substantial 
progress was made in these years in terms of regional 
cooperation. The consequences of this period of cooperation 
and the institutions then set up would be reflected in the 
growth of regional trade after 1960.
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APPENDIX Is A TEST OF THE VERDOORN-KALDOR LAW
Tables IV.4.A and IV.4.B present the results of the 
regression of the logarithm of employment (dependent 
variable) on the logarithm of production (independent 
variable), using the raw data provided by Katz and Kosacoff 
for Argentina and that of the industrial censuses of the 
years 1939, 1949 and 1959 for Brazil.
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TABLE IV.4.A
ARGENTINA: REGRESSION OUTCOMES
Dependent Variable: log(E) 
Independent Variable: log(Q)
Period: 1946-54 (ISI-1)
Constant 1.7067
b* 0.6387
SE b* 0.1290
to(0* >1) 2.80 +++
R Squared (%) 65.34 +++
Durbin-Watson 1.9859
Period: 1954-61 (ISI-2)
Constant: 2.1844
b* 0.4606
SE b* 0.1889
to(0* >1) 2.85 +++
R Squared (%) 31.37 ++
Durbin-Watson 2.3746
+++ Significant at the 1 % level 
++ Significant at the 5 % level 
+ Significant at the 10 % level 
Source: See statistical appendix
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TABLE IV. 4. B
BRAZIL; REGRESSION OUTCOMES
Dependent Variable: log(E) 
Independent Variable: log(Q)
Period; 1939-49 (ISI-1)
Constant 4.3776
b* 0.1228
SE b* 0.2929
to(0* >1) 2.99 +++
R Squared (%) 1.44 (n.s)
Durbin-Watson 1.5129
Period: 1949-59 (ISI-2)
Constant 0.5434
b* 0.8382
SE b* 0.09430
t0(/3* >1) 1.71 +
R Squared (%) 83.16 +++
Durbin-Watson 1.7505
+++ Significant at the 1 % level 
++ Significant at the 5 % level 
+ Significant at the 10 % level
Source; See statistical appendix
In the case of Argentina, the original conclusions of 
Katz and Kosacoff stand when the re-specified test is
applied. In effect, both periods showed increasing returns 
to industrial production - the coefficient b* is
significantly lower than 1 and employment and production 
growth are significantly correlated in both cases. But gains
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in efficiency with the increase of production tended to be 
lower in the ISI-1 than in the ISI-2 phase. This can be seen 
by comparing the coefficient b* in the two periods. As b* 
in 1946-51 (ISI-1) is higher than b* in 1954-61 (ISI-2),
employment tended to increase relatively more (and thus 
labour productivity relatively less) with an increase in 
production. However, as mentioned, this test does not 
consider the influence of the increase in the capital stock. 
As it is shown in Appendix II, when a Cobb-Douglas function 
is applied, constant returns to scale cannot be rejected in 
the case of Argentina in the 1945-55 period.
The evidence for Brazil is less clear-cut but 
nevertheless broadly consistent with the suggested 
hypotheses of an enhanced role of increasing returns to 
scale in the ISI-2 period. The coefficient b* is 
significantly lower than unity and significantly different 
from zero for the period covered by the industrial censuses 
of 1949 and 1959, which roughly corresponds to the ISI-2 
phase. Hence, the hypotheses of increasing returns in this 
period is not contradicted by the evidence. However, while 
b* is significantly lower than 1 between the censuses of 
1939-49, there is no significant correlation between e and 
q and hence b* does not differ from zero. In this case, the 
test does not offer any indication about the nature of the 
links between production and productivity growth and is 
consistent with any hypotheses about returns to scale in 
industrial production - increasing, decreasing or constant. 
In sum, increasing returns to scale were present in the ISI- 
2 period, but no conclusions can be drawn from the test for 
the ISI-1 period l.
1 The vagaries of industrial investment, more related to 
the availability of foreign currency than to the growth of 
industrial production, may have contributed to set apart the 
evolution of these variables. As has been argued in chapter I, 
learning does not automatically follow production, but it is an 
active process which involves investments. If the expansion of 
production is not accompanied by the introduction of new 
equipment and technology, but is based on stretching the use of 
existing capacity, the virtuous circle among production,
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TABLE IV.5.A
ARGENTINA; EVOLUTION OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION AND
EMPLOYMENT. 1946-62
Period 1946-52 Period 1952-61
Sector (1946 = 100) (1952 = 100)
Q E Q E
Food 111 98 123 86
Tobacco 123 101 105 51
Textiles 98 132 115 75
Garment 92 92 147 95
Wood 87 98 100 65
Paper 139 107 147 130
Editorial 86 82 157 85
Chemicals 131 117 134 87
Petrochemicals 181 129 160 97
Rubber 214 200 127 128
Shoes&Leather 65 80 106 66
Non Metals 117 109 130 85
Metals 130 128 161 95
Vehicles 115 185 270 100
Machinery 309 217 274 105
Q = Production in Volume 
E = Employment
Source: J. Katz and B. Kosacoff, El Proceso de 
Industrializacion en la Argentina, pp. 69 and 71
productivity and investment growth may be limited. This problem 
was especially important during the war and early post-war
periods, given the obsolescence of existing industrial facilities 
and the international constraints on the supply of new
equipment.On the other hand, this problem may have been less
relevant in the ISI-2 period, since the concentrated inflow of 
foreign capital and technology in 1956-60 linked the expansion 
of production with the installation of new industries and
technical capabilities.
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TABLE IV.5.B
BRAZIL; EVOLUTION OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION AND 
EMPLOYMENT. 1939-59
Period 1939-49 Period 1949-59
Sector (1939=100) (1949=100)
Q E Q E
Non Metals 288 226 200 126
Metals 288 164 274 174
Metal Mechanical 361 101 352 239
Electrical Appliances n.d n.d 543 360
Transport Equipment n.d n.d 577 426
Wood 289 77 154 172
Furniture n.d n.d 220 161
Paper 272 201 298 165
Rubber 655 196 267 237
Leather&furs 193 142 141 116
Chemicals 227 198 304 145
Textiles 194 145 133 97
Garment&shoes 223 156 156 128
Food 243 133 150 115
Beverage 247a/ 170a/ 148 116
Tobacco --- --- 161 101
Editorial 258 155 160 124
Others 316 252 197 40
a/ Beverage and Tobacco 
Q = Total value of production 
E = Employment
Source:Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, 
Censo Industrial (Rio de Janeiro, 1940, 1950 and 1960).
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APPENDIX II: ESTIMATION OF A COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION
FUNCTION
A Cobb-Douglas production function was estimated for 
Argentina and Brazil for the ISI-1 and ISI-2 periods on the 
basis of the time series provided by Elias. The equation 
adjusted is the following:
Log (GDP/L) = A + B(K/L) + (a + B - 1)L
If a + B - 1 is statistically higher than zero, then 
the production function shows increasing returns to scale; 
if a + B - 1 does not differ from zero, then the production 
function shows constant returns to scale; if a,+ B - 1 is 
negative (and significantly different from zero) the 
production function presents decreasing returns to scale.
Tables IV.6.A and IV.6.B present the results of the 
Cobb-Douglas estimations. In the case of Argentina, it can 
be seen that increasing returns cannot be rejected in 1955- 
65. Conversely, the coefficient of L does not differ from 
zero in 1945-55 and thus constant returns prevailed in this 
period. The regressions for Brazil suggest that in both 
periods increasing returns cannot be rejected. Still, as 
there is only six observations available for the ISI-1 
period (1950-55), this result should be taken with great 
caution.
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TABLE IV.6.A
ARGENTINA: PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS. ISI-1 AND ISI-2 PERIODS
Dependent Variable: GDP/L (in constant Argentine pesos of 
1960)
Regressor Coefficient t-statistic Probability*
1945-55
C -0.1268 -0.3216 (0.756)
K/L -0.0116 -0.0239 (0.982)
L 0.3414 1.0609 (0.320)
R-squared = 21.62 % F(2,8) = 1.1032 (0.377)
Durbin-Watson = 1.2252
Regressor Coefficient t-statistic Probability
1955-65
C -2.6487 -6.3296 (0.000)
K/L -0.0116 11.891 (0.000)
L 0.3414 5.3474 (0.000)
R-squared = 96.92 % F(2,8) = 114.55 (0.000)
Durbin-Watson = 1.2710
* Figures between brackets are probabilities
Kev for the Independent Variables 
C = Constant
K/L = Ratio of the Stock of Capital to Employment 
L = Employment (thousands of people)
The regression uses the logs of the dependent and 
independent variables
Source: Calculated from V. Elias, Sources of Growth.
Appendix B.
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TABLE IV.6.B
BRAZIL; PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS. ISI-1 AND ISI-2 PERIODS
Dependent Variable: GDP/L (in constant cruzeiros of 1949)
Regressor Coefficient t-statistic Probability* 
1945-55
C -0.70461 -0.1794 (0.000)
K/L -0.09858 -0.9989 (0.927)
L 1.3189 8.7023 (0.003)
R-squared = 96.27 % F(2,3) = 38.69 (0.007)
DW = 3.1365
Regressor Coefficient t-statistic Probability
1955-65
C -12.9874 -8.0267 (0.000)
K/L 3.7516 8.5091 (0.000)
L 0.4355 7.2927 (0.000)
R-squared = 97.34 % F(2,8) = 146.23 (0.000)
Durbin-Watson * 1.6204
* Figures between brackets are probabilities
Key for the Independent Variables 
C = Constant
K/L = Ratio of the Stock of Capital to Employment 
L = Employment (thousands of people)
The regression uses the logs of the dependent and 
independent variables
Source:Cf. Table IV.6.A.
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CHAPTER V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME. 1939-60
INTRODUCTION
It was argued in chapter I that international economic 
relations are articulated through institutions (more 
specifically, through international regimes) that constrain 
behaviour and make interactions among international actors 
more predictable. This chapter analyzes the institutions 
that regulated trade relations between Argentina and Brazil 
in 1939-60. Two different phases in the evolution of the 
trade regime in this period are identified. The first phase 
corresponds to the emergence and consolidation of the regime 
of 'restrained bilateralism' (1939-55). The second phase 
corresponds to a transitional period (1956-1960) in which 
the regime of restrained bilateralism went through 
increasing difficulties and a new regime was negotiated. 
This process culminated with the creation of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960, which was 
intended to liberalise trade on a Latin American basis l.
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, it 
aims to present the trade and payments agreements of 1939-60 
in terms of international regimes, that is, in terms of 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, as
1 The main proposals for the constitution of LAFTA are 
briefly presented in this chapter, while the problems of their 
effective implementation are discussed in chapter VI.
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defined in chapter I. This will permit to shed light on the 
process of institutional change, i.e., how changes within a 
regime (adaptation) and changes of regime (learning) 
occurred. Secondly, the relationship between institutional 
and structural change is explored. Some hypotheses 
suggesting that, under certain structural conditions, 
economic cooperation can be expected to increase were raised 
in chapter II. These hypotheses are now tested by looking at 
the co-variation between structures and institutions in the 
period 1939-60.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section I presents 
the principal agreements and instruments of cooperation of 
the 1939-55 period. Section II analyzes the transition 
towards a proposed free trade area in 1956-60. Sections I 
and II offer a description of the framework in which trade 
between Argentina and Brazil developed until 1960. The links 
between institutional and structural variables are addressed 
in section III. These links are illustrated with the help of 
two simple game theory models. Section IV summarises the 
conclusions. In an appendix a catalogue of the bilateral 
trade agreements between 1939 and 1960 is provided. As most 
of this detail is not available in the existing literature, 
appendix I presents the material in a chronological order 
with a view to facilitating further analysis on bilateral 
cooperation before 1960.
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I. THE REGIME OF RESTRAINED BILATERALISM. 1939-55
The regime of restrained bilateralism was characterized 
by a pattern of cooperation which was limited in terms of 
both scope (products included) and depth (degree of 
cooperation achieved). The scope was limited to a small 
number of products, among which complementary primary 
products were dominant. The depth was limited to bilateral 
trade preferences with no efforts to coordinate policy in 
the industrial, fiscal and monetary fields. Such a pattern 
of cooperation clearly reflected the structural conditions 
of the period 1939-55 (see section III). It was rooted in 
different perceptions in Argentina and Brazil as regards 
their insertion in the international system. It was also the 
reflection of the low level of industrial development 
prevailing in these countries until the mid-fifties.
Two different phases can be identified within the 
regime of restrained bilateralism. The first one corresponds 
to the creation of the basic instruments for cooperation 
between 1939 and 1941. These instruments were applied to 
expand trade in the context of the import constraint 
provoked by the Second World War. The second phase 
corresponds to the efforts to adjust to post-war conditions 
(1948-1955) after a short-lived experience of liberalisation 
in Brazil (1946-48). The need to save dollars fuelled the 
concession of trade preferences between Argentina and Brazil
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after the war !. The evolution of cooperation in this period 
can be understood as a process of adaptation, which affected 
rules and decision-making procedures but maintained the 
basic principles established in the earlier 1939-41 period.
1.1. Bilateral Economic Cooperation in the War Years
The outbreak of Second World War prompted efforts to 
facilitate the expansion of trade between Argentina and 
Brazil. The objective was to overcome the barriers that 
accumulated in the thirties 2. During 1939-41 a set of 
bilateral arrangements were signed, reflecting the momentum 
that cooperation had acquired 3. These agreements provided
1 During the period 194 6-51 83% of inter-Latin American 
trade (excluding oil) took place through compensatory agreements. 
In 1953 this proportion raised to 90.7%. Including oil, 
compensatory trade represented 73.4% and 70.5%, respectively, of 
inter-Latin American trade. Cf. ECLA, Estudio del Comercio Inter- 
Latinoamericano. p. 120.
2 On the escalation of protectionist measures in the 
thirties, cf. 'El Tratado de Comercio con el Brasil', La Prensa. 
Buenos Aires, 25 January 1940.
3 The agreements were based on the new instruments that the 
Latin American states had adopted to regulate international trade 
after the 1930 crisis, namely exchange controls and quantitative 
restrictions on imports. In Brazil, a new exchange system was 
adopted in April 1939. It was made up of three exchange rates by 
which 70 % of export earnings could be sold in the free market 
while the other 30 % had to be sold to the Bank of Brazil at the 
official rate. A higher exchange rate, the so-called free special 
flivre especial) was applied to financial transaction. Cf. S.B. 
Vianna, 'Politica Economica Externa e Industrializagao', in M.P. 
Abreu, A Ordem do Proqresso (Sao Paulo, 1990), pp. 105-22. In 
Argentina, a system of multiple exchange rates was established 
in August 1939, comprised by the preferential, basic, auction and 
free exchange rates. This complex system was replaced by a 
simpler one in August 1950. Cf. R. Mallon and J. Sourrouille, 
Politica Economica, pp. 67-9.
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the institutional basis for the expansion of trade in the 
war and early post-war years *.
Already in April 1939 Argentina and Brazil signed an 
Exchange Protocol in which they pledged to apply the most 
favourable exchange treatment to their reciprocal imports 
and avoid the distorting effects of export taxes. The 
subsequent 1940 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was the 
most significant agreement of the period 2. It would provide 
the institutional framework for trade between Argentina and 
Brazil until the creation of LAFTA in 1960. The main 
features of the 1940 Treaty were:
(a) the concession of the unconditional Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) treatment as regards all regulations over 
exports and imports;
(b) the consolidation of duty reductions and 
exemptions, along with new commercial benefits, applied to 
the principal export products of each country, namely wheat 
on the Argentine side and coffee, mat6, cacao and timber on 
the Brazilian;
(c) the commitment of not setting import quotas below 
the average import level of previous years.
The Treaty represented a broad framework providing for
1 Four principal agreements were signed: (i) the April 1939 
Exchange Protocol; (ii) the January 1940 Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation; (iii) the April 1941 Agreements on the addition of 
substitutes, facilitation of imports and reciprocal credits; (iv) 
the November 1941 Treaty for Progressive Free Trade. For details 
see appendix I. The failure to implement the November 1941 Treaty 
for Progressive Free Trade was already studied in chapter VI, so 
it will not be discussed here.
2 Cf. FO 371 24167, 26 January 1940.
trade preferences, which would be extended afterwards *. 
Moreover, a Payments Agreement providing a credit of 50 
millions of Argentine pesos (about US$ 12 millions) for 
reciprocal trade was signed in April 1941. According to this 
agreement net balances were expected to be used for 
purchases of the debtor country's exports. The objective was 
not only to settle net balances in the bilateral clearing 
account. It also sought to avoid the use of restrictive 
practices (controlling imports) and promote trade-enhancing 
instruments (expansion of exports) in order to balance 
trade.
In sum, the basis of the regime of restrained 
bilateralism were established between 1939 and 1941. The 
1940 Treaty of Trade and Navigation was the backbone of the 
trade regime until 1960 and facilitated bilateral trade in 
a context still dominated by the fragmentation of the 
international economy. The April 1941 Payments Agreement was 
the necessary complement to this. Both arrangements 
supported the steady increase in bilateral trade of the war 
years.
1.2. Adaptation Through Incremental Growth in the Post- 
War Years. 1946-55
During the period 1948-1955 important modifications in 
the bilateral trade regime between Argentina and Brazil were
1 Subsequent agreements extended the concessions and 
controlled certain trade-reducing practices, like the addition 
of substitutes to coffee and wheat.
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adopted which, however, preserved the basic features of the 
1940 Treaty l, namely the offering of trade concessions for 
a selected group of products. Therefore, they can be seen as 
adaptative responses within the regime of restrained
bilateralism. These eforts to increase bilateral trade were 
preceded by a short liberal interregnum in Brazil, whose 
failure was significant for encouraging the move towards
'n
cooperation with Argentina in the late forties.
(a) A Liberal Interregnum: The Early Dutra Years, 1946-
48
An important departure from the dominant regime
occurred between November 1946 and October 1948, when Brazil
reformulated her exchange and trade policy in a liberal 
direction. The change of government in Brazil represented 
the rise of a political coalition which sought to reverse 
the interventionist policies of the Vargas era 2. President 
Dutra eased trade controls, liberalised the exchange market 
and adopted a fixed exchange rate, which was set at the 
value of the pre-war period. Conversely, the system of 
quantitative controls on trade and multiple exchange rates 
remained in place in Argentina. No similar political 
transition had occurred in Argentina and the first
1 During a short period, in the early years of the Dutra 
government, there was a substantial departure from the dominant 
pattern. This will be addressed later.
2 cf. T.E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil. 1930-64: An
Experiment in Democracy (Oxford 1967), pp. 65-73.
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presidency of Peron represented a continuity of the 
nationalist coalition in power since the June 1943 c o u p  *. 
The continuation of the US boycott and the failure of the UK 
to return to convertibility reinforced trade and exchange 
controls in Argentina. Therefore, a phase of divergence in 
terms of economic policies began in the early post-war 
years. This divergence naturally affected the normal 
operation of existing bilateral agreements.
In particular, the new liberal regime in Brazil 
compromised the April 1941 Payments Agreement with 
Argentina. Brazil adopted a regime of convertibility for all 
her external transactions. Such a system strained Brazil's 
payments relations with Argentina, whose system was based on 
non-convertibility and discrimination. The 1941 Agreement 
established that bilateral balances between the two 
countries should remain blocked and could only be used for 
purchasing goods from the debtor country. Clearly, this 
contradicted Brazil's new system. Moreover, Brazil held a 
large favourable net position with respect to Argentina at 
the end of 1946, made up of the balances accumulated between 
July 1941 and November 194 6. This implied that Brazil was in 
fact financing Argentine imports. As Brazil's deficit with 
the USA sharply increased after liberalisation, this credit 
became too costly for Brazil and she asked for the payment 
of the Argentine debt in convertible currency. In January 
1947 Argentina agreed to release US$ 43,1 millions in the
1 Cf. J.C. Torre and L. Riz, 'Argentina Since 1946', in L. 
Bethell (ed.), Cambridge History of Latin America, pp. 73-100.
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form of convertible currency so as to alleviate Brazil's 
Balance of Payments problems *.
In sum, the move towards convertibility in Brazil 
challenged her agreements with Argentina, based on bilateral 
trade and exchange advantages. As her deficit with the USA 
increased, Brazil had to demand the settlement of net 
bilateral positions with Argentina in convertible currency, 
thereby eroding the basis of the 1941 Payments Agreement.
(b) Policy Convergence and Cooperation, 1948-55
The new liberal approach to economic policy in Brazil 
would not last, however. It collapsed under the pressure of 
external imbalances with the dollar area 2. Since February 
1948 a severe regime of direct controls on imports was 
adopted 3, which constituted the backbone of Brazil's policy 
until October 1953. Then, it was replaced by the 'Aranha 
Plan', which substituted direct controls by a multiple
1 Cf. Boletin Mensual. vol. XXXII, no. 376 (31 January
1947), pp. 12-14.
2 Cf. W. Baer, Industrialisation and Economic Development, 
p. 48.
3 In June 1949 import controls were made especially severe 
for imports payable in hard currency and only a previously 
defined amount of available hard currency could be used for this. 
Controls were eased in 1951-52 as a precautionary measure in the 
context of the Korean war. Cf. W. Baer, Industrialisation and 
Economic Development, pp. 455-51. See also Desenvolvimento e 
Cojuntura, vol. II, no. 5 (May 1958), pp. 93-104.
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exchange rate system based on exchange auctions This led 
to a convergence of policies in Argentina and Brazil after 
1948. Bilateral negotiations gained momentum again, 
following two main directions: (i) the renewal and
diversification of the list of products to be exchanged; 
(ii) the setting up of a comprehensive payments agreements 
based on the use of 'soft' currencies and reciprocal 
credits.
This clearly represented a return to the forms of 
cooperation that had been developed during the war. The 
agreements can be seen as a process of 'incremental growth' 
within the regime of restrained bilateralism. Improvements 
were made into the instruments of cooperation, and trade- 
diversion, which had been the natural consequence of supply 
constraints in the international economy during the war, 
became more explicit and deliberate with the experience of 
the 'dollar shortage'.
Five significant agreements were signed in the 1948-55 
period. These agreements were the following (see also 
appendix I): the Payments Agreement of October 1948; the 
Commercial Complementary Agreement of May 1949; the 
Commercial Agreement of June 1950; the Commercial and 
Payments Agreement of March 1953; the Commercial and 
Payments Agreement of June 1954; the Wheat Agreement of 
January 1955 (which established the conditions for trade in
1 This system was based on exchange auctions for different 
categories of imports, subject to minimum premiums fagios) in 
accordance with the priorities set by the government. Cf. S.B. 
Vianna, 'Duas Tentativas de Estabilizagao, 1951-54', in M.P. 
Abreu, A Ordem do Progresso. pp. 138-43.
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wheat between 1955 and 1957) . They were aimed at (i) 
sustaining the levels of bilateral trade, which began to 
loss dynamism after 1946, through the concession of trade 
preferences *; (ii) diversifying the composition of trade, by 
encouraging manufactured exports 2; (iii) saving scarce hard 
currency in face of the 'dollar shortage '3.
1 As mentioned in (a), concessions included lower tariffs, 
a favourable exchange rate and the promise to settle net balances 
through exports by the debtor country. In Brazil, imports of 
wheat payed the lowest exchange rate, namely the 'cost of 
exchange surcharge' fcusto de cambio), which entailed a strong 
subsidy. After 1953, Brazil's imports of fruit from Argentina 
were placed in the preferential 'general' category and received 
a more favourable rate than imports from other countries, this 
classified in the expensive 'special' category. Argentina, in 
turn, settled Brazilian imports at the official exchange rate. 
Certain products like coffee and pine wood could only be imported 
from Brazil in the late fifties, although imports of pine woods 
from Chile were allowed as well. Cf. ECLA, Comercio Inter- 
Latinoamericano de productos en 1954 v 1955: Situaci6n v
Perspectivas para 1956 (Santiago: 1958), pp. 106-111. When
Argentina suspended the concession of import permits in 1948 as 
a result of the inconvertibility of the pound, this was almost 
immediately reestablished for imports from Brazil and areas of 
non-convertible currencies.
2 In both countries, preferences seem to have played a 
significant role in promoting exports of manufactures after 1949. 
Brazil granted concessions to Argentine domestic electric 
appliances, drugs and machine writers. Argentina granted 
concessions for a diversified set of Brazilian manufactures, 
including railway equipment in 1955. This encouraged exports 
which were not competitive in the international market, as 
observed by ECLA, Estudio del Comercio Inter-Latinoamericano. p. 
12: 'favoured by the temporal receding of European, Japanese and, 
partially, US supplies during the war, and despite of the 
contraction that occurred when these supplies were resumed, trade
: in manufactures still persists in some degree, principally as a 
result of bilateral agreements. Manufactures are produced by new 
industries which frequently display lower levels of productivity 
than extra-regional producers, and it is therefore difficult for 
them to enter the market' (author's translation).
3 For Brazil, buying wheat in Argentina represented a 
significant saving of hard currency, as was demonstrated in 1952,
: when the failure of the Argentine crop added to the severity of 
Brazil's disequilibrium with the dollar area. For Argentina,
| bilateral trade allowed this country to accumulate negative
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The new payments agreement was negotiated and 
eventually signed in October 1948. This agreement, which was 
a more comprehensive version of that of April 1941 *, would 
constitute the main instrument for bilateral payments until 
1960 2. In addition, more liberal conditions for the exchange 
of certain primary products were established. This was the 
case of trade in fresh, dried, desiccated and industrialised 
fruits and vegetables. In June 1950 a minimum 'basic 
programme' of exchange was set for these products, which 
received automatic import permits. The minimum exchange of 
products proposed in the 'basic programme' was increased 
from about US$ 14 millions in June 1950 to US$ 18 millions 
in March 1953 3.
balances in non-convertible currencies and hence to finance 
imports that she should otherwise have had to pay in dollars. Cf. 
letter from Ambassador Luzardo to Vargas, Buenos Aires, 27 March 
1952, CPDOC GV 52.01.14/4, in which Luzardo commented on the 
Argentine interest in renewing the 1948 Payments Agreement. The 
advantages for Argentina of a large accumulated surplus in favour 
of Brazil in the bilateral clearing account had already attracted 
the attention of Brazilian policy-makers in August 1942. Cf. FO 
371 30323 13 August 1942.
1 The 1948 agreement established that (i) bilateral payments 
would be made in cruzeiros; (ii) an account would be created in 
the Bank of Brazil ('Argentina-Brazil Agreement Account') to 
settle net balances in cruzeiros; (ii) net debtor positions up 
to Cz$ 280 millions (about US$ 15 millions) would not pay 
interest; (iii) net trade balances at the end of the first three 
year period could be cancelled either in 'soft' or 'hard' 
currency.
2 The agreement suffered slight modifications in March 1953, 
when an account in 'agreement dollars' was created. Net balances 
exceeding the amount of US$ 35 millions in December 1956 would 
be transferred to a special account in the Bank of Brazil and 
paid through exports from the debtor country. A reciprocal credit 
equivalent to US$ 35 million was also accorded.
3 Both countries also agreed to apply a favourable exchange 
rate to imports of fruits (June 1954). Brazil instituted special 
exchange auctions for the Argentine fruit after the adoption of
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In sum, the instruments of the regime of restrained 
bilateralism were reestablished and improved in both the 
trade and payments areas in 1948-55.
(c) Institutional Fragility of the Regime of Restrained 
Bilateralism
It was argued that a central feature of the regime of 
restrained bilateralism was the unwillingness of Argentina 
and Brazil to adopt a long-term, comprehensive commitment of 
cooperation. This can be expected to have weaken the
institutional basis of regional trade and increase its
instability. Two pieces of evidence can be used to confirm 
the institutional fragility of the regime of restrained 
bilateralism, namely the interruptions, impasses and delays 
in the negotiation and implementation of the trade 
agreements; and the instability of the trade preferences 
granted to regional producers. This sub-section briefly 
reviews qualitative evidence of uncertainty and instability 
in regional trade. In sub-section (d) an attempt to provide 
a quantitative assessment of the evolution of trade 
preferences after 1948 is presented.
Many difficulties hindered the normal working of trade 
agreements in 1939-55. This was especially evident when they 
had to be renewed and when changes in economic policy 
occurred either in Argentina or Brazil.
(i) The payments agreement of October 1948 and the
the new exchange policy in October 1953.
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trade agreement of May 1949 seemed to end the era of 
divergent policies in Argentina and Brazil. However, the 
failure of the UK to return to convertibility prompted a 
protectionist reaction in Argentina, which affected imports 
from Brazil.1. The protectionist move in Argentina delayed 
the effective application of the trade agreement of May 1949
2. Only in early 1950 would the situation be normalised.
(ii) By mid-1952 institutional instability re-emerged. 
The agreements signed in June 1950 were due to expire in 
July 1952. As no clause of automatic renovation existed, 
there was high uncertainty about whether import permits 
would continue to be granted in the second semester of 1952 
and which exchange rate would be used. At that time, all 
that remained was an agreement for imports of bananas 3. The 
negotiation of the renewal of the 1950 agreement proceeded 
slowly. Besides the problems generated in Argentina by the
1 Cf. the interview given by Economic Minister Gomez 
Morales, published in Boletin Mensual. vol. XXXIV, no. 404 (31 
May 1949), p. 23.
2 In June 1949 the Argentine-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce 
in Buenos Aires sent a note to the Argentine economic Minister 
asking for the effective implementation of the agreement of May, 
pointing out that the Central Bank 'has not conceded, and it is 
difficult to know if it will concede at all, the necessary import 
permits for imports from Brazil, including, among other items, 
pineapples, nonferrous metals and its manufactures, and toes' 
(author's translation). Cf.Boletin Mensual. vol. XXXIV, no. 405 
(30 June 1949), p. 15. In November 1949 the Chamber insisted on 
the fact that there was an 'evident paralysation of trade' and 
that despite of the agreement 'no concrete progress has been made 
so far' (author's translation). Cf. Boletin Mensual. vol. XXXIV, 
no. 410 (30 November 1949), p. 10.
3 This, too, was due to expire by the end of 1952. On the 
concerns that this generated see Boletin Mensual. V.XXXVII, N.442 
(31 July 1952), p. 2.
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failure of the wheat crop of 1952, it seems that the 
Peronist government used this delay to express its 
disapproval of the criticisms of Peron in the Brazilian 
press *. Moreover, the Argentine external crisis of 1952 led 
this country to focus on essential imports which Brazil 
could not produce 2. If an agreement was eventually reached 
in March 1953, and extended in June 1954, the impasse in 
negotiations curbed trade in the second half of 1952.
(iii) The agreements of March 1953 and June 1954 were 
disrupted shortly after their celebration, as a result of 
the adoption of the 'Aranha Plan' in Brazil (October 1953). 
This required adjusting concessions to Argentina to the new 
exchange system. However, this was not done immediately and 
the Argentine-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce observed at the 
end of 1954 that the 'so slow pace shown by the negotiations 
in Rio de Janeiro (...) does not calm the fears of a fall in 
regional trade' 3.
1 Peron told Brazilian Ambassador Luzardo that a trade 
agreement with Argentina at that moment would not be convenient, 
since it could attract strong attacks on his government and on 
Vargas from the UDN press. CPDOC GV, 'Correspondencias', 13 March 
1952.
2 As industrialisation progressed and the import structure 
became more rigid, the criteria for the concession of import 
permits were increasingly associated with the degree of 
'essentiality' of the different categories of goods. For 
Argentina in 1952 essential imports were machinery, chemicals, 
iron and steel, and raw materials for the industry, a few of 
which could be supplied by Brazil. This restricted the Argentine 
disposition to offer concessions for Brazilian products. Cf. 
Luzardo to Vargas, CPDOC GV, 'Correspondencias' (15) 52.01.12/3, 
0760, Buenos Aires, 30 June 1952.
3 Cf. Boletin Mensual. vol. XXXIX, no. 461 (28 February 
1954), p. 8 (author's translation).
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(iv) Finally, changes in the exchange system adopted in 
Argentina in 1956 introduced new problems in bilateral 
trade. This was due to the fact that the Argentine 
government allowed exporters of fruits to sell their dollars 
in the free market. However, exports of fruit to Brazil 
would continue to be paid at the official rate in accordance 
with the payments agreement existing between the two 
countries. Thus, Argentine exporters demanded higher prices 
in the Brazilian market in order to compensate the lower 
value of their 'account dollars' in Argentina *. This led the 
Brazilian government to suspend the auction of dollars for 
imports of Argentine fruit in February 1956 2.
Not surprisingly, business interests repeatedly 
complained about this instability. Some contemporary 
observers considered that the lack of a stable institutional 
framework was the most serious source of difficulties in the 
expansion of regional trade. Thus, the Argentine-Brazilian 
Chamber of Commerce emphasised that
1 Cf. ECLA, Estudio del Comercio Inter-Latinoamericano. pp.
24-5.
2 Cf. Boletin Mensual. vol. XLI, no. 486 (31 March 1956), p. 
8. Similar problems were observed in the case of Argentine wheat 
exports and Brazilian fruit exports. Cf. US Department of State. 
Central Files. Argentina (1987), 835.00/11-352, Desp. N. 546, 3rd 
of November 1954). Alternatively, the existence of different 
exchange rates for extra- and intra-regional exports encouraged 
contraband or triangular operations. This compromised the 
objective of achieving an equilibrium in bilateral accounts. Cf 
ECLA, 'Comercio Inter-Latinoamericano de Productos', p. 7.
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'nothing is more damaging to commercial activities than the 
lack of precise and stable terms for their development. 
(•••) The instability stemming from frequent changes in the 
systems and methods that regulate trade and the access to 
foreign exchange led to a decline in business" *.
A comprehensive Treaty providing a long term horizon was the 
most frequent demand raised by business interests linked to 
Argentine-Brazilian trade 2.
Moreover, it should be observed that if the 
institutional framework provided by the governments was 
fragile, the private sector was unable too to give more 
stability to regional trade. Information about business 
opportunities did not flow easily between the two countries 
and business contacts were established only gradually 3. As
1 Cf. Boletin Mensual. vol. 32, no. 384 (30 September 1947), 
p. 10 (author's translation).
2 In April 1950 the Chamber demanded Ma new commercial 
treaty (...) which replaced the too numerous dispositions which 
treat separately each problem” (Cf. Boletin Mensual. XXXV, N.415, 
30 April 1950, p. 17) . More than a year later, the Chamber stated 
that 'it is urgent to consider as a whole the dispositions that 
now exist in order to unify them in a new Treaty of Commerce' 
(cf. Boletin Mensual. V.XXXVI. N.430, 31 July 1951, p.9). This 
demand continued to occupy the editorials of the Chamber in the 
following years (cf., for instance, Boletin Mensual. V.XXXVII, 
N.442, 31 July 1952, p.9). Six years later, ECLA (1958), p.22-4, 
identified the problem of the instability of the trade 
preferences in this period as one of the most serious setbacks 
for the expansion of regional trade.
3 From 1940 industrialists from Brazil and from other Latin 
American countries sought to exchange information about 
manufactures. An evidence of this was the creation by Brazilian 
industrialists of the 'Brazilian Economic Embassy' in charge of 
promoting Brazilian manufactures in South American countries. Cf. 
FIESP, Circular N. 68-40, June 28 1940. Another evidence was the 
Brazilian exhibition of industrial products at Buenos Aires in 
July 1940. Cf. FIESP, Circular N.69/40, 1 July 1940, and FIESP,
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there was no system of standardisation for industrial 
products, in some cases complains about disparities between 
samples and goods shipped added to uncertainty in regional 
trade *.
In sum, the regime of restrained bilateralism was 
characterized by institutional fragility. As a result of the 
lack of a long-term, comprehensive framework within which to 
control the sources of instability - especially alterations 
in economic policy - trade was frequently impaired. If 
political objectives in trade negotiations were rarely made 
explicit (this seems to have occurred only in 1952), the 
political economy of rivalry permeated the whole 1942-55 
period, by preventing long term commitments for cooperation. 
Uncertainty and instability were the consequence of these 
limits.
(d) The Evolution of Trade Preferences
The previous sub-section highlighted the increased 
importance that trade and payments preferences acquired for 
Argentina-Brazil bilateral relations after 1948. But it may 
be asked whether these preferences had an impact on trade or 
instability rendered them useless. Trends in bilateral trade 
suggest that preferences were unable to stop the decline of
Circular N.79/40, 24 July 1940. But more systematic business
contacts would only appear in the second half of the fifties.
1 This was a source of concern for Brazilian industrialists. 
See, for instance, Boletin Mensual. V. 32, N. 378, 31 March 1947, 
pp.14-15.
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the post-war years. However, a closer observation of trade 
relations in 1946-60 supports a different conclusion.
In order to obtain a quantitative idea of the evolution 
of trade preferences after 1948, the 'Index of Trade 
Intensity' (ITI), proposed by Anderson and Norheim, was used 
*. In the case of exports, the ITI = Xjj/irtj, where x^  is the 
share of i's exports going to country j and nij is the share 
of country j in world imports (net of country i's imports). 
If there is no regional bias in trade, the participation of 
country j in i's exports will be equal to the participation 
of country j in world imports, and hence ITI will be equal 
to unity. A similar index can be calculated for imports, as 
the ratio between the share of country j in total i's 
imports and the participation of j in world exports (net of 
country i's exports) . There are two reasons why the ITI 
between two countries or regions, say A and B, may be higher 
than unity. The first is a high degree of economic 
complementarity between A and B, which leads to higher 
levels of trade between them than with respect to less 
complementary countries 2. The second is the concession of 
trade preferences which discriminate in favour of certain
1 Cf. K. Anderson and H. Norheim, 'From Imperial to Regional 
Trade Preferences: Its Effects on Europes's Intra and Extra- 
Regional Trade', Weltwirthschaftliches Archiv. vol 129, no. 1 
(1993), pp. 78-101.
2 For instance, the ITI between Argentina and Brazil will 
tend to be higher than the ITI between Argentina and the USA, 
given the complementarity in agricultural production between 
Argentina and Brazil and the lack of complementarity between 
Argentina and the USA. For simplicity, it will not be considered 
here the influence of transport costs, which naturally implies 
that neighbouring countries will show a higher ITI.
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countries and against the rest of the world *. This is the 
focus of this sub-section. If the ITI is above the figure 
explained by economic complementarity, this means that trade 
preferences did impact trade in 1948-55, or in other words, 
that the institutions for cooperation played a role in 
shaping regional trade. Clearly, the influence of these 
factors - trade bias based on complementary specialisation 
as against trade bias based on cooperation policies - cannot 
be easily separated in practice. However, assuming that 
specialisation and transport costs remained stable in the 
period of analysis, variations in ITI should principally 
reflect variations in trade preferences 2. Hence, the 
evolution of the ITI may provide an idea of the evolution of 
trade preferences 3. Graph V.l and Table V.l presents the
1 To the extent that trade preferences may reflect trade 
diversion, a higher ITI could be considered as an indicator of 
losses in welfare. However, in the context of dollar shortage 
that prevailed in the period, trade preferences probably 
represented trade creation rather than trade diversion, as 
suggested in the works of ECLA (cf. chapter II). Therefore, the 
efficiency implications of trade preferences will not be 
considered in this discussion.
2 In effect, ITI can be considered as composed by the 
product of two other indexes, and C^ , where B^  is a residual 
transaction costs index and C^  is a complementarity index. C^  is 
defined as Efx^.m^/t^), where xu is the share of commodity k in 
i's exports, mkj is the share of commodity k in country j's 
imports and t^ is the share of commodity k in world trade (cf. 
K. Anderson and H. Norheim,'From Imperial to Regional Trade', pp. 
82-3) . If Cjj does not vary, ITI will only reflect Bijp which (given 
constant transport costs) reflects policy induced bias in the 
direction of trade.
3 It is also interesting to note that the ITI of the years 
1947-48 in Brazil can be considered as a fairly good 'witness' 
with respect to the rest of the period. As discussed above, trade 
and payments preferences were partially eliminated in these years 
because of the liberal orientation of Brazil's economic policy. 
Instruments for trade and payments discrimination were
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calculations of ITI for 1947-60 in the case of trade between 
Brazil and Argentina and Brazil and the USA.
TABLE V.l. INDEX OF INTENSITY OF TRADE 
Index of Trade Intensity. Brazil-Argentina
Exoort Index (1) Imoort Index (2)
Years Mean CV (%) Mean CV (%)
1947-1950 3.6 6.1 3.4 41.5
1951-1956 4.5 15.3 6.0 52.6
1957-1960 5.4 29.6 6.8 9.8
Index of Intensitv of Trade. Brazil-USA
Exoort Index (1) Imoort Index (2\
Years Mean CV (%) Mean CV (%)
1947-1950 3.3 10.3 1.9 6.9
1951-1956 3.1 9.7 1.6 22.8
1957-1960 3.3 7.6 1.8 16.0
Source: calculated from data provided by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Trade and 
Financial Statistics (Washington, various years); and IMF 
Direction of Trade (Washington, various years).
(1) ITI (x) = Xij/irij and (2) ITI(m) = iRjj/Xj, where x^  is the
share of i's exports to j; is the share of i's imports
from j; mj is the share of country j in world imports net of
i's imports; Xj is the share of j in world exports, net of
country i's exports.
reintroduced by the end of 1948 and in fact only applied from 
1950. Therefore, taking the years 1947-49 as the basis for 
comparison seems to be especially convenient.
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GRAPH. V.l. ITI For Exports and Imports, Brazil-Arqentina. 
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GRAPH V .2. Brazil: Average Index of Trade Intensity.
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The evolution of the ITI for exports and imports in 
1947-60 shows that (on the assumption of a relative 
stability in economic complementarity between Argentina and 
Brazil) policy-based preferences increased in this period 1.
The assumption of the stability of economic 
complementarity between Argentina and Brazil in 1946-60 amounts 
to consider that structural change in this period did not lead 
to a significant alteration of the trade structure of the region. 
The assumption is reasonable for the period 1946-55, in which 
structural change was less intense than in 1956-60. But it is 
certainly too strong an assumption after 1956, when 
industrialisation should have led to a fall in economic 
complementarity, as imports became more concentrated in machinery 
and intermediate goods produced by centre countries. Therefore, 
an increase in the ITI implies that policy-based preferences were 
high enough to more tan compensate for the reduction in economic 
complementarity.
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In effect, ITI continued to increase despite the fall of 
bilateral trade in the late fifties. In the case of Brazil's 
export index, this was related to a more intense decline of 
the Argentine participation in world imports than the 
Argentine participation in Brazil's exports. In other words, 
ITI increased because x^  fell less than (see graph V.l). 
The effect of the increase in trade preferences was thus to 
avoid a still more pronounced fall of bilateral trade, given 
the dismal performance of the Argentine external sector *.
In addition, it can also be seen that the intensity of 
trade between Brazil and Argentina (in terms of both exports 
and imports) was higher than the intensity of trade between 
Brazil and the USA. This probably reflects the efforts to 
discriminate against dollar imports in the post-war period 
2. On the other hand, the coefficients of variation (CV) show 
that the instability of ITI was in general much higher in 
the case of Brazil-Argentina than in the case of Brazil-USA. 
This confirms the argument that the lack of a long-term,
1 This can be illustrated through a very simple comparative 
exercise. If Argentina had reduced imports from Brazil in 1957-60 
in the same proportion as she did with respect to the rest of the 
world (and hence the ITI for Brazilian exports to Argentina in 
1957-60 had been exactly the same as in 1947-50), then she would 
have imported from Brazil a value of US$ 43 millions instead of 
the US$ 65 millions actually observed.
2 It is interesting to compare the ITI Brazil-Argentina with 
the ITI Brazil-USA because there exists a similar pattern of 
complementarity in agricultural products. On the other hand, 
there is a much stronger complementarity in industrial production 
between Brazil and the USA than between Brazil and Argentina. 
Hence, one can expect a higher value of the average ITI Brazil- 
USA. This is not what the data suggest, however, and this 
reinforces the idea that preferences did impact the direction of 
trade (in other words, that policy-based trade diversion was 
applied against dollar imports).
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stable institutional framework for trade reflected in the 
instability of the preferences. The recurrent complains by 
traders about the instability of the regional trade regime, 
reviewed above, were justified. Frequent changes in the 
rules of the game led to an erratic behaviour of regional 
trade preferences. This contrasted with the more stable 
pattern shown by trade between Brazil and the USA.
However, instability cannot be entirely attributed to 
institutional variables. It was also related to the 
concentration of Argentine exports in a few agricultural 
products and especially wheat. The crop failure of 1952 in 
Argentina, the fall in wheat prices in 1954 and 1955, and 
the temporary liberalisation of imports in Brazil in 1950 
and 1951, made these years especially instable for bilateral 
trade *.
In sum, trade preferences contributed to at least avoid 
a more pronounced fall in regional trade. The analysis of 
the index of trade intensity (ITI) suggests that trade 
preferences increased in 1947-60. On the other hand, the 
regional ITI fluctuated more than the ITI between the region 
and extra-regional markets. This confirms the problems 
related to the fragility of the regime of restrained 
bilateralism (although other factors associated with the
1 In 1954 Argentina exported 767.3 tons of wheat to Brazil 
(including wheat floor) for a total value of US$ 68.7 millions. 
In 1955, these exports reached 1233.3 tons, but the total value 
was only US$ 92.3. Cf. ECLA, Estudio del Comercio Inter- 
Latinoamericano . pp. 48-50. Another factor that generated 
instability was the beginning of the Korean War, which prompted 
a speculative upsurge of imports in the early fifties.
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structure of trade probably contributed to enhance 
instability).
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II. TOWARDS A NEW REGIONAL TRADE REGIME . 1956-60
The 1956-60 period represented a transition from a 
regime of piecemeal bilateral trade and payments agreements 
towards an incipient free trade area - the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA), created on 18 February 1960. 
It was a transitional period in the sense that the main 
features of the 'old' regime of restrained bilateralism were 
still preserved - through the successive prorogation of 
existing agreements - but at the same time its basic 
principles and norms began to be redefined. This section 
focuses on how the pattern of adaptation within the regime 
of restrained bilateralism shifted towards a process of 
learning in which a new regime was created.
II.1. The 'Demand' for Institutional Change: New
Directions in Exchange and Trade Policy in Argentina and 
Brazil
In the second half of the fifties there was a move in 
Latin America towards the simplification and liberalisation 
of the exchange system. Various factors contributed to this: 
(i) the progress towards convertibility in Europe; (ii) 
recurrent balance of payments difficulties in Latin America, 
which led to the devaluation of local currencies; (iii) 
pressure from the IMF to curb exchange control. Governments 
also sought to give a higher role for tariffs in industrial 
protection.
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In Argentina, an early but short-lived attempt at 
liberalising trade and exchange controls was taken after the 
ousting of Per6n in 1955, along with a sharp devaluation of 
the peso *. By the end of 1958 Frondizi implemented a more 
substantial change in policy. He unified the exchange 
market, devalued the peso and established a system of 'dirty 
fluctuations' against the dollar. Quantitative controls were 
then substituted by differential duties on imports (ranging 
from zero to 300 %) and compulsory prior import deposits 
(ranging from 150 % to 300 %). Similar changes occurred in 
Brazil. The most significant was the approval of a new 
tariff system based on ad valorem duties and the 
simplification of the exchange system in August 1957 2. The 
new system contemplated two categories of imports, the 
'general' and the 'special', in which the former received a 
cheaper exchange rate 3. In addition, a highly subsidised 
exchange rate, the custo de c§mbio. was applied to imports 
of wheat, oil and newsprint.
These changes in economic policy had significant 
implications for regional trade. First, because they had 
macroeconomic consequences in terms of rates of economic
1 The Provisional Government also undertook a failed 
attempt at reducing quantitative controls on exports. Cf. R. 
Mallon and J. Sourrouille, Polltica Econdmica. p. 17.
2 Cf. M.A. Leopoldi, 'Crescendo em Meio a Incerteza', p.
81.
3 It can be seen that, in practice, Brazil and Argentina 
moved to a simplified system of multiple exchange rates, as 
the different values of the new duties and import deposits 
implied different effective exchange rates for the various 
categories of imports.
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growth and price competitiveness, which affected trade 
balances. The devaluations of 1956 and 1958 in Argentina 
strongly reduced imports from Brazil, 1 as the average 
exchange rate cruzeiro/peso fell from 3.68 to 2.73 from 
1945-54 to 1955-60, respectively 2. In turn, the average rate 
of growth of GDP in Argentina (4%) was about half of that in 
Brazil (8%) in 1955-60. This prompted disequilibrium and 
friction in bilateral trade 3. Brazil negotiated with 
Argentina the purchase of Brazilian railway equipment in 
order to balance trade and some exports did take place in
1 Although in February 1959 most imports from Brazil and 
other neighbouring countries were exempted from the recently 
established duties and deposits in Argentina, the 
devaluation of December 1958 offset these trade preferences. 
The peso/dollar exchange rate increased from 18 pesos (the 
preferential rate formerly enjoyed by Brazilians exporters) 
to 85 pesos and this curbed imports. In addition, some 
Brazilian imports were excluded from the list of products 
favoured by the exemptions in July 1957. This was the case 
of sisal fibres (charged with a duty of 100 %), vegetal oil 
(100 %), cotton textiles (100 %) and palms (300 %), among 
others. Cf. Boletin Mensual. vol. XLIV, no. 521 (28 February 
1959), p.8. In the case of the Argentine exports to Brazil, 
the impact of the measures of August 1957 was lessened by 
the fact that wheat continued to receive the most favourable 
exchange rate - although the custo de cambio was 
subsequently increased.
2 Data obtained from the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), Anuario Estatistico do 
Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, various years). It is worthwhile 
noting that the simple correlation between Brazil's exports 
to Argentina and the exchange rate cruzeiro/peso is not 
significant in 1939-55 (R-squared =29 %), while it becomes 
significant at a 5 % level in 1955-60 (R-squared = 65 %).
3 Total Argentine imports from Brazil fell from US$ 107 
millions in 1958 to US$ 42.9 millions in 1959. 
Disequilibrium in the trade balances grew in the second half 
of the fifties. It was estimated that in 1960 the 
accumulated deficit of Brazil in the bilateral account with 
Argentina reached about US$ 60 millions. Cf. FO 371 147787 
16 December 1960.
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1955 and 1956. However, subsequent negotiations failed and 
Brazil turned to other sources of wheat *. Brazil complained 
that she purchased wheat in Argentina on the bases of 
triannual agreements, but that no reciprocal commitment 
existed on the Argentine side to buy Brazilian goods, 
leading to bilateral disequilibrium 2.
But the implications of the new economic policies of 
Argentina and Brazil were not confined to short-term trade 
friction. They in fact challenged the basis of existing 
trade preferences. Since tariffs and devaluations became 
major instruments of trade policy in the late fifties, 
preferences which depended on exchange and quantitative
1 Brazil's Economic Minister Edmundo Barbosa da Silva 
paid a visit to Argentina in November 1960 in order to 
promote the export of manufactures and thereby balance 
bilateral trade. However, his demands were not attended, as 
observed by British diplomats in Rio de Janeiro: 'So far as 
we can judge from here, his mission appears to have been 
unsuccessful. No doubt because Brazil's railway equipment 
and manufactures are more expensive than similar goods 
obtained from the world market, and because railway 
equipment in particular can be obtained from the USA under 
special terms by the Eximbank. According to the press, 
Brazil is negotiating with the USA to obtain 1.7 million 
tons of American wheat (presumably.. .under PL 480) and it is 
believed that arrangements have already been made for the 
supply of 200 000 tons from the USSR. If these supplies are 
forthcoming, domestic production could probably make up the 
balance of Brazil requirements: total consumption next year 
is estimated at 2.2 millions of tons'. Cf. FO 371 147787, 16 
December 1960).
2 This argument was used to demand a diversification and 
stabilisation of Argentine purchases in Brazil. Cf. CDO, 
'Despachos, 1958-60: Instrugoes Para a Delegagao do Brasil 
a Reuniao da Comissao Mista Brasil-Argentina, a realizar-se 
em Buenos Aires a partir de 20 de Noviembre de 1959', 16
November 1959. In May 1961 it was observed that 'Brazil has 
for some time been seeking to persuade Argentina to increase 
her purchases of manufactured goods, notably railway 
equipment, but so far without success'. Cf. FO 371 155768 AA 
10322/61, Confidential, 3 May 1961.
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restrictions were eroded *. Brazil's new tariff system of 
August 1957 was especially important in prompting a revision 
of existing regional agreements. Preferences in favour of 
Argentina had to be renegotiated, now on the basis of tariff 
rather than exchange preferences. However, as Brazil was 
member of the GATT, tariff preferences were incompatible 
with Brazil's international obligations and an impasse 
emerged. Argentina, in turn, moved in a similar direction. 
Although this country was not a member of the GATT, she 
suffered pressures from the IMF and the Paris Club in order 
to eliminate her bilateral agreements. When the Brazilian 
Foreign Minister Horacio Lafer visited Buenos Aires in 
December 1959 in order to extend the bilateral 1940 Treaty 
of Commerce and Navigation, observers pointed out that
'Argentina would probably have preferred not to prolong this 
agreement and might have avoided doing so if the Latin 
American free trade area negotiation had kept to the 
timetable. The IMF is known to be critical of Argentina's 
remaining bilateral agreements. Moreover, the preferential 
treatment given to Brazil cannot yet be said to be in the 
context of a plan of regional economic integration and is 
thus strictly at variance with Argentine undertakings to
1 It is important to remark that the governments were 
aware of this conflict between new policies and preferences. 
Cf. Gustavo Magarinos, former Uruguayan representative at 
LAFTA/LAIA, interview. 20 June 1993, Montevideo. This is 
also recognised in the study conducted by the Brazilian 
Economic Ministry on the impact that the 1957 tariffs would 
carry on regional trade. Cf. Ministerio da Fazenda. 'Uma 
Zona de Livre Comercio', unpublish. paper, Rio de janeiro, 
1959, especially pp. 12-14.
members of the Paris Club' l.
The mismatch between the old agreements and prevailing 
trends in economic policy implied that they were 
increasingly inoperative 2. ECLA observed that the
'Argentine exchange reform of 1955, the subsequent reforms 
in Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay, and the modifications 
experienced by trade policy in most of the Southern Latin 
American countries, have created a new situation in which 
the mechanisms that have been applied before in order to 
facilitate and encourage regional trade no longer work. On 
the contrary, these mechanisms represent in certain cases 
serious barriers to regional trade' 3.
1 Cf. FO 371 139029 A 1136/2, 4 December 1959. On the 
external pressure for a change of policies see also next 
sub-sections.
2 This was also complicated by the lack of synchrony 
between policy reform in the two countries. While Brazil 
adopted a system of tariff protection in mid-1957, Argentina 
moved away from direct controls in December 1958. For more 
than a year the two countries applied different instruments
to regulate their external economic relations. Common
grounds were thus more difficult to find, and this led to a 
'virtual paralysation' of trade in the last quarter of 1958. 
Cf. Boletin Mensual. V.XLIII, N.509, 28 February 1958, p .9.
3 ECLA, Estudio del Comercio Inter-Latinoamericano. p.6
(author's translation). The contradiction between bilateral 
arrangements and the new economic policies was especially 
apparent in the case of the exchange reform in Argentina in 
October 1956. As mentioned, the lower value of the dollar 
agreement Argentina-Brazil than that of the dollar in the 
free exchange market severely hampered the exports of 
Argentine fruits to Brazil.
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Clearly, the previous agreements had to be extended 
while the new trade regime was being negotiated, so as to 
give continuity to bilateral trade preferences. However, 
this was a provisional solution, beset by higher instability 
New basis for cooperation had to be looked after in order 
to adjust the interest of Argentina and Brazil in keeping 
their bilateral preferences to the new international and 
domestic context. The idea of a forming a free trade area or 
customs union, set forward by ECLA in 1956, offered an 
answer to this.
II. 2. Sources of Institutional Change: ECLA as an
Eoistemic Community
It was mentioned that in the forties industrial 
entrepreneurs and the military were in favour of 
industrialisation, but no articulated set of ideas lent
1 The transitional nature of the agreements naturally 
added to uncertainty in regional trade. Bilateral relations 
remained provisionally regulated during 1956-1960 by the old 
Trade and Navigation Treaty of 1940 and the Commercial 
Agreements of March 1953 and June 1954. Uncertainty was 
particularly high considering that both countries announced 
their intention to set aside the old agreements. On 21 
September 1956 Argentina expressed her intention of 
terminating the payments agreement of the 25 June 1954. On 
12 September 1957 Brazil formally denunciated the 1940 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. These announcements 
created an awkward situation, since in fact the validity of 
both agreements had to be nevertheless extended several 
times after the date of their postulated cancelation. 
Argentina and Brazil renovated the validity of these 
instruments seven times, always over the date in which they 
were supposed to be terminated (in September 1956, March 
1957, July 1957, May 1958, September 1958, June 1959 and 
December 1959). Cf. Boletin Mensual. various years.
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support to this objective *. The same was true for the policy 
of regional cooperation, still conducted under the pressure 
of the 'dollar shortage' and the opportunities provided by 
economic complementarity. However, when the policy of 
regional cooperation had to be changed, a basis of 'shared 
knowledge' became more important. Translating the crisis of 
the previous regime into a new agenda for cooperation 
demanded an articulated perception of the relationship of 
industrialisation, regional integration and international 
trade. This was provided by ECLA. ECLA's role conformed to 
the insights provided by Haas as regards the role of 
epistemological communities as sources of innovation. The 
highly significant role played by ECLA derived from the 
influence of its economic ideas among policy-makers and 
tecnicos of Latin America 2. It contributed to build up 
common perceptions among tecnicos of different countries 
about how economic integration could enhance 
industrialisation 3. ECLA also represented a source of
1 On the debate on industrialisation before ECLA see R. 
Bielshowsky, Pensamento Economico Brasileiro: 0 Ciclo 
Ideoldqico do Desenvolvimentismo (Rio de Janeiro, 1982).
2 These ideas were also welcomed by Brazilian 
industrialists in the early fifities. On the (highly 
selective) absorption of ECLA ideas among industrialists in 
Brazil, who supported the industrialisation proposals but 
ignored those related to efficiency, and social and 
political reform, see R.P. Colistete, 'A Forga das Id&ias: 
A CEPAL e o Industrialism© no Brasil no Final dos Anos 
Cinquenta', unpublish. paper, First Brazilian Congress of 
Economic History, Sao Paulo, 7-11 September 1993.
3 ECLA encouraged a 'Latin American' perspective among 
policy-makers, who had until then been working in isolation 
from other Latin American colleagues. Cf. Eduardo Gana, 
consultant to ECLA, interview. Santiago de Chile, 15 October 
1993. This point was also emphasized by Anibal Pinto in a
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independent technical capability at a moment in which this 
was scarce in Latin America 1. In sum, ECLA facilitated a 
transformation of the crisis of the bilateral regime into a 
process of learning, that is, a search for new principles of 
regional cooperation.
In November 1956 the ECLA Trade Committee (created in 
September 1955) held its first session in Santiago 2. The 
Trade Committee set up two panels, the Central Bank Working 
Group (in charge of studying the possibility of a regional 
payments agreement) and the Working Group on the Latin 
American Common Market (in charge of proposing guidelines
seminar on ECLA ideas at UNICAMP, 15 September 1993. C. 
Lafer, 0 Brasil e a Crise Mundial (Sao Paulo, 1984) , p. 156, 
observes that 'the great diplomatic proposal of ECLA was the 
hypotheses of a common action in order to answer the 
challenge of growth and viability. In this sense, the theme 
that ECLA introduced in the diplomatic agenda of Latin 
America from the fifties was the theme of the avenues for 
cooperation' (author's translation).
1 ECLA gathered, analyzed and disseminated information 
about regional trade among the countries involved in 
negotiations. The first study on intra-regional trade was 
produced by ECLA in 1953. Cf. ECLA, Study on the Prospects 
of Inter-Latinamerican Trade Santiago, 1953). Subsequent 
studies were published in 1956, ECLA, Estudio del Comercio 
and 1958, ECLA, 'La Promocidn del Intercambio Regional: El 
Caso del Comercio Entre la Argentina, Chile y Uruguay', 
unpublish. paper, Santiago, 1 September 1958.
2 ECLA, The Latin American Common Market, p. 29, points 
out that the proposal of a regional market appeared in a 
study conducted by Garrido Torres of Brazil and Eusebio 
Campos of Argentina, written under ECLA auspices in 1956. M. 
Wionczek, 'A Brief History of the Montevideo Treaty', in M. 
Wyonczek, Latin American Economic Integration (New York, 
1964) , p. 74-75, observes that ECLA only gave priority to 
the theme of the creation of a regional market in 1956-57. 
The main preoccupation of ECLA studies had formerly been 
international cooperation for development and the reduction 
of trade barriers in centre countries.
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for a future common market) *. In February 1959 a detailed 
draft providing for a two-stage process of liberalisation of 
regional trade was produced 2. The bases then suggested by 
the Working Group on a Latin American Common Market were 
formally presented to the Latin American governments at the 
ECLA Conference at Panama City in May 1959. But its 
discussion was complicated by a parallel proposal set forth 
by the Southernmost countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay. These countries had concluded a draft providing for 
the creation of a free trade area among themselves a month 
before the Panama Conference, to which it was submitted for
1 In February 1958 the Working Group on the Latin 
American Regional Market issued a report. Proposals 
comprised among other considerations: (i) membership open to 
all Latin American countries; (ii) gradual trade 
liberalisation of most goods in regional trade; (iii) 
special treatment for less developed countries; (iv) 
definition of a common tariff with respect the rest of the 
world; (v) promotion of industrial specialisation; (vi) 
creation of a regional payments system; (vi) provision of 
technical assistance and credits for industrial development. 
The report of the Working Group on the Latin American Common 
Market can be found in ECLA, The Latin American Common 
market, pp. 28-35.
2 Cf. ECLA, The Latin American Common Market, pp. 38-49. 
A 'substantial7 reduction of regional trade barriers would 
be undertaken in the first ten years - although no specific 
timetable for tariffs reduction was then set forth. In a
second phase, tariff reductions would be completed and the 
agreement should progress towards its ultimate objective, 
namely forming a common market. Liberalisation would be
faster for primary goods and new dynamic industries
(capital, intermediate and durable goods), which were 
produced by only a few Latin American countries, than for
simpler consumer goods currently produced in several 
countries. The ECLA proposals also allowed for complementary
industrial agreements open to all interested countries. A 
special treatment for less developed countries was included. 
Finally, it was recommended the coordination of trade 
policies, collective negotiations with third countries and 
the organisation of a regional payments regime in Latin 
America. Cf. ECLA, The Latin American Common Market, 
especially pp. 39-43.
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information l. As a result, two similar but competing 
projects existed by mid-1959 2. The Southern countries had 
been prompted to action by the urgency to stop the fall in 
their mutual trade in the late fifties. They hurried to 
device a simpler, geographically circumscribed arrangement 
to reinvigorate trade as soon as possible, spurred by the 
expiration of their bilateral agreements. Intense 
negotiations were conducted in order to find a formula of 
compromise between the project of ECLA and that of the 
Southern countries. It was feared that the Southern project 
could lead to the fragmentation of the regional market in 
various sub-regional groupings 3. A solution was provided by 
an article of the Southern project opening the free trade 
area to other Latin American countries (article 40) . In 
addition, dispositions for a special treatment to less 
developed countries, the regulation of escape clauses and 
industrial complementarity were strengthened, drawing on the
1 Cf. M. Wionczek, 'A Brief History of the Montevideo 
Treaty', in M. Wionczeck, Latin American Economic 
Integration (New York, 1964), p. 81. The negotiations of the 
Southern countries free trade area took place in the 
headquarters of ECLA at Santiago in August-September 1958 
and April 1959. The Southern Countries project is published 
in ECLA, The Latin American Common market, pp. 102-6.
2 The features that differentiated the Southern 
proposals from the ECLA Working Group were: (i) the precise 
definition of a timetable for reducing trade barriers and 
creating a free trade area; (ii) the lack of distinction 
among different goods as regards the pace of liberalisation; 
(iii) the lack of special treatment for less developed 
countries. In addition, the Southern project had a 
circumscribed geographical scope which conflicted with the 
idea of open membership to Latin American countries.
3 Cf. V. Urquidi, Travectoria del Mercado Comtin 
Latinoamericano (Mexico, 1960), p. 75.
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ECLA Working Group suggestions l, which ironed out
difficulties for regional negotiations.
As a result, invitations to participate in the common 
market were extended to Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru. These 
countries joined a round of negotiations held at Lima in 
June 1959. A meeting was then convoked in Montevideo in 
September 1959 to which observers from Mexico and Venezuela 
were also invited. Eventually, the Montevideo Treaty was 
signed on the 18th of February 1960, creating the Latin 
American Free Trade Association LAFTA 2.
ECLA ideas have already been presented in detail in 
chapter III 3. Still, it is worthwhile recalling the basic 
ECLA tenets on regional integration, which would inform the 
principles and norms of the proposed free trade area. First, 
regional economic integration was an instrument of
industrialisation. Regional integration would allow to 
overcome the inefficiency associated with parallel 
industrial activities in isolated national markets.
Secondly, the negative welfare implications of trade 
diversion would be minimal, since trade diversion would be 
translated into higher rates of growth (allowed by regional 
import-substitution) and thus the total amount of imports
1 Cf. V. Urquidi, 'Travectoria del Mercado Comtin. p. 75.
2 The Montevideo Treaty was originally signed by 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay. Later, it received the adhesion of Colombia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia.
3 The evolution of the specific proposals for the free 
trade area are summarised in section III.
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from centre countries would remain constant or even 
increase. Thirdly, regional integration would encourage the 
diversification of exports towards manufactures. Finally, 
reciprocity and balanced regional trade would be central to 
the success of economic integration, since this assured that 
all countries would share in the growth of manufacturing.
If ECLA ideas shaped the negotiation of a regional 
market, the 'supply' of institutions had to consider as well 
international commitments. The international regime might or 
might not facilitate the strategy proposed by ECLA. Two 
different situation are found in this respect, namely a 
coincidence of proposals with GATT and confrontation with 
the IMF.
II.3. Sources of Institutional Change; The GATT Regime
The regional regime had to take account of the broader 
international regime that had emerged from Bretton Woods. 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay were members of the GATT and had 
therefore to lend attention to its rules. The main obstacle 
to consider was the need to obtain a waiver from the Most 
Favoured Nation clause, which provided for the automatic 
extension of trade preferences to all GATT members. In two 
cases the GATT allowed for a waiver from the MFN clause. 
Article XXV (5) allowed for a especial waiver if a majority 
of two thirds of GATT members supported a request tabled by 
a contracting party. Article XXIV allowed for an exception 
to the MFN clause if trade preferences were granted with the
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objective of forming a free trade area or a customs union. 
It soon became clear that the most convenient course of 
action would be the constitution of a Latin American free 
trade area or custom union, in the terms defined by article 
XXIV of the GATT, rather than requesting a waiver under 
article XXV *. This would raise less resistances from other 
countries and especially from the USA, which made it clear 
that she would favour a solution in the terms of article 
XXIV 2. This was expressed in several occasions during the 
negotiations of LAFTA 3. Raymond Mikesell (US representative
1 With this objective, consultations with the GATT took 
place in November 1958. Concurrently, the Brazilian and the 
Chilean representatives informed the GATT about the 
initiative of forming a regional market at the thirteenth 
session of the Contracting Parties in Geneva. 
Representatives of the USA and the UK were also approached, 
given the weight that their views carried within the GATT. 
Cf. the report given by Mr. Edmundo Barbosa da Silva at the 
meeting of Consultation in Trade Policy of representatives 
of the four Southern countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay) in Santiago, on 6 April 1959. Cf. ECLA, The Latin 
American Common Market, pp. 100-1.
2 This meant that Latin American countries had to 
complain with GATT conditions as regards the formation of a 
free trade area. First, the free trade area should not apply 
higher trade barriers to the rest of the world than those 
formerly applied by its members. This would lead to more 
trade creation than trade diversion. Second, the free trade 
area should include most of the traded goods. The reason for 
this requirement is theoretically less clear (as noted by 
Bagwhati), as it implies more potential for trade diversion. 
Cf. J. Bhagwati, 'Multilateralism and Regionalism'. 
Apparently, this was intended to avoid piecemeal, 
discriminatory arrangements which could strengthen the hand 
of the government in foreign trade.
3 The Embassy of the USA at Rio de Janeiro stated in 
August 1958 that Washington would be prepared to accept a 
free trade area or customs union but would study the effects 
on trade diversion of any other preferential scheme in Latin 
America. The statement can be found in ECLA, The Latin 
American Common market, pp. 101-2. The US negative attitude 
respect to a Latin American free trade area was analyzed in 
chapter IV.
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at the second session of the ECLA Working Group in Mexico, 
February 1959) criticised aspects of the ECLA project that 
seemed to contradict GATT rules *. A similar position was 
adopted by the USA at the Buenos Aires Conference of 
September 1957, in which the US representatives were 
'successful in getting eliminated any reference to possible 
selectivity by product or industry' 2. Prebisch himself 
reassured the USA that the free trade area would have a 
competitive approach 3.
However, the proposal of the free trade area cannot be 
seen just as a convenient device to surmount US and GATT 
resistances to trade preferences in the region. The idea of 
a free trade area had solid foundations in ECLA's view on
1 R. Mikesell observed that the steps necessary to 
create a free trade area were not as clearly spelled out as 
that required for the creation of a partial scheme of 
preferences. This could lead to ad hoc discriminatory 
arrangements. He also observed that the ECLA project of 
special arrangements for industrial complementarity and 
specialisation 'seems to leave the door open to bilateral 
negotiations of a discriminatory nature'. The comments of 
Mikesell are reprinted in ECLA, The Latin American Common 
Market, p. 50. See also the reply of Urquidi to these 
criticisms in V. Urquidi, 'The Common Market as a Tool of 
Latin American Economic Development: A Comment', in A. 
Hirschman (ed.), Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments. 
(New York, 1961).
2 Cf. 'Current Economic Developments', Department of 
State, Lot 70, D467, Secret, Washington, 17 September 1957, 
in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-57.
3 In a conversation with Sub-Secretary Dillon, Raul 
Prebisch emphasised that 'the idea of creating a common 
market for individual products in the field of capital goods 
would be economically productive only if there were complete 
freedom of competition between the industries in the 
countries participating in the plan'. Cf. 'Memorandum of 
Conversation, Alvear palace, Buenos Aires', Lot 60, D 665, 
MC/1-23, official use only, 16 August 1957, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States.1957.
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the role of economic integration in the process of
industrialisation. It also had support in the antecedents of 
1941 and (to a lesser extent) 1953 *. Thus, the support for
the idea of a free trade area was not limited to its
political expediency. This was pointed out by the Brazilian 
negotiator at the GATT, Barbosa da Silva, when he considered 
the disadvantages of asking for a special waiver under
article XXV (5):
'to invoke article XXV (5) might be somewhat risky. By means 
of subtle distinctions in the wording of the waiver, the 
Contracting Parties to GATT might to some extent frustrate 
the aims of the Latin American countries. That provision was 
also more suitable for sectoral integration than for the 
broader objectives aimed at by Latin America' 2.
Therefore, there was a coincidence of objectives, 
reflected in a smooth negotiation with the GATT 3. Wyonczek 
observed that 'contacts and discussions between the Latin
1 A more stable and comprehensive institutional 
framework for bilateral trade had also been demanded by 
business sectors in the late forties and fifties. If this 
demand did not imply supporting a free trade area, it 
provided a stimulus for change.
2 Cf. ECLA, The Latin American Common Market, p. 101.
3 An early draft of the agreement was presented to the 
GATT in October 1959, in Tokyo, to the fifteenth session of 
the Contracting Parties. Subsequently the Montevideo Treaty 
was officially submitted to scrutiny by the GATT 
Secretariat. While proceeding to further analysis of the 
application, the GATT gave support to the continuation of 
negotiations in Latin America.
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American members and the GATT Secretariat were most 
amicable, since GATT was doing its utmost to make allowances 
for the region's special difficulties in the field of trade 
and economic growth' l. This coincidence did not exist, 
however, as regards the creation of a regional payments 
system. In this case, the 'supply' of institutions was 
limited by the opposition of the USA and the IMF and the 
lack of consensus in Latin America.
II.4. The Limits of institutional Change: The IMF and 
the Regional Payments Agreement
A key problem in the facilitation of regional trade was 
the creation of a regional payments system. The early post­
war period was characterised by the predominance of rigid 
bilateral agreements in Latin America 2 and among Latin 
American, European and Asian countries. Advancing towards a 
more multilateral approach to payments in non-convertible 
currencies became an attractive option at the height of the 
'dollar shortage'. Already in June 1948 ECLA was asked to 
study a multilateral payments system including some Latin 
American and European countries 3.
1 Cf. M. Wyonczek, 'A Brief History', p. 85.
2 Not all Latin American countries, however, used 
bilateral payments agreements. Countries like Peru and 
Venezuela had achieved convertibility earlier than Argentina 
and Brazil and trade with these countries had to be 
undertaken in convertible currency.
3 The study, which was carried out for ECLA by experts 
of the IMF, concluded that such a system could have only a 
limited impact on the facilitation of trade while involving
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In the mid-fifties some Latin American countries signed 
payments agreements with European countries in an attempt to 
move towards a partially multilateral payments system. The 
1955 'Hague Club' gathered Brazil with the Netherlands, the 
UK, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg in a 
multilateral payments agreement which allowed for the 
transfer of balances in European currencies. The 1956 'Paris 
Club' was established between Argentina and the same 
European countries as the 'Hague Club', plus Switzerland and 
the Scandinavian countries. However, this had little effect 
on intra-Latin American trade as the two clubs were not 
inter-related, that is, Argentina and Brazil could not 
compensate reciprocal balances through their respective 
clubs l. Therefore, while trade and payments relations with 
Europe gradually became more multilateral, they remained on 
a strictly bilateral basis in the Southern cone of Latin 
America 2.
many costly technical problems. It was recommended instead 
to encourage trilateral compensations and transfers of 
sterling balances. However, the creation of the European 
Payments Union (EPU) in 1950 reinvigorated the idea of a 
payments system. EPU represented an opportunity for 
compensations within the Latin American area and with 
respect to Europe. Subsequently, a study conducted by Robert 
Triffin and handled to ECLA in March 1953 lent support to 
the idea of multilateral payments in non-convertible 
currencies. Although Triffin was sceptical about the 
advantages of creating a Latin American Payments Union, he 
was in favour of reaching a compensatory multilateral 
agreement among Latin American and EPU countries. Cf. V. 
Urquidi, Travectoria del Mercado Comtin. p. 36.
1 Cf. ibid., p.42.
2 This was the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay, which would later take the lead in the quest of a 
multilateral payments system in the region.
242
The idea of forming a free trade area encouraged the 
quest for a complementary payments system !. A project for a 
regional payments system was proposed at the second meeting 
of the Central Banks Working Group, held in Rio de Janeiro 
by the end of 1958. It included automatic compensations and 
transfer of balances among Latin American countries. The 
Southernmost countries would later include the Rio de 
Janeiro dispositions in their proposed free trade agreement 
2. However, several factors eventually brought these 
initiatives to a standstill. This failure was associated 
with: (i) the opposition of the IMF to any form of payments 
system in Latin America and (ii) divergent views among the
1 In November 1956, during the first session of the ECLA 
Trade Committee, a set of norms to be adopted by the Latin 
American countries in their payments agreements was 
proposed, with a view to making them more uniform and 
flexible. These norms were the following: (i) exchange rates 
for export earnings in clearing accounts should be equal to 
those applied to transactions in convertible currency; (ii) 
trade through bilateral accounts should be made at prices no 
higher than those prevailing in the international market; 
(iii) payments for trade-related services (transport, 
insurance) should be included in the bilateral clearing 
system; (iv) reciprocal credits, partially automatic, should 
be adopted for the transfer of balances among the members of 
payments agreements. These norms sought to reduce the 
instability of regional trade and the opportunities for 
fraud and contraband, that had beset regional trade under 
the bilateral system. In May 1957 a meeting of the Latin 
American Central Banks Working Group approved a model for 
bilateral payments agreement, the so-called Montevideo 
Standard Agreement, drawing from the norms defined by the 
ECLA Trade Committee. Bilateral payments agreements were 
expected to conform to this model in order to facilitate the 
transition to a multilateral payments system. The Montevideo 
Standard Agreement was subsequently adopted by Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay and this allowed for some modest 
compensatory transfers in the region. Cf. ECLA, The Latin 
American Common Market, p. 106.
2 Cf. ECLA, The Latin American Common Market, pp. 106-7.
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Latin American countries.
The opposition of the IMF to the idea of a regional 
payments agreement was based on fears that it could hinder 
the move towards convertibility. This position was fully 
supported by the USA *. It was believed that a Latin American 
payments system could either strengthen exchange controls in 
the Southern countries or reintroduce them in countries that 
had already achieved convertibility. As reported by an UK 
observer,
'the IMF, the US government and the UK have all expressed 
definite opposition to the view that a regional payments 
system for the multilateral compensation of bilateral 
balances is either necessary or desirable to stimulate trade 
among Latin American countries. In our view the introduction 
of a system in which there is not automatic settlement of 
balances in convertible currencies would tend to perpetuate 
bilateralism and the maintenance of exchange controls, 
particularly if there were no provision for the automatic 
discouragement of extreme creditor and debtor positions' 2.
In particular, a regional system of automatic credits for 
debtor countries was expected to lead to significant trade-
1 Cf. The Latin American Common Market, p. 113 for a 
summary of US official statements and ibid., p. 123, for 
those of the IMF. The attitude of the USA and the IMF have 
been analyzed by M. Wyonczek, 'A Brief History of the 
Montevideo Treaty', pp. 84-104.
2 Cf. FO 371 155768 A 1123/10, 3 March 1961. See also FO 
371 155768 A 1123/3, 16 January 1961.
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diverting effects *.
On the other hand, ECLA and many Latin American 
governments argued that the move towards convertibility had 
been associated with severe import restrictions. More trade 
liberalisation would require higher levels of compensatory 
transfers within the region in order to avoid external 
difficulties 2. This was regarded as a tool for furthering 
the process of liberalisation on a multilateral basis. 
However, these arguments did not mollify IMF resistances to
1 It was considered that 'a common tariff combined with 
arrangements for automatic credits, whereby countries with 
a persistent surplus will be obliged to grant automatic 
credits to other area members rather than use the surplus to 
import products freely from anywhere in the world, would 
represent a step back from the high degree of convertibility 
attained in Latin America'. Cf. FO 371 155769 A 1123/17, 25 
May 1961. Concerns about new barriers to trade were also 
expressed in the press. The Financial Times pointed out that 
'the lesson of all this for British industry is clear. (...) 
If the UK is to retain a stake in the area it must follow 
the example of her German and Japanese competitors and 
establish, or share in establishing, manufacturing 
industries within Latin America'. Cf. 'The Latin American 
Free Trade Area', Financial Times. 4 February 1960.
2 In his speech to Latin American representatives at 
LAFTA negotiations, Prebisch observed that 'a free trade 
zone needs a credit system which absorb the initial impact 
of liberalisation. This requires a payments system which 
gradually should become convertible. Convertibility will be 
more easily achieved when trade balances became 
equilibrated, since that reduces the necessity of settling 
balances in dollar'. Cf. 'Reunion Para el establecimiento de 
una Zona de Libre Comercio, Committee N.3', tachygraphy 
version of the meeting, mimeo, 18 September 1959. In a 
subsequent report, the ECLA secretariat observed that 'the 
function of credit will be to give time to correct adverse 
effects of liberalisation on balance of payments. This 
correction should come from the favourable consequences of 
liberalisation measures that countries with a persistent 
export surplus will have to adopt'. Cf. ECLA, 'The 
Reciprocal Credits System for the Free Trade Area', 
unpublish. paper, Montevideo, January 1960.
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the project l, which was particularly significant as external 
difficulties had strengthened the hand of the IMF in policy 
decisions in Latin America 2. This offers an interesting 
contrast with the formation of the EPU in 1950. In this 
case, the IMF expressed as well its opposition to EPU, but 
strategic concerns led the USA to give support to the 
initiative. But no similar interest existed in the case of 
Latin America and a more orthodox approach to the problem 
prevailed.
Various factors played a role in shaping this different 
international response to Latin American initiatives. If the 
creation of the European Economic Community represented a 
significant antecedent for a free trade area in Latin 
America, the European return to convertibility implied that 
a Latin American payments system would contradict the 
general trend towards convertibility. Moreover, developing 
countries were more represented and their views more 
considered in the GATT than in the IMF, and this affected 
the policy of these organisations. Besides that, the 
different ability to enforce policies by the GATT and the
1 The clash of views was especially strong during the 
meeting of the representatives of Central Banks in January 
1961, when Prebisch 'used the formal opening session to 
launch a strong and at times bitter attack on the IMF's 
attitude towards the problem of payments in the proposed 
free trade area'. Cf. FO 371 147678 A 1123/2, 27 January 
1961.
2 As noted by M. Wyonczek , 'A Brief History', p. 90, 
the very significance of the role that the IMF had acquired 
in Southern Latin America in the late fifties was in 
contradiction with the alleged success of the move towards 
convertibility. Argentina and Uruguay signed stand-by 
agreements with the IMF in 1958.
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IMF was relevant. The IMF had a say in Latin American 
economic policies which the GATT had not, especially as a 
result of the financial difficulties of the late fifties. 
Countries could have challenged the GATT, and the costs 
would probably have been low, but challenging the IMF (as 
Kubitschek learnt in 1959) implied in substantial financial 
costs.
Moreover, there were as well divergent views among the 
Latin American countries as regards a regional payment 
system l. The heterogeneity of situations in Latin American 
prevented her from reaching a common position. At the 
meeting of Central Bank representatives of January 1961, 
these divergences were visible. While Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay supported ECLA's proposal, this was firmly 
opposed by Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru, while Mexico was 
neutral 2. Therefore, both opposition from the IMF and
1 In relation with the debate raised by the regional 
payments system proposal, it was observed that 'conflict, of 
course, was inevitable (...) because the proposed free trade 
area contains some countries which already practice free 
convertibility and some which are years ago from such a 
goal' Cf. FO 371 147678 A 1123/2, 27 January 1961.
2 Cf. FO 371 147680 A1123/2 27 January 1961 and A
1123/22, 29 March 1961. Even within the Southern countries 
the endorsement of the idea was not uniform. While Chile and 
Uruguay were the most enthusiastic, Argentina was frequently 
ambiguous. In 1959 Argentina had joined Peru in opposing the 
idea of a regional payments system. Cf. 'Conferencia Inter- 
Gubernamental para el Establecimiento de una Zona de Libre 
Comercio Entre Paises de America Latina', tachygraphy 
version of the sessions of Committee N.l, mimeo, 18 
September 1959. Brazil in turn gave priority to the free 
trade area and placed less emphases on the regional payments 
system. These differences were related to the degree of 
convertibility already achieved by these countries. 
Argentina conducted her trade with the USA and Europe in 
convertible currency - although this coexisted with 
substantial trade restrictions. Conversely, the multiple
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internal differences within the Latin American group blocked 
the initiative for a regional payments system during the 
negotiations of January 1960
In sum, while the GATT adopted a flexible attitude 
which facilitated the creation of new institutions for 
promoting regional trade, the opposition of the USA and the 
IMF, along with divergent views within Latin America, acted 
as a barrier to regional payments system.
II.5. Conclusions
1. This section addressed the collapse of the regime of 
restrained bilateralism and the emergence of the free trade 
area proposal, which led to the creation of LAFTA in 1960. 
In the second half of the fifties the main instruments that 
regulated bilateral trade between Argentina and Brazil were 
challenged. Devaluations, the simplification of the exchange 
market and the shift towards tariff protection redefined the 
framework for negotiations and made adaptative responses 
ineffective. As a result, previous expectations and patterns 
of behaviour were no longer working in the context of the
exchange rate system still remained in place in Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay. Cf. 'Conferencia Inter-Gubernamental para 
el Establecimiento de una Zona de Libre Comercio entre 
Paises de America Latina', tachygraphy version of the 
session of the Committee N.3, mimeo, 18 September 1959.
1 The final declaration of the Conference stressed full 
convertibility as the final aim while admitting that 
different payments arrangements would coexist for some time. 
The only common position achieved in this respect was a 
pledge for avoiding any kind of intra-zone discrimination 
that could arise from these different payments arrangements. 
Cf. FO 371 147678 A 1123/2, 27 January 1960.
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late fifties. New arrangements were required in order to 
keep existing preferences and capitalise on the experience 
in trade negotiations.
2. In the search for a new trade regime, ECLA played a 
significant role in promoting the convergence of 
perspectives among policy-makers in different countries and 
in providing the technical capabilities demanded by the 
negotiations. ECLA acted as a catalyst in the formation of 
LAFTA by extending the basis of consensual knowledge upon 
which new principles and norms would be adopted. The late 
fifties were a period of learning in which a new trade 
regime emerged. However, the formation of LAFTA had to 
consider other constraints, associated with the 
international regime of trade and payments. In the case of 
the GATT, ECLA proposals for a free trade area and GATT 
requirements converged, and hence no external barriers 
existed for institution-building. In the case of the 
regional payments systems, the IMF and the USA understood 
that this represented a deviation from a general move 
towards convertibility. The opposition of powerful actors in 
the international system, and divergent views among the 
Latin American countries (stemming from their different 
position in terms of convertibility), weakened the case for 
a payments agreement and constrained the 'supply' of 
institutions.
249
III. TRADE REGIMES AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The objective of this section is to provide a more 
formal definition of the regime of restrained bilateralism 
and of the proposed LAFTA regime, and relate them to the 
process of structural transformation of 1939-60. Thus, this 
section briefly summarises the previous discussion on 
structural and institutional change.
III.l. Comparing Trade Regimes: Restrained Bilateralism 
and LAFTA
A change of regime implies a redefinition of the 
principles and norms which shape expectations and behaviour. 
If principles and norms differ, then the rules and decision­
making procedures that provide for their detailed 
application should also change l. Chart V.l offers a 
comparison of the components of the regime of restrained 
bilateralism and those of the proposed LAFTA regime.
1 The definition of the concepts of principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures is presented in chapter
I.
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CHART V.l. TRADE REGIMES
Restrained Bilateralism Proposed New Regime (LAFTA)
Princioles
(i) Cooperation subordinated 
to geopolitical rivalry;
(ii) Bilateralism;
(iii) Obtaining the gains 
from trade, especially in 
complementary primary goods;
(iv) Saving hard currency.
Princioles
(i) Cooperation should 
reinforce the position of the 
region in the international 
system and support economic 
development;
(ii) Regionalism (Latin 
American MFN clause);
(iii) Increasing the 
efficiency and scope of ISI-2 
through regional industrial 
exports and specialisation;
(iv) Saving hard currency.
Norms
(i) Trade liberalisation for 
complementary primary 
products and a small set of 
industrial goods;
(ii) Bilateral preferences;
(iii) Compensation of 
payments and equilibrium in 
the bilateral trade balance.
Norms
(i) Trade liberalisation with 
a view to include most of 
regional trade;
(ii) Regional trade 
preferences;
(iii) Compensation of 
payments (since 1965) and 
equilibrium in the regional 
trade balance, especially in 
industrial trade;
(v) Special treatment for 
less developed countries.
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Rules
(i) Value and composition of 
exchange established for a 
certain period (1-3 years) 
through a negotiated list; 
renegotiation of the list of 
products and quantities at 
the moment of expiration;
(ii) Duty reductions, 
automatic import permits and 
favourable exchange 
treatment;
(iii) Credits for financing 
trade and facilities for the 
settlement of net trade 
balances.
Rules
(i) Progressive and 
irreversible trade 
liberalisation, that should 
encompass almost all trade in 
an 12-year period;
(ii) Annual negotiations to 
define the new products to be 
added to the progressive 
list;
(iii) Programmed reduction of 
tariffs and non-tariffs 
barriers through 'common' and 
'national lists'; sectoral 
'complementary agreements';
(iv) Automatic cancellation 
of regional credits and 
debits (since 1965);
(v) Non extensible 
preferences in favour of less 
developed countries.
Decision Makina Procedures
Very low degree of formal 
institutionalisation and 
supra-nationality.
Decision Makina Procedures
Higher degree of formal 
institutionalisation but low 
degree of supra-nationality.
At the more general level, both regimes were based on 
different principles. In the former regime cooperation was 
subordinated to geopolitical rivalry, while gains from trade 
focused mainly on the exchange of primary goods. In LAFTA, 
closer cooperation was seen as an instrument to enhance 
economic development. The gains from trade were regarded in 
the context of the process of ISI-2 in which a regional 
market would lead to increased efficiency, advance import- 
substitution and develop industrial exports. Saving hard 
currency was an objective in both regimes, reflecting the 
persistence of external disequilibrium in convertible
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currency. But the proposed LAFTA regime established this 
objective at a regional rather than a bilateral level. In 
LAFTA, a Latin American MFN clause provided for the 
extension of preferences negotiated at a bilateral level to 
all members - except in the case of preferences given to 
less developed countries.
These different principles were translated into 
different norms in the two regimes. In the regime of 
restrained bilateralism, the principle of the subordination 
of cooperation to geopolitical rivalry meant that 
politically demanding forms of cooperation should be avoided 
and thus concessions limited to preferences for specific 
goods. The saving of hard currency was associated with the 
norms of granting preferences (trade diversion from the 
dollar area), achieving trade equilibrium and using soft 
currencies to compensate for trade imbalances. Conversely, 
in the LAFTA regime the principle of obtaining the gains 
from trade was associated with the promotion of 
industrialisation. This was expressed in the norm of 
extending trade preferences to a more diversified set of 
goods, especially industrial goods. Complementary agreements 
were also intended to strengthening industrial 
specialisation. In turn, the norm of special treatment for 
less developed countries reflected the heterogeneity 
implicit in the new regional approach. This norm adapted the 
principle of enhancing industrialisation to the diversity of 
industrial capabilities in the region.
Norms were applied through specific rules. In the case
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of the regime of restrained bilateralism, rules comprised 
the definition of the list of products to which preferences 
were given. They also defined the types of preference 
granted - a lower exchange rate, lower duties and automatic 
import permits, depending on the specific trade and exchange 
regulations in each country. Finally, rules detailed the 
payments arrangements for financing trade and settling net 
balances. These rules applied to short periods and then had 
to be renegotiated. Conversely, in the LAFTA regime, the 
norm of liberalisation of 'substantially all trade' was 
detailed in a timetable for progressive trade 
liberalisation, based on annual product-by-product 
negotiations, through which 'common' and 'national' lists 
were defined. Specific, more flexible rules for less 
developed countries were established, in accordance with the 
norm of special treatment for less developed countries l.
As regards decision-making procedures, the regime of 
restrained bilateralism displayed a very limited degree of 
institutionalisation and supra-nationality. This was in full 
conformity with the principle of subordinated cooperation 
and the limited scope - in terms of the periods covered and 
the goods involved - of the agreements. On the other hand, 
the more complex set of commitments entailed by LAFTA 
implied a higher degree of formal institutionalisation in 
the management of the trade regime. LAFTA implied a pattern
1 The norm of payments compensation was expressed in an 
agreement for automatic cancellation of credits and debits 
in regional trade. However, as discussed, this rule could 
only be included in 1965, while it was absent in the 
original LAFTA Treaty.
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of systematic negotiations which was absent in the former 
regime. LAFTA thus represented a significant progress in 
terms of formal institutionalisation. However, the degree 
of effective supra-nationality in LAFTA and powers conferred 
to regional bodies remained very low (the point is analyzed 
in Part III).
III.2. Institutional Change and Structural Change
It has been argued in chapter I that the evolution of 
the trade regime was closely associated with structural 
change and to perceptions about how the system works. It has 
also been suggested that these variables - structures, 
institutions and ideas - interact in an "evolutionary” 
model. In the first case, institutions appear as a variable, 
which depends on structures and ideas. In the second case, 
institutions are intervening variables that can affect 
outcomes. The first approach corresponds to a static 
analysis which permits the identification of how policies 
are constrained by systemic variables and actors' 
perceptions. The second approach corresponds to a dynamic 
analysis in which constraints are changing, in part as a 
result of past decisions.
(a) Institutions as a Dependent Variable
Chart V.2 summarises the links among structures, 
institutions and ideas, in which institutions appear as the
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dependent variable. Institutions are in this case the 
regimes of regional cooperation; structures are the systemic 
variables that shape the costs and benefits of cooperation; 
and ideas are perceptions of how the structural variables 
are inter-related and how they affect trade and growth. 
Institutions are shaped by ideas within the boundaries 
placed by the structural variables.
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CHART V.2. STRUCTURES. IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS. 1939-60
Variables/ Period 1939-55 1956-60
Structural
Variables
Changes in 
the
International
System
Opportunities 
for regional 
trade created 
by II World 
War and the 
dollar 
shortage; 
rise and fall 
of Brazil-USA 
special 
relationship; 
regional 
rivalry.
Perception of
inadequacy of
multilateral
institutions
and US policy
towards Latin
America;
balance of
payments
crisis;
export
pessimism;
inflow of the
'new' foreign
capital.
Structural 
change in the 
domestic 
economy
ISI-1: easy 
stage of 
import- 
substitution.
ISI-2: 
industrial 
diversific. 
and
increasing 
returns to 
scale.
Ideas Adaptation; 
Growing 
emphases on 
industrial 
development, 
with reduced 
analytical 
content.
Learning; 
impact of 
ECLA ideas on 
the role of 
regional 
trade and 
integration 
in economic 
development.
Institutions Restrained
Bilateralism.
Proposed 
LAFTA regime.
Chart VI. 2 shows that the regime of restrained 
bilateralism corresponds to a set of structural conditions 
which favoured diverging perceptions in Argentina and Brazil 
as regards opportunities and constraints in the
international system. This was related to tensions in the
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relationship of Argentina, Brazil and the USA, which 
encouraged regional rivalry and limited Brazil's interest in 
cooperation with Argentina. The weak industrial basis of the 
period also contributed to limit trade and cooperation (ISI- 
1) , as weak supply capabilities (especially in the capital 
goods sector) constrained the expansion of trade and raised 
the costs of trade diversion. On the other hand, cooperation 
was stimulated by economic complementarity in agricultural 
products, the opening of new trade opportunities brought 
about by the war and the dollar shortage of the post-war 
period. The regime of restrained bilateralism expressed 
these structural conditions. The balance of costs and 
benefits of regional cooperation was tilted towards the 
costs. This favoured a limited pattern of cooperation based 
principally on preferences to primary products. The 
institutional fragility of the regime and the limited scope 
reached by the agreements were a consequence of this.
Conversely, the new structural conditions of the 1956- 
60 period reshaped the incentives for cooperation. 
Cooperation was then enhanced by shared perceptions 
regarding the place of Argentina and Brazil in the 
international system, which prompted a defensive move. This 
was associated with what was seen as the US neglect of Latin 
American demands for development. It also reflected the 
inadequacy of the multilateral system (the Bretton Woods 
institutions) to respond to the demands posed by the 
developmentalist effort. Domestic structural change 
reinforced this outlook. The progress of industrialisation
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(ISI-2) heightened the inefficiency of production for 
isolated markets, reduced the costs of trade diversion and 
increased the potential scope for regional trade. This was 
accompanied by the diffusion of ECLA ideas linking 
industrialisation, import-substitution, export 
diversification and regional trade. This provided a new 
shared theoretical framework - in the words of Haas, new 
basis of consensual knowledge - which shaped the 
reformulation of new principles and norms, thereby giving 
rise to a process of learning. The demand for institutions 
prompted by the crisis of the regime of restrained 
bilateralism in the mid-fifties could then be translated 
into new principles and norms that comprised a new trade 
regime.
(b) Institutions as an Intervening Variable
The previous comparative discussion sought to show how 
structural change and ideas redefined the boundaries within 
which actors cooperated in 1939-60. By changing the costs 
and benefits of economic cooperation, these variables shaped 
different patterns of behaviour, structured in two different 
trade regimes. Still, institutions may have an impact in 
structures and ideas. Institutions seem to have played a 
role in enhancing bilateral trade through trade preferences 
and special payments arrangements. It was seen that they 
were unable to avoid the loss of dynamism of bilateral trade 
after the war. But the increase in the index of intensity of
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trade between Argentina and Brazil suggests that the fall in 
trade could have been still sharper had these preferences 
not been granted. Therefore, the regime affected structural 
conditions by encouraging trade and strengthening the 
interest in cooperation. It should be borne in mind that the 
main reason that originally moved the Southern Cone 
countries towards a free trade area was the aim to keep 
their preferences after the changes in economic policy in 
1957-58. The advantages provided by the old regime were 
regarded as valuable and the new trade regime was seen as a 
form of giving continuity to this.
On the other hand, institutions may affect ideas by 
providing experience of negotiation and of a basis for the 
discussion of alternative policies. Lack of satisfaction 
with the regime of restrained bilateralism was high among 
trading interests before the mid-fifties. The experience by 
these sectors of recurrent instability led them to demand a 
reformulation of the trade regime with a view to stabilizing 
trade. In the same vein, in the second half of the fifties 
Brazilian negotiators pressed for a more consistent 
programme of imports of Brazilian manufactures by Argentina, 
in the light of the disequilibrium prompted by the 1956 
devaluation in Argentina. Therefore, ECLA ideas as regards 
the formation of a free trade area found a fertile ground 
among policy-makers who had experienced the difficulties of 
negotiating within the old arrangements, especially after 
1955.
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III.3. The Determinants of Cooperation: A Simple
Illustration
The different settings in which economic cooperation 
between Argentina and Brazil took place in the period 1939- 
60 can be analyzed, with gains in terms of simplicity, 
through two well known game theory models, namely the 
'prisoner's dilemma' and the dilemma of 'common aversions' 
*. This can help to illustrate the options faced by these 
countries and the role that the regional trade regime played 
in reducing uncertainty. Rather than an effort in 
formalisation, this exercise should be seen as a stylized 
description of the research presented in the previous 
chapters.
The strategies of Argentina and Brazil with respect to 
bilateral and regional trade are defined as partial 
liberalisation, full liberalisation and non-cooperation. 
Partial liberalisation implies a reduction in trade barriers 
and the awarding of preferences for complementary primary 
goods and a small number of industrial goods, while 
maintaining protected most of the industrial sector. Full 
liberalisation amounts to the creation of a free trade area. 
Non-cooperation implies commercial sanctions, in which both 
countries place heavy restrictions on imports from and 
exports to each other. Two different scenarios emerge from 
the combination of these strategies, based on different
1 Cf. A. A. Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: 
Regimes in an Anarchic World', in S.D. Krasner (ed.), 
International Regimes, pp. 120-25.
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structural conditions: the Pinedo-Aranha/LAFTA scenario
(which represents the 1939-41 and 1956-60 periods) and the 
regional/hemispheric rivalry scenario (which may be loosely 
labelled a Per6n/Vargas scenario, which represents the 1942- 
55 period).
(a) The Pinedo-Aranha/LAFTA Scenario
The frustrated initiative at creating a free trade area 
in 1941, and the relatively more successful effort 
represented by LAFTA in 1960, can be described in terms of 
the prisoner's dilemma. This is the standard game in trade 
negotiations and there is nothing special in this scenario. 
But it sheds light on the more complex situation represented 
by the regime of restrained bilateralism. Chart V.3 presents 
the pay-off matrix of the Pinedo-Aranha/LAFTA scenario.
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Chart V.3. The Pinedo-Aranha/LAFTA Scenario
Argentina Brazil
PL FL NC
PL 2,2 4/1
FL 1,4 3,3
NC 0,0
PL = Partial Liberalisation 
FL = Full Liberalisation 
NC = Non Cooperation 
0 = Worst Outcome 
4 = Best Outcome
If Argentina and Brazil act unilaterally, the dominant 
strategy of each country will be partial liberalisation. 
This strategy allows a country to seize on the opportunities 
provided by the market of the other country without exposing 
her industrial sector to international competition. However, 
the combination of each country's preferred strategy leads 
to an outcome which is inefficient (2,2). Both countries can 
achieve an increase in their pay-offs if they adopt a 
cooperative strategy and both liberalise trade. The outcome 
will be (3,3) in this case, which is Pareto optimal, as no 
country can improve its position without reducing the 
welfare of the other. In other words, in this case,
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independent decisions would lead to an outcome which is not 
Pareto optimal. Therefore, it is rational for Argentina and 
Brazil to reach an agreement on trade policy based on the 
strategy of full liberalisation in both countries. However, 
in order to coordinate decisions and to be sure that each 
country would fulfil its promises, a regime was necessary - 
that is, a set of implicit and explicit rules which assured 
the partners that they would be protected against non- 
cooperative behaviour. This was the objective of the 1941 
Treaty for progressive Free Trade and the 1960 LAFTA 
agreement.
(b) The Regional/Hemispheric Rivalry Scenario
A different pay-off matrix emerges when is considered 
the existence of rivalry between Argentina and Brazil and 
the influence of Brazil's 'special relationship' with the 
USA during the war years. This scenario is illustrated in 
chart V.4.
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Chart V.4. The regional/Hemispheric Rivalry Scenario
Brazil
Argentina PL FL NC
PL 2,3 4/1
FL 1,4 3,2
NC 0,0
PL = Partial Liberalisation 
FL = Full Liberalisation 
NC = Non Cooperation 
0 = Worst Outcome 
4 = Best Outcome
This matrix differs from the Pinedo-Aranha scenario in 
that the strategy of full cooperation with Argentina gives 
to Brazil a lower pay-off than partial cooperation - even if 
Argentina follows a strategy of full cooperation. In other 
words, regardless of the strategy followed by Argentina, for 
Brazil it would always be rational to adopt a strategy of 
partial liberalisation. In order to understand this matrix 
it is necessary to consider that a third actor is now in the 
game, namely the USA. This gives rise to a more complex 
problem, namely that of coalition formation. Even so, the 
game can still be defined in very simple terms assuming that 
a coalition between Argentina and the USA is ruled out and
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that the USA can obtain a higher pay-off forming a coalition 
with Brazil than by not forming a coalition. This assumption 
is reasonable since conflict between Argentina and the USA 
prevailed in most of the period and Brazil was the natural 
partner to restrain Argentina. Thus, it is valid to focus on 
Brazil's options. Brazil can choose between making a 
coalition with Argentina or making a coalition with the USA. 
A free trade area with Argentina implies that Brazil opted 
for a coalition with her neighbour, as a free trade area 
would be regarded as a non cooperative move (high political 
commitment) by the USA and therefore elicit a non 
cooperative policy with respect to Brazil by the USA. This 
means that Brazil would loose political, military and 
economic support from the USA (the 'special relationship' 
would be terminated) . Brazil's outcome would then be only 2, 
while Argentina outcome would be 3 ‘. If on the contrary 
Brazil chooses a partial liberalisation strategy, such a 
move would not be regarded as unfriendly by the USA, and the 
economic and political benefits of the 'special 
relationship' will continue to come. If Argentina follows as 
well a strategy of partial liberalisation with Brazil, 
Brazil would receive 3 instead of 2, while Argentina is left 
with 2.
It could be argued that such a pay-off matrix makes 
unnecessary the formation of a regime. Regimes imply an
1 It is assumed that Argentina would obtain more 
benefits from a cooperative policy by Brazil than on the 
other way round because Argentina was suffering the US 
boycott and hence needed trade more than Brazil did.
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agreement in which countries accept not to apply certain 
policies unilaterally. However, no constraint on Brazil's 
policy decisions seems to exist in this case. Brazil would 
unilaterally apply the policy of partial liberalisation 
which assures her the highest outcomes, no matter what the 
Argentines did. Argentina, in turn, would have to follow a 
policy of partial cooperation, because any other strategy 
would leave her in a worse situation (outcome 2 in the case 
of partial liberalisation, 1 in the case of full 
liberalisation and zero in the case of a trade sanctions). 
Why is a regime necessary in this case?
The answer lies on the heightened uncertainty that 
exists in a context of hemispheric and regional rivalry, in 
which expectations are particularly volatile. The fact that 
Brazil formed a coalition with Argentina's rival, forcing 
Argentina to accept a lower outcome than that she would have 
obtained with full cooperation from Brazil, left Argentina 
'aggrieved'. The controversial secret conference of Per6n at 
the Argentine War School, in which he criticized the 
ambiguous position of Vargas, is an example of this. 
Argentina might then consider applying trade barriers in 
order to force Brazil to reconsider her strategy. In other 
words, if one of the players feels 'aggrieved', a regime is 
necessary to manage tensions and avoid the worst possible 
result, namely a commercial war A regime would prevent the
1 It could be argued that as a trade war results in the 
worst outcome for all players (0,0), this strategy violates 
the assumption that actors play rationally. However, with no 
coordination and limited exchange of information relatively 
small steps in terms of retaliation may trigger a major
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aggrieved country from resorting to a negative-sum game. The 
argument also applies to Brazil. During the war, the USA 
demanded from Brazil a more aggressive attitude towards 
Argentina. Significant internal sectors in Brazil also 
demanded a clear-cut break with Argentina. This added to 
uncertainty and made trade sanctions a likely event, 
especially in the early fifties. Therefore, a regime 
providing a context for negotiations (including the basic 
guidelines and procedures for bilateral agreements), 
frequent contacts and exchange of information becomes 
necessary. This hypotheses seems to be confirmed by the 
discussion presented in Part I of the theses. Even during 
the turbulent years of the second Vargas government, when 
cooperation with Argentina was a major source of friction in 
Brazil's domestic politics, a cooperative atmosphere was 
sought and maintained through informal (and even secret) 
channels. Efforts to sustain a climate of cordiality were 
visible during the Dutra government. Through the 1942-55 
period agreements were negotiated and a framework for trade 
provided by the 1940 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. 
Clearly, the trade regime of the years 1939-55 was highly 
instable and concessions limited. However, the regime of 
restrained bilateralism provided a framework for curbing
trade conflict. This was more than a purely theoretical 
possibility. As discussed, Argentina did use the delaying of 
commercial negotiations with Brazil in the early fifties 
with a view to penalise the latter for what she regarded as 
an hostile attitude in Brazil towards cooperation with 
Argentina, led by the domestic opposition to Vargas. 
Moreover, this was precisely what happened in the relations 
between Argentina and Uruguay in the early fifties, as 
analyzed below.
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uncertainty and averting a commercial war in a context of 
high political rivalry.
III.4. Structures and Institutions in a Negative-Sum 
Game: Argentina-Uruguav. 1942-55
An interesting contrast can be obtained by comparing 
the Argentine-Brazilian and the Argentine-Uruguayan 
relations. Clearly, the distribution of power resources 
between Argentina and Uruguay is extremely asymmetrical, 
while between Argentina and Brazil is relatively even. This 
makes up a different scenario in which to analyze the 
association between structures and institutions. The 1942-55 
period is chosen since it comprised a major crisis in the 
relationship between the two countries which led to trade 
sanctions and the collapse of bilateral trade.
First, it is necessary to look at Uruguay's position in 
the international system. The study of Methol Ferre gives a 
acute account of this l. A 'buffer state' between Argentina 
and Brazil, with a very close association with the UK - 
along very similar lines of Argentina - Uruguay had to 
adjust to the decline of the UK and the emergence of US
1 Cf. A. Methol Ferre, El Uruguay Como Problema 
(Montevideo, 1971; first edition 1967). On the evolution of 
Uruguayan economy see J.P. Barran and B. Nahum, Historia 
Rural del Uruguay Moderno (Montevideo, 1967-78) and M.H.J. 
Finch, A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870 (London, 
1981). A study on the evolution of industry in Uruguay can 
be found in L. Bertola, The Manufacturing Industry of 
Uruguay 1913-61: A Sectoral Approach to growth. Fluctuations 
and Crisis (Goteburg, 1990).
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hegemony *. A producer of temperate agricultural products 
like Argentina, Uruguay was placed in an eccentric position 
in terms of economic complementarity with the rising 
hegemon. A move towards closer economic relations with her 
two big neighbours (and especially with Brazil, which was a 
complementary economy in agricultural production) would have 
been a natural strategy. It can be expected that the 
conditions of the war and the post-war dollar shortage would 
have created an interest in Uruguay for a more active 
regional policy.
The war prompted a move in Uruguay towards cooperation 
with Argentina. On 14 December 1941 Uruguay and Argentina 
signed the Barra de Maldonado Treaty, which provided for 
facilities in the exchange of fruits and livestock and 
established conventions for navigation and fishing in the 
River Plate. A Mixed Commission to study the custom, fiscal 
and exchange clauses required to constitute a customs union 
was created 2. However, as the economies of Argentina and 
Uruguay were more competitive than complementary, there was
1 Prompted by the fears of being cut out from the 
British market, Uruguay negotiated an extension of the Roca- 
Runciman agreement which provided her with an import quota 
in the UK. Cf. G. Bernhard, Comercio de Carnes en el Urucruav 
(Montevideo, 1958), pp. 15-25. Negotiations with the USA 
were not less complicated. The same day that the USA 
announced the breakdown of trade negotiations with 
Argentina, she suspended negotiations with Uruguay, because 
of the similarity of the export structure of the two 
countries. Cf. FO 371 2416, 22 January 1940. A trade
agreement granting concessions to linseed, canned corned 
beef, casein, cattle hides, tallow, meat extracts and 
certain coarse wools in the US market would only be signed 
in July 1942. Cf. FO 371 30 734 A 6883, 27 July 1942.
2 Cf. FO 371 25728, 20 December 1941.
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strong opposition to the idea in Uruguayan business circles 
and the initiative faded. Subsequently, bilateral relations 
became increasingly problematic and no new trade initiatives 
were adopted.
In effect, Uruguay adopted an active pro-US stance in 
hemispheric affairs. This increasingly set her apart from 
Argentina. The Committee for the Defence of the Continent (a 
strong pro-US body gathering most Latin American countries 
and the USA) had its location in Montevideo and was presided 
by former Uruguayan Foreign Minister Alberto Guani l. By the 
end of November 1944 Uruguay had not recognised yet the 
Farrell government, demanding a clear anti-axis position 
from Argentina based on 'effective commitments and measures' 
instead of 'vague promises' 2. Moreover, an Uruguayan note 
issued in November 1945 (then known as the 'Rodriguez 
Larreta doctrine'), stating that collective military 
intervention in other Latin American republics could be 
considered legitimate if the security of the continent was 
threatened, was naturally regarded as an hostile move by the 
Argentines 3 and this further deteriorated bilateral
1 Cf. A. Frega, M. Marona and Y. Trochon, Baldomir v la 
Restauracion Democr^tica. 1938-46 (Montevideo, 1987) .
2 BA, Box 70, 'Memorandum Para la Reuni6n de 
Cancilleres', 29 November 1944. Concurrently, in October 
1944 Argentina carried out naval manoeuvres in the Uruguay 
River, in front of the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos. This 
was regarded as an Argentine attempt to put pressure on her 
neighbour. Cf. FO 371 378899 AS 611/5094/2, 30 October 1944.
3 The 'Rodriguez Larreta Doctrine' received a negative 
response from most Latin American countries, as it opened a 
dangerous precedent for military intervention. Cf. FO 371 
52077 AS 17/11/51, 14 december 1945. See also the Uruguayan 
weekly magazine Marcha. 'El Papelon Sin Precedente', vol.
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relations.
The situation began to acquire still more serious 
features from 1950, when Montevideo became a haven for 
Argentine anti-Peronist exiles. The exiles counted on large 
support in the public opinion and within the official press, 
which launched strong attacks on the Peronist government, 
especially after the Peronist seizing of the Argentine 
newspaper La Prensa l. The Argentine reaction was to demand 
that Uruguay restrict the political activities of the exiles 
and curb criticisms from the press - the latter a demand 
which conflicted with the Uruguayan democratic regime. 
Argentina retaliated by cutting off the flow of trade and 
people across the border and trade fell vertically in the 
early fifties, as can be seen in table V.2. The 
participation of Argentina in the Uruguayan trade became 
almost negligible (cf. table V.3) . This in turn made it more 
difficult for the Uruguayan government to change its 
policies and raised protests even from sectors sympathetic 
with the idea of regional economic integration 2.
VII, no. 311, 7 december 1945.
1 It should be observed that in Brazil it was the 
opposition to Vargas which pushed forward the strongest 
criticisms of peronism. The fact that, conversely, Vargas 
represented positions more sympathetic with Argentina 
prevented further deterioration in bilateral relations. In 
Uruguay, it was the bianco opposition led by Luis Alberto de 
Herrera which sought to preserve the links with Argentina. 
On the role of Herrera see A Methol Ferre, El Uruguay Como 
Problema, pp. 37-41. Yet this effort was not enough for 
stopping inter-state friction in the early fifties.
2 Thus, for instance, Marcha expressed its support to 
the idea of economic unions but pointed out that 'these 
ideas deserve other kind of leaders. We believe that the 
political nature of the governments involved (in the 1953
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Table V.2
TRADE BETWEEN URUGUAY AND ARGENTINA 
(In thousands of Argentine pesos)
Year X Argentina M Uruguay
1934 8761 4130
1935 9628 8416
1936 8203 5495
1937 11472 5568
1938 8089 4628
1939 15230 5162
1940 25474 5659
1941 27279 5339
1942 34098 6201
1943 40978 8433
1944 29464 7425
1945 48298 12019
1946 49211 13178
1947 84600 23121
1948 52068 35421
1949 11234 43578
1950 19981 9336
1951 13294 18870
1952 1511 4748
1953 10108 9
1954 15396 506
1955 12145 —
X Argentina = Exports of Argentina to Uruguay (FOB prices)
M Uruguay = Imports of Argentina from Uruguay (CIF prices)
Source: Repdblica Argentina, Direcci6n General de
Estadisticas y Censos, Anuario de Comercio Exterior (Buenos 
Aires, various years).
economic union agreements) makes more damage than benefit to 
the progress of integration' (author's translation). Cf. 
Marcha, 'Los Dos Riesgos', vol. XV, no. 680, 24 July 1953. 
A month later, it stated that 'we have fought and we still 
fight against the Argentine government not only for what 
this regime implies but also for its policy towards our 
country, founded on authoritarianism and prepotency' 
(author's translation). Cf. Marcha, 'Un Discurso y una 
Visita', vol. XV, no. 684, 21 August 1953. It should also be 
kept in mind that because of its condition of buffer state, 
Uruguay was extremely sensitive to what could amount to an 
unduly intervention in her domestic affairs by any of her 
big neighbours. Cf. A. Methol Ferre, El Uruguay Como 
Problema. pp. 30-33.
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TABLE V.3
URUGUAY; MAIN TRADE PARTNERS 
(In percentage)
Period
I 
1
CO 
1 
• 
1 
> 
1 1 1
i 
a
Arg Bra U.S. Europe U.K. Germ Fran
1934-39
Ex 13.1 7.8 4.5 11.6 66.7 24.2 15.1 6.1
Im 31.5 6.7 7.3 10.7 50.9 18.3 11 2.3
1940-45
Ex 8.7 2.4 3.5 44.4 40.7 27.6 0.3 1.1
Im 48.1 15.1 16.4 24.9 17.2 10.7 0.4 0.4
1946-50
Ex 7.4 2.0 3.4 32.8 53.1 17.6 3.8 4.6
Im 26.2 6.2 9.6 29.2 35.4 15 1.2 3.3
1951-55
Ex 11.9 0.3 9.3 21.6 60.7 19.3 6.4 6.0
Im 23.5 0.4 11 21.7 45 12.6 8.8 5.5
Ex=Exports; Im=Imports
Source: Reptiblica Oriental del Uruguay, Direccidn General 
de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadistico (Montevideo, various 
years) ; Banco de la Reptiblica Oriental del Uruguay, 
Departmaneto de Investigaciones Econdmicas, Revista del 
Banco de la Reptiblica Oriental del Uruguay (Montevideo, 
various years).
The outcomes of the conflict were negative for both 
actors. Argentina failed to impose a change of policy in 
Uruguay, which in turn lost a trade partner and faced higher 
political instability. Although some attempts to reach an 
agreement were made in 1953 and 1955 *, bilateral relations 
would only be normalised after the fall of Perdn. In
1 Confidential conversations were reported between the 
Argentina and the Uruguayan governments in March 1953. Cf. 
'Misidn Confidencial del Dr. Radi Jude', El Diario. 
Montevideo, 11 March 1953. In addition, a note was issued by 
Argentina on 8 May 1955 in which she formally expressed her 
view that the most important cause of strained relations 
between Argentina and Uruguay was the uncontrolled 
activities of the exiles in Montevideo. This move was seen 
as an effort to initiate a dialogue on the problem. Cf. 
Department of State Central Files, 735.00/5-1055, R. 633.35, 
10 May 1955, in Argentina 1955-59. microfilms.
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November 1956 Argentina and Uruguay reached a new trade and 
payments agreement that normalised bilateral trade l. Still, 
for most of the period 1941-55 no economic agreements were 
reached.
This situation contrasts not only with that of 
Argentina and Brazil - which negotiated several trade and 
payments agreements after 1947 - but also with that between 
Uruguay and Brazil. Trade relations between Uruguay and 
Brazil were regulated by the Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation of August 1933, which provided for duty 
exemptions for a large set of primary products, including 
some vegetables and live cattle, along with quotas for other 
primary products like wheat, live cattle and meat 2. In 
addition, Uruguay benefited from the regime of free trade 
for fresh fruits signed between Argentina and Brazil, which 
Brazil extended to Uruguay through the MFN clause. Both 
countries agreed in 1948 the denounce the 1933 Treaty with 
a view to sign a new, more comprehensive treaty, comprising 
a new list of products to be exchanged and including a 
payments agreement. This Treaty was approved in 1949 and 
applied almost immediately, even before its ratification by
1 The agreement also included a credit of US$ 5 millions 
to finance bilateral disequilibrium. Cf. FO 371 120437 AW 
1132/3, 22 November 1956.
2 However, certain taxes where not considered in Brazil 
as part of the 'total exemption' of duties and remained in 
place. This was the case of the additional tax of 10 % and 
the ad valorem 2 % tax for Social Security. Cf. BA, Box 69- 
Brazil, 'Departamento Comercial', no. 129/945, 5 June 1945. 
In December 1935 the two countries signed an agreement on 
trade in fruits, favourable to Uruguay, which promised to 
facilitate imports of Brazilian timber.
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the Uruguayan parliament (which only debated the Treaty 
after considerable delay) *.
However, the change in the exchange system in Brazil 
(the October 1953 Aranha Plan) placed Uruguayan fruit in 
disadvantage with Argentine fruit. The Uruguayan fruit had 
then to face the highest exchange premium - twice the 
premium faced by the Argentine 2. This problem was eventually 
resolved through a new trade agreement (July 1954) which 
granted to both Uruguayan and Brazilian fruits the best 
existing regime in their respective markets. Thus - besides 
the formal difficulties created by the Uruguayan delay in 
ratifying the agreements - the regime of bilateral trade 
between Brazil and Uruguay did not differ from that between 
Brazil and Argentina. The big contrast was between the 
relatively cordial Argentine-Brazilian relations and the 
conflictive Argentine-Uruguayan relations. The absence of a 
trade regime between Argentina and Uruguay is remarkable, 
especially considering that Argentina had a specific policy 
of approaching smaller neighbours in order to form 'economic 
unions'.
1 The payments agreement began to work in 1949 out of a 
tacit consensus between the Bank of Brazil and the Bank of 
the Republic of Uruguay. The same procedure was adopted in 
the case of the trade agreement signed in 1953. Only in June 
1955 the new treaty of Commerce and Navigation (29 May 
1949), the Payments Agreement (18 december 1948) and the 
Trade Agreement (18 december 1953) were ratified. The 
Comercial Chamber of Montevideo severely criticized the lack 
of parliamentary interests in the agreements. Cf. 'Confusidn 
y Desorientacion en el Trafico con Brasil', Revista de la 
Bolsa de Comercio (30 June 1954), p. 5.
2 Cf. La Manana. 'Nuevo Convenio de Frutas', 1 June 
1954, and La Manana. 'El Nuevo Convenio de Frutas con 
Brasil', 30 June 1954.
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Clearly, the non-economic objectives of Argentina 
(stopping exiles activity in Montevideo) can explain why she 
drove so hard her bilateral economic relations with Uruguay. 
This approach was made easier by the fact that Uruguay was 
relatively negligible for Argentina from an economic point 
of view and then she could pursue more freely non-economic 
objectives. On the other hand, an approach exclusively based 
on structural variables cannot explain why Uruguay insisted 
on keeping the conflict with Argentina. The cost of such 
attitude for Uruguay was probably not very high during the 
war, when the USA absorbed most of Uruguay's exports, 
especially of wool. But already in the second half of the 
forties Uruguay realised that the relatively generous stance 
adopted by the USA in wartime period had changed and there 
was very little to gain in supporting US policy with respect 
to Argentina *. Argentine-Uruguayan disputes were indeed a 
burden rather than an asset for the Uruguayan international 
position in the late forties. As observed by Ambassador 
Briggs, commenting on the negotiations over a Treaty of 
Friendship between Uruguay and the USA, 'Uruguay's relations 
with Argentina would probably be a factor in Uruguay's 
willingness to sign such a Treaty with us. That is, the more
1 The US Ambassador in Montevideo reported Uruguayan 
complaints about the fact that 'the USA grasped Uruguayan 
friendship and sought Uruguayan cooperation during the war 
(when having a pro-USA sentinel on the North bank of the 
River plate was of great importance to us), but once the war 
was won we started taking Uruguay for granted'. Cf. 
711.33/8-548, Secret N.546, 5 August 1948, in Foreign
Relations of the United Sates. 1948. p. 743. Thus, Uruguayan 
expectations about an US favourable attitude regarding trade 
and development did not last as long as in Brazil.
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strained Uruguay's relations with Argentina(...) the more 
eager Uruguay might be for a Treaty of Friendship with the 
USA' *. This weakness of the Uruguayan position was 
especially significant since trade friction with the USA 
aggravated in May 1953, after the US decision to apply 
compensatory duties (8 %) on Uruguayan wool top exports 2.
Still, for Uruguay a change of policy was difficult to 
implement, as she could not curb the press and the public 
was sympathetic with the anti-peronist cause. Again, 
domestic politics mediated between the international system 
and the response of the states. Moreover, if the lack of a 
trade regime was a consequence of the narrow trade interests 
existing between two very similar primary exporters, it also 
may have contributed to constrain the opportunities for 
controlling the conflict. Had a more systematic regime of 
bilateral trade negotiations been in place, this would have 
facilitated a settlement of the dispute at an earlier, more
1 Cf. 711.33/8-548, 5 August 1948, Foreign Relations of 
the United States. 1948. p.744. In the early fifties, US 
observers also pointed out that the Uruguayans fear that 
'the moment any apparent deterioration come to light in our 
(US) relations with Uruguay, such as our recent commercial 
disputes, this fact would be seized upon and exploited by 
Argentina to create further difficulties'. Cf. 'Memorandum 
of Conversation by the Chief of Protocol', Eisenhower 
Library, Withman File, 27 October 1953, in Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1952-55. pp. 1568-9.
2 Cf. FO 371 103621 AW 1331/2, 8 May 1953. Uruguayans 
are reported to complain about what they considered an 
'unfriendly gesture towards a small but democratic country'. 
As Uruguay only represented 3 % of the consumption of tops 
by the US industry, the move appeared as unjustified. The US 
measure was adopted on the basis that the Uruguayan system 
of multiple exchange rates implied a subsidy to wool top 
exports.
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manageable stage.
Thus, looking at the Argentina-Uruguay conflict of 
1942-55 is interesting for various reasons. First, it is 
another example that countries can react differently to 
similar systemic constraints. The rationality of a policy of 
regional cooperation should have been still more compelling 
for Uruguay than for Argentina and Brazil because small 
countries have more to gain from trade. However, specific 
political variables led Uruguay to play a negative-sum game 
which compromised her negotiation stance not only with 
respect to Argentina but also with respect to the USA. 
Secondly, the advantages of Brazil's policy of dialogue and 
'distant' cordiality with respect to Argentina, by which she 
sought to preserve her trade with that country and increase 
her bargaining power vis-a-vis the USA, were confirmed by 
the negative Uruguayan experience of clear-cut opposition to 
Peron. The logic of the bargain is straightforward: regional 
conflict debilitates the ability of the countries to 
negotiate with extra-regional actors, if the latter have no 
special strategic interest to consider. Thirdly, it should 
be seen that at the moment of worst political disagreement 
between Argentina and Brazil (the 1952-54 years) there was 
in place a regime of negotiations and trade preferences 
between Argentina and Brazil. A Mixed Commission was working 
and periodical contacts took place in order to renew the 
agreements, as mentioned above. This controlled the risk of 
a potential accumulation of retaliatory measures. No similar 
regime, however, was in place to restrain Uruguay and
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Argentina, through which institutions could play a role of 
'intervening variables'. Since the failure of the 1941 
agreement, no new negotiations had been carried on. 
Moreover, institutions need time to be created and the 
conflict Argentina-Uruguay was already high when some timid 
attempts at negotiation took place in 1953. Conflict 
emerged from an institutional vacuum in bilateral relations, 
which allowed for misconceptions and successive errors in 
assessing the consequences of policy decisions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
1. Two phases in the evolution of the regime of trade 
between Argentina and Brazil can be identified, namely the 
regime of restrained bilateralism (1939-55) and the 
transition towards a free trade area (1956-60). These 
regimes are defined in terms of principles, norms, rules and 
decisions making procedures which set a framework 
constraining the behaviour of actors, reducing uncertainty 
and facilitating the process of negotiation. The regime of 
restrained bilateralism was formally expressed in the 1940 
treaty of Commerce and Navigation and in the 1948 Payments 
Agreement, within which successive trade and payments 
agreements were negotiated. The LAFTA regime was formally 
defined in the Montevideo Treaty of 1960, which reshaped the 
objectives and instruments of regional cooperation with a 
view to establishing a free trade area in 12 years. These 
regimes set the framework for the regional cooperation
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policies.
2. This chapter offered evidence on the association 
between structural change and change of regime. Perceptions 
on constraints and opportunities in the international 
system, along with the phase of the process of 
industrialisation (ISI-1 and ISI-2), shaped the scope and 
depth of cooperation policies. Economic integration only 
progressed when structural variables had tilted the balance 
of costs and benefits in favour of the benefits of 
cooperation.
3. The sources of change of regime were both exogenous 
and endogenous, although a neat separation between them is 
frequently difficult to make. After 1956 the Latin American 
trade regime was in contradiction with the move towards 
convertibility in the rest of the world and the commitments 
assumed at the GATT by its Latin American members. These 
were exogenous factors straining the bilateral regime. 
Concurrently, dissatisfaction with the evolution of trade, 
the change of economic policies and the progress of 
industrialisation in the late fifties were endogenous 
factors calling for a redefinition of the trade regime. ECLA 
offered a response to the demand for a new trade regime 
through the proposal of a regional free trade area, which 
should allow to increase the efficiency of import- 
substituting industrialisation and to diversify exports. The 
coincidence between ECLA proposals and GATT conditions, and 
the GATT flexibility with respect to the integration 
project, facilitated the international acceptance of the
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free trade area project. Conversely, the attempt to set up 
a regional payments agreement was constrained by IMF and USA 
opposition to an arrangement that they considered 
contradictory with the consolidation of a multilateral 
payments regime.
4. The idea that LAFTA emerged as a 'conspiracy' of 
Latin American t^cnicos and as an imitative response to the 
EEC, out of place in the Latin American conditions, does not 
seem to find support when the study of regime transformation 
considers the whole period 1939-60. Firstly, because the 
initiative of forming a free trade already had significant 
antecedents in the region well before the rise of a regional 
bureaucracy. The lessons of the years 1939-41 and 1953-54 
were probably present in the late fifties. Secondly, because 
the negotiation of LAFTA emerged as an answer to concrete 
conditions which were theorized in an innovative fashion. 
Clearly, ECLA played a key role in promoting the idea. The 
EEC was certainly influential as a successful example of a 
regional market. However, the gradual accumulation of 
experience, the increase in the capacity to learn from this 
experience, the difficulties to adjust to convertibility and 
enhance industrialisation were all significant forces 
driving the region towards economic integration 5.
The change of regime did not automatically follow the 
change of structural conditions. This is reflected in the 
periodisation suggested in this work. The year 1956 appears 
as a turning point for economic integration in Latin 
America. This timing cannot be entirely explained by
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structural variables. Although rapid industrial 
transformation after 1956 was certainly a new key structural 
factor, international conditions had changed before 1956. 
The dissatisfaction in Latin America with US economic 
support to development and the shortcomings of the 
multilateral system were already visible in the early post­
war years. But the adoption of a new regional cooperation 
policy was not immediate, and shared perspectives and 
favourable conditions in domestic politics had to be 
developed. This confirms the reservations suggested by the 
'modified structural' approach in international relations 
theory as regards the limits of deriving behaviour directly 
from structures. Perceptions were path-dependent and 
difficult to change. Changes in ideas and institutions 
displayed a much slower pace than structural change, as the 
Argentine difficulties in adjusting her foreign policy in 
the forties proved. Institutions cannot be created out of 
the blue, and past experience in cooperation and the 
existence of regular contacts and agreements were necessary 
to advance to closer cooperation. The conflict between 
Argentina and Uruguay in the early fifties provides more 
evidence on this. A non-cooperative behaviour and a 
negative-sum game resulted from political conflict (the pro- 
USA stance of Uruguay in hemispheric affairs and the 
Argentine exiles in Montevideo), which was not restrained by 
the existence of interests and institutions favouring 
bilateral trade.
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APPENDIX I: MAIN TRADE AND PAYMENTS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, 1939-60
1. Treaty of Peace. Friendship. Commerce and 
Navigation.7 March 1856.
Main Concessions
(a) Conditional Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment 
for citizens, goods and ships of the two countries.
(b) Rights of navigation of the Parand, Uruguay and 
Paraguay Rivers.
Expiration/denunciation
No provisions made in the Treaty.
Note: In October 1933 a new 'Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation' and an 'Additional Protocol' were signed. 
However, none of these agreements was implemented. A similar 
fate was followed by the 'Treaty of Commerce and Navigation' 
signed in May 1935. These agreements contemplated the 
concession of the unconditional MFN treatment and favourable 
dispositions regarding duties and quotas for traditional 
items in bilateral trade.
2. Exchange Protocol. 13 April 1939.
Main Concessions
Argentina and Brazil accorded to apply to their 
reciprocal imports the most favourable exchange treatment 
provided by each country. Both governments would also avoid 
to apply export taxes which could lead to an artificial 
increase in prices.
Expiration/denunciation
Valid until the conclusion of a definitive Treaty of 
Commerce, to which the exchange agreement would be 
incorporated.
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3. Treaty of commerce and Navigation. 23 January 1940.
Main Concessions
(a) Unconditional MFN treatment regarding import and 
export taxes, trade regulations and prohibitions.
(b) The best possible treatment as regards import 
quotas, which should not be lower than the average levels of 
trade in previous years.
(c) Reduction and consolidation of import duties for a 
list of primary products which comprised the principal items 
of bilateral trade. Argentina received, among others, 
concessions for wheat, wheat floor, ovine and chicken meat, 
extracts, fruits and vegetables. Brazil received concessions 
for cashew nuts, coffee, cocoa, palm, mat€ and pine timber, 
timber in general, tobacco, rubber and bauxite. Pine timber 
and mate were also exempted of the 10% tax applied by 
Argentina since October 1931.
(d) Equal treatment for ships bearing the flag of 
either country.
(e) Creation of two Mixed Argentine-Brazilian 
Commissions, one in Buenos Aires and the other in Rio de 
Janeiro, in charge of the promotion of trade. These 
commissions would also function as an arbitrator in case of 
divergences respecting the interpretation of the agreement.
Expiration/denunciation
Valid from the exchange of ratification until a year 
after its denunciation by either country.
285
4. Agreement on the Addition of Substitutes to Coffee 
and Wheat. Facilitation of Imports and Complementary 
Payments Agreement. 9 April 1941.
Main Concessions
fa) Mixed Coffee and Wheat
(a.i) Argentina assumed the commitment of prohibiting 
the addition of substitutes to coffee within the term of a 
year.
(a.ii) Brazil would limit the addition of substitutes 
to wheat floor up to 15% in 1941 and 10% in 1942 and 1943.
(a.iii) By January 1944 both products would be sold in 
each country in accordance with the standards and 
specifications of the country of origin.
(b) Facilitation of Imports
Argentina would facilitate the importation of Brazilian 
textiles, iron ore, steel and its manufactures, rubber and 
timber. Argentina would issue exchange permits for Brazilian 
cotton textiles (except sacking) from a minimum of MN$18 
millions (Argentine pesos). This quota should increase by 
MN$ 12 millions in 1942. Cotton sacking imports by Argentina 
should amount to MN$ 8 millions. In addition, Argentina 
would not reduce the Brazilian quota for cotton textiles 
below that of 1942 and would also allot to Brazil other 
countries' unused quotas up to 30 millions of pesos.
(c) Complementary Payments Agreement
(c.i) A reciprocal credit of MN$ 50 millions was 
accorded with a view to facilitate the balanced expansion of 
bilateral trade ('Agreement on Reciprocal Credits for the 
Purchase of Surpluses, 9 April 1941).
(c.ii) Net balances could only be used to pay for
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imports from the debtor country.
Expiration/denunciation
Valid from the exchange of ratification (provisionally 
from the 14 th of April 1941) until a year after its 
denunciation by either country.
5. Treaty for Progressive Free Trade. 21 November 1941.
Main Concessions
(a) Both governments would encourage a system of 
progressive free trade intended to lead to the formation of 
a custom union.
(b) In order to implement this objective, trade in 
activities yet not established or of small economic 
importance in either country would not be subject to import 
duties for 10 years.
(c) Trade restrictions on sectors of larger economic 
relevance for the national economies should be gradually 
removed, without affecting existing production.
(d) Within a six-month term both countries would 
present a list of the articles produced in their respective 
territories together with details of their economic 
importance.
Expiration/denunciation
Valid for the next 10 years following the exchange of 
ratification. (The agreement was not ratified.)
Note: A year before, in October 1940, a joint-
recommendation had been issued in Rio de Janeiro by the 
Ministers of Economy of Argentina (Pinedo) and Brazil (Souza 
Costa) calling for the gradual formation of a free trade 
area (FTA) . The joint-recommendation also emphasised the 
need of an understanding between central banks in order to 
improve the existing regime of bilateral payments, including 
its extension to other LA countries.
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6. Commercial Agreement. November 1946.
Main concessions
(a) Argentina would supply Brazil with a minimum of
1.200.000 tons of wheat annually during five years - from 
January 1947 to December 1951. If the Argentine exportable 
surplus of wheat was less than 2,700.000 tons, Argentina 
would then sell to Brazil at least 45% of her exportable 
surplus for that year. Both countries were allowed to buy or 
sell in other markets if they found more convenient prices. 
Argentina would also export to Brazil annual quotas of 
unwashed wool (5,000 tons) and casein (1,000 tons).
(b) Brazil would export to Argentina tires for lorries 
and motorcars with their respective inner tubes. Argentina 
would also import from Brazil annual quotas of rubber (up to
5.000 tons), growing annual volumes of cotton textiles (from
60,000,000 lineal metres in 1947 to 100,000,000 lineal 
metres in 1949 and 1951) and carded cotton yards (1,000 
tons).
Expiration/denunciation
Valid for five years. No provisions made for 
denunciation.
8. Payments Agreement. 22 October 1948.
Main Concessions
(a) All bilateral payments accruing from direct 
operations between the two countries would be made in 
cruzeiros. An 'Argentina-Brazil Agreement Account' in 
cruzeiros would be created in the Bank of Brazil (Article 
3) .
(b) Net debtor positions up to 280 millions of 
cruzeiros would not pay interests. An annual interest rate 
of 2% would be paid for net debtor positions in the range 
between 280 millions and 560 millions of cruzeiros. Above 
this value interests would be set at an annual rate of 2.5%.
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(c) Net balances exceeding 650 millions of cruzeiros at 
the end of the first three-year period of implementation of 
the agreement would be settled in the currency of the 
creditor country, in convertible currency or in gold. The 
same mechanism of settlement would be applied in each 
ensuing two-year period after that date. In case of 
denunciation of the agreement, the debtor country should 
cancel the total net balance within a term of 18 months.
(d) Payments related to the transport of goods involved 
in bilateral exchange, using ships bearing Argentine or 
Brazilian flag, could also be made through the 'Agreement 
Account'.
(d) Both countries would adopt all the necessary 
measures to facilitate bilateral trade, including the 
concession for their reciprocal imports of the most 
favourable exchange treatment existing in each country.
(c) The current regime providing for an equal 
distribution of shipments between Argentine and Brazilian 
ships as regards bilateral trade would be kept during the 
period of validity of the agreement.
Expiration/denunciation
The agreement had a validity of three years and would 
be tacitly renewed for subsequent periods of two years, 
except in case of denunciation six months before its 
expiration.
9. Commercial Complementary Agreement. 16 May 1949.
Main Concessions and products
(a) Argentina would firmly sell to Brazil 600,000 tons 
of wheat in a year term. She also agreed to sell an 
additional amount of 300,000 tons in conditions to be 
determined within the following six months.
(b) Argentina would facilitate imports from Brazil with 
a view to at least sustain the average imports levels of 
1946-48 for timber, cotton yarns and fabrics, fruits, mat§,
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cocoa, tobacco, coffee, iron, steel and their manufactures, 
nonferrous metals and their manufactures, fibres, tea, 
waxes, medicines and veterinary products.
(c) Brazil would in turn endeavour to assure that her 
imports from Argentina reached at least the average levels 
of the period 1946-48 for fresh and dried fruits, garlic, 
butter, cheese, frozen poultry, hides, wool, tanned hides, 
leather articles, medicines, semolina and millet.
Expiration/denunciation
Valid for one year.
10. Commercial Agreement. 23 June 1950.
Concessions and products
(a^  /Basic Proaram/ for the exchange of fresh, dried, 
desiccated and industrialised fruits and preserved 
vegetables.
(a.i) With the purpose of balancing bilateral trade in 
fresh, dried, desiccated and industrialised fruits and 
preserved vegetables at the highest possible levels, both 
governments set up an annual 'basic exchange program' for 
these items.
(a.ii) The Argentine Central Bank would open a 
'statistical account' were the balance of the trade in 
fruits program would be registered using FOB prices.
(a.iii) The exchange of these products would be 
considered 'balanced' when the net position at the end of 
the annual period of validity of the agreement did not 
exceed the value of 30 millions of cruzeiros. In case of 
disequilibrium, the creditor should adopt measures to 
increase imports from the debtor. If this alternative 
failed, the debtor would be allowed to impose restrictions 
on her imports.
(a.iv) The two governments would endeavour to adopt all
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available measures to reach the exchange values proposed in 
the 'basic program', amounting to 275 millions of cruzeiros.
fb) Wheat and Other Items of Bilateral Trade
Brazil would grant a liberal treatment regarding the 
concession of import permits for the following Argentine 
exports: (i) 800,000 tons of wheat and 15,000 tons of wheat
floor, amounting to a value of Cz$ 1,195 millions; (ii) 
hides, dairy products, wool and wool fabrics, cheese, 
casein, barley, oats, rye, onions, garlic, vegetal oils, 
quebracho extract, salt, tartaric acid and drugs, amounting 
to minimum value of Cz$ 1,500 millions.
Argentina would offer a liberal treatment in the 
concession of import permits for the following Brazilian 
exports: cotton textiles, timber, mate, cacao, tobacco,
coffee, iron bars and iron tubes, tea, vegetal ceres, plane 
glass, non-ferrous metals and its manufactures, and 
electrical and non-electrical machinery, amounting to a 
value of Cz$ 1,352 millions.
Expiration/denunciation
Valid for one year, renewable by common consent of the 
two countries.
11. Commercial and Payments Agreements. 23 March 1953.
Concessions and products
fa) Trade in Fruits
A free trade regime for dried, desiccated, preserved 
and industrialised fruits and vegetables was established, 
subject to the general principles of balanced trade and 
reciprocal compensations. It entailed the concession of 
automatic import permits under the most favourable exchange
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treatment available in each country. Trade would be 
considered balanced if net debtor/creditor positions at the 
end of each annual period was lower than Cz$ 50 millions. In 
case of disequilibrium, restrictions might be imposed by the 
debtor country in the following year. A basic annual program 
of Cz$ 380 millions was accorded. In the case of 
industrialised fruits and vegetables, specific quantities 
for the various products were set up as a minimum per annum. 
It was also agreed that all the complementary measures 
necessary for the promotion of this trade would be adopted, 
as defined in the agreement of June 1950.
(b) Wheat and Other items of Bilateral Trade
Besides trade in fruits, both governments assumed the 
commitment of granting to each other import permits for an 
extended list of products. Minimum values in cruzeiros for 
this exchange were in turn established. The lists included 
the traditional primary products that composed the bulk of 
bilateral trade and also some manufactured goods.
With respect to Argentina's exports, the list was 
similar to that of the former agreement, but it was further 
extended in order to include frozen meat (Cz$ 10 millions, 
to be exported between August and December of 1953) and a 
larger amount of exports of manufactures (Cz$ 34,5 millions, 
basically composed of books, tartaric acid and drugs). In 
all, Argentine exports should reach the value of Cz$ 2,728 
millions, of which Cz$ 2,486 millions corresponded to wheat 
exports. Thus, wheat represented about 90% of the total 
Argentine exports (excluding fruits), while manufactures 
only comprised about 1%.
On the Brazilian side, the list of exports was as well 
very similar to that of June 1950. Yet a significant new 
feature in the agreement should be stressed, namely the 
intended expansion of the Brazilian exports of capital 
goods. Cz$ 200 millions in capital goods were proposed to be 
imported from Brazil by Argentine governmental agencies, of
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which Cz$ 100 millions corresponding to railways equipment. 
The definitive conditions of this purchase were to be settle 
in subsequent negotiations. In 1953, Brazil's exports of 
capital goods were expected to reach the value of Cz$ 40 
millions. Manufactures were therefore to represent about 7% 
of the total Brazilian exports (excluding fruits) to 
Argentina this year.
(c) Mixed Araentine-Brazilian Commission
A new Mixed Argentine-Brazilian Commission was 
established in Buenos Aires with the aim of supervising the 
progress of the agreement and promoting the development of 
bilateral trade.
(d) Renewal and Modification of the 1948 Payments 
Agreement.
(d.i) Beginning in January 1954, Payments between 
Argentina and Brazil would be made in 'account dollars' in 
place of the cruzeiro;
(d.ii) when net debtor/creditor positions in the 
bilateral account (established by Article 3, October 1948 
Payments Agreement) exceeded the value of US$ 35 millions in 
December 1956, the surplus would be then transferred to a 
special account in the Bank of Brazil. An annual interest 
rate of 2,5% would be charged on this surplus. It would be 
cancelled out through exports from the debtor to the 
creditor country during the years 1957 and 1958, in two 
annual payments.
(d.iii) If the agreement were prorogated after December 
1956 net positions exceeding the value of US$ 35 million 
would be settled in convertible currency, beginning in 
December 1957. If the agreement were discontinued in that 
date, total net debtor positions would have to be cancelled 
in convertible currency.
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Expiration/denunciation
The agreements would last until the 31 of December 
1956. They would then be opened to prorogation for yearly 
periods. The list of specific products to be exchanged, 
however, would be valid for just one year, and both 
governments assumed the commitment to renegotiate the list 
three months before its expiration, in order either to 
prorogate its validity or design a new list.
12. Commercial and Payments Agreement. 25 June 1954.
Concessions granted
fa) Renewal of the Agreement for Trade in Fruits
(a.i) It was renewed the 'basic program' for the 
expansion of trade in fresh, dried, desiccated and 
industrialised fruits and vegetables.
(a.ii) Brazil would auction the necessary amount of 
exchange for fulfilling the annual basic goal of US$ 20 
millions by applying the minimum exchange premium (first 
category in the classification of imports) to imports of 
Argentine fruit;
(a.iii) The Argentine government would guarantee the 
automatic concession of import permits for the Brazilian 
fruit within the basic program.
fb) Wheat and Other items in bilateral trade
As contemplated in the previous agreement, the list of 
products that would receive trade preferences had to be 
renegotiated after a year. The new list was largely similar 
to previous one, whith wheat making up the backbone of the 
Argentine exports. Brazil's purchases of wheat in grain 
would reach 750,000 metric tones plus 26,250 of metric tones 
of wheat floor during 1954. It was expected, however, a
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diversification of the manufactured exports of Argentina. 
The Argentine list of exports benefited with preferences 
included several electric domestic appliances, like washing 
machines, refrigerators, and writing machines. Brazil's 
list, in turn, included (as in the previous year) the export 
of railways equipment, together with the traditional list of 
primary goods - of which imports of iron ore and steel would 
have to be arranged in accordance with the 'Plan Sidertiraico 
Araentino' (Argentine Steel Plan).
(c) Modification of the Payments Agreement
(c.i) Since January 1954, all direct payments between 
the two countries would be made in US$ dollars and 
registered in the 'Account of convention dollars Argentina- 
Brazil'.
(c.ii) Net debtor\creditor positions would not render 
interests up to the value of US$ 15 millions. They would pay 
2% annually from positions between US$ 15 millions and US$ 
30 millions and 2,5% for the amount exceeding the latter 
value.
(c.iii) If the agreement was prorogated, positions 
exceeding US$ 35 millions would be paid during the following 
year in goods, convertible currency or any other from 
accorded by the two governments. If the agreement was 
terminated then the total net position would be settled 
trough two equal annual payments.
Expiration/denunciation
The agreement would expire on the 31 of December of
1956. It could then be prorogated for successive annual 
periods save its denunciation by either country three months 
before its termination. The list of products would be 
prorogated on an annual basis, except in case that one of 
the Parties demanded its renegotiation before the 31 of 
October of the current year.
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13. Reversal Notes: Wheat Agreement. 20 January 1955.
Concessions and products
(a) Argentina would sell to Brazil 1,200,000 tons of 
wheat in 1955, 1956 and 1957. 4% of this quantity would be 
delivered in the form of wheat floor. In case that the 
Argentine exportable surplus of wheat came to be lower than
3,000,000 tons, this country would sell to Brazil at least 
30 % of her surplus.
(b) Brazil would be released from the obligation of 
having to buy that part of the 1,200,000 tons of wheat for 
which she could not pay through an increase of her exports 
to Argentina.
(c) In order to facilitate the compensation of Brazil's 
large wheat purchases, Argentina would increase and 
accelerate the concession of import permits in favour of 
Brazilian goods and revoke the legal permission to add 
substitutes to coffee. It would also be renovated the 
contract for trade in bananas. The stimulus of other 
Brazil's export items would be analyzed by the Mixed 
Agentine-Brazilian Commission.
(d) The Mixed Commission would follow the evolution of 
trade and the honouring of the agreements.
(e) The Mixed Commission would gather in the first 
fortnight of each year in order to lay the conditions for 
the annual purchases of wheat.
Expiration/denunciation. Valid until December 1956. No 
provisions made for denunciation.
14. Modification of the Trade in Fruits Agreement. 19 
September 1956
Main products and concessions
There were introduced some modifications to the Fruit 
Agreement of June 1954 with a view to regulate the terms of 
concession and validity of import permits, prices and
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quantities regarding the exchange of fresh, dried, 
desiccated and industrialised fruit.
(a) Argentina would concede automatic import permits 
for import requests of Brazilian fruit placed before the 
15th of February 1957. Import requests for the importation 
of 300,000 chests of oranges would be received until the 
10th of October 1956. Special dispositions were established 
as regards trade in bananas. Brazil would in turn undertake 
special auctions for the importation of Argentine fruit 
amounting to 'account dollars' $ 1,600,000 . Import permits 
would be valid until the 31 of March 1957.
(b) Both countries would grant the most convenient 
exchange rate for their reciprocal imports. This 
preferential exchange amounted to 18 pesos per dollar in 
Argentina and to the minimum import bonus of 36 cruzeiros 
per dollar in Brazil (first category of imports).
Expiration/ Denunciation. The governments would resume 
negotiations in the first fortnight of January with a view 
to establish a new regime of trade in fruits from April 1st
1957.
15. Reversal Notes. 29 July 1957.
Main products and concessions. The conditions
regulating trade in wheat for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960 
were established. Brazil would buy an annual quota of
1.000.000 tons of wheat. Argentina assumed the compromise of 
selling at least 30 % of her surplus if that quota were not 
reached. Brazil would keep the option of restricting imports 
in case of an increase in domestic production. Prices and
quantities of the annual purchases of wheat should be
contracted before the 28th of February each year. The 
agreement also regulated the concession of quotas and
automatic import permits for trade in fruits.
Expiration\denunciation. The negotiation of a 
definitive agreement would begin in February 1958.
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16. Trade and Payments Agreement. 19 September 1958.
Main products and Concessions.
(i) The 1940 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
(denounced by Brazil on the 12 September 1957) and the 1953 
and 1954 Payments and Trade Agreements (of which the June 
1954 Payment Agreement had been denounced by Argentina in 
November 1956) were renovated covering the period of the 
negotiation of a new trade agreement. This should begin in 
November 1958;
(ii) Trade in fresh and semi-industrialised fruits was 
exempted from all quantitative, exchange and price controls;
(iii) It was established that wheat purchases should be 
made through a single annual contract to be signed before 
the 26 of March each year, within the framework of the Wheat 
Agreement of July 1957;
(iv) It was emphasised that Brazil would undertake 
previous consultations with Argentina before purchasing 
wheat in the US under Law 480;
(v) A Mixed Group for industrial cooperation was 
created, with the participation of the private and public 
sectors. The group should study new mechanisms for promoting 
industrial complementarity and industrial trade.
(vi) A new Payments Agreement was signed, establishing 
the parity of the account dollar with that of the dollar 
freely convertible. Agreements on the expansion of mutual 
credits and on the possibility of using bilateral balances 
to settle payments with other LA countries were also 
reached.
Expiration\Denunciation
The negotiation of a new, definitive agreement should 
be concluded before the 12 June 1959.
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17. Declaration of the 2 6 November 1959
(i) Prorogation of the 1940 Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation and the 1953/54 Trade Agreements until the 
approval of the Free Trade Area;
(ii) Brazil would not apply the custom tax of 5% 
approved on August 14th 1957 to the Argentine exports. In 
turn, Argentina would exempt Brazil of the tax of 8% on 
fruits established in 1955.
(iii) Both governments would take measures with a view 
to sustain bilateral trade and promote industrial 
complementarity.
18. Reversal Notes. 2 December 1959
(i) The Argentine government would ship 200.000 tons of 
wheat to Brazil. The rest of the shipments contemplated in 
the July 1959 agreement would be made by means of direct 
dealings with the Argentine private sector. This was due to 
the new trade regime for wheat established in Argentina in 
July 1957.
(ii) The tax exemption for trade in fresh fruits came 
into vigour.
NOTE: The Treaty of Montevideo that created LAFTA was signed 
on the 18th of February 1960, ratified by Argentina on the 
6th of October 1961 and ratified by Brazil on the 2nd of 
February 1961. On the 1st of January 1962 began to be 
implemented the tariff reductions for the list negotiated in 
the First Conference of the Contracting Parties in 
Montevideo.
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PART III, FROM LAFTA TO MERCOSUR. 1960-90
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CHAPTER VI. STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND INTEGRATION. 1960-92
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the evolution of regional 
cooperation in relation with structural and institutional 
change after 1960. It is therefore an extension to the LAFTA 
period of the framework applied in Part II. This framework 
can be summarised as follows: (i) cooperation is expressed 
in institutional change, namely the creation of new patterns 
of behaviour or the adaptation of old patterns with a view 
to fostering regional trade; (ii) the stimulus for 
cooperation depends on structural change in the 
international economy (international constraints and 
opportunities) and in the domestic economy (especially 
industrial transformation); (iii) ideas play a role in 
transforming the stimulus for change in new international 
regimes. It will be suggested that these variables 
contribute to explain why cooperation increased until the 
mid-sixties and subsequent fell, and why a new generation of 
bilateral agreements emerged in the eighties.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first three 
sections are concerned with structural change. Section I 
briefly reviews the international context in which regional 
cooperation developed in 1960-92. This section presents the 
general trends in growth and financing in the period, while
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a more detailed analysis of the role of international 
constraints in shaping expectations and policies will be 
presented in chapter VII. Section II considers the impact of 
the 'maturation' of industry in Argentina and Brazil on the 
evolution of cooperation. Section III focuses on the growth 
and composition of regional trade. Section IV analyzes the 
evolution of cooperation and integration in relation with 
structural and institutional variables. The main conclusions 
of the chapter are summarized in section V.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
1.1. The 1960—80 Period
LAFTA emerged from an international context which, in 
the view of contemporary analysts and policy-makers, seemed 
to consolidate the marginalisation of Latin America. The 
subsequent twenty years (1960-80) proved that this concern 
was not entirely unfounded. Protectionism in centre 
economies remained high in agricultural goods and in some 
simple industrial exports (especially textiles) in the shape 
of tariff and non tariff barriers *. However, high rates of
1 On the persistence on trade barriers in agricultural 
goods, see T.K. Warley, 'Western Trade in Agricultural 
Products', in A. Schonfield (ed.), International Economic 
Relations of the Western World, vol. 1 (London, 1976), 
especially pp. 292-334. On protectionism in textiles see B. 
Baker et al, 'The Multifiber Arrangement', in C. Stevens 
(ed.), The EEC and the Third World; A Survey 3. The Atlantic 
Rift (London, 1983), pp. 74-83.
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growth of international trade in the sixties offered 
increasing export opportunities, especially for those 
developing countries that diversified towards industrial 
production l. When recession curbed growth in the centre 
economies after 1973, Latin America still continued to grow,
this time on the basis of an increase in the external debt
2
•
This can easily be seen in table VI.1, which presents 
the comparative performance of Latin America with respect to 
other regions in 1960-90.
1 On the factors that sustained rapid growth in 1960- 
73, see A. Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist 
Development; A Long Run Comparative View (Oxford, 1991), pp. 
177-89.
2 Cf. C. Saunders, 'Investment, Debt and Growth: The 
Diversity of Experience', in H.W. Singer and S. Sharma 
(eds.), Economic Development and World Debt (London, 1989), 
and Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, 'Southern Cone Stabilization 
Plans', in A. Velasco (ed.), Trade. Development and the 
World Economy. Selected Essays of Carlos F. Dlaz-Aleiandro. 
pp. 268-82.
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TABLE VI.1
GROWTH AND TRADE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. 1960-90 
(Annual rates of growth, in percentage)
World DC Dgc LA
1960-70
GDP 5.2 5.1 5.8 5.5
X 9.3 10.1 7.4 5.7
M 9.2 10.3 6.7 6.3
1970-80
GDP 3.7 3.1 5.5 5.4
X 20.3 18.8 25.9 20.8
M 20.2 19.5 23.8 20.6
1980-85
GDP 2.0 2.4 1.9 1.3
X -0.6 0.5 -4.4 -0.8
M 0.4 -1.4 -2.6 -8.0
1985-90
GDP 3.3 3.2 3.4 1.9
X 12.1 14.0 11.5 4.5
M 12.0 14.6 13.4 7.5
1990-92
GDP 0.4 1.6 4.2 2.6
X 3.2 3.7 7.0 1.4
M 2.5 2.0 11.1 15.6
GDP = rate 
X = rate
of growth 
of growth
of
of
GDP. 
exports; M = rate of growth of
imports.
DC = Developed Countries; DgC = Developing Countries; LA = 
Latin America
Sources; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and 
Development (New York, 1993) ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin 
America■ New York: United Nations, various numbers.
Table VI. 1 shows, first, that the region grew at higher 
rates than the world economy in 1960-80. Latin America grew 
at a cumulative annual rate of 5.5 % and 5.4 % between 1960- 
70 and 1970-80, respectively, while the world grew at rates 
of 5.2 % and 3.7 % in the same periods.
Tables VI.2.A and VI.2.B. display the rates of economic 
and manufacturing growth in Argentina and Brazil. The annual 
rates of growth of the Brazilian industry in the sixties and
seventies were impressive - almost 7 % in I960-'
1970-80. The Argentine industry performed very
sixties but contracted in the seventies.
TABLE VI . 2. A
ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC AND MANUFACTURING GROWTH
(Annual rates of growth, in percentage)
Growth Growth of
of GDP manufacturing
1960-70 2.9 5.6
1970-80 2.6 1.6
1980-85 -1.7 -3.1
1986 5.2 11.7
1987 3.1 1.8
1988 -1.8 -4.6
1989 -6.3 -9.8
1990 0.2 -0.9
1991 7.3 12.7
TABLE VI . 2 • B
BRAZIL: ECONOMIC AND MANUFACTURING GROWTH
(Annual rates of growth, in percentage)
Growth Growth of
Of GDP manufacturing
1960-70 3.1 6.9
1970-80 8.7 9.0
1980-85 1.0 -0.6
1986 7.6 11.3
1987 3.6 0.9
1988 -0.1 -3.4
1989 3.3 2.9
1990 -4.4 -9.5
1991 0.9 -0.7
Source: ECLA. Statistical Yearbook of Latin -
York, various years).
On the other hand, if high rates of growth in Latin 
America and the world economy, especially in the sixties, 
convey an optimistic view of the economic performance of
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Latin America, this is qualified by the evolution of Latin 
American exports. If compared with the rest of the 
developing world, Latin America was unable to exploit the 
opportunities offered by international trade. Table VI. 1 
shows that exports and imports in Latin America grew at 
lower rates than the world in 1960-70. This changed in the 
seventies. Latin American exports and imports grew at annual 
rates of about 20 % in 1970-80, which was slightly above the 
world average. However, the expansion of trade in the 
seventies was accompanied by a substantial increase in the 
Latin American external debt. This can be seen in table 
VI. 3.
TABLE VI.3
DISBURSED EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
(Balance at the end of the year in current US$ millions)
Year Argentina Brazil
1960 987 2202
1965 1700 2395
1970 1872 3681
1975 3023 13618
1978 12496 52585
1979 19034 58907
1980 27162 68354
1981 35671 78580
1982 43634 87580
1983 46500 96500
1984 49000 102443
1985 49326 105126
1986 51422 111045
1987 58324 121174
1988 58473 113469
1989 63314 115096
1990 60973 122200
Source; ECLA, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America (New 
York, various numbers).
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Table VI.3 shows that the external debt of Argentina 
and Brazil was multiplied by a factor of four between 1975 
and 1978. The recover of the region's position in 
international trade in the seventies was therefore 
misleading. Argentina and Brazil reached the eighties in a 
very vulnerable position l. Moreover, this vulnerability was 
aggravated by the rise of the so-called 'new protectionism' 
in the central countries, an expansion of non-tariff 
barriers triggered by the recession of the second half of 
the seventies 2. The new protectionism affected sectors in 
which peripheral countries had acquired new competitive 
advantages 3.
1 The bibliography on the impact of the external debt on 
policy and growth is huge. Cf., for example, W.R. Cline, 
'Latin American Debt: Progress, Prospects and Policy', in S. 
Edwards and F. Larrain (eds.), Debt. Adjustment and 
Recovery: Latin America's Prospects for Growth and 
Development (New York, 1989), pp. 31-64; S. Griffith-Jones, 
'The International Debt problem: Prospects and Solutions', 
in H.W. Singer and S. Sharma (eds.), Economic Development 
and World Debt, pp. 3-22; R. Bouzas, 'America Latina y la 
Crisis del Endeudamiento Externo: A Modo de Introduccidn', 
in R. Bouzas (ed.), Entre la Heterodoxia v el Aiuste: 
Neqociaciones Financieras Externas de America Latina (Buenos 
Aires, 1989), pp. 11-25.
2 Cf. F, Bergsten and W.R. Cline, 'Trade Policy in the 
Eighties: An Overview', in W.R. Cline, Trade Policy in the 
1980s (Washington, 1983), especially pp. 66-72; R.H. 
Ballance et al, The International Economy and Industrial 
Development: The Impact of Trade and Investment in the Third 
World (London, 1982), pp. 73-83; J. Bhagwati, Protectionism 
(London, 1988), pp. 42-59. The impact of the new 
protectionism on perceptions regarding regional integration 
will be addressed in the next chapter.
3 Cf. B. Balassa, 'Los Paises de Industrializacidn 
Reciente Despues de la Crisis del Petroleo', Inteoracion 
Latinoamer icana. vol. 6, no. 61, pp. 3-62. This author 
estimates that in the late seventies non-tariff barriers 
covered about 51 % of the Argentine exports, 23 % of the 
Brazilian exports and 41 % of the Uruguayan exports.
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It was suggested in chapter I that states would only be 
prepared to share sovereignty, and move towards higher 
cooperation, if constraints on growth and policy making are 
high. In general, the expansion of international trade and 
financing in 1960-80 may have implied a lower stimulus for 
cooperation, as unilateral, national ISI seemed to have 
promoted growth successfully, especially in the case of 
Brazil. The evolution of trade, however, suggest that this 
view should be qualified as the trade performance of Latin 
America was worse than that of the rest of the world. If the 
regional market contributed to improve this (especially in 
the context of the new protectionism) then interests in 
regional trade would remain high, despite of the apparent 
success of unilateral ISI policies.
1.2. The 1980-92 Period
The eighties witnessed a drastic fall in the rates of 
growth and in trade in the region. The figures presented in 
table VI.1 show that growth was below the world average in 
1980-90, a reversal of the trends of the previous period. 
This changed again after 1990, as trade and growth 
recovered. However, the pattern of recovery is similar to 
that of the pre-1980 crisis. Exports grew below the world 
average while imports grew at a rate more than six times 
higher than the world average. This can be seen as an 
indication of external weakness and of a future painful 
adjustment to changing international conditions.
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The single most important issue in the eighties was the 
debt crisis. Table VI.4 presents the burden that external 
debt represented for the Latin American economies in general 
and for Argentina and Brazil in particular.
TABLE VI.4.
THE DEBT BURDEN: LAIA. ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
(In percentage) \ ____  _ - - ^  7
Argentina Brazil LAIA
% gnp serv/exp % gnp ser/exp % gnp serv/exp
1975 11.3 27.7 18.7 40.1 18 19.5
1980 28.5 25.1 25.0 57.1 24.5 27.9
1987 67.9 57.2 35.3 25.1 51.4 27.0
1988 57.3 31.7 32.8 43.6 44.9 33.4
1989 103.5 34.4 21.2 26.3 37.0 25.5
% gdp = long term debt/GNP.
serv/exp = debt service/total exports of goods and services. 
LAIA = Latin American Integration Association (Argentine, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay).
Source; UNCTAD, Handbook of Development Statistics (New 
York, 1992).
The figures are impressive. The outstanding long term 
debt represented about 18 % of the Argentine GDP in 1975 and 
more than 51 % in 1987. The figures for Brazil were 18.7 % 
and 35.3 %, respectively. Moreover, the debt service
absorbed a quarter of Brazil's total exports and more than 
a third of Argentine total exports in the late eighties. The 
burden of the external debt prompted major efforts to 
contract imports and expand exports *. This can be seen in 
table VI.5, which presents the evolution of the import and
1 Cf., for instance, C.F. Diaz-Alejandro, 'Latin 
American Debt: I Don't Think We Are in Kansas Any More', in 
A. Velasco (ed.), Debt. Adjustment and Recovery, pp. 321-44.
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export coefficient of the region for a set of selected 
years.
TABLE VI.5
IMPORT AND EXPORT COEFFICIENTS. SELECTED YEARS
(In percentage of the gross domestic product at constant
1970 prices)
ARGENTINA
Year Import
coefficient
Export
coefficient
1950 9.9 8.1
1960 8.6 7.5
1970 6.7 7.1
1975 6.3 5.3
1980 11.9 8.2
1981 11.2 9.7
1982 6.6 11.1
1983 6.0 11.7
1984 6.0 11.0
BRAZIL
Year Import
coefficient
Export
coefficient
1950 11.8 9.4
1960 8.2 6.5
1970 7.0 6.5
1975 8.6 6.4
1980 7.1 7.6
1981 6.5 9.5
1982 6.0 8.6
1983 5.0 10.1
1984 4.4 11.5
Source; Elaborated from ECLA, Statistical yearbook for Latin 
America (New York, 1986).
The contraction of the import coefficient and the 
increase in the export coefficient in the early eighties 
highlight the importance of the transfer of real resources 
to the rest of the world. It is necessary to recall that 
this fall took place from an already reduced import
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coefficient, stemming from the 'closeness' that 
characterised Latin American ISI. The costs of external 
adjustment (in terms of lower efficiency and technological 
diffusion associated with closing the economy to imports) 
should have been very high. Moreover, the real transfer of 
resources associated with the change in the import and 
export coefficients was aggravated by the fall in the terms 
of trade of the. region in the same period, as shown in table 
VI. 6.
TABLE VI.6.
EVOLUTION OF THE TERMS OF TRADE. SELECTED YEARS
(In percentage and in millions of US$ constant dollars of
1970)
Year Argentina Brazil
I RE I RE
1960 104.9 26 104.4 53
1965 109.2 160 93.9 -97
1970 100.0 0 100.0 0
1975 100.7 -53 85.4 -544
1978 79.9 -356 87.6 -494
1979 81.1 -81 79.9 -1003
1980 94.2 323 67.4 -2152
1981 97.2 245 56.7 -3598
1982 82.0 -628 54.2 -3573
1983 79.4 -775 55.1 -4226
1984 86.4 -473 59.5 -4662
NOTE:
I = Terms of Trade Index, 1970 = 100.
RE = real effects of the terms of trade in millions of 
constant dollars of 1970.
RE = x (px/pm -1), where x are exports at constant prices, px 
is the deflator of exports and pm is the deflator of imports.
Source: Elaborated from ECLA, Balance of Payment Statistics 
(New York, 1986).
Finally, the contraction of the import coefficient was
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associated with a contraction in the levels of investment, 
as shown in table VI.7. Investment as a percentage of GDP 
fell almost 8 percentage points in Argentina and 6 
percentage points in Brazil.
TABLE VI.7
INVESTMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF THE GDP 
(In percentage)
Period Argentina Brazil
Average 1965-70 20.5 23.3
Average 1977-82 21.9 21.9
Average 1983-88 14.1 15.8
SOURCE; Elaborated from IMF, International Financial 
Statistics (Washington, 1990).
Investment rates can be considered a key indicator of 
the existence of constraints on growth. Levels of investment 
are strongly associated with expectations about growth and, 
in developing countries, with external constraints, as these 
countries are dependent on imports of capital goods (see 
section VII). Investment also impacts the ability to sustain 
growth and trade in the future.
In sum, heavy constraints on growth and policy-making 
emerged in the eighties as a result of the debt crisis, 
largely incubated in the seventies. This, it will be argued, 
shaped defensive attitudes which (after a period of learning 
and political change) encouraged the move towards a new 
phase in regional integration.
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II. INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL.
The period 1960-73 can be seen as a period of 
'maturation' of the industrial structure established in the 
late fifties (ISI-2) l. The maturation of industry took place 
through a process of learning in which technological 
capabilities gradually increased and more capital- and 
skill-intensive sectors enlarged their participation in the 
industrial structure. Graphs VI.1.A and VI.l.B present the 
rates of growth of different industrial branches in the 
sixties and seventies. In both countries the metal- 
mechanical and chemical sectors were the most dynamic in the 
sixties while more traditional industries (food, footwear, 
textiles) lost ground 2. The sixties were therefore a period 
of convergence in terms of industrial development in 
Argentina and Brazil. Convergence in the industry occurred 
despite divergent rates of economic growth.
1 'Maturation' means that the industry increased its 
productivity and ability to compete in the domestic and 
external markets through the accumulation of experience and 
through formal and informal R&D, leading to improvements and 
adaptation in imported technology. Cf. J. Katz and E. Ablin, 
'Tecnologia y Exportaciones Industriales', p. 20.
2 For the case of Argentina see B. Kosacoff, 'El Sector 
Industrial Argentino', mimeo, ECLAC - Buenos Aires, Buenos 
Aires, 1992. For the case of Brazil, cf. J. Serra, 'Ciclos 
e Mudangas Estruturais na Economia Brasileira do P6s- 
Guerra', in L.G. Beluzzo and R. Coutinho, Desenvolvimento 
Capitalista no Brasil; Ensaios Sobre a Crise. vol 1, (Sao 
Paulo, 1983), and A.B. Castro and F.P. Souza, A Economia 
Brasileira em Marcha Forcada (Rio de Janeiro, 1985).
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GRAPH VI.l.A and B: Industrial Transformation in Argentina 
and Brazil (yearly rates of growth)
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GRAPH VI.2. The Argentine and Brazilian Industries in the
Seventies
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On the other hand, the seventies were marked by 
industrial divergence between Argentina and Brazil. Graph 
VI.2 offers a synthetic view of this divergence. It can be 
seen that in Brazil the leading sectors of industry were the 
same as in the previous period. High rates of economic 
growth were achieved in the capital goods sector and in some 
intermediate sectors l. Conversely, Argentina suffered a 
process of deindustrialization in which the metal-mechanical 
sector suffered most, while some intermediate sectors 
expanded 2. The results of these divergent patterns can also 
be seen in Tables VI.8.A and VI.8.B, which indicate 
asymmetries in the industrial capabilities of the two 
countries.
1 Cf. B. Becker and C.A.G. Egler, Brazil: A New regional 
Power in the World Economy (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 92-95.
2 Cf. For the case of Argentina see B. Kosacoff, 'El 
Sector Industrial Argentino', pp. 10-17.
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TABLE VI,8.A
ARGENTINA: STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR. SELECTED 
YEARS
(in percentage of total value added)
Sector 1970 1975-77 1981-83 1988-90
Food products 20.4
Beverages 2.2
Tobacco 0.6
Textiles 9.1
Wearing apparel 2.4
Leather and fur 0.6
Footwear 0.7
Wood and cork 1.2
Furniture 0.7
Industrial chemicals 4.4
Other chemicals 7.1
Petroleum refineries 2.5
Petroleum products 0.9
Rubber products 2.3
Plastic products 1.2
Pottery and china 0.4
Glass 0.9
Other non-metallic 3.4
Iron and Steel 4.4
Non-ferrous metals 1.1
Metal products 6.4
Non electrical mach. 5.6
Electrical machinery 3.9
Transport equipment 10.7
Scientific equipment 0.6
Other manufactures n.a
13.9 15.4 14.5
2.5 3.0 3.8
1.9 2.2 0.4
8.2 7.4 7.0
4.6 2.5 1.7
1.5 1.1 1.0
1.2 0.9 0.6
1.6 1.1 0.9
2.7 2.5 2.1
3.8 5.0 5.7
4.9 5.9 6.0
12.7 16.0 17.5
0.3 0.4 0.4
1.3 1.4 1.3
1.5 1.9 1.3
0.8 0.6 0.6
0.7 0.7 0.8
2.6 2.3 3.1
3.6 4.1 5.2
0.7 1.0 1.0
5.3 5.4 5.6
7.1 4.2 2.7
3.8 3.4 3.7
8.9 7.6 6.9
0.4 0.3 0.4
0.5 0.3 0.3
SOURCE: Elaborated from UNIDO, Handbook of industrial 
statistics (New York, various numbers).
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TABLE VI,8.B
BRAZIL; STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR. SELECTED 
YEARS
(% in total value added)
Sector 1970 1975-77 1981-83 1988-90
Food products 15.8 12.7 12.5 9.7
Beverages 1.0 1.9 1.4 1.1
Tobacco 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.7
Textiles 9.9 6.9 6.2 6.5
Wearing apparel 2.1 2.6 2.9 2.8
Leather and fur 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
Footwear 1.3 1.2 1.9 2.3
Wood and cork 2.7 2.6 2.0 1.4
Furniture 2.7 1.6 1.4 1.1
Industrial chemicals 2.3 4.3 7.8 6.2
Other Chemicals 6.0 5.4 4.0 6.2
Petroleum refineries 3.5 4.2 5.7 6.1
Petroleum products 0.4 0.5 1.7 0.8
Rubber products 1.9 1.6 1.5 2.0
Plastic products 1.8 2.4 2.2 2.6
Pottery and china 1.5 0.7 0.2 0.2
Glass 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7
Others non metallic 3.8 4.8 4.0 3.5
Iron and Steel 6.3 6.0 5.6 7.5
Non ferrous metals 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.4
Metal products 4.2 5.3 4.4 4.3
Non electrical mach. 4.8 10.4 9.1 9.3
Electrical machinery 7.8 5.9 6.0 8.2
Transport equipment 8.4 7.2 7.4 6.2
Scientific equipment 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9
Other manufactures n.a. 1.5 1.5 1.0
SOURCE: Cf. Table VII.2.A.
Tables VI.8.A and VI.8.B shows that the participation 
of the capital goods sector and transport equipment in the 
total value added of the Argentine industry fell 5 
percentage points between 1973-55 and 1981-83. Conversely, 
intermediate sectors increased their participation, namely 
iron and steel, chemicals and petroleum products. In Brazil, 
the participation of capital goods and transport equipment 
in the total value added of the industry remained at about
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the same levels as in the mid-seventies (24 %) . Intermediate 
sectors increased their participation in the Brazilian 
industry, especially industrial chemicals. But the move from 
capital to intermediate goods was less pronounced in Brazil 
than Argentina. In the mid-seventies the metal-mechanical 
sector represented about 20 % of the industrial value added 
of Argentina and 24.2 % of that of Brazil. In the early 
eighties the respective figures had moved apart - 15.5 % in 
Argentina and 24 % in Brazil. This divergent trend was
reinforced in the eighties. The metal mechanical and 
electro-mechanical sectors experienced further contraction 
in Argentina, from 15.5 % to 13.7 % of the total value added 
of industry, between the early eighties and the late 
eighties, respectively. Conversely, these sectors slightly 
increased their participation in the total value added of 
Brazil's industry in the same period.
Structural change in the industry of Argentina and 
Brazil had significant implications for regional trade and 
integration. The 'maturation' of industry and the 
convergence of industrial transformation in the sixties led 
to enhanced opportunities for trade in industrial goods and 
intra-industry trade. This would encourage the interest in 
regional trade. On the other hand, structural divergence in 
the late seventies reduced the scope for intra-industry 
specialisation as Argentina lost industrial capabilities, 
especially in the metal-mechanical sector. This can be 
expected to have weakened the interest in the regional 
market. Views would diverge in the future as regards the
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costs of multilateral liberalisation and regional 
liberalisation. In order to assess the impact of structural 
change on the interest in regional trade, the composition 
and growth of trade will be considered in the next sub­
section.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL TRADE
III.l. The Growth of Trade
The first element to consider in assessing business and 
state interests in regional trade are both the total values 
of trade and the comparative rates of growth of intra- 
regional and extra-regional trade. Table VI.9 presents the 
comparative evolution of regional trade with respect to 
extra-regional trade. It can be seen that regional trade 
grew at rates higher than total trade for both Argentina and 
Brazil taking the 1960-90 period as whole. However, 
differences are visible between the two countries as regards 
the various sub-periods considered. Regional trade grew at 
higher rates than extra-regional trade in all the sub­
periods in the case of Argentina. This was true for the 
eighties too - when regional imports fell sharply as a 
result of the debt crisis - probably reflecting the boost to 
Argentine exports provided by the bilateral agreements with 
Brazil in the second half of the decade. On the other hand, 
Brazilian exports to both Latin America and Argentina were 
severely affected by the debt crisis (1982-85) and the
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recessive consequences of hyper-inflation in Argentina in 
1989 and 1990 l.
Table VI.9
BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA; YEARLY RATES OF EXPORT GROWTH 
(In percentage)
Period 1960-90 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90
Brazil total 7.8 5.5 10.7 3.2
Brazil to Latin America 9.4 11.7 14.6 -1.3
Brazil to Argentina 4.2 11.4 7.1 -6.1
Argentina total 3.3 3.2 7.5 0.2
Argentina to L. America 4.6 9.1 8.4 2.7
Argentina to Brazil 4.3 9.4 9.2 5.2
Source: Elaborated from IMF, Direction of Trade (Washington, 
various years), and IMF, International Financial Statistics 
(Washington, various years). Rates of growth calculated from 
values in constant US$ dollars of 1985.
As a result of the trends presented in Table VI.9, the 
participation of the region in total trade increased between 
1980 and 1990 in the case of Argentina (cf. Table VI.10). In 
1990 more than a quarter of Argentina's exports and more 
than a third of her imports were destined to or came from 
the regional market. In the case of Brazil, the region lost 
ground in Brazilian total trade. However, this trend changed 
in recent years and Latin America had increased her 
participation in Brazil's trade, as shown in Table VI.10.
1 In constant dollars, Brazilian exports to Argentine 
fell at an annual rate of -12.7 % between 1980-85 and 
increased at a rate of only 1.1 % between 1985-90. The 
corresponding figures for the Argentine exports to Brazil 
were -12.8 % and 18.1 %, respectively.
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TABLE VI.10
PARTICIPATION OF REGIONAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN TOTAL
(In percentage of tota!
ARGENTINA
X M
1970 20.6 22.1
1975 25.5 23.1
1980 23.0 20.2
1985 17.7 34.1
1990 25.3 33.0
1991 29.2 28.1
1992 32.9 31.2
BRAZIL
X M
1970 11.1 10.9
1975 13.8 5.7
1980 17.2 11.6
1985 8.7 11.9
1990 10.2 16.9
1991 15.6 17.4
1992 21.1 17.4
Source: LAIA, Estructura v Evolucion del Comercio Regional 
(Montevideo, 1992) and ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin 
America (Santiago, various years).
The rates of growth of extra- and intra-regional trade 
in 1960-92 suggest that economic interests in the regional 
market should have consistently increased after 1960. 
Clearly, the fact that the participation of regional trade 
in the total trade of Argentina and Brazil never exceeded 20 
% indicates that priorities remained in the markets of 
central countries. But the dynamism of regional trade until 
the late seventies cannot be overlooked when the bases for 
cooperation are considered. Moreover, such a conclusion is
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strengthened when due consideration is given to the 
composition of trade. This reveals more clearly the impact 
of structural change in redefining interests in regional 
trade.
III. 2. The Composition of Regional Trade
If the region played a relatively minor role as a 
destination of total exports, it was the principal market 
for exports of certain industrial goods for most of the 
1960-90 period. Given the emphases that Latin American 
governments placed on the industrialisation process, this 
means that the region attracted a larger interest than what 
total trade values suggest. Table VI.11 shows the region 
played a central role as a market for manufactured exports 
from Argentina and Brazil. The importance of the region fell 
in the case of Brazil by the end of the period, but it was 
still responsible for about 20 % of Brazil's exports of 
manufactures in the late eighties. Argentina remained 
heavily dependent on the regional market for these exports 
throughout 1960-90. The regions absorbed more than 40 % of 
Argentine manufactures in the late eighties.
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TABLE VI.11
REGIONAL TRADE IN MANUFACTURED GOODS. SELECTED YEARS 
(As percentage of total manufactured exports)
Year Argentina Brazil
1965 49.1 59.5
1970 50.0 41.6
1975 52.2 38.4
1980 45.7 35.0
1986 40.8 20.2
1990 44.6 18.8
Source: Elaborated from Inter-American Development Bank,
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (Washington, 
1985) ; LAI A, Estructura v Evolucion del Comercio Recrionai 
(Montevideo, 1992).
The importance of the region is further enhanced by the 
type of manufactures that made up intra-regional trade. The 
region continued to represent the principal market for more 
complex industrial goods. Table VI.12 shows that Latin 
America represented the principal market for Brazil's 
chemical and metal-mechanical exports in 1988-90. And so it 
did for Argentina. Moreover, about 17 % of Argentine capital 
goods and transport equipment imports came from the region 
in 1988-90.
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TABLE VI.12
COMPOSITION OF MANUFACTURED REGIONAL EXPORTS
(Mean 1989-90, in millions of US$ dollars and as percentage
of total exports in each category)
ARGENTINA
Exports LAIA Global %
Chemicals 325 716 45.4
Machinery and 
transport equipment 
Total manufactures
408
1164
669
2647
61.0
44.0
Imports LAIA Global %
Chemicals 294 1112 26.4
Machinery and 
transport equipment 
Total manufactures
226
638
1344
2921
16.8
21.8
BRAZIL
Exports LAIA Global %
Chemicals 478 1903 25.1
Machinery and
transport equipment 1290 6364 20.2
Total manufactures 2376 13377 17.8
Imports LAIA Global %
Chemicals 392 3226 12.2
Machinery and
transport equipment 230 5818 4.0
Total manufactures 1147 11411 10.1
Source: Cf. Table VI.
1
•oH
The fact that the region absorbed a higher proportion 
of exports from sectors which are usually considered to be 
more dynamic in terms of the generation of external 
economies and the use of skilled labour has significant 
implications for regional cooperation. Governments give more
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attention to the development and promotion of exports from 
this kind of industries. In addition, it can be expected 
that trade preferences would be more necessary (and hence 
more demanded) by exporters from sectors which are less 
dependent on natural resources and low salaries, and more 
dependent on technology. These conditions were present in 
the leading sectors of the ISI-2, which originated an 
increasing flow of industrial exports in the sixties.
Table VI.13 offers more evidence of this by comparing 
the Argentine and Brazilian composition of trade with the 
region in 1970 and 1987. The participation of manufactured 
goods in total regional exports increased between 1970 and 
1987. The fall in the participation of food (from 63 % to 36 
%) and the increase in the participation of manufactures 
(from 35 % to 52 %) in the Argentine trade with the region 
in this period was impressive. Not less remarkable was the 
change in the structure of Brazil's exports, in which the 
participation of manufactures increased from 33 % to 62 %. 
The chemical and metal-mechanical industries in particular 
expanded their role in regional trade *.
1 In addition to exports of manufactures, Argentina and 
Brazil began to export technology, engineering and 
construction services, which are also skill- and technology­
intensive. Cf. S. Teitel and F.C. Sercovich, 'Exportacidn de 
Tecnologia Latinoamericana', El Trimestre Econdmico. vol LI, 
no. 204 (1984) , pp. 811-41, and C. Dahlman and F.C.
Sercovich, 'Exports of Technology From Semi-Industrial 
Economies and Local Technological Development', Journal of 
Development of Economics, vol. 16, no. 1 and 2 (1984), pp. 
63-99.
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TABLE VI.13
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF TRADE FLOWS AMONG SELECTED LATIN 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES
(In percentage of total regional trade)
ARGENTINA EXPORTS IMPORTS
1970 1987 1970 1987
Food 63.3 36.3 20.6 11.8
Agricultural and 
raw materials 2.8 25.6 6.9
Fuel 1.5 2.5 9.0 20.1
Mineral and metals — 5.9 25.3 19.6
Manuf actures 35. 3 52.5 19.5 41.58
Chemicals 8.9 14.1 2.7 16.3
Machinery and 
transport equipment 16.1 18.2 9.9 16.9
Other manufactures 10.4 20.2 6.9 8.4
Total 100 100 100 100
BRAZIL EXPORTS IMPORTS
1970 1987 1970 1987
Food 26.0 12.5 46.5 25.8
Agricultural and 
raw materials 18.9 2.7 1.4 3.8
Fuel 0.7 3.6 19.5 13.7
Mineral and metals 21.1 18.3 12.9 25.4
Manufactures 33.3 62.8 19.7 31.4
Chemicals 3.0 13.8 5.4 11.8
Machinery and 
transport equipment 21.6 35.4 6.6 7.1
Other manufactures 8.7 13.5 7.7 12.5
Total 100 100 100 100
Source; R, Baumann, 'Economic Blocs and Intra-Industry 
Trade', unpublish. paper, ECLA, Santiago, 1990, pp. 52-3.
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It can be expected that this pattern of trade enhanced 
the interest of the private and public sectors in the 
regional market. The literature has observed and duly 
emphasised that regional trade was more intensive in skills 
and technology than extra-regional trade l. But the 
implications of this for the political economy of regional 
integration has not been correspondingly underlined. The 
focus on the resistance to liberalisation in LAFTA 
negotiations has somewhat obscured less visible but still 
relevant indications that industrial interests and 
'developmentalist' objectives on industrial exports were 
served by an opening of the regional market - albeit partial 
and controlled.
These benefits were not overlooked by policy-makers, at 
least until the late seventies. LAFTA had succeeded in 
recovering trade from the crisis of the late fifties 2. By 
mid-1967, when the failure of LAFTA to achieve its 
objectives was already clear, the Institute of Latin 
American Integration (INTAL) recalled the 'hidden benefits' 
(beneficios ocultos) that integration had produced: 'the
1 J. Tavares de Araujo Jr., 'Mudanga Tecnologica e 
Competitividade das Exportagdes Brasileiras', Texto Para 
Discussao N. 8. Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro, Rio 
de Janeiro, 1982.
2 In a late recollection, R. Alemann, former Economic 
Minister of Frondizi, observed that the 'emergence of LAFTA 
(was) a suitable instrument for encouraging Argentine 
industrial exports (...) About half of Argentina's 
industrial exports went to LAFTA countries for many years - 
our critics are not justified in alleging that the policies 
begun in 1958 had an anti-export bias'. Cf. 'Roberto T. 
Alemann', in G. Di Telia and C. Rodriguez Braun, Argentina. 
1946-83: The Economic Ministers Speak, p. 67.
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products exchanged (within Latin America) present a much 
higher value added and incorporate more qualified workforce 
and entrepreneurial abilities' than extra-regional trade *. 
This was in turn consistent with the measures taken to 
foster 'non-traditional' exports since the early sixties 2. 
Some Latin American observers also saw in the rise of the 
new protectionism in the seventies an evidence of the wisdom 
of the integration initiatives 3. However, after the failed 
effort of E. Frei in 1967 to revive integration, LAFTA was 
increasingly losing' political importance 4. This lack of
1 Cf. 'Editorial: Integracion y Cooperacidn 
Latinoamericana, Los Beneficios Ocultos', Intearacidn 
Latinoamericana. vol.l, no. 6 (September 1976), pp. 1-3. In 
addition, INTAL emphasised the steps that had been taken to 
create regional enterprises and promote technological 
cooperation (ibidem., p. 3).
2 Cf. R. Mallon an J. Sourrouille, Economic Policy- 
Making in a Conflictive Society, pp. 79-82. These authors 
also present regressions showing a significant association 
between LAFTA and the expansion of manufactured exports in 
the sixties.
3 Cf. 'Editorial: El Nuevo Protecionismo y la 
Integracion', Integracion Latinoamericana. vol. 4, no. 35 
(1979), p. 1-2. The editorialist pointed out 'that it is 
evident that the dynamism of Latin American exports tends to 
fall. In this circumstances the idea of integration as a 
means for Latin American development gains special 
significance' (author's translation; cf. ibid., p. 1). The 
rapid growth of intra-regional trade in the seventies 
reinforced this perception. Cf. 'Editorial: Revalorizacion 
del Mercado Latinoamericano', Integracion Latinoamericana. 
vol.4, no. 37 (1979), pp. 1-2, in which it is stated that 
'the international economic context, characterized by 
recession and the new protectionism in the developed 
countries, in combination with the size and potential for 
future growth of the Latin American markets, suggest that 
the regional market should be re-valorised' (author's 
translation).
4 Cf. A. Casas Gonzales, 'Reflexiones Sobre el Futuro 
de la ALALC', Integracion Latinoamericana. vol. 4, no. 40 
(1979), pp. 7-34, who speaks of the 'distant attitude of
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governmental support - already visible in the early years of 
LAFTA 1 - would become more evident as the international 
economy expanded 2 and regional rivalry increased in the 
sixties.
Concurrently, private firms took an active part in 
shaping negotiations and in setting the (slow) pace of 
integration that would prevail, in accordance with their 
interest in a cartelized market. This pattern was reinforced 
by the governments indifference, which facilitated the 
'capture' of LAFTA by the private sector. The advance of 
liberalisation would thus become a function of the interest 
of private firms in exchange concessions. The fact that 
negotiations were conducted on a product-by-product basis 
facilitated the control of the process of liberalisation by 
vested interests 3. A study conducted by J. Campos in 1973 4,
governments', which had been unable to 'generate, for 
instance, a special meeting of presidents or common actions 
by the Foreign Ministers' with a view to supporting LAFTA. 
This occurred 'despite the explicit decision, taken in 1975, 
of gathering the Council of Foreign Ministers at least once 
a year' (ibid., p. 15).
1 Cf. section IV.
2 INTAL observed that 'it was paradoxical that the idea 
of Latin American integration emerged in the sixties, when 
it was less necessary than now because the industrialised 
countries were then in a process of expansion' and had 
'managed to reduce tariffs in the Kennedy Round' (author's 
translation). Cf. 'Editorial: El Nuevo protecionismo y la 
Integracidn', Integracion Latinoamericana. vol. 4, no. 35 
(1979), pp. 1-2. In fact, the idea emerged in the late 
fifties, and not in the sixties, out of the conflict between 
accelerated industrialisation and the post-war international 
economic order. It began to work, however, in the early 
sixties, when the international economy rapidly expanded.
3 Cf. G. Salgado, 'The Latin American Regional Market: 
The Project and the Reality', Cenal Review (April 1979),
especially p. 99. See also ibid., pp. 110-122, for a general
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based on the participation of entrepreneurs at the sectoral 
meetings of LAFTA, observed the active role they played in 
the definition of concessions, especially in the oligopoly 
'new' sectors. The chemical, electro-mechanical and metal- 
mechanical industries provided most of the representatives 
to the sectoral meetings, while traditional sectors had a 
very small representation l. In turn, the demand for 
concessions was higher in the new 2 than in the traditional 
sectors 3. Finally, most of the firms represented at the
discussion of the barriers faced by LAFTA in the late 
seventies.
4 Cf. J. Campos, 'La Participacion Empresarial en el 
Proceso de Integracion: Las Reuniones Sectoriales', Revista 
de la Integracion. vol. VII, no. 16 (May 1974), pp. 147-88. 
Similar conclusions were obtained by C.V. Vaitsos, Crisis en 
la Cooperacion Regional: La Integracion Entre Paises
Subdesarrollados (Mexico, 1978), especially pp. 42-49.
1 The chemical industry contributed with 27.4 % of the 
representatives, the metal-mechanical and electric- 
mechanical industries with 20.7 % and the textile industry 
with 2,5 %. Cf. J. Campos, 'La Participacion Empresarial en 
el Proceso de Integracion: Las Reuniones Sectoriales', p. 
158. As can be expected, the more industrialised countries 
in the region (Argentina, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, 
Mexico) were those with more representatives in the 
meetings. These countries represented 61 % of total
regional trade in 1973 and provided 64 % of the
representatives. Cf. ibid., p. 151.
2 Chemicals, metal-mechanical and electro-mechanical 
industries responded for 85 % of the total concessions 
requested. Cf. ibidem., p. 167.
3 The higher demand for trade preferences in metal- 
mechanical and chemical goods probably reflected the rapid 
growth of these industries in the sixties (which cushioned 
the impact of competition) and the existence of more 
opportunities for intra-industry trade (which reduced 
resistances to liberalisation), as will be shown below. In 
the opposite pole were sectors like textiles and autos, 
which firmly resisted liberalisation and in which the 
concession of preferences was very reduced. Cf. E. 
Baldinelli, 'Las Negociaciones en la Mira Argentina', p. 18. 
In the case of textiles, the industrial organisation of the
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sectoral meetings were multinational enterprises which had 
subsidiaries in more than one LAFTA country l.
In sum, the region provided an outlet for exports by 
the new sectors of the ISI-2. If some policy-makers realised 
the qualitative importance of the regional market, political 
commitment with LAFTA steadily eroded from the late sixties. 
The private sector, in turn, negotiated a selective opening 
which (within the limits of its aim of protecting the
sector - made up by a large number of producers and low 
entry barriers - prevented an agreement among producers, who 
feared that competition could drive many firms out of the 
market. In the case of autos, the most likely reason for the 
persistence of high barriers lies on the powerful lobby of 
subsidiaries of multinational firms, which benefited from 
protection in closed markets.
1 Cf. J. Campos, 'La Participacidn Empresarial en el 
Proceso de Integracidn: Las Reuniones Sectoriales', pp. 178- 
7 9. In a study conducted in the early seventies on the 
attitude of the Argentine elite with respect to economic 
integration, it was observed that 63 % of the union leaders, 
50 % of senior bureaucrats, 36 % of the entrepreneurs, 33 % 
of politicians and 14 % of high rank militaries were in 
favour of integration as against those who believed that 
conditions for integration were not adequate and/or opposed 
regional cooperation. Cf. E.R. Catterberg, 'Actitudes de las 
Elites Argentinas Hacia la Creacidn y Desarrollo de un 
Mercado Latinoamericano', Revista de Intearacidn. vol. VII, 
no. 17 (September 1974), pp. 105-121. The opinion of union 
leaders may have been biased by the Peronist traditional 
support to Latin American integration, and it may not 
reflect actual support to the idea. The small proportion of 
the military in favour of integration was indicative of the 
significance that rivalry with Brazil had acquired in the 
sixties and seventies. It suggests that the higher the 
influence of the military in politics the lesser would be 
the interest in cooperation. Finally, the reduced proportion 
of entrepreneurs in favour of integration seems to 
contradict the evidence provided by Campos and Vaitsos of an 
active participation of firms (especially multinational 
firms) in LAFTA. The contradiction is only apparent as far
(i) the participants to the sectoral meetings did not 
necessarily supported a free trade area, but managed trade;
(ii) support to a (limited) regional market was concentrated 
in a group of modern, capital-intensive sectors whose 
representation in the sample of 'elite entrepreneurs' is not 
discriminated in the study.
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internal market and cartelizing the regional market) 
facilitated some specialisation and an increase in trade .
III.3. The Growing Significance of Intra-Industrv Trade
It was suggested in chapter I that intra-industry trade 
implied (relatively) lesser costs of adjustment to 
competition and therefore was more conducive for cooperation 
in trade matters. Higher levels of intra-industry trade 
within the region can then be expected to be associated with 
more regional cooperation. Table VI.14 and VI.15 presents 
the existing evidence for different periods, as calculated 
by Bela Balassa (World Bank) in the mid-seventies and by 
Renato Baumann (ECLA) in the eighties *.
1 Cf. B. Balassa, 'Intra-Industry Trade and the 
Integration of the Developing Countries in the World 
Economy', in H. Giersch (ed.), On the Economics of Intra- 
Industrv Trade: Symposium 1978 (Tubingen, 1979), pp. 245- 
270, and R. Baumann, 'Una Evaluacidn del Comercio Intra- 
Industrial en la Region', Cenal Review, no. 48 (December 
1992) , pp. 87-99.
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TABLE VI.14.
MEASURES OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE FOR TRADE IN MANUFACTURED 
GOODS. 1975
World DC LAFTA LDC
Argentina 0.675 0.874 0.573 0.908
Brazil 0.689 0.828 0.597 0.796
DC = Developed Countries
LDC = Less Developed Countries (except LAFTA)
Index of Intra-Industry Trade defined as the adjusted 
weighted index:
IIT = E |Xei - MeiI / E(Xei + Mei), where 
Xei = Xi [ 1/2 E(Xi + Mi) / EXi ] and 
Mei = Mi [1/2 E(Xi + Mi) / EMi ]
Source: B. Balassa, 'Intra-Industry Trade', p. 250.
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TABLE VI.15.
PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH IIT > 0.5 IN INDUSTRIAL AND TOTAL
TRADE, SELECTED YEARS 
(In percentage)
Countries
.a/
Industrial products Total trade
1980 1988 1980 1988
ARGENTINA
with North America 20.5 12.6 17.8 7.7
with Western Europe 1.9 4.9 1.3 2.1
with Latin America 20.2 23.2 15.2 14.0
BRAZIL
with North America 30.2 22.3 20.0 15.6
with Western Europe 12.0 2.6 8.2 1.6
with Latin America 16.8 31.3 11.2 14.7
a/ Intra-Industry Trade Index, defined as:
IIT = ££E[(Xijk + Mijk) - |Xijk- Mijk |] / EEE(Xijk + Mijk) , 
where Xijk represents exports of the product i by the 
country j to the country k and Mijk are imports of the 
product i by country j from country k.
Source: R. Baumann, 'Una Evaluacidn del Comercio Intra- 
Industrial', p. 90.
The results of Balassa (Table VI.14) tend to confirm 
the existence of higher levels of intra-industry trade in 
the exchange of Argentina and Brazil with LAFTA than with 
the rest of the world 1. It also confirms that intra-industry 
trade was more intense within the region as compared with 
trade with developed countries. This can be deemed to 
support the argument that there was a stronger stimulus for
1 The reader should observe that the construction of 
Balassa's intra-industry trade index implies that a lower 
value of the index represents higher intra-industry trade. 
Conversely, the index used by Baumann increases with the 
increase in intra-industry trade.
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regional liberalisation than that for multilateral 
liberalisation. Moreover, Balassa argues that complementary 
agreements had an effect on the levels of intra-industry 
trade l. Intra-industry trade was higher in industries and 
countries which had celebrated complementary agreements. 
This conclusion reinforces the hypotheses that - within its 
limits - LAFTA was instrumental for the expansion of 
regional trade.
The results of Renato Baumann for the 1980s (table 
VI.15) are less clear cut. Baumann calculated the percentage 
of the Argentina and Brazilian trade which exceeded a 
certain value of intra-industry trade in 1980 and 1988. He 
found that the trade of Argentina and Brazil with the USA 
had a percentage of intra-industry trade which was higher 
than or similar as that between Argentina and Brazil and 
Latin America. Moreover, the intra-industry trade of 
Argentina and Brazil with the USA subsequently decreased. 
This result is less consistent with the literature than 
those reported by Balassa. Intra-industry trade is expected 
to increase with the degree of development, the similarity 
of the industrial structures and the existence of 
integration agreements. The higher values of intra-industry 
trade between Brazil and the USA challenge this view. An 
explanation for the figures of 1980 might be found in the 
strict controls on imports applied by the Brazilian Foreign 
Trade Office (Carteira de Comercio Exterior. Portuguese
1 Cf. B. Balassa,'Intra-Industry Trade and the 
Integration of the Developing Countries in the World 
Economy', pp. 251-53.
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acronym CACEX). It is likely that as far as protection was 
directed towards goods which could be produced domestically, 
only imports from centre countries found their way through 
CACEX restrictions (see more on this above). As regards the 
data for 1988, it may be argued that industrial 
restructuring and the fall of investment in the early 
eighties led to losses in the capabilities required for 
intra-industry specialisation in trade with the USA. On the 
other hand, intra-industry trade of Argentina and Brazil 
with Latin America continued to expand. This may be 
explained by the 1986 bilateral agreements between Argentina 
and Brazil which facilitated specialisation, especially in 
the capital goods sector.
In any case, the recover of intra-industry trade 
between Argentina and Brazil with Latin America in the late 
eighties implied that regional trade may have represented a 
less costly avenue for trade liberalisation and encouraged 
integration. This conclusion is confirmed by the evidence 
offered by a study of the Inter-American Development Bank on 
the evolution of intra-regional trade in manufactures 
between 1970 and 1990 !. This study shows that, in the case 
of Argentina, the IIT (unweighted average) for intra- 
regional trade in manufactures increased from 23.3 % (1970) 
to 52.1 % (1990). In the case of Brazil these figures were 
20.1 % and 48.9 %, respectively. The increase was still more 
impressive in the case of intra-regional trade in
1 Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social 
Progress in Latin America: 1992 Report (Washington, 1992), 
especially pp. 207-212.
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manufactures which are human capital (or technology)- 
intensive. The IIT for this sector increased from 25.2 % 
(1970) to 58.2 % (1990) in Argentina, and from 19.6 % (1970) 
to 51.6 % (1990) in Brazil.
III.4. Conclusions
1. This section has reviewed the structural conditions 
shaping the interests in regional cooperation in the 1969-90 
period. The account is still partial *, but some broad 
conclusions can nevertheless be drawn. If governments do not 
give up unilateral policies when positive results can be 
obtained with no sacrifice in sovereignty, then the 
international conditions discouraged the move towards 
economic integration in 1960-80. However, the trade position 
of Latin America was weak even in this favourable period and 
this was reflected in the growth of external debt in the 
seventies and the painful adjustment that followed in the 
eighties. The subsequent period was characterized by severe 
external constraints on growth and policy-making, associated 
with the debt crisis. The gains to be obtained from 
cooperation in these conditions increased and so did the 
readiness to cooperate in order to foster trade.
2. Industrial transformation from 1960 contributed to 
diversify trade towards industrial goods and encourage
1 As mentioned, central problems related to the change 
in the international trade regime will be reviewed in the 
next chapter, along with a more detailed discussion of the 
emergence of the MERCOSUR.
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intra-industry trade and regional foreign direct investment. 
This strengthened the interests in regional trade and in 
more open regional markets. However, the accumulation of 
industrial capabilities did not proceed smoothly. Divergent 
patterns of structural change developed in Argentina and 
Brazil in the seventies. There is no evidence so far that 
structural divergence have reduced the progress of 
diversification of regional trade and the importance of the 
region for certain industrial goods. The data suggests that 
in fact intra-industry trade increased in the seventies and 
eighties. But the assessment of costs and benefits of 
regional and multilateral liberalisation by regional actors 
can be affected by this trend. This will be discussed more 
attentively in the chapter VIII.
The literature most frequently emphasises the 
resistance of business interests in opening the market and 
the unwillingness of governments to share sovereignty. This 
assessment is correct as it accounts for the dismal 
inability of LAFTA to reach its objectives - the formation 
of a free trade area. However, the analysis of the trends in 
trade and structural change suggests that public and private 
actors benefited from the expansion of regional trade and 
that the role of LAFTA was not irrelevant.
4. The next section concerns itself with the evolution 
of regional cooperation policies from 1960. Different phases 
will be identified and related to the process of structural 
change presented in this section. In doing so, it aims at 
conveying a long term view on the determinants of the
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intensity of trade in the region and that of cooperation and 
integration.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION. 1960-90
IV.1. LAFTA and the Evolution of Trade Preferences
It was observed that in the period of consolidation of 
LAFTA conflicting signals came from the international 
economy and from industrial transformation. Gains from trade 
and the 'maturation' of ISI-2 provided an incentive for 
cooperation and integration. Conversely, the strong stimulus 
towards convergence in foreign policy of the late fifties 
receded and Argentina and Brazil gave priority again to 
promote national ISI. No long term commitment for a free 
trade area existed and the views on LAFTA were strictly 
'commercialist' l. The result was that strong elements of 
continuity remained between the regime of restrained 
bilateralism and the LAFTA regime.
The danger was early realised by ECLA. Prebisch 
hastened to warn against the sluggish progress of 
liberalisation in September 1962: 'the Free Trade Zone is
not developing as we would wish, but at a dangerously slow 
and cautious pace. LAFTA activities could be reduced to just
1 Cf. R. Barbosa, America Latina em Persoectiva: A
Integracao Regional, da Retorica a Realidade (Sao Paulo, 
1991a), pp. 35-45.
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a series of weak and timorous preferential agreements' *. 
Progress was relatively easy in the first three Conferences 
of the Contracting Parties as they comprised concessions for 
primary goods which in fact already existed under the old 
bilateral regime 2. In addition, concessions were offered for 
those industrial goods whose production was insignificant in 
the region - and hence no opposition existed from local 
producers. However, when liberalisation had to be extended 
to products which could affect domestic production 
agreements became more difficult 3. Thus, the process by 
which trade would be liberalised by including 'substantially 
all trade' in the common list in four triennial stages 
stopped in the second stage because of the lack of consensus
4
1 Cf. F0371 162021 A1123/26, Mexico City, 13 September
1962.
2 F0371 155769 A1123/18, Montevideo, 13 June 1961.
3 The unwillingness to liberalise regional trade was 
made it crystal clear at the moment of the negotiation of 
the Common List, aimed at freeing 25 % of regional trade. 
The importance of the Common List stemmed from the fact that 
concessions could not be revoked, as was the case of those 
granted in the National Lists. The result was a protracted 
negotiation in which the basic course of action was to water 
down commitments. Cf. E.B. Haas and P. C. Schmitter, The 
Politics of Economics in Latin American Regionalism: The 
Latin American Free Trade Association After Four years of 
Operation (Denver, 1965), pp. 18-22, on this point. The 
negotiations for composing the Common List dragged 
throughout 1964 and only in December an agreement was 
reached which reflected the 'most minimal of minimum common 
denominators' (cf. ibidem., p. 22).
4 Cf. ECLA, 'ALALC: El Programa de Liberacion Comercial 
y su Relacion con la Estructura y las Tendencias del 
Comercio Zonal', Inteqracion Latinoamericana. vol. 4, no. 40 
(1979), pp. 54-56.
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This trend can be seen in table VI.16, which shows the 
cumulative evolution of the number of preferences granted by 
LAFTA members between 1963 and 1979 in the National Lists. 
It can be seen that these concessions increased at a fast 
rate until 1966, then grew at a slower rate until 1969 (the 
data for 1968 is in fact inflated by the incorporation of 
Bolivia and Venezuela) and stagnated thereafter. The 
concessions granted by Argentina and Brazil followed the 
same pattern as the total concessions of LAFTA.
TABLE VI.16.
LAFTA: CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF CONCESSIONS GRANTED. 1962-79
Year Total Argentina Brazil
1962 4268 699 910
1963 7601 1077 1250
1964 8248 1280 1312
1965 8474 1363 1352
1966 9054 1537 1511
1967 9393 1621 1603
1968 10382 1717 1710
1969 10869 1839 1802
1970 11017 1867 1842
1971 11042 1869 1851
1972 11079 1871 1859
1973 11110 1879 1865
1974 11157 1879 1877
1975 11165 1883 1878
1976 11164 1881 1874
1977 11174 1882 1876
1978 11238 1881 1880
1979 11242 1885 1881
Source: Elaborated from Instituto de Integracion
Latinoamericana (INTAL) Integracion Latino-Americana (Buenos 
Aires, October 1979).
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The evolution of trade preferences confirms this 
picture. Table VI.17 shows the tariff margins of preferences 
granted, weighted by the effective amount of exports and 
imports under LAFTA's preferential schemes *.
TABLE VI.17
LAFTA: TARIFF PREFERENCES. 1963-70
(In percentage) 
LAFTA Argentina Brazil
1963 19.6 9.2 36.2
1966 21.7 59.3 35.5
1968 27.3 39.6 28.8
1969 27.8 34.7 13.5
1970 11.2 10.7 8.7
Source: INTAL, Ancilisis de los Maraenes de Preferencia v el 
Comercio Intra-Zonal en el Marco de la ALALC (Buenos Aires, 
1974), p. 72.
The stagnation in trade liberalisation that occurred in 
the late sixties is evident. The margins of preference 
conceded to the region in fact fell in 1970. Moreover, this 
fall was especially strong in the case of Argentina and 
Brazil, whose preferences were below the LAFTA average in 
1970 2.
This trend should not lead to the conclusion that the 
progress achieved - even if far from satisfactory in the 
light of the original LAFTA programme - was innocuous. It
1 It includes the goods that form part of the National 
Lists and also those that comprise the Special Lists which 
only benefits the least developed countries in the region.
2 This picture conforms to the results obtained by 
Campos, who shows that the number of sectoral meetings 
increased steadily until 1969 and then stagnated. Cf. J. 
Campos, 'La Participacion Empresarial en el Proceso de 
Integracidn', pp. 150-51.
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was already mentioned that the chemical, metal-mechanical 
and electro-mechanical industries were privileged and 
oligopoly arrangements for specialisation achieved in the 
sectoral meetings. These sectors received more than 50 % of 
the total concessions granted in the first four Conferences 
of the Contracting Parties and more than 70 % of those 
granted in the 1965 Conference !. This had a significant 
influence on regional trade. A study conducted by the 
Institute of Latin American Integration (Spanish acronym 
INTAL) in the early eighties provides evidence for this 2. In 
the study, intra-regional trade in different sectors was 
regressed on the tariff margins of preference provided by 
LAFTA. Two main conclusions emerged from the study, namely 
that (i) the margin of preferences had a positive effect on 
trade and that (ii) this effect was especially significant 
in the case of the metal-mechanical and chemical industries 
3. Conversely, significant regressions coefficients were less 
frequent in sectors like vegetables and in the food 
industry.
This was reinforced by the complementary agreements, 
which were almost exclusively confined to the chemical,
1 Cf. Comercio Exterior, vol. XVI, no. 4, April 1966, 
pp. 232-34.
2 Cf. INTAL 'El Margen de Preferencia Arancelario y sus 
Efectos en el Comercio Intra-ALALC', Intearacidn 
Latinoamericana, vol. 5, no. 49 (1980), pp. 5-12.
3 Cf. ibid., p. 8.
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electro-mechanical and metal-mechanical sectors *. Table 
VI. 18 shows the participation of complementary agreements in 
total negotiated trade, which experienced an increase after
1963.
TABLE VI.18.
LAFTA: DISTRIBUTION OF LAFTA CONCESSIONS
(According to the programme of liberalisation, in percentage 
and millions of US$ current dollars)
NL (%) a/ SL (%)b/ C.A.(%)c/ Total i
1962 96.7 3.3 X X 315.8
1963 96.1 3.8 --- 429.6
1964 95.3 4.6 0.1 571.4
1965 94.7 5.0 0.3 677.8
1966 94.5 4.9 0.6 697.4
1967 94.1 4.9 1.0 672.2
1968 93.3 4.1 2.6 741.4
1969 93 4.3 2.7 894.4
1970 90.3 5.3 4.4 933.6
1971 89.7 5.6 4.7 950.8
1972 89.5 5.2 5.3 992.3
1973 89.5 5.4 5.1 1254.7
1974 88.2 6.1 5.7 1917.3
1975 88.4 6.8 4.8 1846.2
1976 88.2 4.5 7.2 2163.4
1977 88.2 5.2 6.6 2487.5
a/NL = National Lists b/ AL = Special Lists; c/ 
Complementary Agreements; d/ Total negotiated trade in 
current US$ millions (cif).
Source: Elaborated from INTAL, Integracidn Latino-Americana 
(Buenos Aires, various years).
In sum, trends in negotiated trade and the conclusions 
of the INTAL study support the hypotheses that LAFTA 
effectively offered advantages for regional producers and
1 During the LAFTA period 25 complementary agreements 
were signed, which covered a total of 2134 products of the 
NALAC classification.
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played a role in facilitating trade in industrial goods. The 
achievement was modest if compared with LAFTA ambitious 
objectives, but it was nevertheless a significant one, 
especially considering that LAFTA countries had almost no 
previous experience in trade negotiations for industrial 
goods l. In due course, new evidence in favour of this 
hypotheses will be presented, in the context of the 
discussion of the determinants of regional trade.
IV.2. The Regional Payments System
A second significant contribution of the period to 
regional trade was the reciprocal payments agreements signed 
in 1965 by the central banks of the LAFTA countries, of 
which also participated Santo Domingo. The Mexico Agreement 
provided a system of compensation for regional trade through 
a net of bilateral payments agreements. In addition, the 
'Santo Domingo Agreement' provided reciprocal credits to
1 It was mentioned that in the Southern Cone countries 
some negotiation experience had been accumulated in the past 
and this was useful for advancing cooperation. However, the 
experience was by large confined to primary products. Much 
less experience existed as regards the negotiation of 
industrial liberalisation. This had a significant practical 
implication for LAFTA. Governments had to rely too heavily 
on information provided by the private sector. The lack of 
governmental capabilities in this field was not conducive to 
trade liberalisation. This was aggravated by the decision of 
giving more room to direct private sector negotiations, in 
the shape of sectoral meetings. Cf. on this point E. 
Baldinelli, 'Las Negociaciones en La Mira Argentina', pp. 
17-18; Jose Melero, former Argentine representative at LAFTA 
and GATT, interview. Montevideo, 25 July 1993.
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finance net positions in intra-regional trade *. This 
represented in practice the creation of a regional payments 
system. The success of this system was impressive. Table
VI. 19 shows that the effective use of dollars in regional 
trade was strongly reduced as a result of intra-regional 
compensations, and dollar transfers were always lower than 
one third of the total value of trade. In addition, the 
percentage of compensated trade increased from 13.6 % in 
1966 to 41,4 % in 1970 and 79 % in 1981 2.
TABLE VI.19. LAFTA; THE OPERATION OF THE REGIONAL PAYMENTS 
AGREEMENT. 1966-75
(in thousands of US$ current dollars and in percentage)
Year Total a/ Transf*
1966 106.4 30
1967 332.7 28
1968 376.5 33
1969 479.2 17
1970 560.5 20
1971 708.1 19
1972 984.4 19
1973 1403.1 20
1974 2288.3 17
1975 3396.3 26
1979 6420.7 25
1980 8663.1 23
1981 9331.4 27
1982 6553.0 29
a/ Total of credits and debits at the end of the period of 
compensation in thousands of current US$ dollars, 
b/ Percentage of dollars effectively transferred (the 
difference between 100 and the percentage of transfer 
represents the saving of dollars in this year).
Source: Elaborated from LAFTA, Slntesis (Montevideo,
January-February 1976).
1 Cf. IDB, Desarrollo Economico e Social (Buenos Aires, 
1985), p. 60.
2 Ibidem., p. 61.
347
It is somewhat ironical that the initiative for a 
regional payments system, resisted in 1960, was at the end 
of the day more successful than the (supposedly) consensual 
move towards a regional free trade area. This can be seen as 
an indication that the convertibility question in latin 
America had not been entirely resolved in the fifties and 
continued to haunt the region after 1960. This was another 
factor underlining the continuity of the cooperation effort 
in the sixties and seventies.
K^I.3. LAFTA and the Limits to Cooperation
(a) The Weakening of LAFTA
The lack of political will of the national governments 
to accept closer cooperation was expressed in their 
resistance to transfer decision powers to LAFTA. In neo­
functionalist terms, the degree of 'politization' and the 
transfer of loyalties to supra-national authorities remained 
at very low levels *. Cooperation continued to be restrained 
(even if then on a more diversified industrial and 
geographical bases). The tendency towards limiting the 
process of cooperation was already visible in late 1962. 
Romulo de Almeida, then President of Executive Secretariat 
of LAFTA, explained the reasons that led him not to seek re- 
election:
1 E.B. Haas and P. C. Schmitter, The Politics of 
Economics in Latin American Regionalism, p. 18.
'I have no hope that the current structure of LAFTA and the 
policy of most countries towards it could permit changes in 
the role of the presidency before the election of 1964, and 
I do not want to be reelected. I intend to endeavour in this 
period to strengthen the role of the Secretariat, which I am 
persuaded is highly necessary if any international 
organisation is to work properly' l.
Another Brazilian diplomat at LAFTA, Evandro Lins e Silva, 
observed that
'the characteristics of the representations (before the 
Permanent Executive Committee in Montevideo) do not permit 
any decision, even those most irrelevant, to be taken 
without previous consultation with the respective 
governments. Given the terrible precariousness of 
governmental support for the representatives, the result is 
that the regime of consultations have become an overwhelming 
obstacle for the activities of LAFTA. (•••) We have to react 
promptly. Otherwise the Contracting Parties will be 
contented with these small, transitory advantages that do 
not correspond to the ambitious programme proposed in the 
Montevideo Treaty' 2.
1 Cf. the letter from Romulo de Almeida to Foreign 
Minister Affonso Arinos, CDO, 'Diversos no Exterior, 1962- 
63', 800(20), no. 1302, 23 November 1962 (author's
translation).
2 Cf. CDO, 'Situagao do Comite Executivo Permanente', 
Confidential 96, 800(20), no. 1175, 15 August 1963 (author's 
translation) . The description provided by Lins e Siva of the 
proceedings of the Committee in 1963 is illustrative enough.
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High-level initiatives were launched in order to rescue 
LAFTA. In 1965 President Frei demanded critical political 
decisions and the formation of a panel of experts to propose 
solutions for LAFTA *. However, the unwillingness to 
negotiate prevailed, especially as a result of the 
opposition of Argentina and Brazil 2. The creation in 1969 of 
the Andean Pact (Cartagena Treaty) by a group of countries 
which wished to accelerate integration (Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) represented the plain 
recognition that LAFTA had ceased to offer prospects for
In the first month of the year the typing correction of the 
National Lists was made. Another month was taken to discuss 
wether the Committee would be allowed to exceed in eight 
days the deadline established by the Conference for the 
definition of a planning meeting. The timetable for sectoral 
meetings was defined only in May. Then it was realised that 
the 'LAFTA secretary did not have the necessary means to 
take care of the tasks demanded by the Committee' (ibid., 
author's translation). When eventually the sectoral meetings 
began, the Uruguayan government imposed an indiscriminate 
duty of 20 % on all exports. This created an impasse which 
led the Committee to suspend its activities for two months, 
until the Uruguayans withdrew their decision. Still, the 
impasse created impeded the celebration of a meeting of 
Foreign Ministers in Montevideo, which had been called for 
Presidents Alessandri and Goulart.
1 The panel was formed by a group of distinguished Latin 
American experts (Radi Prebisch, Felipe Herrera, Carlos 
Santamaria and Jose Mayobre) , who should elaborate a plan of 
action. Cf. Boletim ALALC. vol. II, no. 1 (May 1965), pp. 6- 
8. This plan (many of whose suggestions would be later used 
by the Andean Pact) were then presented to the Latin 
American presidents. Cf. R. Prebisch et al, Hacia la 
Integracion Acelerada de America Latina (Mexico, 1965), 
especially pp. 36-38.
2 R. Barbosa, '0 Brasil e a Integragao Regional: a ALALC 
e a ALADI', mimeo, paper presented to the Second National 
Seminar on 60 Years of External Policy, Sao Paulo, USP, 
1991, p. 5.
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progress *.
In 1969 the LAFTA timetable was reformulated and the 
deadline for the formation of the free trade zone was 
extended until December 1980. In the mid-seventies it was 
again clear that the new deadline would not be reached, and 
steps were taken to adjust the discourse to reality 2. It was 
considered that the rigidity of the regional MFN clause was 
hindering cooperation and that a move towards higher 
flexibility (in terms of the liberalisation programme and in 
terms of the geographical scope of the agreements) was 
necessary 3. Regional integration was then seen more 
explicitly as the creation of an area of trade preferences
1 Venezuela joined the Andean Pact in 1973 and Chile 
abandoned it in 1976. An important question, whose analysis 
however exceeds this work, is why certain countries opted 
for a new project of integration while others preserved 
LAFTA in its narrow scope. Clearly, the limits posed on 
industrialisation by the size of the market was much 
stricter in the case of the Andean countries than in large 
countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Ideological and 
political factors also influenced this. The Andean Pact was 
founded by reform oriented governments led by democratic 
Chile. Cf.R. Ffrench-Davis, 'Integracidn Econdmica', 
Integracion Latinoamericana. vol. 12, no. 142 (1989), pp.
35-51. Argentina made a short-lived approach to the Andean 
Pact during the Peronist government in the early seventies, 
which would not progress because of political instability 
after 1974. Cf. C.J. Moneta, /La Politica Exterior del 
Peronismo', in R.M. Perina e R. Russell, Argentina an el 
Mundo. 1973-1983 (Buenos Aires, 1988), pp. 87-90.
2 Already in 1974 negotiations began to restructure 
LAFTA. Cf. G. Salgado, 'The Latin American Regional Market',
p. 120.
3 Cf. The speech at LAFTA of the Argentine Ambassador 
C.G. Martinez, 'La Crisis del Monismo Integrador', 
Integracion Latinoamericana. vol. I, no. 8 (1976), pp. 4-21.
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*. LAFTA gave way to the Latin American Integration 
Association, created by the 1980 Montevideo Treaty. This was 
based on higher flexibility, clearing the ground for the new
bilateral agreements that would emerge in the late eighties
2
(b) The Revival of Regional Rivalry
The installation of military governments in Argentina 
(1966) and Brazil (1964) reinvigorated power competition in 
the region and limited the willingness of governments to 
share sovereignty. The predominance of a Cold War 
perspective in foreign policy (which debilitated the 
'autonomist' stance of the early sixties) and of a rivalry 
perspective in regional policy were not conducive to 
regional cooperation. This was reflected in the bitter 
Argentine-Brazilian disputes about the utilisation of the 
Parana River for the production of hydroelectric power. 
Argentina was a downstream country and considered that the 
Brazilian-Paraguayan Itaupu project would affect her ability
1 Cf. 'Editorial: El Futuro de la ALALC', Intearacidn 
latinoamericana. vol. 4, no. 40, pp. 1-2, and 'Editorial: 
ALADI Como un Area de Preferencias Economicas', Inteqracidn 
latinoamericana. vol. 5, no. 52 (1980), pp. 1-3, in which 
the 'enabling clause' conceded by the GATT on 28 November 
1979, allowing developing countries to form areas of tariff 
and non-tariff preferences, is invoked in favour of the new 
approach. On the 'enabling clause' see R.E. Baldwin, The 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Towards Greater 
Liberalization? (Washington, 1979), pp. 20-21.
2 Cf. R. Barbosa, America Latina em Perspectiva. pp. 5-
6.
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to use hydroelectric resources. This dispute was permanent 
source of friction in the sixties and seventies and 
contributed to hinder the progress of cooperation
Moreover, the quest for influencing neighbouring 
countries increased. Argentina sought to secure agreements 
with smaller countries as a form of counter-balancing the 
impressive economic development achieved by Brazil in the 
sixties 2. Concerns with regional equilibrium reinforced the 
Argentine opposition to Itaupu, which would lead to the 
incorporation of Paraguay to the Brazilian orbit 3. Brazil, 
in turn, saw Latin America as the natural area for expanding 
her political role. A tacit agreement with the USA was 
sought, in which Brazil's alignment with the USA in the Cold 
War would be reciprocated by US support for Brazil's role in 
Latin America 4. As a result, the dynamic initiatives adopted 
in relation with smaller neighbours contrasted with the
1 Cf. A. Lands, De Chapulteoec al Beagle, pp. 297-302. 
The Treaty of the River Plate Basin, signed in April 1969 
and created to promote cooperation in the use of natural 
resources among Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, 
became just another arena of conflict in which divergent 
views prevailed. Cf. Moneta, 'La Politica Exterior del 
Peronismo', p. 86.
2 Ibidem., pp. 84-85.
3 Cf. I. Almeida Mello, 'Argentina, Brasil e a Balanga 
de Poder Regional: Equilibrio, Preponderancia e Hegemonia', 
unpublish. Doctorate Theses, University of Sao Paulo, 1991, 
p. 15.
4 Cf. L.I. Almeida mello, 'Brasil, Argentina e a Balanga 
do Poder Regional', p. 17. The views of the military 
government on geopolitics can be found in G. do Couto e 
Silva, Geooolitica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1967, 2nd 
edition), especially pp. 55-60.
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sluggish pace of Argentine-Brazilian negotiations l.
Divergence of views persisted in the seventies. If 
Brazil then emphasised the 'diplomacy of development' and 
sought a more active role in Africa and the Middle East (on 
which she was strongly dependent for oil) 2, the Argentine 
military government privileged strategic 3 and territorial 
objectives 4, after the timid attempts of the early years of 
the Peronist government to set forward a more articulated 
external policy 5. Divergences began to be ironed out in
1 Uruguay benefited from significant trade concessions 
granted by Argentina in the Argentine-Uruguayan Convention 
for economic Cooperation (CAUCE) of 1974 and by Brazil in 
the Protocol for the Expansion of Trade (PEC) of 1975. Cf. 
N. Berretta, 'Las ventajas de ser Pequeno: Apuntes Para una 
Politica Comercial Estrategica Frente al MERCOSUR', Revista 
Paraouava de Socioloala. vol. 29, no. 33 (1990), pp. 90-95. 
Argentina also signed an agreement with Paraguay to 
construct a dam on the Parana (Yaciretci-Apip6) and 
negotiated with Bolivia the exploration of iron in El MutQn.
2 R. Ricdpero, 'A Diplomacia do Desenvolvimento', mimeo, 
Programa de Politica Internacional e Comparada, University 
of Sao Paulo, October 1991, pp. 14-15. Brazil also 
strengthened her links with Europe and especially with 
German through an agreement on nuclear cooperation in 1975.
3 R. Russell, 'Argentina y la Politica Exterior del 
Regimen Autoritario', in R.M. Perina and R. Russell, 
Argentina en el Mundo. PP. 105-7. Argentina believed that 
she should occupy the spaces that the declining hegemony of 
the USA left in the region, by playing a more active role in 
fighting communism. This included support to the Garcia Meza 
c o u p  d'etat in Bolivia and the participation of Argentine 
military in training anti-guerrilla forces in Central 
America. In addition, in many cases, the military of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay cooperated in the 
abducting and assassination of political oppositors.
4 In 1978 Argentina and Chile almost went to war because 
of the dispute for the Beagle Islands in the South Atlantic.
5 Policies in the May 1973-March 1976 period were 
disrupted by conflict within the peronist government. C. 
Leyba, Under-secretary of Economic Programming and 
Coordination, observed that 'for almost five months (from
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October 1979, when a solution was eventually reached for the 
Itaupu problem *. The rapprochement was also encouraged by 
the Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982 2 and the external crisis 
of 1982, which gave rise to perceptions of high 
vulnerability in the international system. However, it was 
the transition towards democracy in 1985-86 which would 
confer momentum to the redefinition of Argentine-Brazilian 
relations and sustain a new wave of economic integration, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter.
October 1973) we were backed by Per6n and the social 
alliances, although the government team was caught in the 
crossfire between government factions. Politically speaking, 
this was our golden age, when we succeed in the conclusion 
of the Triennial Plan, drawing-up sectoral acts, a 
commercial opening to the Eastern bloc, discussion of 
foreign capital proposals, projects for Latin American 
integration and the lifting of the Cuban blockade'. Cf. 
'Carlos Ratil Gabriel Leyba', in G. Di Telia and C. Rodriguez 
Braun, Argentina. 1946-83 , p. 127. However, the gradual
control of the government by the right-wing groups led by 
Isabel Peron and Jos§ Lopez Rega, and the political unrest 
and economic crisis that followed the sharp devaluation 
adopted by Economic Minister Celestino Rodriguez in June 
1975, impeded the implementation of coherent economic and 
foreign policies. Cf. 'Guido Di Telia', in G. Di Telia and 
C. Rodriguez Braun, Argentina. 1946-83. p. 147.
1 M.Hirst, 'La Participacidn de Brasil en el Proceso del 
MERCOSUR: Evaluando Costos y Beneficios', Documentos e 
Informes de Investigacidn N. 135. FLACSO, Buenos Aires, 
December 1992, p. 4.
2 Brazil provided broad commercial and diplomatic 
support to Argentina during the war. Argentine exports to 
the CEE were channel through Brazilian ports in order to 
circumvent the European commercial boycott. Brazil also 
assumed the representation of the Argentine interests in the 
UK. C.A. Moniz Bandeira, Estado Nacional e Politica 
Internacional. p. 245, reports that Brazilian planes and 
crew participated of observation flights in the South 
Atlantic coast during the war.
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(c) Trade Policy and Industrial Policy in the 
Seventies
It was already mentioned that international lending 
allowed Latin America to sustain growth and trade in the 
seventies, even in a context in which the terms of trade of 
non-oil producers fell and markets in the central economies 
experienced recession and increased protectionism (cf. table
VII.3 and VII.4.). This was a period in which state autonomy 
increased in Latin America *, stemming from the willingness 
of private banks to recycle the so-called petro-dollars. 
National governments thus became less dependent on the 
conditionality imposed by official agencies as they had 
resources to apply in their they preferred policies. There 
was less stimulus for 'sharing sovereignty' through regional 
integration. The room for manoeuvre made possible by 
external financing reinforced the unilateral approach to 
trade and industrial policy in Argentina and Brazil 2.
In effect, both countries set out to promote 
significant changes in the economic structure. The direction 
of this effort was divergent. Brazil moved towards further 
import-substitution, while Argentina made a bold attempt at 
trade and financial liberalisation. Both policies had in 
common that they gave little attention to regional
1 Cf. P. Evans, 'The State as a Problem and Solution: 
Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural Change', pp. 
150-55.
2 Cf. R. Ffrench-Davis, 'Integracion Econdmica', pp. 36-
37.
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integration. The conditions seemed to be favourable enough 
to go alone and regional integration was not deemed 
necessary for fostering structural change.
In the case of Brazil, the Second National Development 
Plan (PND II, 1974-8) represented a kind of ISI-3, aimed at 
'deepening' ISI towards new intermediate and capital goods 
*. The import coefficient of the economy contracted while 
industrial transformation accelerated. Spurred by the 
disequilibrium provoked by the first oil crisis, a thorough 
system of non tariff protection was set up and managed by 
GACEX, while generous subsidies were granted to priority 
sectors 2. In order to compensate for the anti-export bias of 
the new protectionist polices, export subsidies were 
provided 3. In turn, international lending financed the 
implementation of this new phase of industrialisation. The 
results were impressive in terms of growth and structural 
change in the period 1974-79, as discussed in section II. 
However, Brazil would begin the eighties in a delicate 
position in the external and fiscal fronts.
Clearly, the new Brazilian policy left no place for
1 Cf. A.C. Barros de Castro and P.F. Souza, A Economia 
Brasileira em Marcha Forcada (Rio de Janeiro, 1985) and B.K. 
Becker and C.A.G. Egler, Brazil: A New regional Power in the 
World Economy (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 92-98.
2 Cf. On the policies of the II PND see J.C. Batiste, 
Debt and Adjustment Policies in Brazil (Boulder, 1992), pp.
36-51.
3 Cf. R. Bonelli et al, 'Macroeconomic Instability and 
Trade Liberalization: Lessons From the 1980s to the 1990s', 
IDB Working Paper Series N. 101. Washington, March 1992, PP. 
11-14.
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regional specialisation. The policy was inward-looking and 
stretched ISI to its limits, thereby reinforcing the bias 
against regional imports implicit in the ISI pattern. Only 
the most essential primary goods or complex capital goods 
(which could not be substituted) were imported l. The 
overwhelming objective of furthering ISI was not softened by 
the opportunities offered by regional trade to avoid costs 
and inefficiency. This was the period of the diplomacia da 
qaveta. in which CACEX controlled intra- and extra-regional 
imports with equal zeal 2.
Conversely, Argentina used the abundance of 
international financial capital to implement a comprehensive 
programme of trade and financial liberalisation since 
1977/8. The objective was to move away from the dominant ISI 
pattern of growth and achieve unrestricted integration in 
the world economy 3. With this objective, trade barriers were 
reduced (slowly in 1976-78, quicker from early 1979) and
1 For an analysis of how the structure of effective 
protection operated in favour of these imports see P. Malan, 
'Politica Economica e Teorias do Balango de Pagamentos: 
Relagoes Internacionais do Brasil no Periodo 1946-79', 
unpublish. Professoral Theses, Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro, 1981, part III.
2 The diplomacia da qaveta (diplomacy of draws) refers 
to the delays with which CACEX considered the concession of 
import permits, even for regional imports. Cf. Jose Melero, 
interview. Montevideo, 25 July 1993.
3 Cf. 'Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz', in G. di Telia and 
C. Rodriguez Braun, Argentina 1946-83; The Economics 
Ministers Speak, p. 151, in which he emphasised that '(0)ur 
programme intended to implement a structural reform of the 
economy and not only to overcome a crisis. We had to 
reinsert Argentina within the framework of the international 
economy'.
358
full financial liberalisation implemented *. In December 1978 
a tablita fixing the exchange rate for a certain period was 
established, with a view to controlling expectations in the 
exchange market and to bringing about 'convergence' in 
domestic and international prices 2.
As in the Brazilian case, regional integration had no 
role to play in this policy. Trade liberalisation should not 
distinguish between regional and extra-regional producers 
and in fact the neutrality of incentives was supposed to be 
at the basis of the new policy and would be enough to secure 
the most efficient allocation of resources 3. As unilateral 
liberalisation advanced from 1978, regional preferences were
1 Nominal protection in Argentina was 210 % in 1976, 
with an average of 55 %. This was firstly reduced to 100 % 
with an average of 41 % and in january 1979 a programme for 
quarterly reductions of tariffs was set out, with the aim of 
achieving a maximum of 20 % and an average of 18 % in five 
years. For an interesting analysis of the association 
between economic and political variables in the 1976-82 
period see J. Schwarzer, La L6qica Politica de la Politica 
Econdmica (Buenos Aires, 1982).
2 Cf. 'Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz', p. 170.
3 The sources of the Argentine problems, according to 
Martinez de Hoz, were 'statization and regulations (which) 
had stifled individual initiative, pushing private 
enterprises into wooing public officials for their favours' 
(ibid.), p. 152. This clearly applied to the industries 
which had been dynamic in regional trade in the sixties 
(especially metal-mechanical and electro-mechanical 
industries). However, despite the official discourse of 
elimination of public subsidies and protection, some sectors 
continued to receive a special treatment, especially 
capital- and resource- intensive intermediate industries 
(steel, paper, petrochemicals), which expanded their role in 
industrial production and exports in the eighties. Cf. D. 
Aspiazu, 'La Promocion de la Inversion Industrial en la 
Argentina: Efectos sobre la Estructura Industrial', in B. 
Kosacoff and D. Aspiazu, La Industria Argentina: Desarrollo 
v Cambios Estructurales (Buenos Aires, 1989).
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eroded.
In sum, neither the ambitious Brazilian ISI-3 effort 
nor the Argentine radical liberalisation programme demanded 
a specific regional policy. Both countries used the enlarged 
autonomy then provided by international lending to set 
forward their own programmes of economic restructuring. If 
the objectives of these programmes were divergent (the guest 
for semi-autarky in Brazil and the quest for a drastic 
exposition of the economy to world competition in 
Argentina), both reserved a very minor role to be played by 
regional cooperation.
IV.4. The Creation of Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA)
The creation of LAIA in 1980 was the formal recognition 
that the ambitious objectives of LAFTA could not be 
fulfilled. LAIA sought to preserve the limited advances so 
far made by LAFTA, which had been the core of the trade 
regime in 1960-80, while setting a more flexible framework 
for regional cooperation l. To be sure, LAIA mentioned the 
formation of a common market as a long term objective, but 
no concrete programme to advance in this direction was 
presented. The practical objective of LAIA was to create a
1 Cf. 'Texto del Tratado de ALADI', Inteqraci6n 
Latinoamericana. vol. 4, no. 47 (1980), pp. 4-14.
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zone of partial trade preferences l. It was as if structural 
conditions and institutional arrangements, the reality and 
the letter of the regional agreements, had at last been 
reconciled. Moreover, the principle of regionalism was 
dropped and room was made for- flexible bilateral 
preferences, by which tariff reductions between two members 
of LAIA would not be required to be extended to other 
members 2.
The principal instruments of LAIA are the Regional 
Tariff Preference, the Programme for the Expansion of Trade, 
the Lists for Opening the Market and the Partial Agreements
3. The 'Regional Tariff Preference' was to provide a basic 
preference of 5 % in 1984, 10 % in 1987 and 20 % in 1990 for 
the 'big three' (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). Countries of 
intermediate development (Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela) would receive a preference of 38 %, while
Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay would receive 40 % (plus an 
additional 8 % in the case of hinterland countries). These
1 Cf. R. Barbosa, 'O Brasil e a Integragao Regional', 
pp. 5-8, and B.M. Macadar and T.S. Bello, 'A Integragao 
Latinoamericana Frente as Transformagoes da Economia 
Mundial', Ensaios FEE, vol 10, no. 22 (1989), pp. 189-211.
2 Cf. In 'Editorial: ALADI, Una Esperanza Renovada', 
Integracion Latinoamericana. vol. 4, no. 47, p.l, INTAL 
suggests that 'LAFTA was frozen in a multilateral approach 
which demonstrated to be ineffective. The new LAIA Treaty, 
more realist, makes possible partial actions in which it 
would not be necessary the participation of all the members 
of the Association' (author's translation). However, a 
principle of convergence remained, through which preferences 
should be 'regionalised' so as to gradually conform a free 
trade area in Latin America.
3 Cf. 'Texto del Tratado de Aladi', pp. 5-10.
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benefits would not apply to a negative list of exceptions. 
The 'Programme of Recover and Expansion of Trade' (created 
in January 1989) was intended to divert trade from third 
countries through tariff reductions on a positive list of 
products. The 'List for Markets Opening' would completely 
eliminate barriers in favour of less developed countries for 
a positive list of products. Finally, 'Partial Agreements' 
(Spanish and Portuguese acronym AAP, Acuerdos de Alcance 
Parcial) can be celebrated bilaterally or among a small 
group of countries, which would be allowed to offer non- 
extensible concessions to each other.
The new instruments provided by LAIA were in practice 
mostly ineffective. No-one of them had significant influence 
in regional trade up to now, either because the list of 
exceptions was too large or the positive list too short. 
Frequently less developed countries had no adequate supply 
capabilities to take advantage of the concessions received 
*. On the other hand, LAIA did lead to new developments that 
fostered integration. By introducing flexibility, LAIA 
facilitated agreements. Partial Agreements (AAP) provided 
the institutional framework for the new, more dynamic phase 
of cooperation that begun in 1986. LAIA permitted a timely 
flexibility which would be used in the new structural and
1 The Regional trade Preference programme embraced so 
many exceptions that its relevance has just been symbolical. 
The Programme for the Expansion of Trade came to include 
very few products in the positive list. The percentage of 
imports of the major countries favoured by the preference 
was of 10 % with respect to other major countries, 15 % with 
respect to intermediate countries and 20 % with respect to 
the less developed ones.
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political conditions of the mid-eighties. The 1986 Programme 
for Economic Integration and Cooperation Between Argentina 
and Brazil (PICE) would represent the first step towards 
this new, more dynamic phase of cooperation.
V. STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE; AN OVERVIEW
The discussion above has considered several variables 
affecting the evolution of regional trade. Some of them were 
related to the structure of the international system and the 
domestic economy - reflected in constraints on growth and 
policy-making, and in the transformation of industrial 
capabilities. Other variables were institutions, which 
contributed to shape the policy of regional cooperation. 
Which was the role of these variables in shaping the 
economic relations of Argentina and Brazil?
The index of trade intensity (ITI), presented in 
chapter V, can be used to answer this question. From one 
hand, the ITI is related to the international specialisation 
of the country and thus changes with the structure of supply 
and demand of the domestic and the international economy. On 
the other hand, the ITI also reflects trade discrimination 
and transaction costs. If economic cooperation and 
integration lead to a fall in transaction costs, the ITI 
would increase. A study on the evolution of the ITI can thus 
permit to identify different phases in regional economic 
relations and the role of structural and institutional 
change.
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First, an 'impressionistic' view of the evolution of 
the ITI will be offered in this section. Secondly, an 
admittedly crude effort for quantifying the influence of 
structural and institutional variables in shaping the ITI is 
offered.
V.l. The Evolution of the Index of Trade Intensity
The evolution of the average index of trade intensity 
for the period 1960-90 is presented in graphs VI.3, VI.4 and
VI. 5. The index has been calculated for trade between 
Argentina and Brazil (graph VI.3), Brazil and Latin America 
(graph VI.4), and Argentina and Latin America (graph VI.5).
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Graph VI.3. Average ITI. Argentina and Brazil. 1960-90
jArgentina-Brazil
20
15
10
5
0
1960 1 962 1964 1 966 1968 1970 1972 1 974 1976 1 978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
1961 1963 1 965 1967 1969 1 971 1973 1975 1 977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 
_________________________________________Years________________________________________
Source: Cf. Table IV.1.
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GRAPH VI.4. Average ITI. Brazil-Latin America. 1960-90
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GRAPH.VI.5. Average ITI. Arqentina-Latin America. 1960-90
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The graphs show at least three phases in regional 
trade: (i) a phase of increase in the ITI until the mid­
sixties/late sixties; (ii) a phase in which the ITI remained 
stable or suffered a modest decline from the late sixties to 
the mid-eighties; (iii) a phase of rapid increase of the ITI 
in the second half of the eighties. Table VII.20 presents 
the ITI for imports, exports and the average ITI in 
different sub-periods. The coefficient of variation for the 
average ITI is also presented.
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TABLE VI.20
EVOLUTION OF THE INTENSITY OF TRADE INDEX (ITU. 1958-93
(a) ITI Argentina-Brazil
Period Exports Imports
1958-1960
1960-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1985
1986-1990
5.1 
5.4
11.1
9.2
6.2 
14.9
7.2 
6.4 
9.7
7.2
10.5
14.6
Average
6.1
5.9
10.4 
8.2
8.4 
14.7
C.V. (%)
10.5
41.0
23.0
15.2
14.2
17.2
1958-1990 10.0 9.0 9.5 35.8
(b) ITI Argentina-Latin America
Period Exports Imports
1958-
I960-
1965-
1974-
1981-
1986-
■1960
•1964
■1973
•1980
•1985
■1990
2.7 
2.2
4.2
4.7 
6.9
9.3
Average
2
2.
4.
4
5 
8
4
2
1
,5
,9
,4
C.V. (%)
5.0 
20.5 
11.2
8.0 
7.6 
5.8
1958-1990 5.0 4.2 4.6 41.3
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(c) ITI Brazil-Latin America
Period Exports Imports Average C.V.(%)
1958-1960 1.1
1960-1964 1.1
1965-1973 2.2
1974-1980 3.1
1981-1985 3.4
1986-1990 4.3
2.3
2.4
2.5 
2.2
3.4
5.4
1.7
1.8
2.4
2.7
3.4
4.8
10.0
24.7
13.8 
18.7 
7.0 
11.3
1958-1990 2.7 3.0 2.8 38.2
Source: Calculated from IMF, Direction of Trade (Washington, 
various years) and IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
(Washington, various years).
It can be seen that the ITI increased sharply between 
1960-64 and 1965-73 (it practically doubled in all cases, 
except in the case of trade between Brazil and Latin 
America), remained more or less stable in 1974-85 (it
experienced a modest increase in the case of Brazil-Latin 
America and Argentina-Latin America in the seventies and 
eighties, and fell in the case of Argentina-Brazil in the
seventies) and again experienced a significant increase
after 1986. Table VI.20 also presents the ITI for the pre- 
LAFTA 1958-60 years as a point of reference for the study of 
its subsequent evolution.
The analysis of the different phases of the ITI
suggests some preliminary comments on the factors explaining 
its behaviour (these will later explored through a simple 
econometric model). The rise of the ITI after 1965 suggests 
an impact of both the trade preferences provided by LAFTA 
and the new industrial capabilities of Argentina and Brazil.
369
They complement each other, since preferences offered 
opportunities, and supply capabilities were already in place 
to use them.
The fact that the ITI remained stable or fell in the 
seventies (1974-80 period) suggests that either industrial 
capabilities and preferences remained stable or that they 
move in opposite directions and cancelled each other. 
Observing the ITI between Brazil and Latin America, it can 
be realised that the small rise in the average ITI accrued 
from an increase in the ITI for exports and a decrease in 
the ITI for imports. This may reflect Brazil's protectionist 
policy, which discriminated against regional goods - or at 
the very least reduced the preferences of the sixties *. It 
may also reflect the impact of the increase in oil prices in 
1973 and 1979. The 1973 and 1979 oil crises amounted to a 
shift in international specialisation (Brazil then became 
more 'complementary' of Middle East oil producers than on 
non-oil producing countries) 2. In addition, Brazil 
endeavoured to promote industrial exports towards the Latin
1 If Brazil's protectionist policy had been applied with 
the same rigour to all producers in the world (with no 
discrimination in terms of products and sources), the ITI 
Brazil-Latin America would have not been affected: Brazil 
would have imported less from Latin America but she would 
also have reduced imports from the rest of the world in 
exactly the same proportion, and therefore the ITI would 
have remained constant. The fact that the ITI fell suggests 
that protection was applied more severely to regional 
imports.
2 Clearly, this change in the pattern of specialisation 
resulted from a price effect and not from change in the 
productive structure, since Brazil in fact substituted 
imports of oil by domestic production and in this sense 
became relatively less complementary to Middle East 
producers.
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America and other peripheral areas. This suggests that 
Brazil became more complementary to Latin America on the 
export side (higher industrial exports) and less 
complementary on the import side (more dependent on extra- 
regional oil imports). The eventual outcome was a slight 
increase in the average ITI in the seventies.
The ITI Argentina-Brazil, on the other hand, was 
reduced in both directions in 1974-80 and the result was a 
relatively significant fall of the average ITI. The 
Argentine policy of unilateral liberalisation deprived 
Brazilian exporters of former advantages in the Argentine 
market. Concurrently, the fall of Brazil's ITI for Argentine 
imports confirms the negative impact on regional trade of 
the Brazilian move towards a semi-autarkic economy in the 
seventies.
The early eighties witnessed a slight increase in the 
ITI in all cases. To some extent, this may have accrued from 
an interest in saving dollars in face of the debt crisis. As 
trade in the region was covered by payments agreements, 
there was a stimulus to divert trade towards the region. The 
strengthening of quantitative controls in a period of acute 
dollar shortage (1981-85) gave rise to ad hoc preferences to 
imports from the region. This behaviour is consistent with 
patterns observed in earlier periods. But its significance 
should be qualified. In fact, the debt crisis led to a 
disarray in the regional payments system in 1982. Some 
countries temporally cancelled payments and the working of
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the agreement was affected *. In addition, the regional trade 
system had been reformulated with the creation of LAIA in 
1980 and the framework for cooperation was still weak. The 
debt crisis encouraged cooperation, but the effective shift 
in patterns of behaviour was not immediate. Moreover, 
Brazil's especially high ITI for imports from Argentina may 
reflect a conjunctural variable, namely Argentine exports to 
Europe through Brazilian's ports during the 
Malvinas/Falklands war. Therefore, even if the general 
results for the early eighties are broadly consistent with 
the hypotheses that external constraints encouraged 
cooperation, a more detailed analysis of the period does not 
allow to establish this causality.
The evolution of ITI in the late eighties, on the other 
hand, reflects more clearly the new cooperative framework 
that emerged from the debt crisis. The substantial increase 
of ITI after 1986 was associated with the Argentine- 
Brazilian bilateral agreements of 1986-90 (PICE). The crisis 
led to regime transformation, the fall in transaction costs 
and the promotion of bilateral trade. These figures also 
confirm the evidence provided by Baumann showing an increase 
in intra-industry trade between 1980 and 1988 2. In effect, 
the PICE agreements provided for complementary preferences 
in capital goods, a sector which usually presents high
1 IDB, Desarrollo Economico e Social, pp. 64-6.
2 Cf. R. Baumann, 'Una Evaluacion del Comercio Intra- 
Industrial', p. 90.
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levels of intra-industry trade
In sum, the evolution of the ITI in the 1958-90 period 
allows preliminary speculations about the behaviour of 
structural and institutional change. The discussion of these 
variables will be now assessed in terms of a simple 
econometric model.
1 The capital goods sector includes electrical and non 
electrical machinery. These were the industries that 
presented the highest levels of intra-industry trade in the 
Balassa's study on LAFTA. Cf. B. Balassa, 'Intra-Industry 
Trade', p. 253.
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V. 2. Structural Change. Institutional Change and the 
Direction of Trade
(a) A Simple Test on the Determinants of the ITI
The use of 'proxies' for structural and institutional 
change as independent variables in a multiple regression 
model in which the ITI is the dependent variable, permits to 
have an idea of (i) wether these variables were associated 
in the 1958-1990 period and (ii) which the specific 
contribution was of structural and institutional change in 
shaping regional trade. This can complement the historical 
analysis presented above, bearing in mind the usual caveat 
that association does not imply causality.
Perceptions on constraints on growth and policy-making. 
This variable is most difficult to quantify as it depends 
strongly on expectations and ideas l. Still, the rate of 
gross investment in fixed capital as percentage of the GDP 
seems to be an adequate 'proxy' for this, since investment 
decisions are related to expectations about future growth 
and (in economies heavily dependent on external financing 
and exports for importing the capital goods they need) about
1 This chapter has provided data on rates of economic growth 
and trade, investment, trade balance and terms of trade to 
describe the conditions that shape these perceptions. However, 
qualitative analysis is critical and more of this will be 
provided in the next chapter.
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the evolution of the international economy 2. In accordance 
with the hypotheses raised in chapter I, a fall in the rate 
of investment would be related to the perception that 
constraints on growth and policy-making have increased and 
thus with a stimulus to regional cooperation. This would 
lead to an increase in the ITI as a result of trade 
diversion and/or the reduction of transaction costs in 
regional trade through cooperation. Clearly, there is a 
temporal lag between the perception of external constraints 
and the fall in investment. This can be ignored, however, by 
assuming that this lag is the same as that required by the 
governments to change policies in response to new 
conditions, and for cooperation to have an impact on 
regional trade.
The maturation of ISI-2. The impact of structural 
change on regional cooperation was related to 
diversification and industrial learning in the sectors 
installed in the late fifties. In the following regressions 
the index of manufacturing production of Argentina and 
Brazil will be used as a proxy for learning. It is assumed 
that the growth manufacturing production opened new 
opportunities for specialisation and trade in the region,
2 This is the result provided by models that relates rates 
of growth to the long term performance of the Balance of 
Payments. Cf. G. Amendola et al, 'The Dynamics of International 
Competitiveness', pp. 455-65.
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leading to a higher ITI 3.
Institutional Change. As argued by Keohane, 
institutions tend to persist and sustain cooperation even 
after a change of the structural conditions in which they 
were created in the first place 4. As experience develops and 
the benefits of cooperation increases, institutions keep the 
actors together despite of short term changes in interests. 
They also facilitate the adjustment of cooperation to new 
structural conditions. In this sense, institutions have a 
'once and for all effect', which is to set cooperation at a 
higher level. In order to assess the impact of institutional 
change two dummy variables will be used. The first one 
(LAFTA) takes the value of 1 from 1964, the first year after 
the liberalisation of trade promoted by LAFTA. The second 
variable (PICE) takes the value of 1 from 1986, when 
Argentina and Brazil began the 'second wave' of integration 
agreements.
The regression equations used logarithms and hence they 
provide an assessment of the elasticity of the ITI to a 
change in the independent variables. The period considered 
was 1960-89, for which there exist comparable data of
3 Admittedly, this variable is unsatisfactory. The 
literature mentioned in chapter III suggests that learning cannot 
be considered an automatic process that follows production, and 
hence the index of manufacturing production misses the impact of 
formal and informal R&D on competitiveness and trade 
opportunities. Still, this index is a reasonable proxy as far as 
there is no time series of formal and informal R&D activities in 
Argentina and Brazil for the period considered in this work.
4 Cf. R. Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 14.
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manufacturing production. The results of the regression 
equations were as follows 5:
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION
Dependent Variable: ITI(Ar) 
Regressor Coefficient
C -0.7304
LAFTA . 0.42 08
PICE 0.3825
INV(Ar) -0.3516
MAN(Ar) 0.6440
t-ratio
-1.3376
4.4093
4.0481
-2.7327
4.6741
Probability
(0.193)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.011)
(0.000)
R-squared = 0.92807 F(4,25) = 80.6457 (0.000)
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.7366
Diagnostic tests.6
1. Serial correlation: Chi2(l) = 1.8482 (p = 0.667);
F(1,24) = 0.1488 (p = 0.703)
2. Functional Form: Chi2(l) = 0.49315 (p = 0.483);
F(l,24) = 0.4011 (p = 0.533)
3. Normality = Chi2(l) = 0.5859 (p = 0.746)
4. Heteroscedasticity: Chi2(l) = 1.7156 (p = 0.190);
F(1,28) = 1.6984 (p = 0.203)
'p' stands for probability
Dependent Variable: ITI(Br)
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio
C 1.2822 2.7284
LAFTA 0.4311 4.4164
PICE 0.4239 5.0261
INV(Br) -0.5087 -3.5283
MAN(Br) 0.2092 3.2941
Probability
(0.011)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.003)
R squared = 0.8528 F(4,25) = 36.2123 (0.000)
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.6352
5 All the series were tested for unit roots (Dickey-Fuller 
test for residuals) and they were stationary. The statistical 
programme used for the regression and diagnostic tests was 
Microfit 3.0.
6 See the key for diagnostic tests below. The figures 
between brackets are the probability values of the statistics.
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Diagnostic tests.
1. Serial correlation: Chi2(l) = 0.6658 (p = 0.415);
F(1,24) = 0.5447 (p = 0.468)
2. Functional Form: Chi2(l) = 2.7775 (p = 0.096); F(l,24) =
2.4487 (p = 0.131)
3. Normality = Chi2(l) * 3.1322 (p = 0.209)
4. Heteroscedasticity: Chi2(l) = 0.079218 (p = 0.778); 
F(1,28) = 0.074132 (p = 0.787)
'p' stands for probability
Key for the Diagnostic Tests
1. Lagrange Multiplier Test for Residual Serial Correlation. 
The hypotheses tested is that the disturbances, \\, are 
serially uncorrelated against the alternative hypotheses 
that they are autocorrelated of order 1.
2. Ramsey's RESET test for functional form mis- 
specification, using the square of the fitted values;
3. Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
(Bera and Jarque test);
4. Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared 
fitted values.
Kev for the Variables
ITI(Ar) = index of trade intensity between Argentina and 
Latin America;
ITI(Br) « index of trade intensity between Brazil and Latin 
America;
MAN(Ar) = index of Argentine manufacturing production;
MAN(Br) = index of Brazilian manufacturing production;
LAFTA and PICE = dummy variables;
INV(Ar) = gross investment in fixed capital as percentage of 
the GDP in Argentina;
INV(Br) as gross investment in fixed capital as percentage of 
the GDP in Brazil.
Source: The index of trade intensity was calculated from 
data provided by the International Monetary Fund, Direction 
of Trade (Washington, various years). The index of 
industrial production was obtained from the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) Data Bank, and 
elaborated taking 1980 as the data base. The series for the 
rate of gross investment in fixed capital was obtained from 
IMF, Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington, various 
years).
The results presented above do not contradict the 
hypotheses that the institutional and structural variables
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presented in this chapter contributed to shape the evolution 
of the index of intensity of trade. All the variables are 
very significant and have the expected signals. Although the 
Durbin-Watson test is in the range of indeterminacy, the 
other diagnostic test perform remarkably well, suggesting 
that there are no serious problems in the specification of 
the equations 7.
The negative association between the ITI and investment 
rates in fixed capital is consistent with the hypotheses 
that the region played an anti-cyclical role when prospects 
on growth and policy-making were pessimistic. Clearly, 
favourable international conditions fostered regional trade 
as the Latin American economies were able to grow at higher 
rates. But less favourable conditions encouraged 
negotiations to facilitate trade in the region and avoid a 
more intense fall in trade and growth.
With this in mind, it is interesting to analyze again 
the evolution of ITI. The ITI of Argentina and Brazil with 
the region remained high in the unfavourable international 
conditions of the eighties. This anti-cyclical pattern is 
still more clear if the ITI for exports and imports are 
considered. If both the ITI for exports and imports 
increased, such an increase was especially pronounced in the 
case of the ITI for imports. Thus, the contraction of 
imports from the region was less pronounced than with 
respect to the rest of the world, in a context in which the
7 The exception is the test for the functional form in the 
case of the regression for Brazil, suggesting that the variables 
may have a non-linear relation in this case.
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import capacity of Argentina and Brazil had been severely 
curtailed. Conversely, in the seventies the ITI for imports 
fell. In this case, abundant external credit led to increase 
imports from centre countries at higher rates than from the 
region, and hence the role of the region was reduced.
The positive association between manufacturing 
production and the ITI suggests that learning effects were 
significant and the expansion of industry favoured regional 
specialisation and trade. But the relationship between 
structural and institutional variables is most difficult to 
establish in this case. If the new industrial capabilities 
sustained exports, the existence of preferences offered a 
source of demand which 'pushed' manufacturing production. In 
any case, the results confirm the role of the regional 
market as an outlet for industrial exports, either as a 
result of growing economic complementarity or as a result of 
the stimulus provided by trade preferences.
Institutions seem to have had a lasting and significant 
effect in sustaining cooperation. The two institutions 
considered (LAFTA and PICE) were negotiated in periods of 
perceived external crisis (the late fifties and the mid­
eighties) , but they remained in place and played a role in 
stimulating regional trade when the external conditions 
changed. The results, thus, give support to the hypotheses 
of R. Keohane.
Clearly, the results have to be interpreted very 
cautiously. As mentioned, the specific impact of structural 
and institutional variables on the ITI cannot be entirely
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separated. Strictly speaking, these variables are not 
independent 8. Most of this work has been concerned with the 
inter-relation between structures and institutions, and the 
two-faced role that institutions play, as both a dependent 
and an 'intervening' variable. It was suggested that an 
'evolutionary' model is more adequate to analyze this kind 
of process. Thus, the regressions presented should be seen 
as a complementary exercise, which offers a simple test for 
the existence of an association among the variables shaping 
regional cooperation.
(b) Regional Integration as a Collective Good
It was suggested above that LAFTA was less ineffectual 
- albeit far from successful - in encouraging regional trade 
than it had been usually acknowledged. This may contribute 
to explain the persistence of LAFTA, despite the fact that 
it failed to make further progress since the late sixties. 
Clearly, other factors may have contributed as well to 
explain this persistence. From a 'state as a predator' point 
of view, LAFTA may have offered an opportunity for the 
government to distribute jobs and assignments. Bureaucrats 
may have resisted to abandon their positions and set out to 
produce conferences and rhetoric in order to convey the
8 It was already mentioned that, if industrial 
transformation leads to more regional trade, then the interest 
in regional trade and therefore the efforts for reducing 
transaction costs would also increase. Concurrently, a reduction 
in transaction cots would encourage industrial exports and 
accelerate industrial transformation.
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impression that they were doing a significant job. Even if 
these factors played a role, nevertheless the evidence 
presented in this chapter suggest that there was a ' public 
good' rationale in sustaining regional integration 
institutions.
To be sure, a higher ITI did not necessarily represent 
a gain in welfare. It may arise from higher barriers against 
the rest of the world than from a reduction of barriers in 
the region. Vested interests supported the concession of 
preferences in a relatively closed regional market and 
opposed a free trade area, strengthening trade diversion. 
But if the counter-fact to partial regional liberalisation 
was national ISI and not multilateral liberalisation, then 
LAFTA did make a contribution to regional efficiency and 
welfare. This question already emerged in chapter V in 
relation with the 1939-60 period. Given the dominant trends 
in economic policy and in the international economy, 
regional liberalisation acted in such a way as to partially 
'correct' the distortions provoked by indiscriminate import- 
substitution.
Clearly, the context of the forties and fifties was 
very different from that of the sixties and seventies. The 
costs of import-substitution were much higher after 1960. 
Still, the predominant policies continued to be highly 
protectionist and the participation of Latin America in 
world trade relatively weak. LAFTA achievements should be 
seen in the light of this. Regional trade liberalisation was 
a collective good whose production was clearly below its
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optimal. But it is very likely that LAFTA allowed for a 
higher supply of this public good than if no institutional 
arrangement had existed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
1. If the late fifties witnessed a strong convergence 
of perspectives in Latin America, the international 
conditions of the sixties and seventies facilitated the 
adoption of unilateral policies and reduced the governments' 
willingness to share sovereignty or challenge vested 
interests. The revival of power competition between 
Argentina and Brazil also restrained mutual agreements, 
while both countries sought to increase their influence over 
smaller neighbours. Conversely, industrial learning 
sustained regional trade and stimulated an interest in 
cooperation, as the regional market became the principal 
destination for the exports of the 'new' industries. In 
addition, the position of Latin America in international 
trade system remained weak. This weakness was reflected in 
the rapid growth of the external debt and the ensuing 
external crisis, which heightened constraints on growth and 
policy-making. At the first moment each country sought a way 
out of the crisis individually. But gradually in the early 
eighties, and at an accelerated pace after the election of 
the new democratic governments of Argentina and Brazil, the 
efforts for regional economic integration gained momentum.
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2. LAFTA seems to have been instrumental in promoting 
trade and the diversification of industrial exports in the 
region. LAFTA clearly failed to produce the collective good 
of a regional open market. But it avoided still higher 
inefficiency in industrial production by offering an 
expanded regional market for some industrial goods (based on 
trade preferences and regional oligopolistic arrangements), 
in a context still dominated by indiscriminate protection. 
Governments perceived this role of LAFTA (at least until the 
late sixties), and the private sector participated actively 
in securing limited concessions, with a view to reducing 
microeconomic inefficiency.
3. Institutions are both dependent and intervening 
variables, and the relative importance of these roles change 
through time. In very simple terms, institutions appeared as 
dependent variables especially at the moment of their 
creation, shaped by changes in the international system, in 
the domestic economy and the basis of 'shared knowledge' of 
the actors involved. The creation of LAFTA in the late 
fifties and the PICE agreements of the mid-eighties are 
examples of this. Subsequently, the role of institutions as 
intervening variables was enhanced, as they continued to 
influence behaviour, even after the change of structural 
conditions and ideas. Cooperation was then sustained because 
institutions had strengthened interests in favour of 
cooperation and because the costs of renegotiation of the 
trade regime was (until the late seventies) considered high. 
Moreover, the experience and interests developed within
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LAFTA facilitated the transition towards a new generation of 
regional agreements in the mid-eighties/late eighties.
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CHAPTER VII. MERCOSUR: TOWARDS A NEW REGIONAL TRADE REGIME?
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the very significant increase in 
cooperation that took place from 1986, four years after the debt 
crisis triggered by the Mexican default, was highlighted. Data 
about the impact of the external crisis, namely the fall of 
investment and growth, the contraction of the import coefficient 
and losses in the terms of trade were presented. In this chapter 
the association between cooperation and external crisis in the 
eighties will be considered in more detail by looking at how the 
crisis reshaped perceptions and constraints on economic policy­
making.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section I addresses 
external constraints on growth and policy-making. Section II 
discusses the first move towards closer cooperation, represented 
by the 1986 PICE (Protocol of Economic Integration and 
Cooperation) Treaty between Argentina and Brazil. Section III 
studies the MERCOSUR as a new trade regime and compares it with 
the LAFTA regime. Section IV presents the conclusions of the 
chapter.
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I. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON GROWTH AND POLICY-MAKING
1.1. Structural Change in the International System and 
Regional Cooperation
The PICE and MERCOSUR initiatives developed in a 
transitional period in the international system. Transitions are 
periods of high uncertainty as regards the rules that would 
regulate trade and payments relations. There is a similarity, in 
this sense, between the late eighties/nineties and the late 
fifties. In the late fifties the post-war international order 
gradually consolidated, on the basis of what would be known as 
the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates, convertibility 
and multilateral trade negotiations. Cooperation in Latin America 
was encouraged by the perception that the rules had been 
asymmetrically shaped, leaving Latin America in a marginal 
position when she was striving to promote industrialisation.
The eighties and early nineties were a transitional period 
too, marked by external disequilibrium. The main trends in the 
international economy were the following: (i) the weakening the 
multilateral trading system; (ii) the trend to include a growing 
number of policy areas in international negotiations; (iii) the 
consequences of the debt crisis, which reduced policy options in 
a context of fiscal crisis. The impact of these trends on 
regional cooperation will be analyzed in the rest of this 
section.
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(a) The Weakening of the Multilateral Trading System
An open, multilateral trade system is the most advantageous 
framework for international negotiations in the case of small 
global traders l. The weakening of the GATT discipline since the 
mid-seventies therefore aroused concern in Latin America 2. If 
the international system never worked in full accordance with 
multilateral principles, the so-called 'new regionalism' and 
'aggressive unilateralism' weakened the role of the GATT in the 
international economy.
The new regionalism refers to the formation of economic 
blocs connected by intense flows of trade and investment and by 
policy coordination. Intra-bloc cooperation is necessary to 
enhance competitiveness in a world which has become more 
competitive and inter-dependent 3. The creation of the European
1 Cf. J. Baghwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism'. P. 
Katzenstein offers evidence in favour of this view in his study 
of the international insertion of the small European countries. 
Cf. P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial 
Policy in Europe (Ithaca, 1985), pp. 22-30
2 C. Diaz-Alejandro and G.H. Helleiner, Handmaiden in 
Distress; World Trade in the 1980s (Ottawa, 1982), especially pp. 
2-8. See also M. Corden, 'The Revival of Protectionism in 
Developed Countries', in D. Salvatore, The New protectionist 
Threat to World Welfare (New York, 1987), especially pp. 53-56.
3 Cf. D. Tussie and G. Cassaburi, 'Los Nuevos Bloques 
Comerciales; A la Bdsqueda de un Fundamento Perdido', Desarrollo 
Economico. vol. 31, no. 121 (1991), pp. 3-27. The growth of
inter-dependence can be observed by comparing the relative rates 
of growth of the GDP, international trade and investment. GDP 
grew at a rate of 2.8 % per annum in the eighties as against 4 
% per annum of international trade and 9.3 % per annum of
international investment. Cf. P.M. Veiga, 'O Brasil Frente aos 
Macroblocos Comerciais e o GATT', unpubl. paper for the 'Study 
on the Competitiveness of the Brazilian Industry', State 
University of Campinas, 1993, p. 27. As observed by R. Cooper, 
'Worldwide Versus Regional Integration: Is There an Optimum Size 
of the Integration Area?', in F. Machlup (ed.), Economic
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Union in 1992, the alleged existence of an informal trading bloc 
in East Asia and the creation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 are examples of this trend towards bloc 
formation In particular, some authors have observed that the 
adoption by the USA of a regionalist approach was a central new 
variable, which brought about defensive responses in the same 
direction 2.
Aggressive unilateralism was related to the rise of the new 
protectionism of the seventies, when most developed countries 
increased non-tariff barriers despite of the efforts of the Tokyo 
Round of the GATT to curb them 3. In the case of the USA, the new 
unilateralism took shape in the Super and Special 301
Integration; Worldwide, Regional, Sectoral. Proceedings of the 
Fourth Congress of the International Economic Association Held 
in Budapest, Hungary (London, 1976), especially pp. 44-45, the 
increase in the international mobility of factors stimulates the 
creation of international institutions in order to expand the 
jurisdiction of the government.
1 Blocs can be either formal or informal. Japan and the SE 
Asian countries are considered an informal bloc linked by 
Japanese investments and technology transfers. Cf. Y.C. Park and 
W.A. Park, 'Changing Japanese Trade Patterns and the East Asian 
NICs', in P. Krugman (ed.), Trade with Japan (Chicago, 1991), pp. 
85-120. In the case of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), bloc formation seems to have largely focused on the 
concession of trade preferences and curbing US protectionism by 
establishing clearer rules for anti-dumping measures. Cf. C. Vaan 
Grasstek and G. Vega, 'The North American Free Trade Agreement; 
A Regional Model?', in S. Saborio, The Premise and the Promise; 
Free Trade in the Americas (New Brunswick and London, Transaction 
Publishers, 1992), pp. 157-177.
2 Cf. R. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1994), pp. 2-7, suggests that the US initial move towards 
regionalism was limited and based on strategic rather than 
economic objectives, but this provoked a 'domino effect' which 
led to regionalist responses in other countries.
3 Cf. R.E. Baldwin, 'Multilateral Trade negotiations', pp. 
20-21.
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legislation, aimed to secure 'reciprocity'. This led to growing 
uncertainty as regards access to the US market and weakened 
multilateral fora.
(b) Reduced Room for Manoeuvre in International Negotiations
A large number of national policies are now subject to 
international scrutiny. As tariff barriers play a less 
significant role in trade policy, international negotiations have 
been extended to non-tariff barriers and other policy 
instruments. Rules for public procurement, foreign investment, 
technical standards, social legislation, environment, 
intellectual property, business practices and public health, are 
all aspects of domestic policy now brought to the negotiation 
table l. In this sense, international negotiations became more 
'intrusive', embracing areas that had formerly been the province 
of national governments 2. In some cases the strategy of 
development followed by some countries is called into question 
as incompatible with a smooth working of the international system
1 An example of this broader scope of international 
negotiations is the USA-Japan 'Structural Impediments 
Initiative', launched in July 1990 as a result of the 1989 US 
Super 301 investigations. Patterns of saving and investment, 
private business practices, the organisation of keiretsus and 
more generally the 'illiberal' features of Japan's business 
culture were identified by the USA as key topics affecting trade 
between Japan and the USA.
2 In addition, negotiations also became more complex. Non­
tariff barriers are less transparent and mensurable than tariffs, 
and hence commitments more difficult to define and control.
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*. The weaker members of the system therefore may have to face 
an denser agenda in a setting that is less favourable than that 
provided the by GATT 2.
(d) Latin America and the GATT
While in the past the GATT had been seen as a rich-country 
club, in the nineties Latin American countries developed a 
growing interest in multilateral liberalisation 3. Latin America
1 As observed by P.M. Veiga, 'Brasil Frente aos Macroblocos 
Comerciais e o GATT', unpubl. paper, project 'Study on the 
Competitiveness of the Brazilian Industry', Campinas, 1993, p. 
31, 'if (...) the existence of different models of economic 
development - with several strategies very distant from 
liberalism - has not bothered the developed countries, this 
attitude change when 'alternative' models began to generate 
aggressive export policies which modified the game in favour of 
the new participants. In face of the confrontation of different 
socio-economic systems - and even cultural ones - acquires 
relevance the concept of reciprocity' (author's translation).
2 An example of this is the legislation on intellectual 
property rights. While the USA succeeded in including the theme 
in multilateral negotiations and new rules were set up in, the 
Uruguay Round, the US is pressing at a bilateral level as well 
for a more comprehensive legislation. This has become a key 
condition for being qualified for accession to the free trade 
agreements promoted by the USA (NAFTA and EAI, see below) . At 
this bilateral level, conditions of negotiations (and the 
agreements that result) are bound to be less favourable for Latin 
America. Cf. 'NAFTA, Patents, Skyhawks', Latin American Regional 
Report. Southern Cone - Newsletters (therefrom RS) , 17 March 
1994.
3 Small global traders benefit in a multilateral system 
because (i) they can form alliances to resist pressure from 
larger members; (ii) in a system in which concessions are 
automatically extended to third parties (as implicit in the MFN 
principle of the GATT), small countries benefit from the 
agreements of the big countries; (iii) the increasing importance 
for the region of manufactured exports boosted its interest in 
the GATT. Cf. W. Fritsch, 'Brazil's Changing Trade Strategy', 
unpublish. paper, Conference on the New International Order 
sponsored by Foro Nacional. Rio de Janeiro, 13-14 April 1992.
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and other developing countries sought to obtain a special 
treatment in the 1960s and 1970s on the basis of the specific 
problems posed by development l. These countries collectively 
pressed for a change in international rules so as to transfer 
economic and political resources from the North to the South and 
accelerate the process of development 2. This move gained 
momentum in the mid-seventies, in the shape of demand for a 'New 
International Economic Order' (NIEO) 3. Still, if some 
concessions from centre countries were secured, in the late 
seventies the so-called North-South dialogue was in a stalemate 
and pessimism prevailed 4. The failure of the NIEO strategy, and 
the efforts to restructure the economy after the debt crisis, 
prompted a new approach in Latin America towards the multilateral 
trade system 5.
1 The role of the GATT for Latin America was ambiguous in 
the past. The GATT failed to supply the collective goods that 
Latin America demanded (like open markets for agriculture and 
textiles), but it did not prevent the region from applying its 
protectionist industrial policies (and thus to continue 'free 
riding' the system).
2 J.G. Ruggie, 'Another Round, Another Regime? Prospects for 
the Global Negotiations', in J. Bhagwati, Power. Passions and 
Purpose; Prospects for North-South Negotiations (Cambridge Mass., 
1984) , p. 34, observes that while in the sixties the emphases was 
on 'closing the gap', in the seventies the 'distributivist' 
stance became stronger. This new stance was boosted by the 
success of the OPEC in the cartelization of the oil market.
3 Cf. R. Ffrench-Davis, 'Latin America and the NIEO: An 
Introduction', in R. Ffrench-Davis and E. Tironi, Latin America 
and the New International Economic Order (London, 1982), pp. 1- 
11.
4 See on this point C. A. Jones, The North-South Dialogue: 
A Brief History (London, 1983), especially pp. 84-111.
5 Cf. P.M. Veiga, 'Brasil Frente aos Macroblocos 
Comerciais', pp. 3 6-7.
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The GATT is now seen - with all its shortcomings - as a 
defence against unilateral actions and trade discrimination by 
trading blocs. The Latin American policy of unilateral trade 
liberalisation of the nineties reinforced this view, as the 
region became more open to trade and more interested in promoting 
exports. The Latin American countries have sound reasons for 
their new, more favourable approach to multilateralism and for 
their (cautiously) optimistic view on the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round *. The recently created World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) would fill in a crucial gap that existed in the 
international economic system since the dismissal of the ITO and 
its provisional substitution by the GATT 2, and Latin American 
countries have given great significance to the WTO 3. If the risk 
of a fragmentation of world trade and unilateral actions has not 
been not completely averted 4, the Uruguay Round placed 
international negotiations on more solid grounds by including the 
'old' (agriculture and textiles) and the 'new' themes (trade in
1 In April 1994 120 governments signed the Uruguay Round in 
Marrakesh, regarded as a significant achievement after protracted 
negotiations that extended for more than eight years. Cf. Guy de 
Jonquieres, 'Survey of World Economy and Finance. Trade and the 
World Economy: A Test of Resolve', Financial Times. 30 September 
1994.
2 Cf. F. Williams, 'World Trade News: Nations Queue to Join 
WTO', Financial Times. 01 November 1994.
3 The former president of Mexico, Carlos Salinas, and the 
former Brazilian Ambassador in Washington and former Economic 
Minister, Rubens Ricupero, both with an outstanding political 
projection in their countries, were disputing the presidency of 
WTO. Cf. A. Foster, 'Brazil Angered by WTO Choice', Financial 
Times. 18 June 1994.
4 See D. Harbrecht et al, 'Top of the News'. See also Guy de 
Jonquieres, 'Survey of World Economy and Finance'.
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services, intellectual property rights and foreign direct 
investment), within a multilateral framework *.
1.2. The debt crisis and regional cooperation
(a) The Impact of the Debt Crisis
In the late seventies it was believed that private financial 
markets had successfully replaced public agencies in 
international lending, enhancing the autonomy of the governments. 
However, the rise of the US interest rates from 1979, the 1982 
Mexican default, the contraction of private lending and the 
valorisation of the dollar in 1980-85, brought about the largest 
external crisis in Latin America since 1930. Inflows of official 
capital after 1982 were just aimed to avoid a discontinuity in 
debt negotiations and not to sustain economic growth 2. As a 
result, the government room for manoeuvre was drastically 
curtailed. The need to obtain trade surpluses to service the debt 
became the dominant objective and no room was left for other 
objectives and policies.
The external crisis prompted major exchange and financial
1 For an analysis of the results of the Uruguay Round from
a Brazilian point of view see J.B.M. Machado, 'Rodada Uruguai:
Principais Resultados e Impactos Sobre a Politica Comercial 
Brasileira', Balanca Comercial. no. 126 (April-June, 1994), pp. 
9-22, and E.A. Guimaraes and L. Naidin, 'GATT 1994: On Novos 
Acordos sobre Dumping, Subsidios e Salvaguardas', Revista 
Brasileira de Comercio Exterior, no. 39 (April-June, 1994), 
pp.45-54.
2 Cf. M. Baer, O Rumo perdido: A Crise Fiscal e Financeira
do Estado Brasileiro (Rio de janeiro, 1993), p. 70.
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crisis in the public sector !. The government had to service the 
debt with dollars generated by the private sector and it was 
forced to raise capital in the domestic market, thereby 
increasing interest rates 2. This in turn reduced public and 
private investments and aggravated fiscal problems, since the 
cost of financing the public debt rised. Finally, inflation was 
fuelled by public deficits, recurrent devaluations and the 
deterioration of the infrastructure and productive equipment.
The weakness of the Latin American governments was enhanced 
by the pattern of negotiation. Creditors negotiated as a cartel 
while the position of the Latin American countries was analyzed 
on a 'case by case' basis. The creditors position was 
strengthened by liquidity crisis that obliged the Latin American 
governments to urgently seek for inflows of capital in order to 
re-finance the debt. Moreover, the close connection between 
foreign and domestic capital markets, and the high liquidity of 
the private sector portfolio, reduced the ability of the 
government to implement fiscal and monetary policies and resolve 
the problem of the fiscal crisis. High liquidity implies a much 
larger destabilising potential of shifting expectations as 
regards the evolution of the exchange rates 3. External
1 Cf. Baer, 0 Rumo Perdido, p. 84.
2 Cf. V. Bulmer-Thomas, Life After Debt: The New Economic 
Trajectory in Latin America. (London, 1991), pp. 7-8. An 
exception to this rule were Mexico and Chile, whose states owe 
basic export sectors, which generated foreign currency to service 
the debt.
3 The implications of the high liquidity of the private 
agents financial portfolio on policy-making has been emphasized 
by M. Baer, 0 Rumo perdido. pp. 66-69, in the case of Brazil, and 
by J. Sourrouille (1990) , 'Las Reformas de la Economia y el 
Crecimiento de Largo Plazo', unpublish. paper, Conference on the
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constraints on policy-making therefore reached a maximum in 1982- 
89.
The debt crisis strengthened common perceptions in Latin 
America as regards external constraints on growth. As in the late 
fifties, Latin American perceptions converged towards a defensive 
direction. If the initiatives adopted to create a common front 
of debtors did not progress, the region did set out to analyze 
problems and discuss solutions collectively *. The divergent 
experiences of the seventies ended up in the eighties in a common 
policy deadlock and this would shape a new view on regional 
cooperation.
(b) New Directions in Economic Policy and Regional 
Cooperation
The external crisis of the early eighties challenged the 
industrial and trade policies that Argentina and Brazil had 
adopted in the seventies. In the case of Brazil, the combination 
of protectionism with export subsidies raised complains from 
Brazil's trade partners and complicated negotiations in the GATT. 
In addition, heavy export subsidies aggravated the fiscal deficit
Argentine Economy, Oxford-London, in the case of Argentina.
1 In June 1985 eleven highly indebted Latin American 
countries met in Cartagena to discuss the debt problem. A 
declaration - the so-called 'Cartagena Consensus' - was issued, 
in which it was argued that the debt should be treated as a 
political problem. Concurrently, a mechanism for regional 
consultations was established in Buenos Aires, the Committee for 
the Regional External Debt.
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l. In the case of Argentina, trade barriers were re-established 
(including a system of previous import licenses) in the early 
eighties, reversing the former liberalisation process. She thus 
returned to the model of the sixties, based on an ad hoc 
combination of protectionism, tax exemptions and export 
incentives. In sum, in the early eighties both countries returned 
to the former semi-closed model, now challenged by external debt, 
high inflation and falling rates of investment. The task to be 
addressed was by necessity twofold: stabilise the economy and 
promote structural change in the direction of higher 
international competitiveness, so as to move out of the vicious 
circle of recession and inflation of the 'lost decade'. Regional 
integration was seen as an instrument for economic recovery, as 
will be discussed below.
In the mid-eighties, the democratic governments of 
presidents Alfonsin (Argentina) and Sarney (Brazil) applied 
'heterodox' plans aimed at stabilising the economy without 
recession. However, the failure of the heterodox plans in 1988-89 
prompted more decidide action in 1990-93, after the election of 
presidents Menem in Argentina and Collor de Mello in Brazil. A 
new strategy had to be devised as the room for manoeuvre of the 
economic policy had been increasingly reduced 2. The new strategy 
initiated in 1990 was based on trade liberalisation and the use
1 A work by the Brazilian Bureau of External Trade, FUNCEX, 
'Instrumentos de Politica Comercial', unpublish. paper, Project 
'Study on the Competitiveness of the Brazilian Industry', 
Campinas, 1993, p. 63, concluded that 'by the end of 1988 the 
system of (exports) financing have reached a situation of 
collapse, because of lack of resources'.
2 Cf. J. Sourrouille, 'Las Reformas de la Economia', 
especially pp. 5-6.
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of the exchange rate for taming inflation.
The reduction of trade barriers gained momentum in 1990-93. 
Menem in Argentina and Collor-Franco in Brazil eliminated 
quantitative barriers and reduced the level and dispersion of 
nominal tariffs. Several special regimes of industrial and export 
promotion were abolished. In January 1991 quantitative 
restrictions were abolished in Argentina. In April 1991 three 
tariff levels were adopted in Argentina: zero, 11 and 22 % In 
1989, the regime of industrial promotion was eliminated, 
basically for fiscal reasons. The automobile industry, however, 
remained protected through a special regime.
In Brazil, a major trade reform began in March 1990. Most 
export incentives and tax exemptions were eliminated (except 
draw-back arrangements) and the BEFIEX import-to-export program 
terminated. Subsidised export credit lines were in turn reduced 
in June 1990 2. In March 1990 the list of forbidden imports was 
terminated and so was the system of import permits (July 1990). 
A timetable of tariff reductions was subsequently announced to 
begin in 15 February 1991. While certain sectors remained with 
relatively high tariffs (autos, trucks, and computer equipment), 
the aim was to reduce the average tariff level from 32.2 % in 
1990 to 14.2 % in 1994. The standard deviation of tariffs should 
fall from 40 % (1990) to 7.9 % (1994) 3. Tariff reductions were
1 Imports subject to a zero tariff subsequently received a 
tariff 5 % in November 1991, while capital goods remained 
exempted. Cf. Kosacoff, 'El Sector Industrial Argentino', p. 45.
2 Cf. on this point Bonelli et al (1992), pp. 21-2.
3 Cf. Bonelli et al. 'Macroeconomic Instability and Trade 
Liberalization', p. 22.
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accelerated in September 1994 with a view to reinforcing the 
impact of the new anti-inflationary plan. The maximum tariff 
would fall from 35 % to 20 % and the average tariff would fall 
to 14 % (as compared with 20 % in 1992) *.
Trade liberalisation has been accompanied by the use of the 
exchange rate as an 'anchor' for prices and expectations. In 
Argentina, the 'Convertibility Plan' of April 1991 fixed the 
exchange rate with respect to the dollar and since then inflation 
in Argentina led to the valorisation of the Argentine peso. In 
Brazil, the Real has been gradually appreciating since it was 
launched in July 1994 2. This has raised concerns about the 
compatibility between the stabilisation and liberalisation 
policies in the long term, as the exchange rate could not be used 
to stimulate the export sector. The large trade deficit of 
Argentina attracted the attention of economic observers and 
brought about complaints from exporters, and pressure for change 
increased 3. Moreover, if recent inflows of capital facilitated 
the process of stabilisation, this could be sending the 'wrong' 
signals about which the sustainable levels of exports and imports
1 Cf. These tariff reductions were originally due for 1 
January 1995. Cf. A. Foster, 'Brazil to cut wide range of 
tariffs', Financial times. 14 September 1994.
2 The appreciation of the Real was estimated in 15 % by 
September 1994. Cf. A. Foster, 'Brazil to Cut Wide Range of 
Tariffs'.
3 Cf. J. Barham, 'Argentina struggles in World League: High 
Costs and Poor Quality Compound Widening Deficit', Financial 
Times. 05 July 1994. Although the new currency in Brazil would 
not be associated with a fixed exchange rate, most observers 
expect that it would valorize as part of the stabilisation 
strategy. Cf. Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (BNDES), Merco 
Indicadores, December, p. 3.
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were in the long term. Brazil, on the other hand, has advanced 
at a much slower pace towards stabilisation and she still has a 
comfortable position in the trade balance. It is likely and 
desirable the reduction of Brazil's large positive trade balances 
as a result of the new stabilisation plan. But this means more 
pressure by industrial interests on a government which has 
traditionally been more sensitive to industrialists demands !.
What were the implications of these trends for regional 
cooperation? First, multilateral trade liberalisation boosted 
economic integration 2. The general move towards trade 
liberalisation facilitated the removal of regional trade 
barriers, as protectionist demands lost legitimacy. In addition, 
it encouraged regional foreign investment and the rationalisation 
of production 3. Secondly, since economic integration progressed
1 On the concerns expressed by Brazilian industrialists of 
the National Confederation of Industries (CNI), cf. 'Setor de 
Bens de Capital Representa Quase 30 % do Total Importado', Gazeta 
Mercantil, 23 July 1993, and 'Importagoes Aumenatam e Fabricantes 
Pedem Investigates sobre dumping', Gazeta Mercantil. 23 July
1993.
2 Cf. A. Foster, 'The New Economic Order: Latin Americans 
Rediscover Their Neighbours' Markets', Financial Times. 22 July
1994.
3 The big Argentine conglomerates, Perez Companc, Bunge & 
Born and Techint are reported to have increased investments in 
Brazil since the first bilateral agreements of 1986. Cf. 
'Argentina and Brazil Integration Makes (Gradual) Progress', RS, 
86-09, 20 November 1986. A regional strategy was also implemented 
by Autolatina (an association between Volkswagen of Brazil and 
Ford of Argentina) and by Saab and Scania. Cf.'Autolatina: Latest 
Bid to rationalise', RS, 87-01, 5 February 1987. In January 1994 
the big Brazilian beer producer, Brahma, inaugurated a factory 
in Argentina. Cf. A. Foster, 'The New Economic Order: Latin 
American rediscover their neighbours' markets'. Moreover, 
regional foreign direct investment has also come from Chile, 
whose pensions funds have had an important participation in 
Argentine public utilities, especially power generation and 
distribution in Buenos Aires. Cf. 'Integration: What Future for 
Common Market?', RS, 93-02, 11 March 1993.
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in a context of multilateral trade liberalisation, the central 
role that trade preferences had played in the past was reduced 
and emphases on the production of other public goods (related to 
stabilisation and international competitiveness) increased. In 
effect, more attention has recently been devoted to the problem 
of coordination of exchange policies. Concurrently, there is an 
increasing awareness of the need to adopt competitiveness- 
enhancing policies. This topic will be addressed in detail in 
section III.
1.3. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI):Its 
Potential Impact on Regional Cooperation
The so-called new regionalism has not been confined to the 
formation of trade blocs among central countries. The North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) created a zone of trade 
preferences including central and periphery countries l. In 
addition, the US 'Enterprise for the Americas Initiative' (EAI) 
has placed in the agenda the possibility of an hemispheric free 
trade area. In effect, on 27 June 1991 the MERCOSUR countries and 
the USA signed a framework agreement (the so-called 'Rose Garden' 
or '4 + 1' agreement) setting broad guidelines for discussing the 
creation of a free trade zone in the context of the EAI. The 
agenda of the '4+1' addressed the problem of trade in services
1 Mutatis mutandis, it has been observed that this can be 
seen as a new version of the old UK system of 'imperial 
preferences'. Cf. A. O'Connell, 'La Iniciativa de las Americas 
y el Cono Sur de America Latina: Un Punto de Vista Argentino', 
unpublish., paper presented to the Seminar 'International 
Transformations and Hemispheric Restructuring; New Patterns of 
US-Southern Cone Relations', Miami, 7-8 December 1992.
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and foreign investment, themes emphasized by the USA. It also 
referred to the link between debt and trade problems - a 
significant point for Latin America. But the substance of the 
initiative was the constitution of a free trade area from 'Alaska 
to Tierra del Fuego'1.
A considerable degree of uncertainty still surrounds the 
EAI. It is not yet clear wether the USA is prepared to give solid 
political backing to the EAI, given the protectionist 
inclinations that have gained strength in this country, the 
opposition of labour unions to competition from cheap labour 
countries, and the predominance of US interests in other regions 
(in a context of limited resources) 2. Concurrently, the 
convenience of the EAI for Argentina and Brazil is still a matter 
of debate, especially in Brazil 3. However, the EAI is already a 
significant variable in the discussion of the evolution of 
regional cooperation. This section focuses on the potential 
impact of the EAI for regional cooperation - that is, wether it 
is likely to encourage the MERCOSUR or to strain the relations
1 Cf. S. Saborio, 'The Long and Winding Road from Anchorage 
to Patagonia', in S. Saborio (ed.), The Premise and the Promise, 
p. 5-6.
2 Moreover, the recent effort of US President Bill Clinton 
to obtain the support of the Congress for the Uruguay Round seem 
to have reduced the possibility of obtaining the 'fast track' 
procedure for new free trade agreements. This would make still 
more unlikely the celebration of free trade agreements with Latin 
american countries. Cf. R. Dornbusch, 'Economic Viewpoint: What's 
Missing at the Latin Summit', Business Week. 17 October 1994. For 
a critical appraisal of the factors that led to the EAI see A. 
Hurrell, 'El Espejismo de un Bloque Regional Hemisf6rico', 
FLACSO. America Latina Internacional. vol. 8 , no. 30 (1991), pp. 
14-21.
3 Cf. R. Barbosa, 'Regional Common Markets', p. 3.
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among the MERCOSUR countries and compromise the process of 
integration.
(a) The Benefits and Costs of the EAI
The EAI potentially implies a significant redefinition of 
the structure of preferences among Latin America, the USA and the 
rest of the world. The relative impact of the EAI on MERCOSUR 
exports and imports depends on the structures of trade, 
protection and investment in the USA and MERCOSUR countries. From 
the point of view of trade, the EAI is not especially appealing 
for the MERCOSUR. Argentina and Brazil are global traders and 
direct only a small proportion of their total exports to the USA 
. Argentine exports to the USA were only 10. 4 % in 1991 *. The 
corresponding figure for Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay were 20.2 
%, 4.7 % and 10.1 %, respectively. According to standard
integration theory, the potential for trade diversion is high in 
this case and so are potential welfare losses. Moreover, existing 
estimations for the impact on regional exports of an hemispheric 
free trade area only show modest increases 2, although in some
1 Conversely, Mexico sent almost 65 % of here total exports 
to the USA in 1991. Cf. ECLA, El Regionalismo Abierto en America 
Latina v el Caribe: La Integracidn Econdmica al Servicio de la 
Transformacion Productiva con Eauidad (Santiago, 1994), p. 19.
2 Cf. R. Erzan and A. Yeats, 'US-Latin America Free Trade 
Areas: Some Empirical Evidence', in S. Saborio (ed.), The Premise 
and the Promise, pp. 139-40, who estimated that if all US tariffs 
are removed and non-tariff barriers relaxed, Argentina would 
increase her exports to the USA in US$ 65 millions, Brazil in US$ 
94 3.7 millions, Paraguay in US$ 1.6 millions and Uruguay in US$ 
24.5 millions. E. Bianchi e J. Robbio, 'Tratado de Libre Comercio 
de America del Norte: Desvio de Comercio en Perjuicio de 
Argentina y Brasil', unpublish. paper, Centro de Economia 
Internacional -Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Comercio
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sectors the impact can be significant l.
However, the assessment of the EAI should include other 
variables alongside static allocation effects. It is necessary 
to consider (i) the risk of being "marginalized" in a world 
divided in rival trade blocs and (ii) dynamics impacts of the EAI 
on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Some authors have suggested that a free trade agreement with 
the USA is necessary to avoid 'marginalisation' in a fragmented 
world economy 2. From this perspective, it is in the region's 
interest to encourage the EAI and make the necessary side- 
payments to curb domestic opposition in the USA 3. The far the 
international system moves away from the ideal multilateral type, 
the higher the benefits of the EAI. This will be particularly so
Internacional v Culto. Buenos Aires, July, 1993, obtain results 
similar to those obtained by Erzan and Yeats and also observe 
that the gains from trade to Argentina and Brazil would be much 
higher with a successful conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round.
1 The impact on Latin American exports of free trade with 
the USA is reduced because tariff barriers are already low in the 
USA and many Latin American countries benefit from the GSP 
(General System of Preferences). But the impact of the removal 
of non-tariff barriers in sectors like textiles and apparel, 
footwear and leather goods, steel and certain agricultural 
products would be large. Cf. S. Saborio, 'The Long and Winding 
Road from Anchorage to Patagonia', p. 26.
2 Cf. L.C. Bresser Pereira and V. Thornsten, From Mercosul 
to American Integration (Washington, 1992), especially pp. 10-14. 
The key assumptions are that world trade is in a process of 
fragmentation in rival trade blocs and that membership to one of 
these blocs is required to avoid discrimination. As neither 
Europe nor Japan consider Latin America as a priority area, the 
USA is the only great trading power that have manifested an 
interest in the region.
3 This side-payments are related to stricter regulations for 
environmental protection, social legislation, property rights and 
liberalisation of rules for foreign investment and trade in 
services.
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if the USA opens selectively her economy to some Latin American 
countries and raises barriers to others l. The potential for 
trade diversion would increase in this case and so would the 
differences in location advantages for foreign investment. In 
particular, if rules of origin are especially stringent, the 
potential for investment diversion will be very significant.
Thus, the EAI presents a challenge to Latin America. If the 
multilateralist approach is the 'first best' policy for the 
region, it might not be enough, and thus an 'insurance' policy 
towards the EAI would be required. This point will be addressed 
in the following sub-section, from the point of view of the 
potential impacts of the EAI on regional integration.
(b) The EAI and the Hove Towards Regional and Sub-Regional 
Cooperation
Jb.l. The Stimulus for Cooperation and the EAI.
The EAI would favour regional integration if it encourages 
a defensive response aimed at avoiding the consolidation of a 
'hub and spoke' structure in hemispheric trade. Such a structure 
would emerge if individual Latin American countries sign free 
trade agreements with the USA but do not form a free trade zone 
among themselves. In this case there would be some Latin American 
'spokes' with the USA as the 'hub'. The USA would have 
preferences in the Latin American markets, but the Latin American
1 The dislocation of Brazilian manufactures in the US market 
has already generated protests by Brazilian industrialists. Cf.
D. Pilling, 'World Trade News: Peril of Fragmentation Over Free 
Trade Area Pacts', Financial Times. 02 September 1994.
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exporters would only have preferences in the US market. The 
potential for trade and investment diversion is the highest in 
this case, as the USA would be the only location with 
preferential access to both the Latin American and the US market. 
Trade liberalisation within Latin America can prevent this from 
happening and, in this sense, the EAI may act as a stimulus for 
a more decidide move towards free trade in the region.
Brazil's proposal for the creation of a South American Free 
Trade Area (Spanish and Portuguese acronym ALCSA) can be seen as 
a step in this direction. Brazil considered that the MERCOSUR 
could provide the basis for attracting the rest of South America 
towards a free trade area *. The opportunity of the initiative is 
reinforced by the fact that several sub-regional trading blocs 
have been created since 1986 in such a way that the regulation 
of trade is becoming increasingly confused and complicated 2. 
Moving faster to sub-regional agreements has also been a reaction 
to the sluggish pace taken by the US promise of an extension of 
NAFTA southwards 3. Even Mexico, which already participates in
1 Cf. 'Polo Irradiador Para A Integragao', Gazeta Mercantil. 
18 january 1994.
2 G. Rosenthal, the Executive Secretary of ECLA, observed 
that there were more than 30 multilateral and bilateral accords 
in Latin America and thus the administration of tariffs is now 
extremely complicated. The tariff on a product could change 
enormously depending on the country of origin and the phase of 
implementation of the liberalisation agreement. Cf. D. Pilling, 
'World Trade News'.
3 As pointed out by US observers, 'Latin American countries 
are already hedging their bets. Chile belongs to the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Group and trades more with Japan than with 
the US. Argentina is moving toward Brazil in a new economic 
union, MERCOSUR, which is cutting deals with Europe. Indeed, 
Washington appears almost unaware of the October Brazilian 
election' which may 'set the US$ 500 billion economy on a new 
course of rapid growth'. Cf. 'Editorial: Don't Let Latin America
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NAFTA, has sought to preserve a high profile in Latin American 
trade and diplomacy l. Table VIII.4 presents a list of the 
bilateral agreements of the past ten years. To this list the 
MERCOSUR should be added, along with efforts to revive the 
Cartagena Agreement and the Central American Common Market.
slip away', Business Week. 03 October 1994.
1 Cf. Ann Chartes and Ken Dermota, 'International Business 
(Latin America): They're Knocking on NAFTA's Door', Business
Week. 27 June 1994.
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TABLE VIII.
Bilateral Agreements in Latin America. 1982-93
Countries Year of the 
agreement
Positive list 
of tariff 
reductions
General
liberalis.
with
exceptions
Arg-Uru 1982 (ACE 1) yes
Braz-Uru 1982 (ACE 2) yes
Arg-Ecuador 1984 (ACE 3) yes
Chile-Uru 1985 (ACE 4) yes
Mexico-Uru 1986 (ACE 5) yes (Uru) yes (Mexico)
Arg-Mexico 1986 (ACE 6) yes
Arg-Braz 1986 (ACE 7)a yes
Mex-Peru 1987 (ACE 8 ) yes
Arg-Peru 1988 (ACE 9) yes
Arg-Venez 1988 (ACE 10) yes
Arg-Colombia 1988 (ACE 11) yes
Arg-Braz 1988 (ACE 12) yes
Arg-Paraguay 1989 (ACE 13) yes
Arg-Bolivia 1989 (ACE 19) yes
Arg-Braz 1990 (ACE 14) yes
Bolivia-Uru 1991 (ACE 15) yes
Arg-Colombia 1991 (ACE 16) yes
Chile-Mexico 1991 (ACE 17) yes
Bolivia-Peru 1992 yes
Arg-Venez 1992 (ACE 20) yes
Arg-Ecuador 1993 (ACE 21) yes
Bolivia-Chile 1993 (ACE 22) yes
Chile-Venez 1993 (ACE 23) yes
Chile-
Colombia
1993 (ACE 24) yes
Source: ECLA (1994), El Reqionalismo Abierto en America Latina 
v el Caribe: La Transformacion Economica al Servicio de la
Transformacion Productiva con Ecruidad. p. 43.
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Note: ACE stands for Acuerdo de Comolementacidn Econdmica.
'Partial Agreements' at a sub-regional level, whose benefits are 
not extensible to other LAIA members.
Clearly, the expansion of regional agreements has been 
impressive *. The quality of the agreements also improved. After 
1986 some of them were aimed at general trade liberalisation with 
exception lists (the ACE 14 between Argentina and Brazil, the 
ACE 17 between Chile and Mexico, the ACE 23 between Chile and 
Venezuela, the agreement between Bolivia and Peru and the 
MERCOSUR), rather than at liberalisation of a positive, narrowly 
defined list of products.
The importance of the MERCOSUR as a 'pole of attraction' to 
other Latin American countries is confirmed by the recent 
association of Bolivia and Chile to the MERCOSUR. Although the 
USA have repeatedly declared that Chile was 'first in line' 2 for 
a free trade agreement with the USA, and the former Chilean 
government declined an invitation to participate in the MERCOSUR, 
a new attitude has been adopted by the government of President
E. Frei 3. The expansion of regional trade in the last years, the 
rise of Chilean investments in Argentina and the fact that most
1 The ACE 12 and 7 between Argentina and Brazil were 
absorbed by the ACE 14.
2 Cf., for example, 'Chile First in Line if NAFTA Partners 
Open the Door to Others in The Americas', RS, 93-10, 23 December 
1993. For a Chilean assessment of the benefits of a free trade 
agreement with the USA, cf. A. Butelman and P. Meller, Evaluaci6n 
de un Eventual Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Chile-Estados Unidos 
(Washington, 1992).
3 Cf. 'Chile's New Government Wants and Understanding With 
the MERCOSUR', RS-94-02, 17 March 1994. Chile and Bolivia signed 
Protocol Agreements in August 1994 order to become 'associates' 
to the MERCOSUR.
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Chilean manufactured exports go to Latin America obliged Chile 
to abandon its reluctant initial stance *. If Chile still expects 
to join NAFTA in the future, she realised that the 
diversification of her external economic relations was crucial 
for her export-oriented policies and that a successful MERCOSUR 
cannot be ignored. In the case of Bolivia, and despite her early 
interest in joining the MERCOSUR, the group with which she has 
her more intense commercial links, full membership could not be 
granted because of Bolivia's participation in another trading 
bloc, the Andean Pact 2. Still, the association scheme now 
approved would permit Chile and Bolivia to receive preferential 
treatment by the MERCOSUR.
Another stimulus for integration that the EAI may provide 
is associated with asymmetries in bargaining power between the 
USA and the MERCOSUR countries. The USA has sought to obtain 
concessions at a bilateral level which would be more favourable 
than those provided by the GATT. The MERCOSUR countries have 
tried to minimise this by adopting the commitment of not to 
negotiate individually with the USA. The '4 + 1' framework
agreement of June 1991 was negotiated between the USA and the 
MERCOSUR as a group. In addition, the MERCOSUR is negotiating as 
a bloc with Chile and Bolivia and it would act in the same way 
in other international fora.
1 Cf. D. Pilling, 'World Trade News: Chile and Bolivia Wait 
in the Wings', Financial Times. 05 August 1994. In addition, the 
new Chilean government is especially interested in a 'second 
phase' in Chile's export-led growth, based on manufactures. Cf.
0. Rosales, interview. ECLA consultant and adviser for the 
Concertacion. Santiago de Chile, October 1994.
2 On the Bolivian interest in joining MERCOSUR see 'No Early 
Entry Angers Bolivians', RS, 93-04, 27 May 1993.
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Jb.2. Centrifugal forces in the region.
On the other hand, the EAI may trigger centrifugal forces 
in the MERCOSUR. The strategy for cooperation presented above is, 
arguably, the one that maximises the gains of the region in the 
long term. However, each country has an incentive to defect and 
to obtain benefits in the short term, even if this represents a 
loss for the region in the long term. The first Latin American 
countries to enter the EAI will be in a privileged position to 
attract US foreign direct investment and benefit from trade 
diversion. They would have an initial advantage in the 
competition for FDI and market shares in the USA, and hence a 
stimulus to abandon collective negotiations *.
This attitude is favoured by the US emphases on a case by 
case approach to the EAI and on the conditions of 'readiness' 
required for accession. The bargaining power of the USA would be 
enhanced in a case by case negotiation and so would the side- 
payments by the free trade candidates in line. Moreover, the 
political impact of Latin American competition on US low-wage 
sectors would be reduced if a gradual approach is adopted. Thus, 
the USA have a strong stimulus to move gradually, and the 'first 
in line' in Latin America have significant gains to obtain from 
joining earlier. This may trigger centrifugal forces in regional 
integration and compromise the region's first-best strategy, 
namely the negotiation as a group which already formed a free 
trade area and advanced in multilateral liberalisation.
1 If increasing returns are a significant variable in 
industrial production, the initial advantage can even become a 
permanent one.
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In fact, seeking individual accession to NAFTA was the first 
response of the Latin American countries in a condition to do so 
- namely Mexico, Chile and Argentina *. This trend to respond 
unilaterally has been aggravated in the case of Argentina and 
Brazil by divergent objectives in foreign policy. It is 
interesting to observe that, from the point of view of trade, 
Brazil apparently has more to gain than Argentina with the EAI, 
as the USA is a more significant trade partner for Brazil than 
for Argentina. However, while Argentina hurried to offer a 
positive response to the EAI and tried to iron out any political 
and economic friction with the USA, Brazil has privileged the 
ALCSA. This indicates that trade is only part of the bargaining 
set and other variables should be taken into account to 
understand the impact of the EAI on MERCOSUR.
Jb.3. Centrifugal Forces in Argentina and Brazil.
Divergent perceptions and objectives in Argentina and Brazil 
explain these different attitudes. In the economic field, 
Argentina has stressed stabilisation and subordinated other 
objectives to this, reflecting the traumatic experience of the 
hyper-inflationary processes of 1989 and 1990 2. The accession to
1 Cf. Ann Charters and Ken Dermota, 'International Business: 
They're Knocking on NAFTA's door'.
2 G. Smith and P. Green, 'International Business: Will
Argentina Stay the Course?, Business Week. 10 October 1994. The 
relatively little stress that has been given to the trade 
argument is illustrated by the fact that Brazil is the country 
to whom (according with available estimations) would accrue the 
largest gains from a free trade agreement with the USA after 
Mexico. In the share of total estimated export gains to latin 
America, Mexico obtains 50 %, Brazil 30 % and Argentina 2 %. Cf. 
R. Erzan and A. Yeats, 'US-Latin America Free Trade Area', pp.
412
the EAI would make a key contribution to the stabilisation 
programme as it represents a vote of confidence by the USA on the 
Argentine economic policy. This would boost business confidence 
and stimulate the inflows of foreign direct investment that 
Argentina needs for sustaining the convertibility plan and 
modernising the economy *. The production of a more stable 
framework is a 'collective good' which the MERCOSUR had so far 
failed to provide, given the instability of the Brazilian economy 
before the Real Plan. This does not dismiss the role of the 
MERCOSUR for the Argentine economy, as the large Brazilian market 
is an asset in the Argentine efforts to attract foreign direct 
investment 2. Moreover, President Menem has made public 
statements in favour that negotiations with the USA should be 
conducted at a sub-regional level 3. But, clearly, the unilateral 
approach adopted by Argentina towards NAFTA raised tensions
139-40.
1 Foreign Affairs Minister G. Di Telia referred to NAFTA as 
a 'seal of quality for investors to invest in Argentina. Trade- 
wise it was never very important, even detrimental', in S. 
Fidler, 'Survey of Argentina: NAFTA Option Shelved', Financial 
Times, 13 July 1994. In effect, in a context of fiscal crisis and 
with very little room for manoeuvre in terms of policy 
instruments, the Argentine government has a limited capacity to 
offer incentives or directly carry out the investments required 
by economic restructuring. Hopes are thus placed on foreign 
capital.
2 Cf. 'Argentina Interested in NAFTA Links But not Pulling 
Out of the MERCOSUR', RS, 92-08, 15 October 1992.
3 Cf. M.R. Soares de Lima and M. Hirst, 'Particularidades e 
Dilemas das Relagoes Entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos Sob O 
Impacto de Novas Cojunturas', unpublish. paper, project 
'Perspectives on the Relations Between Brazil and the United 
States', FUNAG/FINEP, August 1993, p. 57.
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within the MERCOSUR i, has contradicted the formulae of the '4 + 
1' agreed with the USA, and aroused doubts on the Argentine 
commitment to the MERCOSUR process 2.
Moreover, industrial divergence in the seventies and 
eighties contributed to reshape the political economy of trade 
liberalisation and the perspectives on the desirable 
international insertion of Argentina and Brazil. 
Deindustrialization in the late seventies reduced the costs of 
adjustment to external competition in Argentina. She faces less 
domestic opposition to trade liberalisation with the USA than 
Brazil, as the Argentine industrial sector already went through 
a painful adjustment. Conversely, Brazil is more concerned with 
the preservation of her industrial capabilities, especially in 
the capital goods sector. This divergence of views has been 
especially visible in the negotiation of the common external 
tariff 3, aggravated by the fears of the smaller MERCOSUR members 
(Uruguay and Paraguay) of becoming 'captive' markets for the
1 Cf. 'MERCOSUR Partners Worried About Argentina's Stance in 
NAFTA', RS, 94-03, 28 April 1994.
2 Cf. Jose Serra, 'NAFTA: A Hora da Verdade para o 
MERCOSUR', Folha de Sao Paulo. 10 December 1992. Serra, one of 
the most influential deputies at the Brazilian Congress in 
economic matters, observed that 'As Mexico, Argentina uses trade 
as a sweetener for attracting investments and financing from the 
USA, so as to consolidate the adjustment and lock-in the reforms, 
which then appear as irreversible' (...) 'It would be necessary 
to show that we do not play only in the MERCOSUR and that they 
need more our market than we need their market' (author's 
translation).
3 Cf. M. Garriga and P. Sanguinetti, 'El Arancel Externo 
Comun y el Compromiso Competitivo del MERCOSUR', Centro de 
Economia Internacional-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y 
Culto, Buenos Aires, June 1993.
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industrial goods of the big countries l.
In effect, during the negotiations of December 1992 in 
Montevideo, Brazil wished a 35 % common external tariff for 
capital goods, automotive, informatics and chemical industries, 
and about 20 % for oil, plastics, cotton and spare parts for 
airplanes. In turn, Argentina spoke of a 20 % ceiling for the 
common external tariff (admitting 35 % for some sectors),
Paraguay spoke of 10 % and Uruguay of 15 % 2. The solution was to 
set up a new list of exemptions which would continue beyond the 
deadline of December 1994. This list would include sectors like 
non-electrical and electrical machinery, transport equipment, 
informatics, organic chemicals and pharmaceutical products 3, 
while a common external tariff of 20 % would apply for the rest 
of the products. As a result, about 85 % of the universe of items 
would be liberalised within the MERCOSUR and subject to a common 
external tariff from December 1994. The other 15 % would be 
liberalised during a transitional period of 10 years, so that 
only by the year 2006 the common market would be completed 4.
In addition, Brazil is more apprehensive than Argentina 
about the loss of autonomy that an agreement with the USA may 
imply. Argentina considers that her relative declination requires 
a 'pragmatic' approach based on cooperation with the USA, which
1 Cf. 'MERCOSUR Problems With External Tariff', RS, 93-05, 
1 July 1993.
2 Cf. 'MERCOSUR Problems With the External Tariff'.
3 Cf. 'MERCOSUL', Gazeta Mercantil. 2 July 1993, p. 7.
4 Cf. R. Barbosa, 'Regional Common Markets', p. 10.
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would boost her role in regional and international politics *. 
The Argentine alignment with the USA is seen as an instrument to 
increase Argentina's prestige in the international system 2. On 
the other hand, Brazil has followed a more assertive stance since 
the mid-seventies, based on the expansion of industrial exports 
and the diversification of her political relations with Third 
World countries. As an aggressive exporter, Brazil was a 
preferential target for US unilateral protectionism in the 
eighties 3. Although some conflictual issues in the bilateral 
relations have been removed (the law of informatics was dropped, 
trade liberalisation advanced, export subsidies reduced and a new 
legislation on intellectual property approved), Brazil considers 
that her size, population and degree of industrialisation now 
alow her to play a more significant role in the international 
system. This consideration underlies the cool response of Brazil 
to the EAI, her move towards the promotion of new free trade 
areas in the region and her approach to the countries of the
1 Cf. J.C. Cooper and K. Madigan, 'Business Outlook: 
Argentina's Turnabout', Business Week. 12 Sept 1994.
2 Cf. M.R. Soares de Lima and M. Hirst, 'Particularidades e 
Dilemas', pp. 61-65. The rewards of the new Argentina foreign 
policy are not yet clear. Cf. 'No Apparent Rewards for 
Argentina's Military Involvement in the Gulf Crisis', RS, 90-08, 
18 October 1990. See also S. Fidler, 'Survey on Argentina: NAFTA 
option shelved'.
3 A peak in trade friction between Brazil and the USA was 
reached in October 1989 when the USA imposed a tariff of 100 % 
to a set of Brazilian exports - paper, pharmaceutical and 
electronics goods - under Special 301. This tariff was intended 
to force Brazil to change her legislation on protection of 
intellectual property. Brazil was also mentioned in the Super 301 
list of priority countries in May 1989 because of her system of 
import licences. Another significant 301 investigation affecting 
Brazil began in 1985 concerning software legislation and the 
'market reserve' for national firms of informatics goods.
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Amazon rim l.
Still, current Argentina-Brazil-USA relations should not be 
seen as a reprisal of the triangle of the forties in which actors 
changed positions. From the Argentine point of view, 
misunderstandings between Brazil and the USA have reinforced 
Argentina's bargaining position with respect to both partners 2, 
but it is unlikely that this would represent substantial economic 
advantage in the conditions of the nineties. Friction between 
Brazil and the USA are not related to a context of war (as it was 
in the forties), while US trade and financial interests in Brazil 
remain very high 3. Moreover, the regional market can play a key 
role in the Argentine efforts for stabilisation and industrial 
restructuring. The long term success of the Argentine economic 
policy depends on a substantial expansion of exports, and 
regional cooperation can contribute to this, as will be discussed 
in the next section.
(c) Conclusions
The EAI poses a challenge to the capacity of the MERCOSUR 
countries to offer a common response towards change in the 
international system. In the long term, the political economy of
1 Cf. Gazeta Mercantil. June 2 1993, p.5.
2 M.R. Soares de Lima e M. Hirst, 'Particularidades e 
Dilemas', p. 63.
3 This has been enhanced by the prospects of stabilisation
of the Brazilian economy prompted by the Real Plan. Cf. G. Smith
and B. Hinchberg, 7 International Business (Brazil): Is the
Recovery for Real', Business Week. 03 October 1994.
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the EAI implies a stimulus for the acceleration of integration 
in Latin America, with a view to avoiding a 'hub and spoke' 
structure in hemispheric trade. But in the short term the 
structure of incentives for both the USA and the Latin American 
countries 'first in line' to enter the EAI might lead to separate 
competitive efforts for an earlier accession to the EAI. This 
would fragment regional trade in the future.
The fact that the EAI has so far failed to make progress and 
that prospects are now pessimistic, largely because of the 
resistance that the US congress places on the free trade 
projects, have reduced the impact of the EAI and contribute to 
keep Argentina and Brazil together. But divergent objectives 
respecting the pace of stabilisation and international 
specialisation in Argentina and Brazil have generated tensions 
within the MERCOSUR and could generate difficulties in the 
future.
1.4. Conclusions
1. The previous chapter provided some quantitative data 
about how structural change and the debt crisis affected the 
economies of Argentina and Brazil. However, it is also necessary 
to consider trends in international trade policy and changes in 
the room of manoeuvre for policy-makers.
2. The debt crisis of the eighties implied a drastic 
reduction of the degrees of freedom that Argentina and Brazil had
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enjoyed in the seventies. This prompted a defensive move which 
shaped the efforts for regional cooperation and integration since 
1986. In addition, this was associated with negative trends in 
the international economy, already visible from the mid­
seventies. The weakening of multilateralism and the new 
protectionism (and, subsequently, the new regionalism) heightened 
uncertainty and stimulated defensive reactions in the eighties.
3. The EAI can act as a stimulus for regional integration, 
which may be accelerated so as to avoid a 'hub and spoke' 
structure and reduce the impact of power asymmetries in bilateral 
negotiations. But the incentives for the 'first in line' to 
negotiate individually with the USA are high, and therefore the 
EAI can have a significant centrifugal impact (if it is 
effectively implemented by the USA). However, the relatively 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the progress of 
the Latin American process of multilateral liberalisation would, 
at least, reduce the potential trade-diverting effects of the 
EAI.
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II.THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MERCOSUR REGIME
The previous section reviewed in detail the structural 
conditions that shaped the emergence of the new phase of 
regional economic integration initiated in 1986. This 
section will focus on how institutions for regional 
cooperation changed. First, the 1986-89 period is analyzed. 
This may be characterised as a period in which the 
predominant approach would be to increase industrial 
specialisation in the region, while trade liberalisation 
received less attention (II.1). Next, the MERCOSUR regime is 
addressed and the changes that it implied with respect to 
past experiences of integration highlighted (II.2). It will 
be suggested that while trade liberalisation was largely 
successful, efforts for the coordination of economic policy 
and the promotion of competitiveness had made little 
progress, and this posed a challenge to the MERCOSUR. 
Finally, the main conclusions of this section are presented 
(II.3)
II.1. The First Stage of Arqentina-Brazil Economic 
Integration: The Neo-Industrialist Approach. 1986-89
(a) The New features of Economic Integration in 1986-89
The administrations of Alfonsin (1984-89) and Sarney 
(1986-90) consolidated the rapprochement between Argentina 
and Brazil and initiated a new phase of economic integration
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1. The distinctive features of this new phase were its 
bilateral nature (reciprocal benefits would not be extended 
to other latin American countries) and the fact that it was 
based on a sectoral approach (selected industrial and 
agricultural activities were targeted for trade 
liberalisation) 2. The objective was to create new 
opportunities for trade in economies heavily affected by the 
external debt and by the fall in the rates of growth and 
investment 3. The initiative also sought to facilitate 
industrial restructuring in the context of the timid process 
of trade liberalisation initiated in 1986 4.
As a result, the development of industrial and 
technological capabilities assumed a relevance that was 
absent in past integration efforts. The initiative 
privileged the capital goods sector because of its ability 
to generate technological spill-overs and to encourage
1 Cf. F. T. Flores, 'Rumbo a la Integracidn', 
Intearacion Latinoamericana. Vol. 12, no. 122 (1987), pp. 3- 
6.
2 G. P. Rubio, 'Integracion Latinoamericana: De la 
Crisis a la Madurez?, Intearacion Latinoamericana. vol. 14, 
no. 148 (1989), especially pp. 78-80.
3 Cf. 0. Camilion, 'Integracidn Argentina-Brasil: 
Realidades y Proyecciones', Intearacidn Latinoamericana. 
vol. 12, no. 122 (1987), especially pp. 14-15.
4 For an early assessment of the process of integration 
see N. Huci and E. Jacobs, Primeros Pasos de la Intearacion 
Argentina-Brasil-Uruauav (Buenos Aires, 1989), especially 
chapter 1. On the gradual process of trade liberalisation 
initiated by Brazil in April 1988, see I. Danway, 'World 
Trade News: Brazil Lifts Ban on 1250 items', Financial 
Times, 23 November 1988.
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economic restructuring and competitiveness In addition, 
the new phase of integration contemplated the production of 
'public goods' aimed at the diffusion of new technologies, 
namely biotechnology and informatics.
Thus, bilateral cooperation in the period 1986-89 was 
based on sectoral integration and pioneer steps to foster 
technological learning, along with very cautious steps 
towards trade liberalisation.
(b) The PICE Agreements
Initially, economic integration was launched in the 
shape of a series of protocols signed in July 1986, 
denominated the Argentina-Brazil Programme of Integration 
and Cooperation (Spanish and Portuguese acronym PICE), 
covering several sectors and issue-areas 2. The protocols 
signed were the following.
Protocol no. 1 on the capital goods sector 3. This 
protocol provided for the elimination of tariff and non 
tariff barriers for a positive 'Common List' of capital
1 This sector was seen as especially convenient for 
expanding intra-industry trade and thus would not rise fears 
of further de-industrialisation in Argentina. Cf. H.R.
Gertel and H.G.M. Marega, 'Caracteristicas del Intercambio 
entre Argentina y Brasil', Integracion latinoamericana. vol. 
12, no. 122 (1987), p. 29.
2 Cf. 'Documentacion: Acta de Amistad Argentino-
Brasilena. Democracia, Paz y Desarrollo', Intearacion 
latinoamericana. vol. 12, no. 122 (1987), p. 71.
3 Cf. 'Documentacion: Acta de Amistad Argentino-
Brasilena', pp. 73-78.
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goods, on the basis of 'offer lists' provided by the 
suppliers in each country. The inclusion of new items in 
this list would be extended through semestral negotiations. 
The original list of 244 items in 1987 was expanded in 
subsequent negotiations *.
Protocol N. 1 was envisaged as a central instrument in 
this new phase of bilateral cooperation 2. If the protocol 
offered a new outlet for Brazilians producer of capital 
goods, opportunities were still higher for Argentina. The 
agreement with Brazil could contribute to recover an 
industry which had been severely affected in the late 
seventies, and the Argentine conglomerates were reported to 
favour it 3. On the other hand, asymmetries in industrial 
capabilities between Argentina and Brazil implied that 
Argentine producers only offered a narrow 'Offer List'. This 
was a barrier to trade, as equilibrium was one of the 
objectives of the agreement 4. Moreover, the mechanism of 
negotiation (based on the cumbersome 'product-by-product'
1 An appendix to Protocol 1 was signed in Viedma, 
Argentina, in July 1987, extending the list of capital goods 
to be exchanged. Cf. 'Documentacidn: Programa de Integraci6n 
y Cooperacidn Economica Entre la Repdblica Argentina y la 
Republica Federativa del Brasil. Informe de la Comisi6n de 
Ejecucidn del programa', Intearacidn Latinoamericana. vol, 
12, no. 129 (1987), pp. 56-59.
2 F. Porta and J. Fontanals, 'La Integracidn Intra- 
Industrial: El Caso del Acuerdo Argentino-Brasileno en el 
Sector de Bienes de Capital', Integracidn latinoamericana. 
vol. 15, no. 158 (1990), pp. 14-25.
3 Cf. 'Argentina and Brazil: Integration Makes (Gradual) 
Progress', RS, 68-09, 20 November 1986.
4 Cf. Ibidem.
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approach already tried by LAFTA) facilitated protectionist 
pressures, especially from the Argentine side *.
Protocols no. 2 and 3 established quotas for wheat
exports from Argentina and allowed for complementary food 
exports in case of a supply crisis in either country 2. Wheat 
exports should increase from 1,375.000 metric tones in 1987 
to 2,000.000 metric tones in 1990 3.
Protocol no. 4 aimed to encourage liberalisation in 
items not specifically contemplated by the PICE, and was 
negotiated in the LAIA Partial Agreement N.I. It provided
1 If multinational firms showed a small representation 
in the capital goods agreement, highly cartelized schemes 
for bilateral trade in motor vehicles were implemented by 
firms like Autolatina, Sevel and Renault in Argentina and 
Fiat, General Motors and Autolatina in Brazil. Cf. 'First 
capital Goods Traded Under Argentina-Brazil Integration', 
RS, 87-01, 5 February 1987. In some cases this took the form 
of intra-industry trade, like in the case of Autolatina and 
Scania. Cf. 'Autolatina: Latest Bid to rationalise', RS, 87- 
01, 5 February 1987. In other cases, like that of Renault 
and Volvo, the exchange was organised on the basis of 
existing international agreement between the two firms. As 
in the case of LAFTA, differences in the attitude of 
multinational firms in the capital goods and motor vehicles 
industries may be related to problems of industrial 
organization. It is likely that in the more concentrated 
motor vehicles sector oligopoly agreements were more easily 
obtained. Cf. D. Chudnovsky and F. Porta, 'La Trayectoria 
del Proceso de Integracion Argentino-Brasileno: Tendencias 
e Incertidumbres', unpublish. paper, CENIT DT/5. Buenos 
Aires, 1990, pp. 7-11.
2 Cf. 'Documentacion: Acta de Amistad Argentino- 
Brasilena', pp. 79-80.
3 Cf. These goals were not achieved because of the 
policy of Brazil of subsidising domestic production and the 
competition of imports from the USA and Canada. However, 
this obstacle was removed when in 1989 Brazil phased out her 
policy of subsidies. Cf. J. Tavares de Araujo Jr., 'A 
Politica Comercial Brasileira e a Integragao 
Latinoamericana', Instituto de Economia Industrial-UFRJ. 
Texto Para Discussao. no. 233, Rio de janeiro, 1990, pp. 5- 
6.
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for a linear increase of 10 % in the margin of preference 
granted by the creditor to a debtor one when the yearly 
deficit in the trade balance was higher than 8 % of trade. 
This protocol would be used subsequently to establish the 
new timetable for trade liberalisation defined in the Buenos 
Aires Act of July 1990 (see below).
Protocol no. 5 provided for the creation of binational 
enterprises which would enjoy national treatment in both 
countries l. This was devised to encourage the association of 
Argentine and Brazilian firms with a view to exploiting the 
opportunities opened by economic integration.
Protocol no. 6 provided for mutual credits, managed by 
the Central Banks of Argentina and Brazil. Protocol no. 7 
created an Investment Fund (initial capital of US$ 200
millions) to finance export activities in the debtor country
2
•
Protocol no. 8 addressed cooperation in the energy 
field, including the construction of a dam in Neuquen, 
Argentina, and a pipeline to transport Argentine natural gas 
to the Rio Grande do Sul province of Brazil.
Protocol no. 9 set forth the creation of an Argentina- 
Brazil Centre of Biotechnology 3. In addition, common 
research efforts were initiated in the agricultural, health
1 Cf. 'Documentacion: Acta de Amistad Argentino- 
Brasilena', pp. 82-83.
2 Cf. Ibid., p. 83. Like in protocol no. 4, the aim was 
encouraging exports to balance trade deficits, preventing 
the use of restrictions and safeguard clauses.
3 Cf. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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and energy fields, like the creation of the binational
research programme in informatics and the Argentine-
Brazilian School of Informatics l.
Protocol no. 12 called for cooperation in civil and 
military aeronautical research and production. The basic 
component of the programme was an association between 
EMBRAER (Brazil) and FAMA (Argentina) to manufacture a 19- 
passenger airplanes, appropriate for mid-range travel, with 
a view to competing in the international market.
Protocol no. 13 provided for the reduction of trade 
barriers in the steel and iron sectors 2.
Protocols no. 11 and 17 addressed the strategic problem
of cooperation in the nuclear sector, providing for
immediate communication and assistance in case of nuclear 
accidents, and for cooperation in research and supply of 
nuclear equipment 3. By the end of 1989 trade in 32 items of 
the nuclear industry had been liberalised. This also gave 
more transparency to Argentina and Brazil's nuclear 
programmes, reducing suspicions about the development of 
nuclear technology 4.
1 Cf. 'Brazilian-Argentine Integration Takes Another 
Step Forward', RS, 87-06, 6 August 1987.
2 Cf. 'Documentacion: Acta de Amistad Argentino- 
Brasilha', p. 88.
3 Cf. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
4 In August 1987 Brazilians were invited to visit the 
Argentine nuclear research centre of Picanieyu, where 
Argentina developed her uranium-enrichment technique. Cf. 
'Brazilian-Argentine Integration Takes Another Step 
Forward', RS, 87-06, 6 August 1987.
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Protocol no. 14 and 15 addressed the development of 
surface and maritime transportation
Protocol no. 21, signed on 7 April 1987, provided for 
trade in the motor vehicles and parts industries 2. For 
AUTOLATINA the agreement was instrumental in the 
specialisation of its subsidiaries and in facilitating the 
exchange of cars and parts. Annual quotas for vehicles (from 
5000 vehicles in 1989 to 10000 in 1990) and auto parts (US$ 
150 millions) were agreed. An annexe to protocol N. 21 was 
signed in July 1990, allowing for an increase in the 
exchange of parts to US$ 300 millions in 1992, 500 millions 
in 1992, and complete liberalization thereafter 3.
Protocol no. 22 aimed to facilitate trade in the 
agroindustrial sector. Trade barriers would be eliminated 
for a common list of agroindustrial products, initially 
composed of 200 items. Health controls on fruits and 
vegetables in both countries would in turn be made 
compatible, so as to avoid non tariff protectionism.
A new step in the integration process occurred in 
November 1988, when the Argentina-Brazil Treaty of 
Integration, Cooperation and Development was signed and
1 Cf. 'Documentacion: Acta de Amistad Argentino- 
Brasilna', pp. 88-89.
2 Cf. 'Documentacion: Programa de Integracidn y 
Cooperacidn Econdmica Entre la Repdblica Argentina y la 
Republica Federal del Brasil', Integracidn Latinoamericana. 
vol. 13, no. 136-137 (1988), pp. 114-116.
3 Cf. 'Documentacion: Argentina-Brasil: Comunicados,
Declaraciones, Acuerdos y Protocolos', Integracidn 
Latinoamericana. vol. 13, no. 159 (1990), pp. 69-72.
427
subsequently approved by the respective congresses (August 
1989). While keeping the idea that integration should be 
based on a flexible, pragmatic and gradualist approach, a 
specific programme for the reduction of trade barriers and 
the achievement of a common market was set forth. The Treaty 
was aimed at forming a common market in two stages. In a 
first stage (from August 1989 to August 1999) tariffs would 
be eliminated and macroeconomic and competitive policies 
coordinated and harmonised. In a second stage (for which no 
timetable was proposed) a common external tariff would be 
adopted and the rest of economic policies harmonised !. The 
1988 Treaty, despite its generality and the lack of 
definition of certain important topics 2, represented an 
effort for preserving the momentum of cooperation. It 
reasserted its strategic value in a moment in which both 
countries were going through major short-term difficulties 
as inflation had returned to high levels.
In sum, the protocols to PICE aimed to enhance both 
bilateral trade and technological cooperation in selected 
areas. A great emphasis was placed on the capital goods
1 Cf. 'Documentacion: programa de Integracion y
Cooperacion Economica entre la Repdblica Argentina y la 
Republica Argentina de Brasil: Informe de la Comisi6n de
Ejecucion', Intearacion Latinoamericana. vol. 14, no. 152 
(1989), pp. 52-60.
2 There was no clearly definition of what coordination 
and harmonisation of policies should entail. Moreover, as 
the second stage of integration was not subject to a 
specific timetable and required parliamentary approval, the 
objective of forming a common market remained open as 
regards its pace and instruments. Cf. ECLA, El Tratado de 
Asuncion del Mercado Comtin del Cono Sur (MERCOSUR): Alaunas 
Consideraciones (Santiago, 1992), p.7.
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sector, which would foster learning and intra-industry 
trade. PICE also contemplated sectors in which economic 
complementarity (wheat, agroindustries) or economies of 
scale were significant (steel and motor vehicles). Initial 
steps were taken for cooperation in the diffusion of 
technology (binational training and research centres in 
biotechnology and informatics) with a view to foster the 
process of catching-up with the international technological 
frontier. In the case of cooperation in the aeronautical and 
nuclear sectors, strategic objectives played a role 
alongside with technology. Finally, the formation of 
binational enterprises and an investment fund would 
facilitate restructuring and reduce protectionist responses 
to integration. Moreover, the objective of forming a free 
trade area in ten years, as a first stage towards a common 
market, was accorded in the 1988 Treaty of Integration, 
reflecting the strategic value that Argentina and Brazil had 
granted to economic integration since 1986.
(c) The Limits of the Neo-Industrialist Approach
The process of integration in the period 1986-1989 to 
some extent represented a revival of the gradual, state- 
oriented pattern proposed by ECLA in the late fifties. This 
placed significant demands on the governments administrative 
and financial capabilities which were in contradiction with 
the fiscal crisis and the constraints on policy making that 
prevailed in the late eighties. The failure of the heterodox
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stabilisation plans, sudden fluctuations in the exchange 
rate and weak economic growth compromised the role of the 
regional market.
The government purchasing power had been seen as a key 
instrument to sustain trade in capital goods 1 and this was 
challenged by the economic crisis of 1989. The crisis also 
compromised the financial contributions to common projects 
in technological development (like in biotechnology, 
informatics and the aeronautical sector), which had to be 
delayed. While the PICE emphasised the capacity of the state 
to regulate and promote, the fiscal crisis and the priority 
of short-term macroeconomic problems made this projet 
largely inviable. In mid-September the representatives of 
heavy machinery and civil engineering companies demanded an 
acceleration of negotiations with a view to expand the 
market, then heavily contracted by the fall in public 
investment 2.
1 Monica Hirst, 'Integragao e o MERCOSUR', lecture given 
at the University of Sao Paulo, April 1993.
2 Roberto Vidigal, representative of the Brazilian 
association of Producers of Capital Goods (Portuguese 
Acronym ADBID), observed that the fall in government demand 
for capital goods had a large impact on the industry, and 
that the regional market could play a stimulating role. Cf.
I. Dawnay, World Trade News: Move on Brazi1-Argentina 
Trade', Financial Times. 15 September 1989.
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II.2. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR): Regional 
Integration in a Context of Openness
The process initiated with the PICAB in 1986, and which 
culminated with the 1988 Treaty of Integration, Cooperation 
and Development, brought to the negotiation table a highly 
complex, diversified and ambitious bilateral agenda. It 
represented a path-breaking change with respect to past 
dominant perceptions in Argentina and Brazil. Most relevant 
steps were given in the direction of deactivating rivalry, 
which had been a stumbling block since the mid-sixties. The 
inability of the state to led this process, however, imposed 
a rectification of policies. Cooperation would not recede, 
but it would take new directions, in accordance with the new 
liberal agenda of the nineties.
(a) The Move Towards the MERCOSUR
In July 1990 Menem and Collor de Mello signed the 
Buenos Aires Act 1, which established a new scheme for the 
constitution of the common market between Argentina and 
Brazil 2. It was then agreed that in December 1994 all 
barriers to the movement of goods, capital and labour 
between the two countries would be eliminated. This
1 Collor de Mello had visited Alfonsin in October 1989 
and reaffirmed his intention of giving continuity to 
bilateral cooperation. Cf. 'Argentina-Brazil Links 
Strengthened', RS, 89-08, 12 October 1989.
2 Cf. 'Documentacion: Argentina-Brasil: Comunicados,
Declaraciones, Acuerdos y Protocolos', pp. 67-68.
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drastically reduced the transitional period defined in the 
1988 Treaty of Integration. The common market would be 
achieved through automatic and linear reductions of all 
trade barriers and the coordination of macroeconomic 
policies l. At the same time, sectoral integration would 
continue on the basis of existing protocols and special 
agreements in highly sensitive or technologically dynamic 
areas. Finally, a Common Market Group was created with 
executive functions, in charge of promoting the 
harmonisation and coordination of policies 2.
The move towards a common market between Argentina and 
Brazil raised concerns in Paraguay and Uruguay 3. Paraguay 
and Uruguay had substantial part of their trade with Brazil 
and Argentina and they therefore feared trade discrimination 
4. In fact, very early in the integration process Uruguay had
1 Cf. G. Mead, 'World Trade News: Collor and Menem Seek 
Closer economic Ties', Financial Times. 06 July 1990.
2 The new timetable for bilateral trade liberalisation 
was subsequently translated into the Partial Agreement N.14 
of LAIA (ACE-14). This incorporated all previous agreements 
between Argentina and Brazil (PICE and subsequent 
protocols), the decisions of the Buenos Aires Act of July 
1990 and the resolutions of the first meeting of the Common 
Market Group in Buenos Aires, in September 1991. The latter 
included a protocol for the Solution of Controversies, 
sanctions for the falsification of certificates of origin, 
terms of reference for the sectoral agreements and the 
internal regime for the workings of the Common Market Group. 
Cf. ECLA, 'El Tratado de Asduncion', pp. 37-38.
3 Cf. J. Barham, 'World Trade News: Argentina and Brazil 
in Common Market Move', Financial Times. 06 September 1990.
4 Cf. J.M. Quijano, 'Los Casos de Uruguay y Paraguay, 
Dos Economias Pequenas el MERCOSUR', unpubl. paper, 
Montevideo, 1993, especially pp. 12-20.
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sought her inclusion l, and this was reinforced by the new 
t i m e t a b l e  2 . P a r a g u a y
in turn joined the process from the beginning of the 
democratisation process in September 1990. As a result, the 
Asuncidn Treaty of 26 March 1991 established the MERCOSUR, 
a common market project based on the instruments of the 
second phase of the Argentine-Brazilian bilateral process, 
namely the programme for automatic trade liberalisation 
during a transitional period 3.
An important step towards the implementation of the 
project was the so-called Cronograma de las Lenas ('Las 
Lenas Timetable', June 1992), aimed at the coordination and 
harmonisation of policies. According to this timetable, the 
Working Groups of the MERCOSUR (see below) would identify 
existing difficulties for policy coordination and propose 
policy measures. The statute for the constitution of 
binational enterprises (agreed in the Buenos Aires Act, 
granting national treatment for firms established with
1 Cf. 'Sanguinetti: Likely to Join In Argentine-
Brazilian Integration', RS, 86-06, 7 August 1986.
2 Uruguay enjoyed preferential access to the Argentine 
and Brazilian markets as a result of the CAUCE (Argentina) 
and PEC (Brazil) agreements signed with her neighbours in 
the seventies. The Treaty of Integration between Argentina 
and Brazil eroded these preferences, aggravated by the fact 
that the Uruguayan preferences were subject to quotas, while 
those of the 1988 Treaty would not be limited. Cf. G. 
Magarinos, Uruguay en el MERCOSUR (montevideo, 1992) and 
CINVE, En el Umbral de la Integracion (Montevideo, 1990).
3 The transitional period was that defined between the 
moment in which the MERCOSUR came in vigour (29 November 
1991) and the conclusion of the common market (31 December 
1994). Cf. ECLA, 'El Tratado de Asuncion', p. 11.
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capital of both countries) was ratified l. The Asunci6n 
Treaty was incorporated to LAIA through the Partial 
Agreement N. 18 (ACE-18), which provides the legal covering 
of MERCOSUR within the framework of the Latin American 
regional regime.
(b) The MERCOSUR Regime
The principal components of the MERCOSUR regime are 
related to the programme of trade liberalisation, the 
coordination of external and domestic economic policies and 
sectoral policies aimed at enhancing competitiveness in the 
international economy.
The programme of trade liberalisation comprised an 
initial preference of 47 % at the moment in which the
MERCOSUR started (November 1991) and an accumulative 
semestral increase of 7 %, which should be elevated to 11 % 
in December 1994, so as to reach a preference of 100 % 
within the sub-region. Although it was established that non­
tariff preferences would be completely eliminated, no 
specific mechanism for its phasing out was established 2. 
This should be subject to negotiations during the
1 Paraguay and Uruguay, however, have no yet been 
incorporated to this statute, which remains bilateral. 
Still, the objective is to transform it in a sub-regional 
instrument.
2 Non-tariff barriers could only be applied to a list of 
goods expressly defined in the Complementary Notes to the 
Complementary Agreement of the Programme of Trade 
Liberalisation of LAIA. See on this point ECLA, 'El Tratado 
de Asuncion', p.14.
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transitional period. The original list of exceptions for the 
tariff liberalisation process included 393 NALADI items in 
the case of Argentina, 324 for Brazil, 439 for Paraguay and 
960 for Uruguay. The number of items in the exception list 
would be reduced at an annually rate of 20 %. Escape clauses 
could be applied during the transitional period, under 
certain conditions, but they could not be used after 
December 1994 *. For Uruguay and Paraguay a special timetable 
was adopted, by which these countries should reduce by 10 % 
the number of items in the exception list in November 1991, 
10 % in December 1991 and 20 % at the end of the following 
years, therefore reaching the 100 % preference a year later 
than Argentina and Brazil. No special treatment, however, 
would be granted to the smaller MERCOSUR countries after 
that date.
The clear-cut schedule for trade liberalisation in the 
MERCOSUR removed the obstacle implied by the former product 
by product approach. The process of trade liberalisation has 
made steady progress. Conversely, advancing towards policy 
coordination, industrial restructuring and technological 
cooperation has been more difficult. Policy coordination in 
the external front made some progress 2, in the shape of the 
common external tariff and the adoption of common anti­
1 Cf. Annexo IV to the Asuncion Treaty.
2 Article I of the Asuncion treaty explicitly states 
that the MERCOSUR would coordinate their positions 'in 
regional and international economic and trade fora'.
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dumping and rules of origin legislation l. As mentioned, the 
MERCOSUR signed as a group the '4+1' agreement with the USA 
and an agreement on technical and institutional cooperation 
with the EEC (April 1991).
On the other hand, advances in macroeconomic
coordination and common sectoral policies have been 
insignificant. Valuable studies have been conducted and 
information on macroeconomic policies has been exchanged in 
recent years 2. In addition, progress towards the 
harmonisation of financial regulations was made, including 
a framework for investments in the stock market, the
adoption of the Basilea rules for financial institutions 3 
and the approval of a Joint Investment Protection Agreement, 
based on the 'national treatment' clause 4. But little has 
yet been done for the coordination of exchange rate
policies. Stabilisation policies in Argentina and Brazil 
have been applied independently and with different degree of 
success. Still, important elements of 'spontaneous'
1 The adoption of common anti-dumping rules are called 
for in Article IV of the Asuncion Treaty and rules of origin 
are detailed in Annexo II to the Treaty. It is established 
that goods using inputs from outside the region would become 
original from the region if they suffer a transformation 
which place them in a new category of the NALADI 
classification. Until December 1994 there would be admitted 
products whose MERCOSUR content is no lower than 40 % of the 
FOB value of the final product.
2 Cf. J.M. Aragao, La Armonizacion de Politicas 
Macroeconomicas en el MERCOSUR: La Construccion de un 
Mercado Comun (Buenos Aires, 1993).
3 Cf. R. Barbosa, 'Regional Common Markets', pp. 8-10.
4 Cf. 'As Regras Para Proteger os Investimentos', Gazeta 
Mercantil. 19 January 1994.
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convergence are already visible, as both countries have 
moved towards similar stabilisation programmes *. 
Concurrently, the interest in controlling competitive 
devaluations by limiting the fluctuation of the exchange 
rates has gained strength in the MERCOSUR policy debate 2. 
This would allow the MERCOSUR to contribute to the 
stabilisation programmes in both countries.
While the efforts for stabilisation tend to facilitate 
macroeconomic coordination, the problem of the adoption of 
common policies in the technological and industrial field 
appears much more difficult. The promotion of sectoral and 
technological cooperation is expressly recommended in the 
Asuncidn Treaty, which calls for 'the adoption of sectoral 
agreements with the aim of optimising the utilisation and 
mobility of factors of production and the achieving of 
efficient scales of operation' 3. Resolution N.3/91 of the
1 After a meeting of the MERCOSUR Economic Ministers in 
August 1991, Cavallo observed that 'coordination will come 
almost automatically if we continue to pursue the same 
present policies and, fundamentally, maintain the fiscal 
discipline which we are all seeking to impose'. Cf. 
'MERCOSUR Economy Ministers Discuss the Coordination of 
Policies', RS, 91-06, 8 August 1991.
2 On the debate about a 'band of fluctuation' for the 
exchange rate, see M. Garriga, R. Etchegaray and P. 
Sanguinetti, 'Notas Acerca de la Aplicacidn de Bandas 
Cambiarias en el MERCOSUR', unpublish. paper, Centro de 
Economia Internacional. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. 
Comercio Internacional v Culto. Buenos Aires, Preliminary 
Version, October 1993. The idea was originated in a 
Brazilian proposal of July 1993, which had positive 
reception among the MERCOSUR countries. Cf. Gazeta 
Mercantil. Sao Paulo, 2 July 1993. The band of fluctuation 
should be in vigour from January 1995, reducing the 
distortions of the 1991-93 period.
3 Cf. Letter "d", Article V, Chapter I of the Asuncidn 
Treaty (author's translation).
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Common Market Group states that sectoral agreements should 
'accelerate integration and favour intra-sectoral 
specialisation', and promote the association of firms to 
compete in third markets, subject to the condition that this 
would not imply the formation of cartels nor constrain free 
trade in the common market l. However, instruments for this 
have not been defined and the role of public policy in 
promoting restructuring remains unclear, as illustrated by 
the fact that no common financial fund has been approved.
Thus, specific initiatives in the field of sectoral and 
technological cooperation have lagged behind trade 
liberalisation. The Working Group no. 7 on industrial and 
technological cooperation selected priority sectors - steel, 
autos, electronics, oil, petro-chemical, chemicals, 
textiles, paper and agroindustries - for which complementary 
agreement were recommended, and some important steps were 
taken in this field 2. A triennial plan for cooperation in 
education, research and training 3, and projects for
1 Cf. MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N.03/1191. See also J.A.E. Faria, 
MERCOSUL: Princloios. Finalidade e Alcance do Tratado de
Assuncao (Brasilia, 1993), p. 66.
2 Studies by the Working Group no. 7 are conducted in 
the areas of technology diffusion, environment, industrial 
quality and productivity, harmonisation of industrial 
policies and the promotion of small and medium enterprises. 
It also offers advice to the private sector in order to 
ensure that sectoral agreements are compatible with MERCOSUR 
norms. Cf. MERCOSUR/SGT N.7/REC N.04/92. In march 1993 a 
special meeting for the discussion of cooperation in science 
and technology was held in Brasilia, in which the financing 
of research and the formation of human resources was 
debated.
3 A Commission of Ministers of Education was created in 
December 1991, during the first meeting of Education 
Ministers of the MERCOSUR. In their second meeting (Buenos
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technological cooperation in agricultural production, the 
pharmaceutical industry, environment and intellectual 
property have been approved *. But so far its implementation 
have advanced very slowly and played a minor role in the 
integration process. This was due, in part, to the fact that 
they are more complex and 'institution-intensive' than other 
policy areas. In addition, it reflects the failure of 
industrial policies in the past (including that of the neo­
industrialist integration approach of 1986-89) which made 
policy-makers suspicious of the role that the government 
could play in economic transformation. The implications of 
the different timing of trade liberalisation, macroeconomic 
coordination and industrial restructuring for the MERCOSUR 
will be addressed in sub-section (d).
(c) The Institutional Framework
Problems of policy coordination in the MERCOSUR are in 
part related to the fact that its institutional framework is 
still provisory. Decision power lies on the Council of 
Ministers, made up by the External Relations and Economy 
Ministers of the four countries, which at least once a year
Aires, June 1992), the Ministers accorded a triennial plan 
for the education sector, embracing cooperation in basic 
education, capacitation of human resources, research and 
graduate studies. The plan was subsequently ratified in a 
third meeting held in Brasilia in November 1992.
1 These projects will be financed be financed by the 
IDB, FAO, FONPLATA (Funding for Investments in the River 
Plate Basin) , OEA, CEE and WOIP (World Organisation of 
Intellectual Property). Cf. Gazeta Mercantil. 29 November 
1993.
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should meet with the presence of the Presidents. The 
executive functions are in the hands of the Common Market 
Group integrated with four representatives of each country. 
These representatives belong to the Ministry of Economy and 
Central Bank of their countries. Subordinated to the Common 
Market group there are eleven Working Groups in charge of 
the different areas of negotiation and the elaboration of 
technical proposals for the coordination and harmonisation 
of policies. The monitoring of the common external policy 
and trade-related mechanisms would be in charge of another 
inter-governmental body, the MERCOSUR Trade Commission *.
Thus, no supra-national decision body has been created 
and the eventual institutional framework of the common 
market would be defined in a special conference to be 
celebrated in the last semester of 1994. The power of taking 
policy initiatives is so far firmly in the hands of the 
member states, as it was in the case of LAFTA and LAIA 2. The 
prevalence of the consensus criterion for adopting decisions 
in the MERCOSUR potentially implies less efficiency in 
decision making and generates problems, given the different 
population and GDP of the four MERCOSUR countries. 
Therefore, a major effort for institution-building is still
1 Cf. R. Barbosa, 'Regional Common Markets', p. 10.
2 J.A.E. Faria, MERCOSUL: Princloios. Finalidade e 
Alcance do Tratado de Assuncao. p.72, observes that 'in 
conformity with the individualism that characterizes the 
relations among the Latin American countries, bound to an 
exclusive notion of national sovereignty which still 
dominates diplomacy in the continent, the Treaty does not 
grant the exercise of any fraction of the sovereignty of the 
member states to institutions established by themselves'.
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to be done. Some important steps towards supra-nationality 
have already been taken, as the 'Protocol of Brasilia for 
the Solution of Controversies' l. The creation of the Joint 
Parliamentary Commission of the MERCOSUR as the embryo of a 
future parliament of the MERCOSUR suggests as well that an 
expanded role for sub-regional political bodies may emerge 
in the future 2.
Chart VII.1 offers a comparative summary of the 
transitional MERCOSUR regime inaugurated in 1991 and the 
regime of restrained multilateralism of the period 1960- 
1980.
1 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. n.01/1991. The protocol contemplates 
four instances in the negotiation of controversies. The 
first two are direct negotiations between the states 
concerned and consultations to the Common Market Group, and 
do not require any kind of supra-national power decision. 
But if the previous instances failed then an arbitrary panel 
is established, whose decisions are binding. In effect, 
article 21 of the protocol for the Settlement of Disputes 
establishes that 'the decisions of the Arbitral Panel cannot 
be appealed, (and) are obligatory for the parties in the 
controversy from the moment of the notification'. In 
addition, a more expedite procedure is contemplated to 
attend demands from the private sector. Clearly, such a 
mechanism is still very much an ad hoc arbitral procedure 
which lacks the formal institutionalisation of a sub­
regional Justice Court. Yet it suggests that efforts have 
been committed to set up a regime in which member states 
would be prepared to accept decisions from supra-national 
bodies - in this case, an Arbitral Panel. In the Asuncidn 
Treaty, if direct negotiations were not successful, the 
controversy should be placed before the Common Market Group 
and, in case of the persistence of the disagreement, before 
the Council of Ministers (Annexo III).
2 The Joint Parliamentary Commission of the MERCOSUR had 
its regulations approved in Montevideo in December 1991. The 
Commission already held two ordinary meetings, the first in 
Cordoba in May 1992 and the second in Brasilia a year later.
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CHART VII.1. REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES. 1960-1993
Restrained Regionalism MERCOSUR
Principles
(i) Cooperation subordinated 
to regional power 
competition;
(ii) Regionalism;
(iii) Expansion of industrial 
exports as a complement to 
import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI-2);
(iv) Saving hard currency;
(v) Reciprocity and 
equilibrium in regional 
trade.
Principles
(i) Regional power 
competition subordinated to 
cooperation;
(ii) Sub-regionalism (towards 
regionalism?);
(iii) Sub-regional trade 
liberalisation as part of a 
process of multilateral 
liberalisation;
(iv) enhancing regional 
competitiveness in a context 
of external openness; improve 
the allocation of resources 
for a competitive insertion 
in the international economy.
Norms
(i) Liberalisation limited to 
a set of primary and 
industrial goods;
(ii) Regional trade 
preferences;
(iii) Regional payments 
agreement;
(iv) Special treatment for 
developing countries.
Norms
(i) Common external economic 
policy;
(ii) Liberalisation including 
most of trade (with limited 
exemptions);
(iii) Regional trade 
preferences limited by the 
objective of international 
competitiveness;
(iv) Sectoral and 
technological cooperation for 
the promotion of 
competitiveness.
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Rules
(i) Selective product-by- 
product trade liberalisation 
leading to a system of 
limited trade preferences; 
tariff and non-tariff 
reductions for a list of 
negotiated products; 
complementary sectoral 
agreements;
(iii) Automatic compensation 
of regional trade (Santo 
Domingo Agreement);
(iii) Non extensible 
preferences and special 
schedule of liberalisation 
for less developed countries; 
preferential bilateral 
agreements.
Rules
(i) Common external tariff, 
anti-dumping and competitive 
policies; coordination of 
macroeconomic policies;
(ii) Automatic, linear and 
progressive trade 
liberalisation; elimination 
of all tariff and non-tariff 
barriers; progressive phasing 
out of a list of exemptions;
(iii) No special treatment to 
less developed country;
(iv) Sub-regional initiatives 
for cooperation in education, 
research, formation of human 
capital and industrial 
quality and productivity.
Decision-makina orocedures Decision-makina orocedures
High degree of formal 
institutionalisation; low 
degree of supra-nationality; 
strong influence of the 
private sector in 
negotiations.
Low degree of formal 
institutionalisation; low 
degree of supra-nationality; 
reduced influence of the 
private sector; stabilisation 
policies as a factor of 
policy convergence in the two 
countries.
It can be seen in Chart VII. 1 that the principle of 
rivalry and the regionalist approach of LAFTA were replaced 
by that of cooperation and sub-regional integration. While 
in LAFTA the regional market was seen as a complement for 
import-substituting industrialisation, in the MERCOSUR 
regional liberalisation is regarded as an instrument for the 
more efficient allocation of resources in a context of 
multilateral liberalisation. Reciprocity and equilibrium 
left place to the quest of efficiency and international 
competitiveness in the sub-region. Concurrently, saving hard
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currency does not appear as a relevant principle in the
MERCOSUR. This may be associated with the expectation that
trade liberalisation and market-led restructuring would
provide an adequate expansion of exports. In other words, it
is expected that balance of payments difficulties would no
longer be a barrier to growth in the Latin American
economies in a context of higher productivity and efficiency 
1
•
Change in principles led to new norms. First, the 
principle of cooperation implied not to apply unilateral 
decisions in a wide range of policy areas, like tariffs 
(common external tariff), rules of origin, the settlement of 
disputes, anti-dumping and export-promotion practices and 
(if the proposal of a band of fluctuation is accepted) 
exchange rate policies. This contrasts with the loose 
commitments of LAFTA. Secondly, the emphases on efficiency 
led to abandon the norm of special trade preferences for 
less developed countries. Thirdly, the new context of 
openness implies that trade preferences would loss 
relevance. Conversely, sectoral and technological 
cooperation should acquire an enhanced role in the promotion 
of international competitiveness.
In turn, the rule of automatic and linear reductions in 
trade barriers replaced the product by product approach of 
LAFTA. All trade would be liberalised in the MERCOSUR
1 Still, the objective of saving hard currency is 
somewhat contemplated by the LAIA Payments Agreement. The 
MERCOSUR belongs to LAIA, and this allows for a regional 
approach in certain policy areas.
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(although a small albeit significant group of products would 
be included in the common market only by 2006), as 
originally proposed but never achieved in practice in the 
LAFTA project. The emphases on a market-led process in the 
MERCOSUR excludes the adoption of managed trade at a 
sectoral level, which were admitted in the LAFTA 
complementary agreements. New rules for cooperation in this 
field are discussed (although not yet implemented) , with 
emphases on the formation of human capital and joint 
technological learning. But it is not yet clear the role 
that these agreements would play in the MERCOSUR.
Finally, the process of decision-making maintained a 
low degree of formal institutionalisation and supra- 
nationality. Governments have not yet accepted the transfer 
of sovereignty to sub-regional institutions. So far this has 
been compensated by convergence towards market-led policies 
and orthodox programmes of stabilisation. The emphases on 
market forces has also been instrumental in limiting the 
capacity of the private sector to resist liberalisation. But 
it is likely that institutional problems would become 
increasingly complex as the MERCOSUR countries advance to 
the common market, demanding more elaborated institutions 
and policies in the fields of coordination, harmonisation 
and the promotion of competitiveness.
445
(d) MERCOSUR: Towards Higher International
Competitiveness?
The results achieved by the MERCOSUR, a customs union 
for about 85 % of trade in only five years, contrasts
markedly with the failure of LAFTA (considering LAFTA stated 
objectives). The adoption of an automatic process of 
liberalisation and the priority given to international 
competitiveness prevented sectoral demands for protection to 
hinder integration The MERCOSUR has also encouraged a 
significant expansion of regional trade and investments that 
have strengthened the interest in integration and made less 
probable a reversal of this process.
However, the difficulties to advance in macroeconomic 
coordination (especially in the management of the exchange 
rates) created tensions. Growing external imbalances led 
Argentina to apply trade restrictions which affected the 
MERCOSUR countries. Quotas were imposed on pneumatics, paper 
and textiles; anti-dumping duties applied to some metal- 
mechanical and metal products; the 1993 quotas for the 
automobile sector (accorded in Protocol 21) suspended; 
specific duties on textiles and garments imposed; and 
tariffs on capital goods set at a zero level, thereby 
eliminating the preferences formerly granted to Brazil with
1 As observed by the Secretary of Economic Policy of 
Brazil, Winston Fritsch, 'the policy of liberalisation has 
so far worked because no exemptions have been made, avoiding 
the case-by-case approach'. Cf. Gazeta Mercantil. 30 June 
1993, p. 3
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respect the rest of the world *. Moreover, Argentina imposed 
the so-called "statistical tax” of 10% on imports - a thinly 
disguised new tariff 2. Brazil reacted by suspending the 
preference granted to Argentine producers of capital goods 
and by reducing the Argentina quota for synthetic textiles 
(September 1993) 3. Although Itamaraty (which understood the 
difficulties of the Argentine economy and valued the 
benefits of the MERCOSUR in the long term) sought to 
minimise friction, opposition to the MERCOSUR became 
increasingly vocal in Brazil 4. Paraguay reacted angrily too 
to Argentine measures which were seen as violating the 
spirit and the letter of the MERCOSUR 5. In turn, Argentina 
saw the behaviour of Brazil as 'predatory' and only based on 
the lack of political will to implement a serious programme 
of stabilisation 6. Therefore, macroeconomic divergencies and
1 Cf. Gazeta Mercantil. 3 December 1993, p. 3.
2 Cf. 'Brasil Endurece Negociagao Com a Argentina', 
Gazeta Mercantil. 30 July 1993.
3 Cf. Gazeta Mercantil. 23 November 1993, p. 5.
4 See, for instance, 'Editorial: Acertos a Fazer no 
MERCOSUL', Gazeta Mercantil. 31 July-2 August 1993; 
'Brasileiros e Argentinos Discutem na Quarta-Feira Imposigao 
de Salvaguardas', Gazeta Mercantil. 24 July-26 July 1993; 
'Itamaraty Vai Consultar Setor Textil Para Avaliar Perdas 
Com Novas Tarifas', Gazeta Mercantil. 04 August 1993.
5 Cf. 'Paraguay Talks of Leaving MERCOSUR', RS, 93-03, 
16 April 1993.
6 The Industrial Union of Argentina (UIA) was reported 
to feel 'harassed by the competition from Brazilian products 
favoured by Brazil's recession and exchange advantages'. Cf. 
'Argentina Interested in NAFTA Links', RS,92-09. The 
Argentine industrialists called for the postponement of the 
December 1994 deadline for the completion of the trade 
liberalisation process. Cf. 'MERCOSUL', Gazeta Mercantil. 1
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lack of coordination in the management of the exchange rate 
have led Argentina to adopt measures that goes against the 
MERCOSUR programme of trade liberalisation.
If the need to stick to the rigid norm of the
convertibility plan unleashed protectionist forces in 
Argentina, the threaten to the MERCOSUR timetable in Brazil 
comes from her interest in protecting strategic industrial 
activities. It was already shown that Brazil was much more 
successful than Argentina in preserving metal-mechanical and 
electro-mechanical activities in the eighties and that this 
led Brazil to ask for a relatively higher common external 
tariff than that preferred by Argentina, Paraguay and
Uruguay. This represented the end of the ' shared
industrialisation' project of the PICE period, which was 
aimed at the recovering the capital goods sector in both 
countries. The fact that the sectors left outside the common 
market until 2006 are critical in terms of the diffusion of 
technology and the creation of externalities suggests that 
differences in perspectives will need to be worked out in 
order to advance in the process of sub-regional integration.
The problems associated with macroeconomic divergences 
and asymmetrical preferences on industrial structures 
heighten the role to be played by sectoral and technological 
cooperation. Common efforts for enhancing competitiveness 
are necessary to reduce the stimulus for protection stemming 
from an overvalued exchange rate. There exists an 
association among these three variables - exchange rate
September 1993, p.3.
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policy, openness and sectoral cooperation. Only a sharp 
increase in productivity would compensate exporters for the 
loss in price competitiveness due to the exchange rate 
policy. But the liberalisation drive of the eighties has not 
been accompanied by the reinforcement of state capabilities 
to promote structural change. The MERCOSUR has given 
important steps in the correct direction, but keeping the 
momentum of liberalisation effort might need a judicious 
stimulus to sectoral cooperation after 1994.
So far, orthodox views have engineered the bolder move 
towards trade liberalisation of the early nineties. But the 
perception that this may not be enough is growing and no set 
of ideas shaping a new response to the problem of 
competitiveness has become dominant *. It should also be 
recalled that heterodox and orthodox views have different 
weight in Brazil and Argentina - this in part a reflection 
of the different set of industrial interests in each 
country. Therefore, the lack of a consensual basis upon 
which to devise the policy of cooperation aggravates the 
problem of diverging views on international specialisation. 
This can limit the process of learning and institutional 
change in the MERCOSUR.
The factors shaping the MERCOSUR regime are summarized 
in charter VII.2, that presents the association between 
structures, ideas and institutions from 1960.
1 The ECLA proposal of 'structural competitiveness' has 
not acquired the influence that the ECLA industrialisation 
project had in the fifties. Cf. Octavio Rodrigues, former 
ECLA Professor, interview. Montevideo, July 1993.
449
CHARTER VII.2. Structures. Ideas and Institutions from 1960
Variables/Period 1960-1980 From 1981
Structural
Variables
Changes in 
the
international
system
Multilateral
trade
liberalisat.
for
manufactures; 
growth of 
international 
trade (60s); 
weak
insertion in 
the GATT 
system; 
expansion of 
private 
external 
credit (70s); 
reduced 
systemic 
constraints 
on policy.
Weakening of 
the GATT 
system; 
external debt 
crisis; 
acceleration 
of
technological 
change; 
globalisation 
and new 
regionalism; 
high systemic 
constraints 
on policy; 
Impact of the 
EAI (?)
Changes in 
the domestic 
economy
Maturation of 
ISI-2; slow 
industrial 
learning, 
especially in 
the metal- 
mechanical 
sectors; 
growing 
intra­
industry 
trade; 
regional 
rivalry.
Restructuring 
for trade 
liberalisat.; 
contraction 
or stagnation 
of electro­
mechanical 
sectors; 
intra­
industry 
trade in the 
region; 
regional 
cooperation 
encouraged by 
democratic 
regimes.
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Ideas Adaptation: 
ad hoc
protection in 
face of BOP 
difficulties 
and private 
sector 
pressures
Learning (?):
orthodox
ideas
instrumental 
for trade 
liberali­
sation in the 
80s. New 
industrialist 
syntheses in 
the nineties 
('structural 
competitive­
ness' ) (?) .
Institutions Restrained 
regionalism; 
failure of 
LAFTA.
Transition 
towards the 
sub-regional 
MERCOSUR 
regime; weak 
LAIA but 
growing 
interest in a 
regional 
approach.
It can be observed that the regime of restrained 
regionalism appears associated with the expansion of the 
international economy and a 'loose' Latin American insertion 
in the multilateral GATT regime. The economic 
complementarity and trade preferences associated with 
industrial learning in this period sustained a limited level 
of cooperation in the region, which also presented common 
demands for a special and preferential treatment in the 
GATT. Constraints on policy-making were less severe than in 
the late fifties and no stimulus to 'surrender' sovereignty 
existed, aggravated by regional power rivalry. This led to 
a regime of restrained regionalism, in which preferences 
were extended to several industrial goods, but cooperation 
could not progress towards a free trade area and
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coordination in trade, technology and exchange policies.
Conversely, international conditions became less 
favourable from 1982. The weakening of the GATT, the 
emergence of the new regionalism and the debt crisis in 
Latin America prompted a defensive move towards cooperation. 
To this the return of democracy in Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay made a significant contribution. In addition, the 
rapid move towards trade liberalisation boosted regional 
liberalisation and encouraged new forms of cooperation, like 
policy coordination and restructuring for competition in the 
world economy. If it is unlikely that the achievements of 
the MERCOSUR would be reversed in the future, the lack of a 
shared view on industrial competitiveness, the vulnerability 
of the stabilisation programmes to changes in the 
international economy, and the potential impacts of the EAI 
on intra-Latin American relations still place a challenge 
for the advance of the process of sub-regional integration.
II.3. Conclusions
1. The revival of regional integration took shape in 
the 1980-89 period in a set of bilateral agreements which 
sought to encourage trade in agricultural and industrial 
products, facilitate the recover of the capital goods sector 
and promote the diffusion of technology in 'strategic' 
areas, like biotechnology and nuclear energy. It was a 
selective, state oriented process, based on the old
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mechanism of product-by-product negotiations and which 
relied (in the case of capital of goods) in government 
purchases. Despite that the programme faced increasing 
difficulties in the late eighties, the PICE placed bilateral 
relations in a new phase of cooperation, that culminated 
with the 1988 Treaty of Integration.
2. Since 1990, Presidents Collor and Menem reduced 
drastically the timetable for trade liberalisation and 
adopted an automatic mechanism for reducing tariffs. This 
marked a new phase which, on the basis of the previous 
agreements and the expansion of trade then achieved, sought 
to accelerate the process of integration and curb the 
bureaucratic obstacles that the former system implied. 
Concurrently, emphases began to be given to problems of 
policy coordination, especially as regards fluctuations in 
the exchange rate, which had generated friction in the 
previous three years. If the results have been impressive in 
the liberalisation front, cooperation for macroeconomic 
coordination and sectoral restructuring has not advanced 
accordingly. This, along with the definition of the 
institutional framework of MERCOSUR, would shape the ability 
of the MERCOSUR to become an instrument for the integration 
of Latin America in the world economy.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. The principal initiatives for integration of the 
period 1939-92 emerged in a context of external 
difficulties. The Pinedo-Aranha project of 1939 was prompted 
by the prospects of war in Europe which, especially in the 
case of Argentina, made necessary the diversification of 
international economic relations. The proposal for 'economic 
union' led by Per6n in 1953-54 was related to the 
difficulties posed by the 'dollar shortage', the Argentine 
1952 crisis and the experience of the US economic boycott. 
In the late fifties, the creation of LAFTA was associated 
with external imbalances and the perception of marked 
asymmetries in the post-war international system (which the 
return to convertibility in Europe had consolidated), 
heightened by the 'developmentalist' project for rapid 
industrialisation. Finally, the revival of integration in 
1986 was related to constraints on growth, investment and 
policy occasioned by the debt crisis. Integration was also 
stimulated by the impact of the new protectionism and 
'minilateralism' on the region's international position. 
Thus, the four major initiatives for economic integration 
were proposed in a context in which international economic 
events constrained growth and the ability to formulate 
development policies.
In addition, domestic economic transformation also 
shaped the incentives for cooperation and integration. 
Economic complementarity between Argentina and Brazil in
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agricultural production provided a siginificant initial 
basis for trade and cooperation. Subsequently, the advance 
of the process of industrialisation expanded the scope for 
trade and the gains to be obtained through regional 
specialisation and intra-industry trade. This process 
sustained an interest in regional trade preferences, even 
when external constraints were eased and governments able to 
pursue unilaterally their preferred policies. The process of 
ISI-2 heightened the costs of national import-substitution 
and provided a stimulus for integration in the late fifties. 
In the sixities the maturation of industry and industrial 
convergence facilitated the growth of regional trade, which 
in turn led to greater efficiency in the manufacturing 
sector. Conversely, divergente patterns of industrial 
transformation from the late seventies redefined interests 
and created friction in economic integration, as the 
objective of 'shared industrialisation' receded and 
Argentine and Brazilian views of multilateral and 
hemispheric liberalisation diverged.
If the move towards regional integration was related to 
external constraints and industrialisation, this was neither 
automatic nor immediate. Domestic politics and ideas played 
a significant role in the timing and form of integration.
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2. The failure of initiatives for economic and 
political reform in Argentina in the early forties (which 
led to the ultra-conservative Patron Costas government and 
the subsequent c o u p  of June 1943) compromised integration by 
raising friction in hemispheric relations. In the same vein, 
the unrelentess opposition of the UDN to Per6n and Vargas 
compromised the ability of Brazil to give a favourable 
response to Argentine proposals for closer cooperation. 
Brazil began to play a more active role in the region only 
when the developmentalist alliance that supported Kubitschek 
was consolidated in the mid-fifties.
It may also be argued that democratic regimes favour 
economic integration in Latin America. Military governments 
tended to be more concerned with geopolitics while 
democratic regimes tended to give more attention to welfare. 
If the Pindo-Aranha initiative was launched by authoritarian 
governments, this occurred in the context of efforts to 
liberalise the political regime in Argentina. Rapid progress 
towards cooperation (leading to the creation of LAFTA) 
occured during the democratic governments of Kubitschek and 
Quadros/Goulart in Brazil and Frondizi in Argentina. The 
links between democracy and regional integration were 
especially clear in the rapprochement of the Sarney and 
Alfonsin governments in 1986, which explicitly sought to 
create a framework of regional stability, conducive for the 
consolidation of the democratisation processes. In addition, 
military views of foreign relations tended to be dominated 
by a Cold War perspective which looked suspiciously at
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'autonomist' positions in the international system. Even for 
democratic governments this was a divisive issue, and 
cooperation between Frondizi and Quadros had to confront 
opposition from those (especially in Argentina) who feared 
the adoption of a 'neutralist' policy.
3. New ideas were a significant variable in the 
initiatives for integration. When Pinedo launched his plan, 
including closer cooperation with Brazil, he relied on the 
'learning' of the thirties, when his main advisers evolved 
from an orthodox position to a view which favoured a more 
active role for the state. Subsequently, ECLA was a catalyst 
in the formation of LAFTA, as it facilitated the convergence 
of perspectives on industrialisation amongst Latin America 
countries and offered a way out of the crisis in regional 
trade. More recently, orthodox ideas were instrumental in 
the successful move to a customs union in the MERCOSUR. 
These ideas facilitated the liberalisation of trade and 
(recently) the convergence of macroeconomic policies. 
However, tensions between stability and long term 
equilibrium in the balance of payments are visible, and it 
is not unlikely that a new approach, more favourable to a 
judicious role of the state in restructuring, will emerge in 
the future.
The role of ideas as a force for change has to be seen 
in the context of politics. When the Traty for Progressive 
Free Trade was launched in 1941, vested interests in
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industrial protection were not significant and the Pinedo- 
Aranha initiative could stress 'openness' in the process of 
integration. On the other hand, when ECLA launched its 
proposals, the objective was to curb indiscriminate 
protection. The cautious integration process that emerged in 
the sixities was intended to reduce the inefficiency of ISI. 
Its contrbution to regional trade, if not negligible, did 
not lead to a substantial reduction in barriers to intra- 
regional trade. Vested interests, created by ISI, had become 
too powerful and were an important element of the dominant 
political coallition of the sixities.
The revival of orthodoxy in Latin America was in part 
a reaction to the indiscriminate protection of ther past. 
But it should also be seen in the light of the challenge 
posed by the weakening of the public sector in the eighties. 
It is not clear in this sense whether Latin American 
orthodoxy is a real theoretical conversion or the 
understanding that the state is in bankrupticy and that 
private capital is now so 'internationalised' and 'liquid' 
that there is no space to pursue dirigiste policies. If the 
current stabilisation programmes in Argentina and Brazil 
succeed in restoring the financial position of the public 
sector, the space for the debate of ideas and policy 
innovation will broaden in Latin America.
It is within this space formed by political alliances 
and ideas that the impact of structural variables on 
regional integration and cooperation should be studied. 
Structural variables can give an idea about how interests
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are shaped and the possible courses of action for states and 
political coallitions. But the adjustment of policies to 
international conditions can experience substantial delays 
and 'deviations' from the point of view of a 'rational' 
observer. Structural models are a useful starting point, but 
they need to be revisited in the light of a careful study of 
the political setting and the ideas shaping the 'strategies' 
of the 'game'. Politics and ideas are path-dependent and may 
not be easily adapted to structural change (which is 
frequently exogenous from the point of view of the 
peripheral economies). Moreover, once the behaviour of the 
actor moved away from a 'rational' decision, it changed 
structures and redefine the nature of the problem.
This can be illustrated by the cases of Argentine-US 
relations in 1942-55 and Brazil-US relations in 1946-52. 
Argentina and the USA faced a history of trade and political 
friction which complicated the Argentine adjustment to US 
hegemony. The process of adjustment was difficult because 
Latin American perceptions of the new international setting 
evolved slowly while political change was dramatic. Few 
policy-makers comprehended the nature of these events. 
President Dutra continued the foreign policy of Vargas, 
apparently unaware that Brazil's position in the 
international system had changed after the war. In the early 
years of his second government, Vargas also seemed to be 
unaware of these new conditions.
The policies followed by Argentina in the forties and 
Brazil in the early post-war period were more than temporary
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'deviations' in the transition towards the kind of behaviour 
and outcomes predicted by structural models. 'Wrong' 
decisions redefined the nature of the problems. The failure 
to set up a free trade area in 1939-41 implied that when 
this initiative was relaunched in 1958-60, unilateral ISI 
had already made significant advances in each country and 
the domestic political economy had been redefined in favour 
of protectionism.
4. Politics and ideas are articulated in policies. This 
articulation may in some cases adopt the form of 
institutions which shape policy decisions and negotiations. 
Institutions are rules of behaviour which, given a context 
of inter-dependence of decisions, permit the players to 
achieve a better outcome (or avoid a worse outcome) than if 
they had acted unilaterally. The concept of regime was used 
in this work to give a systematic account of the conventions 
regulating bilateral and regional trade, to provide a 
hierarchy of conventions (principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures) and to distinguish minor 
(changes within a regime) from major transformations 
(changes of regime) in trade realtions.
Institutions can be seen as 'dependent' and 
'intervening' variables. They are dependent variables in the 
sense that they reflect the structure of incentives for 
cooperation and hence condense the impact of the variables 
mentioned above - structures, politics and ideas. Three 
different regimes were identified, corresponding to a
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certain combination of these variables, namely restrained 
bilateralism, restrained regionalism or LAFTA regime, and 
the transitional MERCOSUR regime towards 'open' sub-regional 
(and, perhaps, regional) integration. The moment in wich the 
new regimes emerged corresponded to large changes in the 
underlying variables - the beginning of Second World War, 
the return to convertibility, the debt crisis, and the 
impact of ISI-2.
But the formation of regimes also implied establishing 
a path of cooperation which would continue after the 
'normalisation' of the exceptional context that had prompted 
their creation. If LAFTA was created when Latin American 
terms of trade were deteriorating and balance of payments 
difficulties increasing, it survived into the sixties when 
external conditions eased, and made a significant 
contribution to the growth of regional exports. If capital 
flows in the seventies accomodated the ambitious unilateral 
strategies of restructuring adopted by Argentina and Brazil 
thereby leading to a fall in the intensity of cooperation, 
the accumulated experience of the LAFTA years and the 
framework provided by LAIA would allow for an impressive 
recovery of cooperation in the mid-eighties. If the revival 
of capital inflows in the nineties reversed the balance of 
payments difficulties that had encouraged the rapprochement 
of Argentina and Brazil in the eighties, the process 
initiated by Alfonsin and Sarney in 1985, and consolidated 
in 1988 and 1990, gave added impetus to cooperation and 
sustained its momentum when macroeconomic strategies
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diverged. Clearly, in all cases the intensity of cooperation 
diminished when domestic and international conditions 
favoured unilateral policies. Nevertheless, even if early 
integration experiments failed to realise their full 
potential, or were frustrated, subsequent trade regimes 
started from a higher threshold, building on previous 
experiences and learning from past failures. In this sense, 
institutions were an intervening variable that allowed for 
the continuity of the achievements obtained during periods 
of close cooperation. As a link between the past and the 
future, instituions embody some degree of inertia. This 
enabled to play a role in shaping regional trade, and 
conferred on them a degree of autonomy.
5. The achievements of the MERCOSUR in the past four 
years are outstanding. In particular, cooperation has 
continued to progress despite the fact that centrifugal 
forces are stronger than in the past. Industrial divergence 
and the potential disruptive impact of the EAI, which might 
trigger individual negotiation with the USA, have not 
weakened the integration process.
So far, the MERCOSUR has overcome tensions associated 
with macroeconomic divergences and it is likely that the 
stabilisation of the Brazilian economy will cement trade and 
investment interests, thereby sustaining the momentum of 
cooperation. Although the economic strategies in Argentina 
and Brazil differ, integration can still play a significant
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role in both countries. The regional market can play a role 
in facilitating restructuring towards a new form of 
insertion in the international economy for the two 
countries. A new strategy for reducing tariff barriers has 
been successfuly applied and this may indicate a commitmment 
to complete a cutoms union. However, the institutions of the 
MERCOSUR are yet to be constructed and much greater effort 
will be required to coordinate macroeconomic, indudstrial 
and social policies. This will be the next test for this 
remarkable experiment in sub-regional economic integration.
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